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C. JULIUS CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
Wars in Gaul,  
AND  
Civil War with Pompey.

To which is added,

A SUPPLEMENT to his Commentary of his  
WARS in GAUL;

As also, COMMENTARIES of the Alexandrian,  
African, and Spanish Wars,

By AULUS HIRTIUS, or OPPIUS, &c.

WITH THE AUTHOR'S LIFE.

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Adorn'd with SCULPTURES from the DESIGNS of  
the famous PALLADIO.

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Made English from the Original Latin,  
By Col. MARTIN BLADEN.

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THE SEVENTH EDITION, revised and corrected.

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With NOTES explaining the most difficult Passages, an Index of  
the Ancient and Modern Names of Places, and DIONYSIUS  
VOSSIUS's Supplement collected from PLUTARCH, APPIAN,  
DION, &c. which makes a Connection between the Wars in  
Gaul and Civil War with POMPEY.

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L O N D O N,

Printed for J. and P. KNAPTON, in *Ludgate-street*; S. BIRT, in  
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hill*, opposite the *Royal Exchange*.

MDCCL;

# EXCELLENCE TO HIS



I get the same unavoidable necessity that  
 obliged the King of Spain to put his sword  
 into your GRACE's hands, forces me to lay  
 down at your feet. I should the  
 greatest Hero of his age have recourse to but  
 the Greatest of ours, V. M. S. Duke of  
 Orléans, but I wished inclination to prompt me  
 to the choice, but I relented my officious zeal  
 should

TO HIS  
EXCELLENCY

JOHN,

Duke of MARLBOROUGH,

*Marquess of Blandford, Earl of Marlborough,  
Baron CHURCHILL of Sandridge and Aumouth,  
Captain General of all her Majesty's Forces,  
one of the Lords of her Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council,  
Knight of the most Noble Order of the Garter,  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from her Majesty to the United Provinces,  
Prince of the Empire, and General of the Confederate Armies, &c.*

S I R,

I Persuade myself your GRACE will pardon this presumption, when You shall consider, the same unavoidable necessity that obliged the King of Spain to put his sword into your GRACE's hands, forces me to lay CÆSAR at your feet. For who should the greatest Hero of his age have recourse to, but the Greatest of ours? Whose protection should CÆSAR court, but the victorious Duke of MARLBOROUGH's?

Not that I wanted inclination to prompt me to the choice; but I resolved my officious zeal should



## DEDICATION.

should not offend your GRACE, before I could bring an offering that might atone for the intrusion: 'till then, I was not content, with the rest of mankind, silently to adore your GRACE's virtues; and return heaven thanks for blessing You with the success, your Royal Mistress's cause, and your own merits deserved.

Often have I wished in vain, that nature had blessed me with a genius, fit to record the noble actions your GRACE has done in defence of Europe; that I could oblige posterity with so grateful a character, to whom so many after ages shall hold themselves indebted for liberty; that I could describe your GRACE's moderation, wisdom, generosity, justice, mercy, your conduct, and your courage; an equal mixture of the hero and the christian. But, alas! the attempt were as vain as glorious; PHAETON like, I should tumble from the heaven I soared to, and convince mankind, my affection was greater than my power, my ambition than my prudence. Here, would the censorious say, lies the man, who essayed to draw the MIGHTY CAPTAIN, that he might set his own name at the bottom of the picture, and erect an eternal monument for himself, by being attendant on so great a person.

But as CÆSAR thought no body so proper to write his actions as himself; so your GRACE being best acquainted with your own wise counsels, deep designs, and happy executions, can best describe the battles You have fought, the victories you have gained, the sieges You have formed, and the towns You have taken; nor were a less person worthy of the office.

And

## DEDICATION.

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And certainly CÆSAR, who writ as well as he fought, gave proofs of his wisdom in leaving these Commentaries, where his pen has engraven the conquests his sword atchieved: a truth the great HENRY the fourth of France was sensible of, when he translated this book, and designed to copy after it. Had ALEXANDER taken the same care, many of those actions which now pass for fables, might have met with credit, when related with greater modesty: but the present accounts we have of his exploits seem wholly poetical, stuffed with Greek hyperboles; and his character, with that of CYRUS, appear ideas for forming the minds of young princes, perfect TELEMACHUS's to teach monarchs what they should be, rather than what others really were. But CÆSAR, who was not inferior to ALEXANDER in virtue, equalled him in success, and far excelled him in conduct.

From your GRACE's memoirs the world might expect an impartial account of the three last campaigns; of the sieges of Bonn, Limburgh, and Liege, of the glorious and successful attempt at Schellenberg, and of that unparallel'd action at Blenheim; where the Bavarians strove in vain to blast brave Prince EUGENE's Italian lawrels, whilst united vigour forced them to retreat. The engineers, ashamed to see their party fly, resolved richly to vindicate the loss of lives innumerable, by taking Yours: but the guardian angel, whom heaven appointed to protect your person, taught even bullets to pay your GRACE all awful deference, and glide submissively between your horse's legs.

Here the eyes of all Europe were fix'd upon your GRACE, for the fate of the Empire de-

pended on your sword, which effected wonders; yet nothing less would have answered the expectations the world had from your management. Reading therefore the journals of this happy day, when from your all-conquering arm France received so fatal a blow, and the Danube gained a more glorious name than Simois, or Scamander, from the fate of many thousands, whom your GRACE dispatch'd to carry news of your victory to the other world, future ages shall break out into that rapture, with the polite and judicious PATERCULUS, *Circa Blenheim vero, tantæ res gestæ, quantas audere, vix hominis; perficere, nullius certe nisi Dei!* Then comparing your GRACE's actions with those of CÆSAR, confess You wanted nothing but the same independent command of an army, to have rendered You equal with him in renown. For as ALEXANDER fought with an effeminate people, so CÆSAR encountered the Gauls when unexperienced, though a warlike nation: but your GRACE has engaged and defeated them, with their best allies, after they were grown old in arms, had been inured to perpetual camps and sieges, and long renowned for the most expert soldiers in Christendom.

This defeat then, the most intire one France has received since our Black Prince led their Flower-de-luce captive into England, his Imperial Majesty and all mankind agree was as much owing to your GRACE's conduct as your courage; a virtue always preferred by CÆSAR to the latter, witness his speech to his soldiers in Spain, when he declined fighting AFRANIUS upon advantage, where his mercy shined as conspicuously as your GRACE's at Liege.

Yet

Yet thus far success attended HANNIBAL, 'till the rout of AMILIUS, and the dreadful slaughter at Cannæ made the Capitol tremble: but here, for want of conduct, she deserted him, leaving his name a proverb to posterity: Hannibal knew how to win, he knew not to improve a victory." Flush'd with the pride of conquest, he vainly thought he had already raised the common wealth of Carthage above that of Rome: empty applause, trophies engrossed his every thought; so intent was the African upon the action past, he could not afford one moment to reflect on accidents that might hereafter happen.

Not so your GRACE, whose deeper judgment, loyal zeal, and charitable care for Europe, taught You to pursue your fortune, whilst by your composure, and wondrous sedateness, a stranger would have judg'd your GRACE had been the conquered, not the conqueror. From such elevated, such more than human minds, the Grecians cull'd the choicest attributes to deck their heathen deities: hence they inform us, when their Jove had thunderstruck the rebellious sons of earth, that aspired to dethrone him; as much unmoved with victory as with their insolence before, retiring to his cabinet, he meditated good to this inferior orb.

But whither will the delightful subject hurry me? I forget, whilst I thus detain your GRACE, I am sinning against the publick; that whilst I attempt to do You justice, I offend your modesty; and that my utmost endeavours cannot add a single spark to your GRACE's lustre, whose surprising virtues have placed you as far above the reach of praise as envy. Let me therefore,



## DEDICATION.

Sir, only beg you would graciously please to accept this translation, as an earnest of my most profound respect.

So may those powers that have already made your name immortal, long preserve your GRACE's life for the universal good of mankind: long may the QUEEN be blessed in such a subject, England in such a General; may constant success attend your GRACE's ensigns; still may You continue the Darling of Europe, and the Terror of France.

*I am,*  
**SIR,**

**Your GRACE's**

*Most Obedient, most Devoted,*

*And most Humble Servant,*

**MARTIN BLADEN.**

# TO THE READER.

**S**O much of this book as **CÆSAR** writ himself, was translated into English, and illustrated with notes by **MR. EDMUNDS**, for the use of Prince **HENRY**, the hopes of our nation, in the reign of King **JAMES** the first: and whether the difficulty of the work, or the disadvantage of coming after so great a man, has prevented others from attempting a new version, I know not; but no body hitherto has obliged the world with an essay of this nature.

These reasons, I must confess, with the trouble of the various lections, the impossibility of expounding the ancient names in some places with modern, and adjusting military terms to the taste of such readers as have not been versed in Roman history, almost discouraged me from venturing upon a task, wherein I had not the vanity to expect applause, whilst I run so apparent a hazard of exposing my weakness to an age that never accepts the intention for the deed. But when I reflected how much more correct the laborious criticks have made our author, and how many improvements our native tongue has received since **MR. EDMUNDS**'s time, I thought **CÆSAR** in a modern style might not be an ungrateful present to such as either do not understand, or are not willing to give themselves the trouble of reading the Latin. Nor was this the only cause that moved me to the undertaking; for, comparing the old English with the original, I found there were several gross errors,  
such

such as applying the actions of one side in a battle to the contrary party; with other trifling mistakes, almost in every page; which I rather attribute to the printer, the edition the book was translated from, or the defect of our language in those days, than to Mr. EDMUNDS's, whose notes sufficiently prove he wanted neither judgment nor learning.

And indeed 'tis a melancholy thought, to reflect with Mr. WALLER and DRYDEN, what strange revolutions our language has suffered; whilst a modern Frenchman may yet understand the barbarous jargon our Law-Reports are penned in, the lasting remembrancers of our Norman slavery; and PETRARCH still speaks good Italian, though CHAUCER, who died sixty-six years after him, must have a Saxon or Scotch commentator to make him intelligible. Yet, on the other hand, when I consider to how vast a degree of politeness those two incomparable masters, the present Bishop of Rochester and Sir ROGER L'ESTRANGE, have arrived, I cannot help thinking they have saved the kingdom the expence of an academy, and brought us to that perfection our neighbours so much boast of. Our language at present is full, elegant, and expressive; our very news-mongers write better now than the most renowned authors about a century ago; and except one or two vulgar errors, it will be difficult to instance any thing in familiar discourse that clashes with grammar. If we are not altogether so happy as other nations in a natural turn and cadence; one advantage I am sure we have to value ourselves upon, which will more than ballance that defect; that as the mild punishments inflicted by the laws are an argument of our native honesty, our language is no less: we have no ambiguous words, nay, the marshalling of them

*Vid.* EDMUNDS's translation, Book V. of the Wars in Gaul, chap. 6. line 13. of the first column. *Ibid.* Civil Wars, Book III. chap. 22. col. 2. from line 22. to 36, &c.

does

does not admit of a double meaning. Thus the traitor, who gave that oraculous advice about king EDWARD the second, *Edvardum occidere noli timere bonum est*, was obliged to travel beyond the limits of his country for the expression.

Mr. EDMUNDS's remarks on CÆSAR's Commentaries, it must be confessed, are very just; but every age has the advantage of the former, and the ingenious Mr. KENNETT has far out-done all that have gone before him on the subject of antiquities. His short, but comprehensive chapter of the Roman Art of War, may make any person a compleat master of that learning, and serve for a comment to explain such things in the following history, as to the English reader appear not intelligible: for though VEGETIUS, LIPSIUS, and some others, are very voluminous upon this point, yet our countryman has omitted nothing necessary to be known.

'Tis fit I should acquaint you, I chiefly made use of VOSSIUS's edition<sup>b</sup>, which the learned take to be one of the most correct. But I must own, for the business of various readings, I have generally followed my own judgment, proceeding upon this maxim, That CÆSAR could not write nonsense. Therefore wherever the text was inconsistent with reason or connexion, though others have not, I have taken the liberty to alter it. But on the other hand, I did not think it worth my while to enter into disputes about derivations, whence CÆSAR had his name, whence the ancient Druids theirs, from Hebrew, Greek, or Welsh; nor yet, whether the epistle CÆSAR sent QUINTUS TULLIUS CICERO, when besieged by the Gauls, was writ in private characters, or Grecian letters: enquiries of this nature I refer to those Gentlemen, who have more leisure and curiosity than I. For in my opinion,

<sup>b</sup> In this edition of the translation, not only Vossius's division into chapters has been followed, but the more common one into sections, after Davies, Jurin, &c.



## TO THE READER.

whoever makes a progress in speculations of this kind, when he appears in publick, will convince the world he has mispent abundance of time; and whilst he endeavours to shew his reading, betrays his want of judgment.

CÆSAR writ no more of these Commentaries than the seven first books of his exploits in Gaul, with those other three of the Civil Wars: for the eighth book of the Gallic, the Alexandrian, African and Spanish wars, were supplied by other hands, whether AULUS HIRTIUS Pansa, or OPPILIUS, imports not the reader much to know. All, except the Spanish memoirs, are very well penned, though not comparable to CÆSAR's style: but for the last, 'tis difficult to determine whether they were more barbarously written, or carelessly transcribed; any man may soon discover, they owe their original to a different hand from the rest. RHELIANUS, who is as wretched a commentator as the other a writer, attributes this single book to OPPILIUS, the rest to HIRTIUS: but I am rather inclined to believe it belonged to some more modern author, who had the vanity to think future ages might mistake his spurious issue for CÆSAR's; for he awkwardly apes him, uses the words *nos* and *nostri* upon all occasions, to make himself a party to the action, which HIRTIUS seldom or never does; and in the description of a bridge cross the Guadalquivir, seems to refer to that of CÆSAR over the Rhine, by these words, *ut supra scripsimus*, as we have already taken notice. All, but this worthy piece, have since been added at different times to M. EDMUNDS's work: and indeed it has nothing to recommend it to the publick, but that it contains part of CÆSAR's actions: for the text is so strangely mangled and corrupt, I was frequently obliged to make both the original and the version too.

'Tis the duty of every translator strictly to adhere at least to his author's meaning, if not his words; for the latter of these the various idiom of languages sometimes

sometimes will not admit of, and he who endeavours to turn a book *verbatim*, may be esteemed an able grammarian, but he will meet with very few readers. On the other hand, I am by no means for allowing so great a liberty as Monsieur D'ABLANCOURT has taken; such as transposing whole paragraphs, leaving out sentences, inserting periods, and (if I may be allowed to say it of so learned a man) mistaking others. For though all versions fall short of the excellence of their original, yet he who renders a book into his native language, should consider he is only accountable for his own, not for his author's failings. To me it appears very strange, that French Gentleman, who has assumed so great a freedom in other places, should be so extremely modest where necessity and even CÆSAR's meaning required he should be otherwise.

Thus our author, describing the customs of the Germans, tells us, pag. 163. *Qui diutissime impuberes permanserunt, maximam inter suos ferunt laudem: hoc alii staturam, alii vires, nervosque confirmari putant. Intra annum vero xx feminae notitiam habuisse, in turpissimis habent rebus.* Thus turned by Monsieur D'ABLANCOURT. *C'est une bonte parmi eux d'avoir la compagnie des femmes avant l'âge de vingt ans, & ils estiment beaucoup ceux qui sont long-temps sans avoir le barbe, parce qu'ils croient, que par ce moyen ils ont plus de taille & plus de force & de vigueur.*—Thus by Mr. EDMUNDS: “Such as continue longest beardless are most commended amongst them: for this some think to be very available to their stature, others to their strength and sinews. They hold it a most dishonest part, for one to touch a woman before he is twenty years of age.”

Here the reader may please to remark, both these Gentlemen are strangely mistaken in the meaning of the word *impuberes*, which in this place signifies not beardless, but virgins: to render

der it otherwise were to make CÆSAR contradict all other naturalists, who esteem hair an argument of strength, and inform us, that too early a knowledge of women relaxes the nerves, and spoils our growth: therefore I would translate it thus; "They esteem those men the most, who have lived the longest virgins; which they believe contributes to their growth, vigour, and the strengthening of their nerves; but nothing is thought so ignominious amongst them, as to know a woman before they have passed the twentieth year of their age."

Next, for the proper names, I have consulted several authors, as OLIVER, SCALIGER, ORTELIUS, but chiefly Monsieur SANSON, Geographer to the present French King, whom one might reasonably expect to have found infallible in the chart of his own country: but towns have frequently changed not only their names, but even their situations; this therefore may excuse what errors he has been guilty of, together with the ambition of confuting an opponent, which upon some occasions would not allow him leisure to reflect before he resolved.

I will give you two instances: Uxellodunum, say ORTELIUS and SCALIGER, is Usseldon in Quercy; but SANSON will have it to be Cahors, because, it seems, there are several of the same distinguishing marks to be met with there, which occur in CÆSAR's description of this place, as the mount, the fountain, &c. But so long as all mankind agree there are still exactly the same to be seen at Usseldon, methinks the affinity of the name might have decided the question in favour of the latter. Another of his arguments seems to run thus *Civitas Cadurcorum*, in CÆSAR's time, meant the capital of Quercy, which is now called Cahors, as appears by the *Notitia* of the provinces; whereas in fact, SCALIGER's *Notitia Gallie* calls *Cahors*, *Episcopus Cadurcensis*, and *Divona Cadurcorum*.

Besides,

Besides, granting so large a *Postulatum*, it were no difficult matter to prove York and Aldborough to be the very same place; for Isuvium, or Aldborough, was the capital of that part of England, before York was founded.

But the other is more palpable than this. SCALIGER and ORTELIVS affirm Metiosedum to be the same with Melodunum, the more modern name of the two for Melun, which lies upon the banks of the Sein, between Sens and Paris. But SANSON says this Metiosedum is another town, which he calls Meudon, about four miles below Paris. The reasons he gives are taken from chap. 27. book viii. of the wars in Gaul, where you may observe LABIENUS designing to secure his retreat from Sens to Paris, commanded the Roman knights to fall about four miles down the river, with the ships he brought from Melun, and expect him there: five cohorts he left in his camp; five more with the baggage he sent up the river; and ordered a parcel of cock-boats to row the same way with as much noise as possible, to alarm the Gauls: Who, upon advice of these motions, likewise divided their forces into three parts; one body they left over-against the Roman camp; *Et parva manu Metiosedum versus missa, quæ tantum progredere-  
quantum naves processissent, &c.* "And detaching a small party towards Metiosedum, with orders to advance as far as the ships were gone before, &c." From hence, says he, it plainly appears Metiosedum cannot be Melun, because the ships fell down the river four miles lower than Paris, whereas Melun lies up the river.

So great a veneration have I for Monsieur SANSON's character, had he positively affirmed this, without giving his reasons, in the Dissertation upon his map of old Gaul, I might have paid an implicit faith to his skill; for my logick taught me so much complaisance to every artist in the way of his own profession. But it happens very unfor-



unfortunately, the next sentence should confute him; *Reliquas copias contra LABIENUM duxerunt*: "They marched with the rest of their forces against LABIENUS;" who was actually with the ships in person, before the legions crossed the river; therefore granting what he says, either the Gauls three parties were dwindled into two, or he has divided LABIENUS and his legions, after CÆSAR joined them.

§ 61.

The stress of his argument you may perceive depends upon the word *naves*, which CÆSAR has indifferently made use of in both places; whereas he expressly calls the vessels that rowed upwards *lintres*, cock-boats. But had Monsieur SANSON given himself the trouble of looking a little further backward, I am persuaded he would have changed his opinion; for CÆSAR says expressly in the chapter before, Metiosedum is a town in the country of Sens; and then it is impossible Paris could lie between that and Sens; for though these two were once united, yet in CÆSAR's time they were different states. Besides, the same chapter tells us, LABIENUS was then come immediately thither from Sens; but finding he could not get over the morass about Paris, returned the same way he came, and surprized Metiosedum upon his march; which plainly demonstrates that town must lie between Paris and Sens.

§ 58. MSS.  
Melodun-  
num.

Had he only considered the propriety of that phrase, where CÆSAR says, after LABIENUS had rebuilt the bridge at Metiosedum<sup>c</sup>, he marched from thence *secundo flumine*, or with the stream, towards Paris, he could not have been guilty of this mistake. The very same expression is made use of in the directions given the ships, *secundo flumine progredi*, to fall down along with the stream; whereas the cock-boats were to row *adverso flumine*, or against the current. But no wonder CÆSAR should make use of the word *Naves* upon this occasion, to

\* But the MSS. and better Edd. read there *Melodunum*, as<sup>13</sup> observed by Davies, Clarke, &c. and so we have altered it in this Edition.

express the orders given by the Gauls, who might easily mistake the cock-boats in the dark for more considerable vessels, by the noise LABIENUS had commanded them to make.

So much for Monsieur SANSON's opinion, with whom his own countryman D'ABLANCOURT likewise differs; for he translates this place Corbeil, according to MARLIANUS; which I durst not, for fear of offending JOSEPH SCALIGER, who wishes those that mistake Melun for Corbeil, a return of their senses; but this critick was no more burdened with ceremony than his father. I might here take notice, that BUNO's edition of CLUVER, places Mediolanum about four miles below Paris; which name, in my opinion, is much nearer a-kin to the Dauphin's palace at Meudon than Metiosedum: but I have already consumed too much of your time about trifles; so we have but a perfect account of the action, the place is not absolutely material: Besides, for my part, I do not pretend to be a geographer, nor will I ever envy the learned the reputation they may acquire by that study.

For one particular I must not omit to apologize, because I perceive some gentlemen, for whose judgment I have no small esteem, are displeased at it: I have in some places made use of the French terminations for towns and countries out of their dominions, where he have no English, as Bavier instead of Bavaria. But if this be a mistake, I shall freely confess, 'twas a wilful one, for I chose Bavier as the shorter word; and since no body has hitherto naturalized Bavaria, I thought the French came nearer our language than the Latin. Our news-papers, I know, call it Bavaria, but by the same reason they might still write Germania and Hollandia: most gentlemen that have been abroad, save themselves the expence of such unnecessary syllables and the borrowing a word from France, falls not within the lash of the act for prohibition

bition of commerce. I could heartily wish the following sheets were subject to no greater errors; for I have not taken notice of others failings, to make you fancy I have none myself: I am conscious of too many in every kind, which I entirely submit to your mercy, in hopes your good nature will forgive them.



## THE

## Life of Cæsar.

**C**AIUS JULIUS CÆSAR, the son of LUCIUS JULIUS CÆSAR and AURELIA, as he himself informed the Romans in the funeral oration he made upon his aunt, was descended on the father's side from IULUS the son of ÆNEAS; on the mother's, from ANCUS MARTIUS. He was born at Rome during the consulat of C. MARIUS, and L. VALERIUS FLACCUS, on the twelfth of July, A. U. C. 654. of the JULIAN period 4615, and of the world 3851, about ninety-nine years before the birth of our Saviour. His genius proved him worthy the descent; for notwithstanding the difficulties of a narrow fortune, his virtue raised him to that stupendous height, which few have attempted, none arrived at.

He was contracted, whilst a boy, to COSSUTIA, a lady whose family, though far from the meanest, was not comparable to her riches: What reasons induced him to put her away, and take CORNELIA, the daughter of CINNA, in her stead, I do not find: but this action, SÜETONIUS informs us, encreased the hatred SYLLA bore him on the score of his affinity to MARIUS, who married his aunt. At sixteen years of age he lost his father, and the next consulat put up for the office of Flamen Dialis, or High-priest of JUPITER; whether he obtained it, or no, authors differ; SÜETONIUS affirms he did; PLUTARCH says otherwise, whose opinion is much the more likely of the two; for SYLLA, having then the supream power in his hands, might, with less trouble, have prevented CÆSAR's being chosen, than turn him out of the pontificate, after he had once gained it by the suffrages of the people. 'Tis agreed on all hands, this election had like to have proved fatal to him, for his early ambition



ambition roused the dictator's jealousy: the presages he made of him, are very remarkable: "You consider not, said he to the persons that were suiters for CÆSAR's life, and urged the innocence of his youth, that many MARIUS's are in that boy." He therefore was for practising the same sure, but bloody policy with ULYSSES, who after the taking of Troy, cast the young ASTYANAX headlong from a tower. For tyrants are never free, even from needless apprehensions; though this, it must be confessed, was a judgment well grounded, as appeared by the future event.

Thus CÆSAR, though labouring under the misfortune of a quartan ague, was obliged to hide amongst the Sabines, and remove his lodgings every night: yet his utmost caution could not prevent his falling in sometimes with the dictator's parties; but CORNELIUS's good-nature was not proof against the talents he offered for his ransom. Such was the course of CÆSAR's life, till at length SYLLA, yielding to the repeated instances of MAMERCUS ÆMILIUS, AURELIUS COTTA, and the Vestal virgins, vouchsafed him a pardon, though not without the utmost reluctance: "Take, said he, the fatal gift you so earnestly desire; but remember I have foretold you, he will one day prove the ruin of our party." So many hardships did our hero labour under, and so great difficulty was there to preserve his life, whom fate had destined for head of the Roman empire, and lord of many kings.

This concession, in a manner extorted from SYLLA, CÆSAR judged no sufficient security for his person; wherefore so long as the other was in power, he continued at as great a distance from Rome as possible. He served as volunteer in Asia, under THERMUS the prætor, who sent him to Bithynia for the fleet; where he contracted a friendship with king NICOMEDES. Returning from thence, he behaved himself so well at the siege of Mytilene, he obtained a civic crown; nor did he give less proofs of his courage, when under the command of SERVILIUS ISAURICUS in Sicily, the time he remained there, which was only short. For on advice that SYLLA's interest declined, he quitted the camp; but instead of returning to Rome, as his friends desired, took a voyage for Rhodes, where with CICERO he became a hearer of APOLLONIUS, MOLON's son, a great rhetorician; designing to render himself equally famous at the bar, and in the field. In this study he made no indifferent progress; and we may easily con-

clude from the masculine and polite style of his Commentaries, with that admirable speech on CATILINE's conspiracy, recorded by SALUST, he might have rivalled TULLY, had not more important reasons changed the lawyer for the statesman, the orator for the general, arts before as incompatible as empire and liberty, but reconciled in CÆSAR.

In his passage to Rhodes, he was taken by the pirates that infested those seas, who proffered him his liberty for twenty talents; but thinking that sum too small, of his own accord he added thirty more. Dispatching messengers to raise the money, he remained their prisoner forty days, 'till it came, attended only by his physician and two servants. During his stay amongst them, as an argument of his unconcern, he frequently employed his time in making verses and orations, obliged them to be his auditors, and if their want of judgment, or ill-nature, gave him not the praises he deserved, would threaten, in jest, to crucify them, which he afterwards performed in earnest; though then it only passed for raillery, and the effect of juvenile heat.

The first proof he gave of his excellence in speaking, was when he accused DOLABELLA of male-administration in Greece; but lost more by the enemies he made on that occasion, than he gained by the applause. His second attempt, indeed, against PUBLIUS ANTONIUS, for bribery, was more successful: he engaged in this affair to oblige the Grecians, and urged the matter so home before M. LUCULLUS, prætor of Macedonia, the defendant was glad to appeal to the tribunes at Rome. Here likewise CÆSAR acquired great reputation by his address, fluent speech, and easy converse; which did not a little engage the common people in his interest: add to this, his magnificent treats, which so strongly confirmed their affections, their votes always bore witness for their gratitude.

CÆSAR all this while lived far greater than his patrimony could afford, contracted many debts, owed 1300 talents before he obtained any publick office; and his enemies, who reflected not to how great advantage he bestowed his money, did not descry the politician through the prodigal: still in vain they expected when his credit would sink, till he had discharged the most honourable employments in the state, and effectually gained his point, by settling a character for the most generous, best humoured nobleman in Rome.

The first trial he made of his interest, was when he stood with C. POPILIUS for a tribunate of the soldiers, and carried it. Some time after he was chosen quæstor, but that year had the misfortune to lose his aunt JULIA and wife CORNELIA. It had always been the custom to make orations on the decease of grave matrons, but never on young women: CÆSAR, however, took this opportunity to shew the affection he had for his departed lady; and so well was he beloved by the people, they looked upon the innovation as the effect of his tenderness and good-nature. But making the harangue in honour of his aunt's memory, he produced the images of her husband MARIUS, which no body ever had the hardiness to do, since the administration came into SYLLA's hands, who declared MARIUS's party enemies to the state; a politick, bold, and happy attempt; for by this means he revived their drooping hopes, and made himself head of that faction. But CÆSAR knew the posture of affairs was something changed; therefore thought he might safely venture to do his uncle that justice, which he afterwards did his enemy: for when the civil wars were decided, thinking it sufficient revenge to have conquered, he was so far from triumphing over the misfortunes of his rival, he restored those trophies the people had demolished. Upon which occasion CICERO was heard to say, "CÆSAR, by setting up POMPEY's statues, had established his own."

By this time we are to suppose he had arrived at the twenty-fourth year of his life; for not before that age, according to the custom of Rome, was any person capable of discharging the office of quæstor, or treasurer: Now therefore he began to enter upon action. The farther Spain was the theatre, where he attended the prætor FOTUS, and acquitted himself with success; yet beholding the statue of ALEXANDER the great in the temple of HERCULES at Cadiz (whither he went by the prætor's command to hold a convention of the states) he was seized with an extraordinary melancholy, reflecting what an unactive life he had hitherto led; whereas that noble Grecian, by his age, had subdued many nations. Thus as the desire of imitating HERCULES made an ALEXANDER, so that of following him, produced a greater CÆSAR, in whom concurred the valour of ALEXANDER, the clemency of CYRUS, and the conduct of FABIVS MAXIMUS.

Whilst his head was filled with glorious notions, and an ardent desire of rendering his name immortal, it is reported

ported he had a dream which shocked him extreamly: he fancied he committed incest with his mother. The construction the soothsayers made of this was, He should subdue his mother earth: an interpretation very agreeable to the temper of the man. But the oracles and augurs of old seldom sent a votary away dissatisfied, provided he was able to pay for the answer. Hence the priests of JUPITER HAMMON persuaded PHILIP's son he was nearly related to the skies; and from the same fountain, no doubt, did many of those auspicious omens rise, that attended CÆSAR's arms when he defeated POMPEY; little crafts despised by the wiser sort, but of singular use to hoodwink the populace, who never fight so zealously, as when they fancy religion and heaven are on their side.

After his return from Spain he married POMPEIA, less renowned for virtue than beauty; witness her affair with CLODIUS: all CÆSAR's accomplishments, which enslaved the world, were not sufficient to fix the roving inclinations of a woman: nay, so imprudent were her desires, she must needs appoint the gallant an interview at her own palace when (CÆSAR being prætor) she and all the Roman ladies were celebrating those sacred rites to the goddesses BONA, where men were never permitted to be present. She hoped the youngster's beardless age would have concealed him: A trusty maid, who was privy to the intrigue, introduced the gentleman; but as her evil stars would have it, the impatience of a youthful lover made CLODIUS quit the place he had been posted in; another of her maids accidentally met him, and discovered by his voice, he had no title to wear petticoats. This immediately put the whole palace in an uproar, the Orgia ended very abruptly; CLODIUS was complained of, not only as an adulterer, but a prophaner of the holy ceremonies; and CÆSAR thought it high time, at once to be rid of his wife and the scandal: yet being summoned as a witness against CLODIUS, he said he had nothing to alledge against him: "Why then, answered the prosecutors, have you dismissed POMPEIA? Because," replied he, I would not have my wife even suspected."

Thus CÆSAR was divorced, CLODIUS acquitted.

Finding his generosity turned to so good account, he still continued to give proofs of it on all occasions. Being elected edile, his magnificence so far excelled his colleagues, that the whole honour redounded only to CÆSAR, whilst BIBULUS shared the same fate with POLLUX, the other



with CASTOR, by whose name alone that temple in the Forum was called, dedicated to both the brother twins

Every day encreased the affection of the people; and CÆSAR, relying on their favour, put up for the extraordinary government of Egypt, because the Alexandrians had expelled their king. He wanted not suffrages; but PTOLEMY having formerly been honoured by the senate with the name of friend, now found protection from his allies. This was the first disappointment he met with; nor did this discourage him from standing soon after for the pontificate, which became void by the death of METELLUS. CATULUS and ISAURICUS, both persons of great interest in the senate, were his competitors; the former, dreading the loss of his honour, privately sent CÆSAR a considerable offer to desist, for he had not much to apprehend from ISAURICUS: but he gave him to understand, he would himself expend a much larger sum to carry the day. When the time appointed for the election was come, leaving the house, he told his mother, "She should either see him high-priest that day, or banished." Thus probably had he missed of the office, his future hopes had been for ever dashed: but fortune had not a mind to disoblige the man, for whom she had already cut out so much business; therefore decided the cause in his favour, by a vast majority of votes.

When CATILINE'S conspiracy broke out, CÆSAR was prætor: The question being put, what should be done with LENTULUS, CETHEGUS, and the rest of their faction; after many senators had voted for putting them to death, he stood up and made an oration, wherein having urged the illegality of executing persons of their rank before they had been duly tried, he advised CICERO, then consul, might confine them in some of the municipal towns, 'till CATILINE should be defeated, that the senate might have leisure to deliberate on their sentence. So strong were his arguments, with so peculiar a grace were they delivered, and so wondrous an effect had they upon the audience, that not only most who came after submitted to his opinion, but even some that had voted before him recanted: 'till the severe CATO, transported with zeal for the commonwealth, made a virulent speech, wherein, to diminish the credit of CÆSAR'S reasons, he insinuated him to be a party to the plot; which effectually turned the scales. Whether CÆSAR was really concerned in this affair, or CATO'S suspicions were false, has furnished the world with matter of dispute; SALUST leaves his reputation clear, and

and truly CÆSAR had so many enemies in the senate at that juncture, amongst which number was the consul himself, they would gladly have laid hold of so fair an opportunity to have delivered themselves from a person whose popularity gave them so many fears. Besides, if CÆSAR, as SÆTONTIUS informs us, declined embarking with LEPIDUS, much more would he have avoided an intimacy with such shallow plotters as these, who admitted strumpets into their councils: on the contrary it appears, they were so angry for want of a lawful pretence to dispatch him, that CICERO's guards (by whose instigation may be easily judged) had like to have sent him to the other world, without the formality of a sentence: but the consul, it seems, thought better of it, covered CÆSAR with his gown, and so preserved his life.

Thus finding himself as much hated by the nobility, as beloved by the common people, his countenancing the tribune METELLUS, when he preferred laws in favour of the latter, may be the more easily excused. Upon this, however, the senate deprived him of his prætorship, but restored it again, and returned him thanks, when they found he modestly declined doing himself justice by that force the people proffered.

His prætorship ended, which gave him more trouble than any office he ever discharged before or after, CÆSAR was chosen governor of the farther Spain. His creditors, who were very numerous, grew mighty uneasy at the thoughts of his leaving Rome before they were paid. Wherefore, to satisfy the most importunate, he got CRASSUS to be engaged for him, as far as eight hundred and thirty talents; then pursued his intended journey. Passing by a small village on the Alps, inhabited by a few miserable wretches, his friends in jest demanded, "Whether he thought the people had any disputes for offices, or feuds about elections there? No, replied CÆSAR; but I assure you sincerely, I would rather be the first amongst these, than the second man at Rome." They tell you likewise, as a farther instance of his ambition, he used frequently to repeat two verses of EURIPIDES, which he thus inverted:

*Nam si violandum est jus, regnandi gratia  
Violandum est; aliis rebus pietatem colas.*

If violation of the laws admit  
Of reason, empire must the failing quit;  
In other things to piety submit.

}  
Yet

Yet even the sage PLUTARCH agrees, CÆSAR would have been contented with an equal, POMPEY would not.

Arriving in Spain, he soon raised a considerable army, reduced Portugal and Gallicia; then pushing his success, advanced higher, and carried his arms as far that way as the ocean would permit. Thus he proved himself an able general; nor had the world less reason to think him a wise civil magistrate, from the wholesome laws he made for the peace, and quiet government of the province. This success, when the year expired, entitled him to a triumph; but that interfering with his pretensions to the consulate, since CATO's management hindered his obtaining both, he wisely declined the former, entered Rome as a private person, and with BIBULUS was chosen consul.

This was the second time BIBULUS had the misfortune of being joined in publick office with CÆSAR, who as far eclipsed him now, as when formerly edile: For whereas CÆSAR only relied on the people's favour before, now he had ingratiated himself with the two most considerable persons in Rome, by reconciling POMPEY and CRASSUS, whilst each of them courted him to be of his party. By this action he did not only gain both their friendships, but was adored by all men, except CATO, for a peace-maker, whose perpetual jealousies foresaw fatal events from that triumvirate, though without any apparent reasons: Which, PLUTARCH observes, then acquired him the title of a sullen busy man, though afterwards of a wise and unfortunate counsellor: for his case was exactly the same with that prophetess's, who always spoke truth, but was never believed. And indeed his opinion was more the effect of foresight than of any just ground; for so long as that alliance continued, Rome enjoyed her imaginary freedom; for in reality she had never been free since the days of MARIUS. But to a people that had always been governed by two, the name of a single magistrate, or king, was a dreadful sound, a magick word sufficient at any time to conjure up civil discord, and act the most solemn murders under the specious name of asserting liberty. And this was the fatal word which afterwards cost CÆSAR his life.

Thus having matched his daughter JULIA to POMPEY, being supported both by him and CRASSUS, CÆSAR was equal to either of them: and had not the latter's untimely death

death in Parthia, left the other two sole disputants for the supreme power, those wars, which cost Rome so much of her purest blood, had never happened: for when there is only one life between ambition and a crown, the object appears so near and so lovely, few are able to withstand the temptation; but in despite of laws, human and divine, give a loose to their desires. Thus, in all probability, CROMWELL had not been instrumental in cutting off the ROYAL MARTYR's head, had not the lord THOMAS FAIRFAX, reflecting on the cause his mistaken zeal embarked him in, laid down his command, a second error, more fatal than the former; for this put it out of his power to preserve the king; and all he could do afterwards, was little more than to send his wishes for the restoration of the royal line.

Thus CÆSAR having by the interest of CRASSUS and POMPEY, notwithstanding BIBULUS opposed them, passed such edicts, as made him more popular than before, and discharged the office of consul much to his own satisfaction, obtained the Government of Illyricum, and both the provinces of Gaul; where PLUTARCH informs us, in nine years time he took five hundred towns by storm, conquered three hundred states, engaged three millions of men at several times, killed one third, and took another. But for a farther account of his glorious exploits in that country, of his actions in Italy, Spain, Greece, Alexandria, Asia, and Africk, I refer you to the following memoirs; having only thus far deduced his life, in the nature of a short appendix to this version. Let it suffice therefore to acquaint you, so long as CRASSUS and CÆSAR's daughter JULIA lived, POMPEY and he were in perfect friendship with each other: the greatest men at Rome made their court to him, POMPEY, CRASSUS, APPIUS, the prætor of Sardinia, and NEPOS, proconsul of Spain, at once attended him at Lucca, where one hundred and twenty lictors, and above two hundred senators, were present. In short, the management of affairs at Rome was wholly decided by these three powerful men. But when CRASSUS died, CÆSAR and POMPEY fell out; so the civil wars began.

How much industry, conduct, and courage, how much mercy he shewed to his enemies, and how well he was beloved by his own soldiers, let every page in the following history witness for him. Even CATO himself, had not despair carried him out of the world, might have survived  
the



the loss of UTICA. When CÆSAR heard of it, he said, "O CATO! how much do I envy thee thy death, since thou hast prevented me the honour of pardoning thee!" But CATO's sons lived to taste of his mercy; CASSIUS and BRUTUS, who afterwards killed him, were received into favour; and nobody asked forgiveness in vain.

Thus giddy with the wondrous height fortune had raised him to, he returned to Rome, after the defeat of young CNEIUS POMPEY; here he was allowed five several triumphs, for Egypt, Pontus, Africk, Gaul, and Spain. Being declared perpetual dictator, he rewarded those who had well deserved from his friendship, and promoted some of his enemies. But the people enjoying peace, and having leisure to reflect how lavish they had been, were for reassuming their mighty grant. This could not be done without an assassination; but instruments were quickly found, and the ungrateful BRUTUS, partly prompted by ambition, partly by old prophecies trumped up to serve that particular turn, and the vanity of imitating his ancestor, that expelled the TARQUINS, became leader of this faction. Yet the confusion Rome was in after the bloody deed committed, is a shrewd argument, revenge had a greater share in the action than any other design. But divine justice did not long permit such an inhuman murder to go unrevenged, for all the assassins came to an untimely end; CASSIUS killed himself with the same dagger that wound CÆSAR, and BRUTUS's ill genius overtook him at Philippi.

The senate house was the place where this tragedy was acted; many were the accomplices, when CÆSAR, having received three and twenty wounds, expired. If ever man was predestined to die by a certain time, he surely was; for divers portentous tokens warned him to beware the fatal day; nay, he had actually a list of the conspirators names, with an account of their design, given him as he was walking to the place, from whence he never returned alive: but fortune in all ages has made the catastrophe of heroes very remarkable; having promoted CÆSAR to the greatest honours man ever obtained, she shewed him her latest friendship in granting him his desire of a sudden death, before she recalled her uncertain favours. Thus fell the great JULIUS CÆSAR on the fifteenth of march, in the fifty-sixth year of his age, having only survived his rival four, and founded the Roman empire in his own blood; for after his decease the common-wealth became an absolute monarchy,

chy, the constant fate of ill governed republicks. He had only the single failing of ambition to prove him mortal ; yet assuming supreme authority, was no more than what the safety of his person required, for otherwise it would have fallen into POMPEY's hands, and then the consequence must have proved fatal to CÆSAR: but the greatest use he made of power was to pardon those that offended him. Many were the honours decreed his memory, and his name was the title of eleven succeeding emperors.



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A Map of  
OLD  
FRANCE  
by Monsr. Sanson

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Scale of English Miles

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C. J. CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARY  
OF HIS  
WAR in GAUL.

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The FIRST BOOK.

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*Gaul described: Invaded by the Swiss; who are  
worsted by CÆSAR in two battles: His war with  
ARIOVISTUS: The Germans driven out of Gaul.*

CHAP. I.

**G**AUL is divided into three parts, each inhabited by people of different language, laws, and customs, the Belgæ, Aquitains, and Celtæ, as they call themselves, but we the Gauls. The last of these are divided from the Aquitains by the river Garonne; and by the Maern and Seine from the Belgæ, the most warlike people of the three, as they are the greatest strangers to the politeness of the Province, hold little commerce with merchants who import such commodities as minister to luxury, and are situated next the Germans beyond the Rhine, with whom they are perpetually at war. For which reason the Swiss likewise are more hardy than the Gauls, because they and their German neighbours are in a continued state of hostility, each of them striving to encroach on the other's dominions. The territories of the Gauls, commencing at the river Rhosne, are bounded

Gaul divided. But this relates only to Gallia Comata,

WAR in by the Garonne, the ocean, and the Belgæ, and inclining  
GAUL. northward, extend through Franchecomte and the Swifs to  
the Rhine. Belgia, which lies north-east, adjoining to the  
farther confines of Gaul, reaches as far as the lower Rhine;  
and Aquitania or Gascony, spreading between the Garonne and Pyrenees, bounds north-west upon the Spanish ocean.

Orgetorix  
persuades  
the Swifs to  
invade Gaul.

2. During the consulat of M. MESSALA and M. PISO, ORGETORIX, the most considerable man amongst the Swifs, as well for birth as riches, being prompted by ambition, engaged the nobility in his interest, and persuaded the people to quit their country in an entire body; by assuring them, that they, who so far excelled all other nations in valour, might without much difficulty make themselves masters of Gaul; which they were the more easily induced to, by the closeness of their own dominions, divided on one side by the Rhine, a broad and deep river, from the Germans; on another by the inaccessible mountains of St. Claud from Franchecomte; and on the third by the lake of Geneva and the river Rhosne from our province. Being thus enclosed, they wanted opportunities of enlarging their territories, or invading their neighbours; nor was it a little irksome to a numerous and warlike people, to see themselves confined within such narrow limits, as those of a country extending but 240 miles in length, and 180 in breadth.

3. These circumstances, so luckily concurring with the authority of ORGETORIX, had that effect, that the people unanimously resolved to prepare for the expedition; whereupon they bought up considerable numbers of waggons and beasts for carriage, tilled their ground, that they might have plenty of corn in their journey, and made a peace with all their neighbours: two years time they thought sufficient to complete their preparations, and obliged themselves, by a law, to begin their march the third.

## CHAP. II.

Orgetorix  
sent embas-  
sador to the  
neighbour-  
ing states.

THE management of this important design was committed to the sole conduct of ORGETORIX, whom they deputed their ambassador to the neighbouring states. He persuaded CASTICUS, the son of CATAMANTALIDES of Franchecomte, where he had reigned many years, and been honoured by the senate and people of Rome with the name of friend, to take upon him the sovereignty of that state, which his father formerly enjoyed; the same

advice

advice he gave to the brother of DIVITIACUS, DUMNORIX WAR in of Autun, a man of the best interest in that province, to GAUL. whom he married his daughter; he demonstrated how easily they might compass their design; and promised, so soon as he had conquered Gaul with his Swifs, whose subjection he was already assured of, to settle each of them in a kingdom there by the assistance of his forces; whereupon they entered into a league, promising themselves the entire possession of Gaul, by the mutual assistance of three such potent nations.

4. The Swifs having notice of this ambitious view of ORGETORIX, according to their usual custom, arrested him, that he might be brought to a trial; and had sentence been passed upon him, he must have been burnt alive: but he took care by the day appointed to have all his relations, friends, clients, and debtors, to the number of 10,000 men, ready to rescue him from the hands of justice; which so incensed the people, that they agreed the magistrates should raise the power of the country, and execute the laws by force; but before they could do it, ORGETORIX was found dead, not without strong suspicion of having laid violent hands on himself. Orgetorix, to avoid judgment, kills himself.

\* 5. The Swifs, continuing their resolution, notwithstanding his death, pursued their intended journey; and to take away all hopes of return, before they set forward, put fire to their twelve cities, four hundred villages, several private houses, and consumed all the corn, except what each man was allowed to carry out of the country, which was provision only for three months.

The people of Basil, Stulingen, and Lausane resolved to follow their neighbours examples, and set fire to their houses, intending to share the same fortune, carrying along with them the Boii, who, having passed the Rhine, had taken the capital of Bavier, and seated themselves there.

6. They had only two ways to go out of their country, one through Franche-comte, between the mountain Jura and the river Rhosne, which was so very narrow and difficult, that in some places a cart could hardly pass; where their journey might easily have been stopped by an inconsiderable force, posted on the top of the impending mountains; the other lay through our province, which was much the easier and shorter cut; for the river Rhosne, which runs between the Swifs and Savoyards; a people lately conquered by the Romans, was fordable in several places; besides, the bridge at Geneva (which is



WAR in the farthest town the Savoyards have on that side) was theirs; and they doubted not but their neighbours, who seemed to submit with reluctance to the Roman yoke, would readily grant them the liberty of passing through their country; which, if denied, they could obtain by force: wherefore having prepared all things for their journey, they appointed the eight and twentieth day of March, in the consulat of L. PISO and A. GABINIUS, for their general rendezvous on the banks of the river Rhosne.

## C H A P. III.

Cæsar takes  
post for  
Gaul.

The Swiss  
demand a  
passage  
through his  
government,

7. SO soon as CÆSAR had notice of their design to pass through his government, he immediately left Rome, took post for the further Gaul; and being arrived at Geneva, ordered the bridge to be cut down, and raised a considerable number of fresh forces in all parts of the province, for he had but one legion there. The Swiss being informed of his arrival, sent NUMEIUS and VERO-DOCTIUS with some other noblemen of the first rank, their ambassadors, to desire he would permit them to pass peaceably through his province, for they had no other way to prosecute their journey: but CÆSAR remembering how the consul L. CASSIUS lost his life, how his army was put to the rout, and his soldiers forced to pass under the yoke, held it not consistent with the honour of the empire to grant their request; not did he think it possible for so barbarous a people to pass through the country without committing some outrages. However, to gain further time 'till his new levies were completed, he told the ambassadors he would consider of their demand, and if they returned on the thirteenth of April following, they should have his answer.

8. In the mean time CÆSAR, with the veteran legion, and the new levies that came in from all parts of the Province, cast up an intrenchment, raised a wall sixteen foot high, and nineteen miles in length, from the Lake of Geneva, where the Rhosne flows into it, to the banks over against the Mountains of Jura, which divide the people of Franche-comte from the Swiss, and built little forts all along the work in the most commodious places, to prevent their passage in case they should attempt it by storm. At the day appointed, when the deputies returned for their answer, he positively denied their request, saying, "He knew no precedent of the like nature amongst the Romans which could justify his conduct;


but are de-  
nied.

and

# Book I. COMMENTARIES.

5

and therefore, should they endeavour to force their way, he was obliged to oppose them." WAR in GAUL.



## CHAP. IV.

MEETING so unexpected a denial, some endeavoured to ford the river where it was shallowest, whilst others attempted to make a bridge of boats, on which they worked with great application in the night, and sometimes by day; but being warmly received by the soldiers on the other side, and repulsed with darts from the fortifications, finding their design impracticable, they at last desisted.

*They endeavoured to get over the river, but are disappointed.*

9. They had now no other way left but that through Franchecomte, which was so narrow they could not pass without leave of the inhabitants, which they could not obtain; wherefore they sent ambassadors to DUMNORIX of Autun, to beg his intercession in their behalf. DUMNORIX, whose engaging carriage and generosity had gained him the affection of the Franchecomtois, was inclinable enough to serve the Swiss, having married from that country the daughter of ORGETORIX; besides, intending to make himself absolute, he was glad of an opportunity to oblige so potent a people, who might hereafter be serviceable to him in his designs: he undertook the business, and succeeded to satisfaction, for the Franchecomtois agreed to let the Swiss pass through their country, upon delivery of mutual hostages, these for their peaceable behaviour, and the other not to interrupt their passage.

*Dumnorix gets the Swiss leave to pass through Franchecomte.*

10. CÆSAR hearing the Swiss designed to march through Franchecomte and the territories of Autun to the confines of Xantonge, not far from Tholouse, which is situated in the Roman province, foresaw what would be the consequence, if so troublesome neighbours, mortal enemies to the people of Rome, once possessed themselves of so open and plentiful a country. Wherefore committing the charge of his new works to his lieutenant T. LABIENUS, he made the best of his way to Italy, where he raised two legions, and drew three more out of their winter-quarters about Aquileia; with which forces he repassed the Alps. In his way to the further Gaul, the inhabitants of Tarentaise, of the valley of Morienne and Ambrun, possessed themselves of the passes, designing to oppose his march; but having often repulsed them, he arrived first at Ocello, in the extremes of the Cisalpine province, next at Vocontium, at the entrance into the Transalpine province, and

WAR in in seven days from his first setting out: from thence he  
 GAUL. carried his army through Savoy to Forest, the next neigh-  
 bour to the Roman province on the other side the  
 Rhosne.

The Swiss  
 lay waste the  
 country of  
 Autun,

11. In the mean time the Swiss, having passed the  
 streights of Franche-comte, and entered the province of  
 Autun, began to ravage the country, which obliged the  
 people, who were not in a capacity to resist them, to send  
 to CÆSAR for assistance, alledging they had never merited  
 so ill from Rome, that she should suffer their fields to be  
 burnt, their children to be made captives, and their towns  
 taken, even in the view of her army: at the same time  
 arrived messengers from the people of Charolais, allies  
 and friends to those of Autun, to complain, that their  
 country was laid waste, and that they were scarce able to  
 defend their towns against the Swiss; and those of Dau-  
 phine likewise, who dwelt on the other side of the Rhosne,  
 fled to CÆSAR for protection, assuring him that all their  
 cities were laid even with the ground; which moved his  
 compassion so much, that he resolved not to wait for the  
 enemy 'till his allies were ruined, and the Swiss arrived  
 at Xantonge.

Cæsar falls  
 upon the  
 Swiss when  
 three fourths  
 had passed  
 the river.

12. The waters of the river Soane, which wash the  
 confines of Franche-comte and Autun, flow into the  
 Rhosne so very slowly, that 'tis difficult to distinguish  
 which way they glide. This river the Swiss were crossing  
 on a bridge of boats, when CÆSAR, upon his spies bring-  
 ing him intelligence that all their forces, except a fourth  
 part, had crossed the river, about midnight left his camp,  
 and fell upon the remainder with three legions, whilst they  
 were unprepared and encumbered with their baggage,  
 put a great number of them to the sword, and routed  
 the rest, who fled for shelter to the neighbouring woods.  
 The Swiss were divided into four cantons, and the de-  
 feated were the natives of Zurich, who alone, leaving  
 their country, in the memory of our fathers, slew L.  
 CASSIUS the consul, and made his army pass under the  
 yoke: so whether it were by chance, or the peculiar pro-  
 vidence of heaven, that very canton which formerly gave  
 the Romans so fatal a stroke, was the first that felt the  
 weight of vengeance; nor did CÆSAR less gratify his  
 private than the publick revenge in this victory, for L. PISO,  
 grandfather to L. PISO, whose daughter he had married,  
 fell in the battle fought with those of Zurich, when CAS-  
 SIUS lost his life.

## CHAP. V.

13. AFTER this defeat CÆSAR threw a bridge cross the Soane, that he might pursue the rest of the enemy; who understanding he had crossed the river in one day, which they could hardly do in twenty, were so surprised and daunted at his approach, that they immediately sent ambassadors to his camp. Their speaker was DIVICUS, commander in chief at the battle where CASSIUS was slain; who being introduced to CÆSAR, spoke to this effect: "That if the Romans concluded a peace with the Swiss, they would submit to march to any place which CÆSAR should think fit to assign them; but if he intended to carry on the war, he would do well to remember the overthrow which the people of Rome formerly received from their valour, and not be puffed up with success, for having surprised a small party, whilst the rest of the army could not come to their assistance: for their parts, they had learnt from their ancestors to contend by force, but scorned deceit; and therefore it imported the Romans to beware, lest the place where they pitched their camp should obtain, to their infinite sorrow, a memorable name from the destruction of their army."

WAR in  
GAUL.

The Swiss  
send embas-  
sadors to de-  
fire a peace.

Their  
speech.

14. TO this CÆSAR answered, "That he had less reason to hesitate concerning the steps he should take, as those actions the ambassadors mentioned were still fresh in his memory; that he had the more reason to resent them as they were committed against the Romans without the least provocation, who, if they had been conscious of giving any, might easily have been prepared to defend themselves; but secure in their innocence, they knew not how to harbour any apprehensions of danger. That if he could persuade himself to forget former injuries, fresh insolences would revive them, their attempting to force a passage through his province, and their sacking Autun, Charolais, and Dauphine: That they boasted with such arrogance of their victory, and prided themselves in their safety, only tended to their ruin; for the Gods sometimes permit mankind to glory in impunity for a while, that vengeance, being less expected, may fall the heavier: however, if they would deliver hostages for the performance of what they proposed, if they would make the provinces of Autun and Dauphine, with their allies, restitution for the damage they had done them, he was contented there should be a peace." But DIVICUS

Cæsar's an-  
swer.



WAR in Gaul. replied, " 'Twas not the custom of the Swiss to deliver hostages, but receive them ;" and so departed.

15. The next day they decamped, and so did CÆSAR, sending all his horse before (which he had levied in the Province and the country of Autun, to the number of 4000) to observe the enemy's motions, who following too close, fell in with their rear, and being obliged to engage at a disadvantage, a few of them were killed. The Swiss, encouraged by their success in this rencounter, where they had maintained their ground with five hundred horse against so considerable a number, presumed sometimes to sally from their rear, and skirmish with our van-guard; but CÆSAR restrained his men from fighting, being contented, for the present, to prevent the enemy's plundering the country, and so continued his march fifteen days successively, keeping his van-guard constantly within five or six miles of the enemy's rear.

#### C H A P. VI.

16. CÆSAR in the mean time pressed the people of Autun for the supplies of corn which they had promised; for Gaul lying northward in a very cold climate, their corn was not ripe, and their pastures scarce afforded forage enough for the horses; nor could the Romans receive any more provisions by the way of the Soane. for the enemy, whose motions they constantly pursued, had marched directly from that river. The Autunois still putting CÆSAR off from time to time, on pretence the corn was coming, 'till the day for delivering out provisions to the army was just arrived, he ordered DIVITIACUS and LISCUS, the chief magistrates (whom they style Vergobret, and create yearly, with power of life and death) with the rest of the noblemen of that country, for he had many of them in his camp, to attend him: these he severely reprimanded, for disappointing him of their contributions at so important a conjuncture, whilst the enemy was so near, when there was no corn in the country, nor any to be procured for money; adding, he had reason to take it very ill that they should desert him, when, at their request, he engaged in that war for their defence.

Liscus's speech; he discovers the treachery of Dumnorix.

17. Whereupon LISCUS, moved by CÆSAR's speech, ingenuously declared what he had so long kept secret, " That there were some private persons of greater authority amongst the people than they who bore the title

of magistrates; that these had seditiously dissuaded them <sup>WAR in</sup> from bringing in their corn, insinuating, that since they <sup>GAUL.</sup> could not obtain the empire of Gaul themselves, it was better to be subject to the Gauls than the Romans; for, they might depend upon it, so soon as the Romans had subdued the Swiss, they and their neighbours would be bereft of their liberty: that from these the enemy received constant intelligence of all that passed in the camp; and that he endangered the loss of his life by speaking so freely, which was the reason he had not informed him of it sooner, for the persons he meant were grown too big to be restrained by the laws."

18. CÆSAR perceived by LISCUS's speech, that DUMNORIX, DIVITIACUS's brother, was pointed at; but thinking it improper to hold further discourse about an affair of that nature in publick, he immediately dismissed the council, and retaining only LISCUS, asked him several questions about the matter, which he answered with an honest freedom; and enquiring further, he found it confirmed from other hands, "That DUMNORIX was a <sup>Dumnorix's</sup> man of spirit and enterprize, a mighty favourite of the <sup>character.</sup> common people, because of his liberality; that he had for many years farmed the publick taxes of Autun at an under-rate, no man daring to interfere with his interest; by which means he had considerably enriched his private patrimony, found the means to be liberal, and was so rich, that he constantly maintained a great number of horsemen, who waited on him wherever he went: that he was not only powerful at home, but had a considerable interest abroad amongst the neighbouring states, for he had married his mother to the richest nobleman in Berry, had taken a wife for himself from amongst the Swiss, and matched his sister by the mother's side, with the rest of his kindred, into other countries: that for the sake of affinity he was a well-wisher to the Swiss, and hated the Romans, especially CÆSAR, because by their arrival in Gaul his authority was eclipsed, and his brother restored to his ancient dignity: that he hoped to obtain the sovereignty by the assistance of the Swiss, in case the Romans should be defeated; whereas their success made him despair not only of a crown, but of keeping the authority he had left." And CÆSAR was further informed, "That when his cavalry was routed, DUMNORIX and his party were the first that fled, for to his charge were committed the horse which the people of Autun had sent to CÆSAR's assistance,

WAR in whose bad example struck a terror into the rest of the GAUL. soldiers."




19. These suspicions were backed by certain proofs; for DUMNORIX was accused by the magistrates, for having procured the Swiss a passage through Franche-comte, on delivery of mutual hostages between them and the people of that country, without the privity or consent either of CÆSAR or those of his own nation; wherefore he thought he had sufficient reason either to punish him himself, or cause him to be tried according to the laws of his own country; which he had immediately done but for his brother DIVITIACUS's sake, a man of singular loyalty, temperance, and justice, who had given constant proofs of his affection to CÆSAR and the people of Rome; for which reason, before he made any farther progress, he sent for DIVITIACUS, and making use of no other interpreter but C. VALERIUS PROCILLUS, a prince of Gaul, his particular acquaintance, in whom he reposed great confidence, acquainted him what he had heard of his brother, at the general council of the Gauls, and what private confirmation he had of the matter afterwards, desiring that he would either cause him to be tried according to the laws of Autun, or not take it ill, if he himself should inflict that punishment on his crime which he deserved.

Cæsar is intreated by Divitiacus to pardon his brother,

20. Whereupon DIVITIACUS embracing CÆSAR, with tears in his eyes, "intreated him that he would not use his brother severely; for though he knew him to be guilty of all that was laid to his charge, and had more reason to be afflicted at it than any man, because he had employ'd that fortune which he was indebted to him for, in ruining his credit both at home and abroad, yet he could not banish natural affection: besides, the people, knowing what a favourite he was with CÆSAR, would attribute DUMNORIX's ruin to his advice; which would make him be detested throughout the whole province." CÆSAR seeing DIVITIACUS in so great concern, took him by the hand, and ordered him to dry up his tears, for he had so particular an esteem for him, that for his sake he would forgive the injury his brother had done the commonwealth, and the affront he himself had received. Then sending for DUMNORIX, he reprimanded him in the presence of his brother, telling him what crimes he could charge him with from his own knowledge, and what complaints his countrymen had made against him, which, for once, at the request of DIVITIACUS, he pardoned;

which he does;

but reprimands him severely.

done; but bid him take care how he behaved himself <sup>W A R in</sup> for the future, for he had such spies upon him as would <sup>GAUL.</sup> take notice of his carriage, and whom he conversed with. 

21. The same day, having intelligence that the enemy had lodged themselves under a hill, about eight miles distant from his camp, CÆSAR sent out a party to take a view of the ascent, which they reported to be very easy; whereupon he detached his lieutenant T. LABIENUS about midnight with two legions and able guides, ordering him to gain the top of the hill; and he himself about three hours after, sending the cavalry before, followed the same way with the rest of the army. P. CAUSIDIUS, an experienced soldier, who had served first under L. SYLLA, and afterwards under M. GRASSUS, was detached with a small party to discover the posture of the enemy.

22. By break of day CAUSIDIUS was arrived within a mile and a half of the enemy's camp, when LABIENUS had actually posted himself on the top of the hill, unknown to the enemy, who neither dreamt of his nor CAUSIDIUS's approach (as we were informed afterwards by the prisoners.) CAUSIDIUS however came riding back with full speed, to acquaint CÆSAR, that the enemy were masters of the place which he ordered LABIENUS to possess, as he plainly discovered by the Swift colours; whereupon CÆSAR retiring to the next hill, drew his army up in order of battle: LABIENUS in the mean time having gained the rising ground, waited for our army, in pursuance of the orders given him not to engage the enemy 'till he saw our forces near their camp, that the attack might be made on all sides at once. But afterward, when the day was far spent, CÆSAR was informed by his spies, that our soldiers were in possession of the hill, that the enemy had decamped, and that CAUSIDIUS's fear made him report what he never saw; so he followed the enemy at the usual distance the rest of that day, and encamped within three miles of them at night.

Caufidius's  
fear, and  
false report.

## C H A P. VII.

23. THE next day CÆSAR being within eighteen miles of Autun, the capital of that province, and obliged to deliver out provisions to the army within two days after, desisted from attending the enemy's motions, and marched directly to the city; which the Swifts having notice of from some deserters in L. AEMILIUS's troop; whether they imagined the Romans retreated for fear (because



WAR IN (because they did not engage them the day before, whilst they had the advantage of the ground) or whether they hoped to cut off all convoys of provision, altering their resolution, immediately faced about, and attacked our army in the rear.

The Swiss  
attack the  
Roman rear.

24. Upon this CÆSAR sent the horse to cover the foot, and drew up his forces on the next hill: his four veteran legions he disposed into three lines; on the summit of the hill he ranged the two legions of new levies lately arrived from the hither Gaul, with the rest of his auxiliary troops, stretching out his wings so as to cover the whole front of the mountain; and disposed the carriages, which were committed to the charge of the battalions on the top of the mount, into a particular place by themselves: the Swiss did the like by their baggage, and having repulsed the Roman cavalry with a numerous squadron, cast themselves into a phalanx, and attacked our foremost ranks.

## CHAP. VIII.

The armies,  
ranged in or-  
der of bat-  
tel, engage.

25. WHEREUPON CÆSAR, to take away all hopes of a retreat, caused all the led-horses to be sent away, setting the first example by his own; then, encouraging his men, began the charge; the Romans, casting their pila from the rising ground, soon broke the enemy's phalanx, and then entered with sword in hand.

## CHAP. IX.

THE Swiss, in the mean time, were greatly incumbered by their targets being pierced through and pinned together by the pila, the iron of which, hanging bent, they could neither draw them out, nor make use of their left arms to defend themselves; wherefore, after long fatigue, many of them flung away their targets, and chose to fight unarmed, till fainting with loss of blood, they began to give way, and retreated to a rising ground about a mile distant from the place where the fight commenced. Our legions pursued them to the hill, intending to force them from their post, but 15,000 Boii and Stulingens, the rear and reserve of their army, attacked the Romans in the flank, and began to inclose them as they were in pursuit of the enemy, which the Swiss, who had retired to the hill, perceiving, renewed the fight; whereupon part of the Roman army was obliged to face about, and whilst

## Book I. COMMENTARIES.

two legions engaged the Swifs, the third maintained their ground against the Boii and Stulingens. WAR in GAUL.

26. The battel was hot and dubious for a while, 'till the enemy, no longer able to sustain the furious charge of the Roman legions, one part of them retired again to the top of the hill, whilst the rest retreated to their baggage; for during the whole battel, which continued from one o'clock 'till the evening, no man saw the back of his enemy.

### CHAP. X.

THE enemy maintained the fight very obstinately at their carriages till the night was far spent, and, making use of their carts for a fortification, gauged our forces with their javelins from the rising ground, and with their pikes and halberds through the wheels of their waggons; but after a warm dispute, our soldiers took their baggage, and forced their camp, where a son and daughter of ORGETORIX were taken prisoners. About an hundred and thirty thousand of the enemy made their escape, and marching day and night without intermission, arrived the fourth day at the confines of Langres; for the Romans being much wounded and fatigued, and three days being spent in burying the dead, there was no pursuit.

The Swifs entirely routed.

But CÆSAR took care to acquaint the people of Langres, that if they offered to assist the Swifs with any kind of provisions, he should esteem them his enemies, and treat them as such within three days, for by that time he designed to be there with all his forces.

### CHAP. XI.

27. THE Swifs being thus reduced to the utmost extremity, for want of all kind of provision, sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, who, meeting him on the road, prostrated themselves at his feet, and with tears in their eyes, implored peace: he commanded them to wait where they were, without advancing any farther. So soon as he was arrived, he enjoined them to deliver hostages for their behaviour, to surrender their arms, and return the deserters.

They send a second embassy for peace.

Whilst they were preparing to put these articles in execution, about six thousand of the canton of Urbigenus, either fearing they should be executed when they had given

**WAR** in given up their arms, or in hopes of escaping, since so small  
**GAUL.** a number could hardly be missed out of so great a multi-  
 tude, or at least that their countrymen would conceal  
 their flight; in the beginning of the night left the Swiss  
 camp, making the best of their way to the river Rhine  
 and Germany.

28. But CÆSAR being informed what road they had  
 taken, commanded their companions to fetch them back  
 again, unless they designed to be accounted parties in their  
 crime; and upon their return he used them as enemies:  
 but all the rest, after delivery of their arms, hostages, and  
 deserters, he received to mercy, commanding the Swiss,  
 Stulingens, and people of Laufane, to return again to  
 their own country; and because every thing was deso-  
 lated there, he ordered the Savoyards to furnish them with  
 what corn they had occasion for, and that themselves  
 should rebuild the cities they had burnt; a necessary pre-  
 caution, lest the Germans beyond the Rhine should be  
 tempted by the richness of the soil, to invade their coun-  
 try, and make themselves neighbours to the Roman terri-  
 tories in Gaul and Savoy. But the Boii were permitted  
 to dwell within the confines of Autun, at the intercession  
 of that people, who knew them to be a warlike nation,  
 and who not only granted them lands, but admitted them  
 to the rights and privileges of natives.

The Swiss  
 war ended.

29. In the enemy's camp was found a Greek list, con-  
 taining an exact account of the age and sex of all that  
 had left their country, how many were able to bear arms,  
 how many boys, how many old men and women, each in  
 a separate roll by themselves; by which it appeared the  
 whole number of the Swiss amounted to 263,000, of the  
 Stulingens to 36,000, of the people of Laufane to 14,000,  
 of Basil to 23,000, and of the Boii to 32,000, be-  
 ing in the whole 368,000, whereof 92,000 bore arms;  
 and a review being made, by CÆSAR's command, of  
 those that returned to their country, the number amount-  
 ed to 11,000.

## CHAP. XII.

30. THE war with the Swiss being thus happily con-  
 cluded, all the states and princes of Gaul sent deputies to  
 congratulate CÆSAR on his success, being sensible that it  
 was not only a satisfactory revenge for former injuries he  
 had received, but that it had obtained a peace no less ad-  
 vantageous to Gaul than their own empire, since the Swiss  
 had

had left their country, where they wanted nothing necessary for the support of life, that they might possess themselves of some plentiful part of the continent, and thence have an opportunity of making the other states of Gaul their tributaries.

WAR in  
GAUL.

They likewise desired that CÆSAR would permit them, at a certain day prefixed; to summon a general assembly of all the states, having matters of the highest importance by the common consent of them, to lay before him. Having obtained their desire, and the day appointed being come, they all obliged themselves by oath, not to reveal the cause of their meeting to any persons but such as should be deputed by the general vote of the whole diet.

31. The assembly breaking up, the same deputies returned to CÆSAR, and demanded a private audience, that they might impart to him something which concerned their common safety. Being admitted, casting themselves with tears at his feet, "They were not more urgent that he would grant their petition, than that he would not divulge it: for should any part of it transpire, they would be plunged into the last degree of misery and affliction."

A general  
assembly of  
the princes  
of Gaul.

DIVITIACUS, who carried the address, acquainted him, "That Gaul was divided into two potent factions, one headed by the Autunois, the other by those of Auverne. After long contention for superiority, at last the people of Auverne and Franchecomte begging assistance of the Germans, received about 15,000 of their troops into pay, who passed the Rhine at their desire, and having tasted the plenty of the soil, and civility of the Gauls, invited more of their countrymen over, till they were increased to the number of 120,000. With these the Autunois had more than once disputed, to their infinite damage, having lost their cavalry, nobility, and senate; by which misfortunes they were so reduced, that they, who in former days, by their own interest and the favour of the Romans, bore a considerable sway through the greatest part of Gaul, were now forced to deliver the persons of best quality in their country, as hostages for their peaceable behaviour, to those of Franchecomte, to oblige themselves by oath never to demand their restitution, nor to apply to the Romans for aid, or any way attempt a deliverance from this subjection. Himself was the only man of the whole province, who could never be persuaded either to take the oath, or deliver up his children for hostages, and for that reason had been obliged to abandon his country, and implore assistance of the

Their ad-  
dress to  
Cæsar.



WAR in of the Roman senate. Yet the conquerors were in a GAUL. worse condition than the conquered, for ARIOVISTUS, king of the Germans, had seated himself in their country, and already possessed a full third of the choicest land in Gaul; and not content with that, had now commanded the Franche-comtois to deliver up the other third, to be distributed amongst 24,000 natives of Constance, arrived some few months before; wherefore, if speedy remedies were not applied, all the Germans would in a few years cross the Rhine, and drive the Gauls out of their country, allured by the richness of their soil, and manner of living, which far excelled that of Germany.

That their king ARIOVISTUS was so elevated with his success at the battle of Magstat, that he behaved himself with unheard of insolence and tyranny, demanding the children of the nobility for hostages, whom he used very barbarously, if the Gauls did not readily submit to whatever he commanded them; and, in fine, that he was a man of a most passionate and inhumane temper, whose yoke they could no longer endure; therefore, unless CÆSAR and the Romans would assist them, they must of necessity be obliged, after the example of the Swiss, to leave their country, that they might be free from the Germans, and seek their fortune in another land; but should their design come to the knowledge of ARIOVISTUS, he would infallibly revenge himself severely on the hostages in his custody: yet, they hoped, if CÆSAR would please to interpose in the matter, his credit, the fame of his army, the reputation acquired by his late victory, and the name of the Romans, might prevent the Germans transporting any more colonies into Gaul, and defend them from the tyranny of ARIOVISTUS."

32. DIVITIACUS having ended his speech, CÆSAR observed that all who were present, except the Franche-comtois, with weeping eyes besought his assistance; but these only fixed their eyes upon the ground, with mournful countenances, which made him enquire the reason of it; they continuing silent in the same posture, made him no answer: which he wondered at extremely; 'till DIVITIACUS of Autun informed him, "That the people of Franche-comte were infinitely more wretched than their neighbours, for they neither durst desire assistance, nor even whisper their grievances, standing as much in awe of ARIOVISTUS's cruelty when absent as present; for whereas the rest might hope to escape by forsaking

faking their country, these having admitted the tyrant into WAR IN the heart of their province, having delivered the keys of GAUL. all their cities into his hands, were obliged to submit to whatever hardships he should please to impose upon them."

## C H A P. XIII.

33. AFTER CÆSAR had heard their complaints, he bid them lay aside their fears, promising them he would make their case his particular concern. He had reason to hope, he said, from the favours he had conferred on ARIOVISTUS, that he should prevail on him to desist from any farther injuries. After this he dismissed the council. Many were the inducements which moved CÆSAR to undertake their cause: first, he saw the Autunois, who had often been honoured by the senate of Rome with the titles of brethren, cousins, and allies, enslaved by the Germans, and obliged to deliver hostages to ARIOVISTUS, at a time when the Roman empire was in a flourishing condition, a circumstance which he thought derogatory to the honour of it: secondly, he foresaw it would be of dangerous consequence to the Romans, if the Germans, transporting themselves by degrees cross the Rhine, should make themselves masters of the whole continent of Gaul; for he did not suppose so fierce and barbarous a people would be content with that only, but, as the Cimbri and Teutons had done formerly, would force their way through the Province, and thence make irruptions into Italy, especially since Franche-comte was only divided from the Roman territories by the river Rhosne. Besides, ARIOVISTUS was grown too haughty and arrogant to be borne.

Cæsar promises to assist them.

34. To obviate these evils, he thought proper to send ambassadors to him, desiring he would appoint a place of interview, that they might treat of some public affairs of equal importance to them both.

Cæsar sends an embassy to Ariovistus.

## C H A P. XIV.

34. TO this embassy ARIOVISTUS replied, "That if he had any business with CÆSAR, he would have waited on him; and if CÆSAR had any with ARIOVISTUS, he might give himself the same trouble: for his part he would not venture his person in the Roman dominions without an army, nor did he design to put himself to the trouble and expence of raising one for that purpose. And he wondered extremely

His answer.

WAR IN extremely that CÆSAR or the Romans should concern  
GAUL. themselves with those parts of Gaul, which the right of  
conquest had made his inheritance."

A second  
embassage.  
Cæsar's de-  
mands.

35. Upon receipt of this answer, CÆSAR sent a second embassage to acquaint him, "That since he had so ill returned the honour done him by the people of Rome (who, during his consulate, had vouchsafed him the title of king and ally) as to refuse a parley for the public good, he had sent him his demands; which were, first, that he should permit no more troops to be transported from Germany into Gaul. Secondly, that he should return the hostages received from the people of Autun, that he should permit the Franche-comtois to do the like, and cease all further acts of injustice or hostility against them and their allies; on these conditions, CÆSAR would engage, in behalf of the Romans, that they should receive him into favour, and maintain a perpetual friendship with him: but, if he would not comply with the terms proposed, CÆSAR was obliged, by a decree of the senate made during the consulship of M. MESSALA and M. PISO, to revenge the injuries done to the people of Autun; for by that decree it was enacted, that all governors of the Province should, for the future, as far as might be consistent with the interest of the commonwealth, endeavour to defend their friends and allies."

Ariovistus's  
reply.

36. To which ARIOVISTUS made answer, "That, according to the law of arms, the conqueror had a right of governing those he had subdued, as he thought fit; the Romans did the same, and if he had not presumed to prescribe them rules of government, he knew not why they should interfere with his: That the Autunois had undergone the decision of war, and by the law of arms were become his tributaries: That the Romans had done him injustice, since by their arrival his tribute had been ill paid: That he would not return their hostages, nor yet should he make war upon the Autunois or their allies, provided they observed their agreement, and paid their tribute yearly; but in default of it, they should find the friendship of the Romans stand them in little stead. And as for CÆSAR, he would have him take notice, since he designed to espouse their quarrel, no man ever yet contended with ARIOVISTUS, but to his own destruction; therefore, let him begin as soon as he pleased, the Germans were ready to receive him, and would let him see what it was to dispute with a warlike

warlike nation, who had not for fourteen years lain under any other canopy than that of heaven."

WAR IN  
GAUL.

C H A P. XV.

37. AT the same time CÆSAR received this answer, ambassadors arrived from Autun and Treves; the first to complain, that the new colony from Constance had entered their country with fire and sword, and that they could not purchase their peace from ARIOVISTUS by delivery of hostages; the other, to acquaint him, that an hundred cantons of the Suabians were arrived at the river Rhine, in order to pass into Gaul, under the command of two brothers, NASUA and CIMBER. CÆSAR was much concerned at this news, and thinking it the wisest way to engage ARIOVISTUS before the Suabians had joined him, he provided his army with corn, and followed the Germans with all expedition.

38. After three days march he had intelligence that ARIOVISTUS was gone about three days before to invest Besançon, the capital of Franche-comte.

Besançon was well stored with all sorts of provisions, and so conveniently situated, that he who commanded it might prolong the war at pleasure; for it was encompassed by the river Doux, except about six hundred foot of land, which nature had fortified with a very steep mountain, the basis of which on both sides was washed by the river. This mountain was surrounded by a wall, which forming a citadel, joined it to the town. CÆSAR marched with the utmost diligence to the city, and threw a strong garrison into it.

Besançon de-  
scribed.

39. Here taking up his quarters for a few days, while he laid in fresh provisions, the soldiers were informed by the natives and merchants of the country, that the Germans were men of prodigious stature, invincible courage, and extraordinary knowledge in the art of war, which the Gauls had often experienced to their sorrow; for whenever they engaged them, they could scarce withstand the very lightning of their eyes, and the terror of their countenances. The whole army were strangely frightened at this report, but especially the tribunes, the chief officers, and such raw soldiers as had followed CÆSAR from Rome to make a campaign out of a compliment. These were the first that began to deplore their danger, and some of them, pretending extraordinary business, desired he would be pleased

The Roman  
army fright-  
ed at the re-  
port of the  
German  
stature and  
courage.



WAR IN to give them their discharge; even those whom shame re-  
GAUL. strained, betrayed their fear by their countenances, some-  
times by their tears, and retiring to their tents, bewailed  
their destiny alone, whilst others did the like with their  
comrades; nay, so far did these terrible apprehensions pre-  
vail, that wills were seen signing throughout the army. The  
cowardice of these men by degrees began to infect the ve-  
teran soldiers, the centurions, and horse-commanders, and  
they who scorned to discover their apprehensions, declared  
they were not afraid of the enemy, but of the narrow passes  
and thick woods which lay between our camp and ARI-  
VISTUS; whilst others pretended to despair of the possibi-  
lity of receiving provisions; and some had even the as-  
surance to tell CÆSAR, whenever he should command the  
soldiers to their arms and march, they would certainly  
disobey his orders.

### CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar calls a  
council of  
war; his  
speech.

40. CÆSAR, observing so great a consternation,  
called a council of war, to which he summoned even the  
centurions of the lowest rank; and so soon as the assembly  
was met, having first severely reprimanded them, "for  
presuming to enquire or conjecture whither, and upon  
what expedition they were going, he told them, that ARI-  
OVISTUS, during his consulate, earnestly courted the  
friendship of the Roman people, and he knew no reason  
any man had to suspect that he should, in so short a time,  
have forgot his duty; as for his particular, he was persua-  
ded, that if ARIOVISTUS did but know what reasonable  
proposals he designed to offer him, he would not refuse his  
friendship, and the favour of the commonwealth: but  
supposing he should be so much his own enemy as to make  
war upon the Romans, what occasion had they to be afraid  
of him? what reason had they to suspect their own virtue,  
or their general's diligence? for, should it come to a bat-  
tle, the enemy they were to engage with, had twice been  
tried before, first, in the memory of their fathers, when  
the Teutons and Cimbri were defeated by C. MARIUS, in  
which battle the army obtained as much honour as their  
general: and since that, in Italy, during the rebellion of  
the slaves, who had the advantage of being skilled in the  
Roman discipline; from whence might be inferred what  
noble actions resolution could accomplish; for that very  
army they were afraid of whilst unarmed, they after-  
wards

wards subdued when flushed with victory. In fine, that these Germans were the same the Swiss had worsted in several rencounters, as well in Germany as Switzerland, and yet the Swiss were not able to maintain their ground against the Romans. WAR IN GAUL.

But if any man drew conclusions from the defeat of the Gauls, upon farther enquiry he might be satisfied, that these for many months besieged ARIOVISTUS in his camp, pitched in a fenny country; but at length despairing of a general battle, and being wearied with a tedious war, dispersed themselves; upon which ARIOVISTUS laying hold of the opportunity, subdued them more by policy than courage: but he would find himself in a great error, if he expected to ensnare the Romans, as he had a barbarous and unskilful people. As for those who pretended the cause of their fear was the difficulty of being supplied with provisions, and the danger of the passes; they betrayed extraordinary insolence, in assuming the liberty to direct their general, as if he himself was ignorant of his duty; but they might lay aside their apprehensions, for he had taken care Lorrain and Franche-comte should furnish them with what they wanted; besides, the corn was almost ripe in all the fields they were to pass through; and as for the ways, themselves should quickly be judges of their error.

Nor did the report, that the soldiers would refuse to march, disturb him in the least, for, he was satisfied, no army ever slighted their general's commands, but on account of his ill success, or notorious avarice; neither of which imputations could be charged on him, witness his constant integrity, and his late victory over the Swiss: wherefore he was resolved immediately to execute that, which he once designed to have deferred to a longer time; for the next morning early he would decamp, and try whether shame and duty would not prevail over their cowardise: that he would make the tenth legion his life-guard, whose readiness he did not doubt of; and, if no body else would follow him, with them alone he would go in search of the enemy." For CÆSAR had a particular esteem for this legion, in whose courage he placed a singular confidence.

41. This speech wrought so wonderful an alteration on the minds of the whole army, that every man seemed brisk, and desirous of an engagement: nor did the tenth legion forget to return him thanks, by their tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them, assuring him how industrious they would be to deserve it: the rest following their

Cæsar begins  
his march.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

their example, by their tribunes and centurions took care to inform him, that they never doubted or pretended to form a judgment of the success of that expedition; for they always submitted those things to his wisdom: whereupon CÆSAR, having learned from DIVITIACUS (in whom he confided more than in any of the Gauls) that, taking a circuit of forty miles, he might lead his army through an open champaign country, according to his former resolution, early in the morning began his march.

## C H A P. XVII.

42. THE seventh day after his departure from Befançon, he had intelligence that ARIOVISTUS was about four and twenty miles off; who being informed of CÆSAR'S arrival, sent ambassadors to let him know, since fortune had brought them so near, provided it might be done without danger, he was willing to accept of an interview. CÆSAR readily complied with the offer, hoping ARIOVISTUS was at last returned to himself, since he now desired that of his own accord which he refused before; and that, considering the proposals he designed to make him, he would at length reflect on the many favours he had received from CÆSAR and the people of Rome, and no longer so obstinately oppose an accommodation.

The fifth day was appointed for the interview, and in the mean time there passed several messages between them. ARIOVISTUS desired CÆSAR would bring no infantry along with him to the treaty, and that each of them should come attended only by their cavalry, to avoid surprize, for otherwise he would not agree to a meeting. CÆSAR being unwilling the interview should be put off, and at the same time not daring to confide in the French cavalry, dismounted the Gauls, and gave their horses to his faithful tenth legion, that he might have a guard, if occasion were, on which he could rely: whereupon one of the soldiers of that legion wittily said, "That CÆSAR had been better than his word, for he only promised they should be his foot guard, but now he had made them his cavalry."

The inter-  
view be-  
tween Cæsar  
and Ario-  
vistus,

43. In the midst of a spacious and open plain, between the two armies, was a rising ground, where, according to agreement, the interview was held: the legion which CÆSAR had put on horseback, he posted two hundred paces short of the mount, the like did ARIOVISTUS by his cavalry, desiring they might discourse on horseback,  
each

each bringing only ten persons to the conference. So soon as they met, CÆSAR began to remind him of “ the favours and advantages he had formerly received from him and the senate of Rome, who had given him the title of king and friend, sending him at the same time considerable presents; honours the Romans conferred but on few, and upon those for signal desert, which had notwithstanding been bestowed on him by the sole favour of CÆSAR, and bounty of the senate.” He also laid before him “ the ancient and just alliance which had been so sacred between the Romans and people of Autun, and the frequent and honourable decrees which had been made by the senate in their favour; that they had from all antiquity held the principality of Gaul, even before their alliance with Rome; and it was not usual with the Romans to suffer the authority of their friends to be diminished; but on the contrary to endeavour the increase of it. To see them lose those native privileges of honour, which they brought with them as a dowry to the Roman friendship, was too injurious to be borne. In fine, he demanded the same conditions which he had formerly offered him by his ambassadors; that he should never make war on the Autunois nor their allies; that he should return the hostages, and if he could not oblige some of his Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he should not permit any more to come into Gaul.”


WAR IN  
GAUL.  
  
Cæsar's  
speech.

44. ARIOVISTUS made little answer to CÆSAR's demands, but enlarged much on his own virtues; saying, “ That he had not crossed the Rhine of his own accord, but on the invitation of the Gauls; nor deserted his country and relations, but in hopes of a considerable reward for his trouble: That the natives had voluntarily allotted him a portion of land, delivered hostages, and that tribute was his due by the right of conquest: Nor did he make war upon the Gauls before they had given the first occasion, whose confederate force he defeated in one single battle; and if they desired a second trial, he was ready to engage them again; but if they expected peace, it was unreasonable they should refuse the payment of that tribute which they had so long willingly submitted to: That he expected the friendship of the Romans would have proved both honourable and advantageous to him, for which reason he courted it; but if he must purchase it at so dear a rate as the loss of his tribute, he should as readily renounce as he accepted it.

Ariovistus's  
answer.



WAR IN  
GAUL.



That as he had not transported so many Germans into Gaul with a design to subdue the country, but only for his own protection (for he came thither at their request) so neither had he engaged in any war with the natives, but in his own defence: that he was seated in Gaul before the Romans came thither; nor had they ever marched their armies beyond the bounds of their province before that time, and he did not understand what they meant by invading his territories; for he had as good a title to that part of Gaul as the Romans had to their province, who ought not to encroach upon his dominions any more than he on theirs. As for the pretence that the Autunois were by the senate decreed the allies of Rome, he would have CÆSAR know, he was not so barbarous and ignorant of the affairs of the world, as not to remark that during the last war with the Savoyards, the Autunois assisted the Romans, who in return helped them against the Franche-comtois; and he had too sufficient reason to suspect, that, under the pretence of an alliance with these, the Romans maintained an army in Gaul with a design to ruin him; therefore if they did not immediately quit his dominions, he should no longer esteem them his friends, but his enemies: that he was well assured by letters from Rome, if he had the good fortune to kill CÆSAR, he should do several noblemen there a very acceptable piece of service, which they would think themselves infinitely obliged to him for: however, if he would depart without disturbing his peaceable possession, he would not only gratefully reward him for it, but be obliged, at his own proper hazard and expence, to undertake any war which CÆSAR should desire."

Cæsar's reply.

45. CÆSAR on the other hand, "urged several reasons why he could not desist from his former resolution; first, his own honour; next, the custom of the republic, which never deserted her well-deserving allies: Nor could he be persuaded that ARIOVISTUS had a better title to Gaul than the Romans; for FABIVS MAXIMVS fairly conquered the people of Auvergne and Rouërgue, whom he might have reduced into a province, and made tributaries to the empire, if he had not thought proper to pardon them: If antiquity is to be our guide, the Gauls owe submission to the Romans; if we follow the judgment of the senate, they enjoy their liberties by the indulgence of the Romans."

The Germans treachery.

46. During this dispute, CÆSAR was informed that ARIOVISTUS's cavalry came nearer the mount, and had assaulted

assaulted our men with a volley of stones and darts; whereupon he immediately broke off the treaty, and retiring to his party, commanded them not to return the enemy's treachery; for, though he might safely have engaged them with that select legion, he waved it, because the Germans should not pretend he had drawn them into an ambush on pretence of a treaty, contrary to his oath and agreement. So soon as the common soldiers were informed how insolently **ARIOVISTUS** had behaved himself at the interview; how he had commanded the Romans to be gone out of Gaul; how his cavalry had assaulted the tenth legion, and that thereupon the treaty broke off, rage and contempt inspired every man with a greater desire to fight than ever.

47. About two days after, **ARIOVISTUS** sent deputies again to **CÆSAR** to desire a second interview, that they might finish their imperfect treaty; or if he did not approve of that, to send plenipotentiaries to conclude such agreement as they should think fit to consent to: but **CÆSAR** was not inclinable to grant a second meeting, because the Germans had not observed their agreement the time before; nor did he think it convenient to expose the persons of any of his followers to the infidelity of so inhumane and barbarous a people: wherefore he sent **M. VALERIUS PROCILLUS** (the son of **C. VALERIUS CABURIUS**, whom **C. VALERIUS FLACCUS** had made a freeman of Rome) a polite and honourable youth, whom he pitched upon for his extraordinary integrity, and expertness in the language of the Gauls, which **ARIOVISTUS** had learned by living so long amongst them, thinking him a person against whom the Germans could take no exception; and joined **M. METIUS**, who was particularly well acquainted with **ARIOVISTUS**, in commission with him, giving them orders to hear what proposals the Germans would offer, and then make their report to **CÆSAR**: but so soon as **ARIOVISTUS** saw them arrived at his camp, in the presence of his army, he demanded their business, whether they came thither as spies? and, before they could answer him, commanded them to be clapt in irons.

WAR IN GAUL.

*ARIOVISTUS desires a second interview, which Cæsar denies.*

*ARIOVISTUS puts the Roman plenipotentiaries in irons.*

48. The same day he decamped, and lodged himself under a hill, about six miles from **CÆSAR**: the day after marching by our army, he encamped about two miles beyond us; designing to cut off our convoys from Autun and Franche-comte: five days successively, after this, **CÆSAR** drew his army out of their trenches, in order to give the enemy

WAR IN enemy battle, which ARIOVISTUS declined, keeping with-  
GAUL. in his camp; but we had frequent skirmishes with parties  
of the enemy's horse.

The Ger-  
man way of  
fighting.

This was a method of fighting, in which the Germans were very expert: they had 6000 horse, and as many foot, chosen out of the whole army by the horse, for their extraordinary strength and activity, each horseman had one for his guard; these perpetually attended them in the battle, and assisted them in time of necessity, for if a horseman was not a sufficient match for his enemy, if he was wounded or unhorfed, one of these immediately came in to his relief; and if there was occasion either for a quick pursuit or retreat, continual exercise had made them so nimble, that, holding by the main, they could run as swift as the horses.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar's two  
camps.


49. CÆSAR perceiving that ARIOVISTUS still kept within his camp, not daring to give him battle, lest the Germans should intercept his convoys from Franche-comte, he chose a convenient place for a new camp, about 600 paces beyond that of the enemy; and marching thither in three battalions, he commanded two of them to defend the rest, whilst they intrenched themselves. ARIOVISTUS sent 6000 foot and all his cavalry to interrupt this design; but CÆSAR commanded the two battalions, according to his former orders, to oppose the enemy, and the third to go forward with their works; which being completed, he left two legions there, with part of the auxiliary forces, and retired with the other four to the larger camp.

50. Agreeably to the design he had formed; the next day CÆSAR drawing his whole army out of both their camps, offered the enemy battle, and perceiving they did not stir out of their trenches, about noon returned again: but at length ARIOVISTUS sent a detachment to attack the lesser camp; whereupon there began a hot dispute on both sides, which continued till sun-set, when ARIOVISTUS, after many wounds given and received, sounded a retreat. CÆSAR, enquiring of the prisoners why the Germans declined fighting, was informed, that, according to the custom of their country, the women were always to decide by lot and augury the proper times for giving battle, and that they declared the Germans should not be victorious, if they engaged before the new moon.

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*The Camps of Caesar and*



A. Caesar's Camp  
B. Ariovistus's Camp.

C. The first & second  
Caesar's forces in  
D. The 3<sup>d</sup>. making of leys



second line of  
in Arms.  
of lesser Camp.

E. All Ariovistus's  
Army.

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## C H A P. XIX.

51. THE next day after, CÆSAR, leaving sufficient parties to secure his camps, ranged all his auxiliary troops to make a shew, before the lesser camp, because the number of his legionary soldiers was very inconsiderable in respect of the enemy; and, disposing these into three lines, marched directly towards ARIOVISTUS's camp; whereupon the Germans being compelled, at last drew out their forces, ranging each different canton at an equal distance, in the same order of battle; viz. those of Constance, Mairhorn, Straßburg, Worms, Spires, Franconia, and Suabia; and then surrounded the army with their carriages, to take away all hopes of security by flight. In these they placed their women, who weeping and tearing their hair, besought their husbands, as they went to the battle, to fight like men of courage, to preserve them from falling into the hands of the Romans.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

## C H A P. XX.

52. CÆSAR having assigned each legion a lieutenant and a questor, who might be witnesses of every man's behaviour, began the fight himself at the head of the right wing, because he perceived the enemy to be weakest in that part. As soon as the sign of battle was given, our soldiers pressed on so briskly, and the enemy advanced so furiously, that there was no room to discharge the pila, so that our men threw them away, and were obliged to have immediate recourse to their swords. But the Germans casting themselves into a phalanx, according to the custom of their country, received the charge with little loss, which several of the legionary soldiers perceiving, leaped upon the phalanx, tore up the targets with their hands, and slew those that lurked under them. The enemy's left wing was routed: but their right, overpowering us with numbers, obliged us to give way. Which young P. CRASSUS, general of the horse, perceiving, as he might more easily than those who were actually engaged, immediately dispatched the third line of battle to sustain us.

The armies  
engage.

53. Upon this, the fight was renewed with fresh vigour, and at length the enemy's army entirely put to flight; nor did they ever look back till they arrived at the Rhine, about fifty miles distance from the field: Being there arrived



WAR IN rived some few escaped by swimming the river, whilst  
GAUL. others got over in little boats, and ARIOVISTUS embarking  
in a small vessel, recovered the other side; but his two  
wives had not the same fortune, for neither of them sur-  
vived the battle; one of these was a Suabian, whom he  
brought with him from his own country; the other a Ba-  
varian, sister to king VOCION, sent him by her brother  
into Gaul, and married there; nor did his two daughters  
escape, for one was slain, and the other taken prisoner.

The Ger-  
mans routed,  
Procillus re-  
taken.

CÆSAR pursuing the German cavalry, by chance over-  
took VALERIUS PROCILLUS while he was dragged along  
bound with three chains. This opportunity of rescuing  
his particular friend, by whom he had been hospitably re-  
ceived, gave him as much pleasure as the victory itself.  
Nor was fortune without her share in preserving this joy  
entire to him. For thrice, he said, had his life been at stake,  
while lots were cast before his face, whether he should be  
committed to the flames immediately, or have a farther  
respite. At the same time M. METIUS was likewise re-  
taken. The fame of this victory reaching beyond the  
Rhine, the Suabians, who had advanced to the banks of  
that river, began to direct their course homewards: But  
the people of Colen taking the opportunity, pursued  
them whilst confused, and slew considerable numbers of  
them in their retreat.

CÆSAR having thus successively ended two such im-  
portant wars in one campaign, put his troops into winter-  
quarters in Franchecomte, something sooner than the sea-  
son of the year required; and, committing them to the  
care of LABIENUS, returned into Lombardy, to preside at  
the general diet,



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C. J. CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARY  
OF HIS  
WAR in GAUL.

---

The SECOND BOOK.

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*His war with the confederate Belgæ: his success in  
Picardy and Hainault.*

CHAP. I.

IN the winter-time, whilst CÆSAR was in Lombardy, WAR IN  
GAUL.  
he had several reports, which were afterwards confirmed by letters from LABIENUS, that all the states of the Belgæ, who, as we have already said, possessed a third part of Gaul, had given hostages to each other, and entered into a mutual league against the Romans. The Belgæ  
enter into a  
confederacy  
against the  
Romans. The occasion of this confederacy, was their apprehension, that, when CÆSAR had subdued their neighbours, he would turn his forces upon them; besides, they were solicited to it by such Gauls as began to think the Roman army, which had taken winter-quarters in their country, as troublesome guests as the Germans; and by such as love innovations, from the mere instability of their temper; and lastly, by those who perceived it was an easy matter for him, who had most money and men at command, to make himself master of all the provinces of Gaul, provided the Romans were once expelled.

2. Where-

WAR IN GAUL. 2. Whereupon CÆSAR levied two new legions in Lombardy, and sent them under the command of his lieutenant Q. PEDIUS into the inner part of Gaul, himself following after early in the spring, so soon as there was forage for his horses. Upon his arrival at the army, he wrote to the inhabitants of Sens, and the other Gauls that bordered on the Belgæ, to observe the enemy's motions, and send him daily intelligence what they were doing: from these he had notice that the Belgæ were very busy in raising an army, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous: wherefore thinking it convenient to lose no further time, he immediately drew his forces out of their winter-quarters, and resolved to begin his march within twelve days; which he did, and arrived within fifteen more, on the confines of the Belgæ.

3. His coming was so sudden and unexpected, that the people of Rheims, whose country lay nearest the Gauls, being surprized at it, dispatched away IECIUS and ANTEBROGIUS, persons of the greatest quality in their province, as ambassadors, to assure CÆSAR they had not concerned themselves in the confederacy with the rest of the Belgæ against the Romans, but were ready to submit to the empire; and, as a proof of their innocence, offered to deliver hostages, to receive him into their towns, and furnish the army with what provisions they had occasion for. They owned that the rest of the Belgæ were all in arms; that the Germans on the other side the Rhine had promised them assistance; and that their countrymen were so hotly bent upon the expedition, that all they could do to restrain them, was not sufficient to prevent those of Soissons from entering into the same alliance, though they were their brethren, and observed so strict a friendship on all other occasions, that they were governed by the same laws, customs, and magistrates, being almost incorporated under one government.

## CHAP. II.

Cæsar having received the people of Rheims into protection, they give him intelligence. 4. CÆSAR inquiring of the ambassadors what people, and how powerful they were that had taken up arms, was informed that the Belgæ were originally descended from the Germans, who had crossed the Rhine, expelled the natives, and, tempted by the fertility of the country, had taken possession of it: that these were the only people, who, during the dreadful inundation of the Teutons and Cimb-  
bers,

bers, had maintained their ground, whilst the other provinces of Gaul were over-run by those Barbarians; the memory of which success inspired them with extraordinary courage. They likewise told him, that by reason of their alliance and neighbourhood to them, they had opportunities of informing themselves what quota of men each particular province had promised in the general assembly, to provide for carrying on the war: that those of Beauvois, who were more numerous, warlike, and potent than the rest of the Belgæ, were able to raise 100,000 men, out of which number they obliged themselves to bring 60,000 into the field, in consideration whereof they expected to have the management of the war committed to their charge: that next to these, in a spacious and fertile country, lay the people of Soissons; lately subject to DIVITIACUS, once the most potent man in Gaul, who was not only master of a considerable part of that country, but had some footing likewise in Britain; but GALBA was their present king, who, by the general consent of the confederates, was, for the sake of his singular conduct and justice, made Generalissimo; these had twelve fortified towns, and promised to furnish 50,000 men: next, those of Hainault, who are the most barbarous people in all that country, were to provide the like number; those of Arras 15,000, Amiens and Caux each 10,000, Vexen and Vermandois together the like number, Torouëne 25,000, Guelders 9000, Douay 20,000, Condrotz, Liege, Namur, Luxemburg, and the rest of the Germans together, 40,000.


5. CÆSAR, to encourage the people of Rheims to continue faithful to the Romans, promised to reward them liberally, if they observed their alliance, commanding them to deliver him their senate and the best of their noblemen for hostages, which they readily performed by the day prefixed; then sending for DIVITIACUS, he informed him how necessary it was, for the public safety, to make a diversion, that the enemy might be obliged to separate their forces; and therefore commanded him to return to Autun, and enter the territories of the Belgæ on that side with fire and sword.

## C H A P. III.

BEING informed afterwards by his scouts and the people of Rheims, that the confederate armies of the Belgæ, being joined, marched directly towards him, and were  
already



WAR IN  
GAUL.



already within a few miles of his camp, he immediately passed the Aſne, which divides Rheims from the reſt of the Belgæ, and encamped on the banks of the river, whereby he prevented any ſurprize from the enemy, and ſecured a communication with Rheims and thoſe other cities whence he expected provisions: to ſecure his retreat croſs the river, he poſted a ſtrong party on the bridge, leaving TITURIUS SABRICUS, one of his lieutenants, on the other ſide with fix cohorts, who had orders to fortify their camp with a trench eighteen foot broad, and a rampart twelve foot high.

#### CHAP. IV.

Their manner of assaulting a town.

6. THE Belgæ were in hopes to have ſurprized Brienne, a town about eight miles diſtance from CÆSAR'S camp; and ſtormed it ſo furiously, that it was ſcarce able to hold out one day. The Celtæ and Belgæ uſe the ſame method in aſſaults; for having ſurrounded the walls, they never ceaſe ſlinging of ſtones till they have ſwept the beſieged off the battlements; then caſting themſelves into a teſtudo, they approach the gate, and undermine the walls; which they might do with great eaſe at Brienne; for ſo numerous were the ſlingers and thoſe that caſt darts, that it was impoſſible for the gariſon to ſtand their ſhot. So ſoon as night had ended the aſſault, ICCIUS, a man of the greateſt quality and intereſt in Rheims, who had not long before been ſent embaſſador to CÆSAR, diſpatched away a courier to our camp, to inform us, unleſs he was quickly relieved, he muſt be obliged to ſurrender the town.

The ſiege of Brienne raiſed by the Romans.

7. CÆSAR ſoon answered his demands; for, making uſe of the courier for a guide, he detached a party of Candian and Numidian archers, with a number of Belearian ſlingers, whom he immediately ſent to their aſſiſtance; which infused freſh courage into the beſieged, and put the enemy out of hopes; who having laid the country waſte, and burnt the villages round about, left the ſiege, and marching in one body towards us, lodged themſelves within two miles of our army, enclosing above eight miles for their camp, as near as could be computed by their fires in the night, and ſmoke in the day.

#### CHAP. V.

The two armies drawn up.

8. CÆSAR at firſt did not deſign to give them battle, becauſe they were reported to be as valiant as numerous; but having tried their courage in ſmall ſkirmiſhes, he perceived

perceived his soldiers were able to cope with them; so making choice of a convenient place before his camp, he drew up his army in order of battle. The little hill whereon we had entrenched ourselves, rising with an easy ascent from the plain below, was but just of a sufficient breadth to contain the front of our army, where the legions were drawn up, descending somewhat steeper on both sides: here, to prevent the enemy's surrounding our men, or charging them in the flank, CÆSAR took care to make a trench from one side of the hill to the other, containing six hundred paces in length, and built little bulwarks at each end, which were well provided with engines to repulse the enemy. So leaving the two legions, lately lifted in Lombardy, in his camp for a reserve, he drew up the other six on the front of the hill before his camp; the Belgæ did the like, and faced our army.

9. Between us and the enemy there lay a marsh, which they believed we would have passed; and we on the other hand expected the like from them, designing to attack them whilst they were endeavouring to get over so troublesome a place: in the mean time the cavalry on both sides engaged; but neither army attempting to cross the marsh, CÆSAR, having had the better in the skirmish, returned to his camp.

Not long after, the enemy decamped, marching towards the river Aisne, which lay behind us, and attempted to cross the water where it was fordable, designing to make themselves masters of the fort which Q. TITURIUS commanded, and to break down the bridge, or at least to harass the country of Rheims and intercept our convoys.

10. Upon notice of this from TITURIUS, CÆSAR crossed the bridge, and marched to his relief at the head of his cavalry, light-armed Numidians, slingers, and archers; where he had a sharp dispute with the Belgæ. The Romans, charging the enemy as they were crossing the river, slew great numbers of them; and those who were so desperate as to endeavour to make a bridge of the carcases of their dead countrymen, in spite of their utmost efforts were repulsed by the soldiers from the shore, whilst they who had safely arrived on the other side were encompassed by our cavalry, and put to the sword.

The Belgæ finding themselves thus disappointed of their hopes, that they could neither gain Brienne, pass the river, nor draw the Romans out of their camp to some disadvantageous post, and considering their provisions were al-

WAR IN most spent; called a council of war, wherein they resolved GAUL. to break up, and return each man to his own country; obliging themselves, in case the Romans invaded any of their confines, that all the rest should immediately come to their assistance; for they judged it safer to fight at home, where they might be secure of provisions, than to dispute the matter in a foreign country; nor was it the smallest inducement to this resolution, that they were informed DIVITIACUS, with a strong party of Autunois, was already on his march to the confines of Beauvois, which obliged them to make a speedy retreat, to defend that country.

## C H A P. VI.

The Belgæ  
decamp, and  
return home.

II. THIS resolution being agreed to by the whole army, about the second watch of the night they began to leave their camp with extraordinary noise and confusion, each man contending for the foremost rank, that he might be soonest at home, marching in as disorderly a manner, as if they had been put to the rout. CÆSAR, who had notice of this from his scouts, being jealous of some design, because he could not conceive the reason of their departure, did not stir out of his trenches; but the next morning early, upon further intelligence, he first detached QUINTUS PEDIUS and L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA, two of his lieutenants, with the cavalry; and after them T. LABIENUS at the head of three legions, with command to attack the enemy's rear. These overtaking the Belgæ, pursued them several miles, and put great numbers to the sword; whilst their rear faced about to receive our charge, the van-guard, who were out of danger, paying no manner of obedience to their officers, broke their ranks, ran away, and deserted their companions, of whom the Romans made a dreadful slaughter, 'till night and their general's commands obliged them to their camp.

The Ro-  
mans attack  
their rear.

## C H A P. VII.

12. THE next day, before the enemy were recovered from their consternation, CÆSAR marched his army to Soissons, which joins to the country of Rheims, and after a tedious journey arrived at Noïon, which he hoped to have surprized, because he was informed it wanted provisions, and a garrison to defend it; but he was disappointed by the breadth of the ditch, and extraordinary height of the wall

wall that surrounded it; wherefore, having fortified his camp, he began to prepare for a formal siege.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

The night after, all the Soissonois who had escaped the slaughter, threw themselves into the town; but surprized at the mounts and batteries he had raised in so short a time, works which the Gauls had never seen before nor heard of, they beat a parley, sent deputies to treat of a surrender; and, by the intercession of their neighbours of Rheims, obtained their suit.

Neion be-  
sieged and  
taken.

13. After they had delivered up their arms, and the chief persons of their country as hostages, amongst whom were GALBA's two sons, they were admitted to mercy.

## CHAP. VIII.


FROM thence CÆSAR marched against those of Beauvois, who having retired with all their moveables into the capital of the same name, had intelligence that CÆSAR was arrived within five miles of the town; whereupon they sent all the reverend old men to meet him, who in a submissive posture said, that they came to surrender themselves to his discretion, and would no longer presume to bear arms against the people of Rome; and when he had encamped his army nearer the town; the boys and women from the walls, with stretched out arms, according to the custom of their country, humbly besought him that he would vouchsafe to grant them peace.

Cæsar  
marches to  
Beauvois,  
which sub-  
mits.

14. For these DIVITIACUS (who had dismissed his army in Autun, and returned to CÆSAR, so soon as he heard the enemy had broken up) interceded, alledging, "That the people of Beauvois had always been faithful friends to those of Autun, and were ready to assist them upon all occasions; nor had they entered into this confederacy against the Romans, forsaking their old allies, unless they had been persuaded to it by their nobility, who made them believe that the Autunois were enslaved by the Romans, and laboured under the vilest oppressions: That the authors of this conspiracy, finding into how miserable condition they had plunged their country, were fled into England: That the people of Beauvois not only sued for CÆSAR's wonted clemency themselves; but those of Autun were become intercessors; whose credit and authority CÆSAR would raise, by this indulgence, among the Belgæ, where they had formerly upon every occasion been obliged to ask assistance."



WAR IN  
GAUL.



Amiens sur-  
renders.

The customs  
of the Hai-  
naultois.

15. CÆSAR being moved by the mediation of DIVITIACUS and the Autunois, promised to forgive them; but, because their dominions were larger, more populous, and powerful than the rest of the Belgæ, he demanded 600 hostages; which being delivered, together with their arms, he left their city, and marched directly to Amiens, which surrendered at discretion, without any trouble.


Next to Amiens lived the people of Hainault; "who, as CÆSAR was informed, held no commerce with other countries, never suffered wine, or any other luxurious merchandize, as might enervate their bodies, or debase their minds, to be imported amongst them; a warlike, savage people, who always condemned the rest of the Belgæ for submitting to the Roman yoke; declaring they would neither send ambassadors, nor accept of peace on any terms."

16. CÆSAR, after three days march in their country, received information from some prisoners, that the enemy were posted on the other side the Sambre, a river about ten miles distant from his camp, where they waited for the Romans: that they were already joined by those of Arras and Vermandois, whom they had persuaded to share their fortune, and daily expected a further supply from Liege: that they had disposed of their women, and such whose age made them unfit for war, in a place by themselves, rendered inaccessible by the marshes that surrounded it.

17. On this information, CÆSAR dispatched his scouts and centurions, to provide a convenient place to encamp in.

Deferters  
carry intelli-  
gence to the  
enemy.

Some of the Belgæ, who had surrendered themselves, and were in CÆSAR's camp (as we afterwards learned from the prisoners) observing the particular order of the Romans march, deserted in the night to the enemy, and informed them, that between each legion marched a part of the heavy baggage; and that they might easily defeat the first legion, so soon as they were arrived in the camp, whilst they were incumbered by their baggage, and at so great a distance from the rest, that they could not readily be supported; which success would put the other legions into such a consternation, that they would not have the courage to maintain their ground. This advice made the greater impression, because the people of Hainault (who were always more expert at fighting on foot than horseback) used formerly to prevent their neighbours from making inroads into



into their country, by a fortification of young trees, whose boughs they bent into the earth, filled up the vacancies so close with thorns, that it served them instead of a wall, which could neither be penetrated nor even seen through. Whilst therefore they contrived to stop the progress of our army by this bulwark, they thought it convenient to put the other expedient in practice.

18. The place which the Romans made choice of to encamp in, was a hill, from whence there was an even descent to the Sambre; and on the farther side of the river, directly opposite to us, about two hundred paces distance, was another hill, plain and open at the foot, but so thick and woody in the upper part, that it concluded our prospect. The enemy had covered themselves in these woods; and in the open ground, by the river side, which was but three foot deep thereabouts, appeared only some few troops of horse.


19. CÆSAR, sending his cavalry before, followed close after with the rest of the army, but had altered the disposition of his march, since the intelligence conveyed to the enemy; for, knowing he was near the Hainaultois, according to his usual custom, he had placed six legions in the front, who had nothing to carry but their arms; leaving the charge of the whole baggage to the two new legions, who marched in the rear.

## CHAP. IX.

THE Roman cavalry, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, engaged the enemy's horse, who at first retired to their companions in the wood, then sallied out again; but the Romans did not think fit to pursue them further than the open ground. The six legions in the front, according to the general's orders, had already begun to intrench themselves, when the enemy seeing our foremost carriages arrived, which was the sign appointed for making their sally, rushed from behind the thickets in order of battle with all their forces; and having easily broke their way through our cavalry, run with such incredible swiftness down the banks of the Sambre, that they seemed at the same instant to be in the woods, at the river, and charging our legions on the other side; for mounting the hill with the same fury they had descended from the banks, they fell upon our soldiers in the works, before they had time to perceive their danger.

The battle  
with the  
Hainaultois.

WAR IN  
GAUL.



20. Now had CÆSAR, at the same instant, all these several things upon his hands; hanging out the flag to give the soldiers warning to repair to their arms, proclaiming the fight by sound of trumpet, drawing off the soldiers from the works, recalling those who were gone to fetch materials for the rampart, ranging the army in order of battle, encouraging the men, and giving out the word by which they were to distinguish their friends from their foes in the heat of the engagement; most of which the unexpected attack of the enemy prevented, by not allowing us time.

## CHAP. X.

The experience of the Roman soldiers.

IN the midst of these difficulties, two things fell out to the advantage of the Romans; one was, each private soldier had so much experience, that he knew his duty, and what was proper to be done upon such an emergency, as well as his officer; the other, that the legions who were employed about the works, and had been commanded by CÆSAR not to leave off 'till his further orders, respecting more the necessity of assisting their fellows, than their general's commands, followed the dictates of their own discretion.

21. CÆSAR having distributed the necessary orders, made haste to encourage the first body of his soldiers he could meet, which happened to be the tenth legion, to whom he said no more, than that he hoped they would remember their antient virtue, and, notwithstanding the surprize, manfully sustain the assault; and being at no further distance from the enemy, than was just sufficient for casting their pila, he gave them the sign of battle; then going to another part of the army, he found it already engaged. So short was the time which the fury of the enemy allowed us, that the officers had not leisure to put on their ornaments of distinction, nor the men their head-pieces, or to uncover their targets; but each soldier, joining himself to the first standard he met, stood to his arms, that he might not lose that time in seeking for his own company, which was to be spent in fighting.

22. The army being drawn up, rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, and particular necessity of the time, than as art-military and order required, the legions engaged the enemy in several places at once; and as a general view of the battle was hindered

by

by the thickets which we spoke of before, it was impossible to know where succours were wanted, or to conduct the fight by one uniform design; an inconvenience that rendered the success dubious, and occasioned various events.

23. The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, who were posted in the left, by their pila soon drove those of Arras, who were weary and wounded, from the eminence where they were posted, into the water; and pursuing them sword in hand, killed great numbers of them as they endeavoured to pass the river. They followed them quite cross it, where, being drawn into a disadvantageous place, the enemy faced about again, and renewed the fight, but were obliged a second time to fly. So likewise, in another part of the battle, the eighth and eleventh legions, having broken the Vermandois, whom they were engaged with, had forced them from the top of the hill to the banks of the river. But in the mean time the front and left side of our camp were left almost naked (for in the right wing were placed the twelfth, and not far from that the seventh legion) which the Hainaultois perceiving, attacked us there with their entire force, under the command of BODUOGNATUS; one party of them endeavouring to flank the legions where they lay most open, and the other to lodge themselves in the highest part of the camp.

24. About the same time the cavalry and light-armed foot, who, as I said, at the beginning of the battle had been broken just as they were retiring into the camp, met the front of the enemy, which obliged them to take a different rout: whilst the servants of the army, who, from the top of the mountain, seeing our men pursue the enemy cross the river, had issued out from the Decuman port, with a design to follow in hopes of plunder; turning about beheld the Hainaultois entering our camp, and immediately fled. This confusion was increased by the clamour of those that attended the carriages, each man in his fright taking a different way. The cavalry of Treves, reputed men of great courage amongst the Gauls, who had been sent from thence to our assistance, perceiving that the enemy were possessed of our camp, that the legions were over-charged and almost surrounded, that our horse, slingers, and Numidians were broken and routed, were so terrified, that, not staying for the event of the battle, they immediately returned home, reporting that the Romans were entirely defeated, and their baggage taken.



WAR IN  
GAUL.

The Ro-  
mans give  
ground,

Cæsar  
snatches a  
shield, and  
places him-  
self in the  
front of the  
battle, to  
encourage  
them.

25. CÆSAR, having encouraged the tenth legion, went up to the right wing of the army, and found them overcharged by the enemy; the standards of the twelfth legion all crowded up in a place together; their ranks so close, the soldiers had not room to fight; all the centurions of the fourth cohort killed, a standard-bearer deprived of his life and colours together; all the rest of the centurions either killed or dangerously wounded, amongst which number was P. SEXTUS BACULUS, the primiple, a man of extraordinary courage, who had received so many wounds, he was not able to stand; the front beginning to give ground, whilst some in the rear were running away; the enemy on the other hand pushing on briskly in the front, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the rising ground, and flanking our men with equal fury at the same time on either side. Finding things in this desperate condition, and knowing he had no forces behind to bring up to their aid, snatching a shield from one of the hindmost (for he was come there without one) he put himself at the head of the army; then calling the centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded them to advance the ensigns, and widen the ranks of the Maniples, that they might have more liberty to use their swords. His presence infused fresh courage into the soldiers; and each of them striving, even in the greatest extremity, to give proofs of his valour, whilst the general was there to be a witness of it, put a stop to the career of the enemy.


## C H A P. XI.

Labienus  
gains the  
enemy's  
camp; and  
sends assistance to Cæsar.

26. PERCEIVING likewise that the seventh legion, which stood next him, was overpowered by the enemy, he commanded the tribunes to close the two legions together by degrees, and joining back to back, face about to the right and left, whereby having made a double front, they were secure from being surrounded; whereupon they began to defend themselves, and attack the enemy with fresh vigour. In the mean time, the two legions which had been left behind to guard the baggage, hearing the armies were engaged, made what haste they could to our assistance, and were discerned by the Hainaultois from the top of the hill. TITUS LABIENUS, who by this time had made himself master of the enemy's camp, perceiving from the rising ground how matters went on our side the river, detached the tenth legion to our relief, who having intelligence from the

the cavalry and servants that fled away, what danger the general, his legions, and the camp were in, hastened with all the speed that was possible.

WAR IN  
GAUL.



27. Their arrival made so strange an alteration for the better on our side, that they who before were faint with bleeding, and forced to rest themselves upon their shields, began the fight afresh; nay, the servants, seeing how great a consternation the enemy were in, fell upon them unarmed; and the horse, to wipe away the ignominy of their former flight, advanced, wherever there was an opportunity, before the legionary soldiers. But the enemy, even in their last extremity, shewed so much resolution, that as soon as the foremost ranks were swept off, the next succeeding in their place, fought upon their bodies, and when death had raised a mountain of carcases, the small remainder, ascending to the top of it, cast their darts from thence, and taking up ours, returned them back again: fame therefore did them justice, in reporting them to be men of such prodigious courage, who durst attempt to cross a broad river, and ascend the steep banks on the other side, to engage an enemy at the greatest disadvantage; dangers which their greatness of soul had learnt to despise.

The enemy  
entirely de-  
feated.

28. The battle being thus decided, and almost the name and people of Hainault extinguished, the old men, women, and children, who, as we have already said, before the fight had been conveyed into bogs and marshes, hearing of the defeat, and seeing no way left to put a stop to the conqueror's success, nor any hopes of safety for the vanquished, unanimously resolved to send ambassadors to CÆSAR, and surrender themselves. When these were arrived at the camp, they laid before him the deplorable condition of their country; that out of six hundred senators, only three remained alive; and that of 60,000 soldiers, they had not now 500 able to bear arms; whom CÆSAR, to give proof of his compassion to the afflicted, carefully preserved, allowing them the free possession of their towns and country, and commanding their neighbours round about to do them no injury.

The mighty  
slaughter of  
the Hainaul-  
tois.

## CHAP. XII.

29. THE people of Douay, who, as we said before, were marching to the assistance of the Hainaultois, having intelligence of their defeat, returned home again; and, deserting all the rest of their towns and castles, conveyed themselves

The people  
of Douay re-  
turn home,  
and fortify  
their princi-  
pal town.

WAR IN themselves and their riches into a well fortified place, GAUL. which was surrounded by inaccessible rocks and steep precipices, except in one place about 200 foot broad, where there was an easy ascent to the town, which they had fortified with a double wall of a prodigious height; whereon they laid stones and sharp pieces of timber, ready to cast down upon occasion.

The descent  
of the people  
of Douay.

These people were descended from the Cimbri and Teutons, who, when they took their journey to Italy, had left six thousand men on the other side the Rhine, with such carriages as they could not conveniently get over: these, after the defeat of their countrymen, having been long in an unsettled state, sometimes invading others, and at another time defending themselves, at last obtained a peace, and firm possession in the country.

Cæsar be-  
siegues them.

30. On the first arrival of our army they made several sallies out of the town, and encountered our men in small skirmishes; but after we had drawn our line of circumvallation, twelve foot high, and fifteen miles in length, and fortified it with little turrets, the besieged kept themselves within their walls. At first when they saw us raising a mount, fitting up the vines, and building a large turret at some distance from the town, making a jest of us, by way of ridicule they demanded, with what hands or strength such little men as we (for the Romans are but of small stature in respect of the Gauls) should be able to bring a tower of that prodigious weight to their walls?

They send a  
deceitful  
embassage  
to Cæsar.

31. But when they saw it move, and advancing near the town, astonished at so strange a sight, they immediately sent deputies to CÆSAR to desire a peace; saying, "They believed the Romans made war by the peculiar assistance of the gods, who were able in so small a space of time to convey engines of that prodigious bulk to their walls; wherefore they willingly submitted themselves, and all they had to CÆSAR'S mercy, only intreating him, that if, out of that goodness and compassion they had often heard of, he should spare their lives, he would not deprive them of their arms; that as they had always been envy'd and hated by their neighbours for their valour, he would not leave them without the means to defend themselves; for they would rather submit to any punishment from the Romans, than be inhumanly murdered by those whom they had formerly commanded."

Cæsar's an-  
swer.

32. To this CÆSAR answered, "That, provided they surrendered themselves before his battering-ram touched their

their walls, he would save the city, more out of his own WAR IN GAUL. natural disposition, than from any merit of theirs: nor would he accept of a surrender on any other terms than the delivery of their arms: That he would give the same orders to their neighbours not to injure them, as he had done for those of Hainault."

The deputies returned with this answer, which the besieged seemed readily to submit to, by casting such plenty of arms over the walls, as almost filled the ditch up to the top of the rampart; but, as we afterwards found, reserved a third part, which they hid; then opening their gates, enjoyed a peace for the rest of that day. The besieged surrender.

33. In the evening CÆSAR caused the soldiers to return to their camp, and the gates of the town to be shut, that the citizens might not be plundered. But the besieged, who had already concerted their design, believing that after their surrender the Romans would set no guard over them, or at least an inconsiderable one, armed with such weapons as they had reserved, and targets made of wicker, covered over with hides, about three o'clock in the morning made a furious sally with all their force upon our fortifications, where the ascent was easiest; which the Romans having immediate intelligence of, by the beacons They sally out of the town early in the morning, (as CÆSAR had before commanded) made haste to relieve the place, where the enemy, emboldened by despair, and placing their safety only in their valour, fought as bravely as men could do against those who had the advantage of but are repulsed. towers and ramparts; but 4000 being slain on the spot, the rest retreated into the town. The next day, without the least opposition CÆSAR forced the gates, and entering with his army plundered the town, and sold the people for slaves, the number of whom amounted to 53,000.

### CHAP. XIII.

34. ABOUT the same time P. CRASSUS (whom CÆSAR had sent with a legion to take in Vennes, Coutances, Landreguet, Cornoüalle, Bretagne, Eureux, and Renes, their maritime towns) sent him word that those places had all submitted to the Roman empire.

35. The wars being thus successfully ended, and all the provinces of Gaul in peace, so great a terror did CÆSAR's victories strike into the barbarians round about, that the nations beyond the Rhine sent ambassadors to offer him hostages, and obedience to whatever he pleased to command



WAR IN mand them; but being in haste to return to Lombardy,  
 GAUL. he commanded them to come again the next spring. Hav-  
 ing disposed his army into winter-quarters in Chartrain,  
 Anjou, and Tours, which lay nearest the country he had  
 last subdued, he took his journey to Italy; and having sent  
 the senate an account of his success, a general thanksgiving  
 was decreed, which lasted fifteen days, an honour which  
 no man, before that time, had ever obtained.



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# C. J. CÆSAR'S COMMENTARY

OF HIS

## WAR in GAUL.

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The THIRD BOOK.

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*The war with the people of Valais, Vannes, Eureux,  
Coutances, Gascoigne, Teroüenne, and Guelders.*


### CHAP. I.

**W**HEN CÆSAR returned to Italy, he sent SERGIUS WAR IN  
GAUL.  
GALBA, with the twelfth legion, and a party of  
horse, against the people of Elen, Valais, and  
Sion, whose territories, beginning at the confines of Savoy,  
the lake of Geneva, and the river Rhosne, extend them-  
selves to the top of the Alps. His commission was to make  
the road over the Alps open to the merchants, who used to  
be exposed in their passage to great dangers, as well as sub-  
jected to heavy customs, with orders, if he should think it  
convenient, to take up his winter-quarters there, with one  
legion.

GALBA, after some successful rencounters, having  
made himself master of several forts, received embassadors  
from all the country round, who came to offer him hostages;  
whereupon he concluded a peace, resolving to quarter two  
cohorts of his legion in the country of Elen, and to lodge  
himself with the rest in Martenac, the capital of Valais.

This

WAR IN  
GAUL.



Galba be-  
sieged by  
the Valais.

This town is situated in a little valley, divided by the river, and surrounded by steep mountains on every side; of which having given one half to the Gauls, he took possession of the other with his cohorts, which they fortified with a ditch and a rampier.

2. After he had continued here several days, and given orders to the country to bring in what corn he had occasion for, he received very unexpected news, that the Gauls had forsaken their part of the city, and that the hills around were covered with multitudes of the people of Valais and Sion. The inducement to this revolt was the small number of the Roman troops, which did not amount to one legion; for two cohorts had been quartered in Elen; and several of those who staid with GALBA, were gone out a foraging. Besides, so advantageous was the situation of the place, they imagined they should descend with such impetuosity from the mountains, that the Romans would not be able to stand the first assault. Add to this, that the natives thought it a great hardship to be robbed of their children under the name of hostages; and suspected that the Romans, not contented with a clear passage over the Alps, would attempt to get possession of them, and unite them to their province.

3. Upon this intelligence GALBA, who had neither finished his fortifications, nor stored himself with sufficient provisions (because he little dreamt of an insurrection, after the people had surrendered themselves, and delivered hostages) immediately summoned a council of war, to consult what was proper to be done: All the officers were strangely surprized at so unexpected a revolution; and some of them, seeing the mountains round about possessed with soldiers (who had so posted themselves, that there was no hope of receiving provision or relief) could find out no other expedient for their safety, but, leaving the heavy baggage behind, and falling out, to force their passage through the enemy at the same place where they entered; but the majority were of a different opinion, holding it more convenient to reserve that as their last refuge, and in the mean time, fortifying their camp, to attend the decision of fortune.

## CHAP. II.

The Romans  
assaulted in  
their camp.

4. BUT, before the Romans had time to execute such orders as were resolved on for their defence, the enemy, upon a sign given, furiously assaulted our camp on all sides with

with stones and darts; which our men at first courageously WAR IN returned, not casting one dart from the ramparts in vain; GAUL. and wherever they saw the enemy make the strongest efforts, thither they flocked to oppose them. But the rebels had much the advantage of us in this, that whenever their foremost ranks began to faint, fresh men supplied their places; which we, having so small a body of troops, were not able to do; so that, with us, neither the weary nor the wounded were permitted to quit their posts.

5. After the conflict had endured for the space of six hours, our men wanting weapons as well as strength, whilst the enemy pressed us with the greater vigour as we grew faint, when things were reduced to the last extremity (for they had already filled great part of our ditch, and began to demolish our rampart) P. SEXTUS BACULUS, the primiple, who, we observed before, received many wounds in the war with the Hainaultois, and CAIUS VOLUSENUS, a tribune of the soldiers, a man of great courage and conduct, came to GALBA, and informed him, that there was no expedient left, but to sally out, and put their fortune upon one brisk attempt. GALBA therefore, having summoned all the centurions, ordered them to give the soldiers respite for a while, and that they should only receive the enemy's darts, without returning any, 'till a sign should be given for sallying out of the camp, when they must rely only on their courage for the preservation of their lives.

6. These orders were so well executed, that issuing out of the camp from all sides at the same instant, they neither allowed the enemy time to rally their forces, nor to know what was the matter: which gave so sudden a turn of fortune, that they, who but the moment before promised themselves the possession of our camp and baggage, were now surrounded on all sides, and out of 30,000, for so many came to attack us, one third lost their lives, whilst the remainder were obliged to procure their safety by flight, being driven off the mountains round about. Thus having entirely defeated the enemy, and taken their arms, we returned again to our quarters.


But GALBA was not willing, after this battle, to try fortune's good-nature a second time; for considering he had met with such a troublesome business, as he little expected when first he came thither, and finding provisions began to grow scarce, having set fire to the town, he returned the next day towards the Province, marched his legion without opposition through the country of Elen, and from

Galba and his Romans sally out of their camp, put the enemy to flight, and entirely defeat them.

Galba returns into Savoy.



WAR IN from thence arrived safe in Savoy, where he took up his  
GAUL. quarters the rest of the winter.



### CHAP. III.

Cæsar goes  
to Illyricum.  
The Gauls  
revolt.

7. CÆSAR, having many reasons to believe that all things in Gaul were quiet, that there was no probability of new insurrections since the Belgæ had been defeated, the Germans expelled, and the people of Valais subdued, at the beginning of the winter took a progress to Illyricum, being desirous to see that country: but most unexpectedly new troubles arose in Gaul upon this occasion. Young P. CRASSUS, who was quartered with the seventh legion near the sea-side in Anjou, finding provisions very scarce in that country, sent out the horse-officers and tribunes to demand corn for his legion in the cities round about. T. TERRASIDIUS he sent to the Eufubii, TREBIUS GALLUS to Cornoûlle, QUINTUS VELANIUS and TITUS SILIUS to Vannes.

8. This last is one of the most potent districts of those nations upon the sea-coast; for being well stored with shipping, with which they trade to England, they are better mariners than any of their neighbours, are masters of those few sea-ports which lie on the coast of so tempestuous a sea as theirs, and exact tribute from most merchants that sail on that ocean.

The Gauls  
imprison the  
Roman  
commission-  
aries.

These set the first example, by detaining SILIUS and VELANIUS; by which means they hoped to recover the hostages they had delivered to CRASSUS: the next country imitating them, did the like by TREBIUS and TERRASIDIUS; and immediately sending ambassadors to each other (for the Gauls are very sudden in their resolutions) they entered into an alliance, not to take any steps without the public and mutual consent, and to share the same fortune whatever turn it should take. Nor did they leave any thing unessayed, to incite the rest of the provinces round them, to assert that liberty which they had received from their ancestors, and not to stoop to the dominion of a stranger. Having thus drawn all the sea-port towns into the same conspiracy with themselves, they sent deputies to CRASSUS to let him know, "If he expected his officers liberty, he must return their hostages."

CHAP. IV.

9. CÆSAR, having intelligence from CRASSUS how WAR IN affairs went, being then at a great distance from the army, GAUL. commanded several gallies and ships to be built on the river Loire, which runs into the ocean, and lifted great numbers of pilots and mariners in the Province; which being accomplished with wondrous expedition, so soon as the season permitted he arrived in Gaul. The people of Vannes in the mean time, and the rest of their confederates, who had intelligence of CÆSAR's arrival (considering how great a crime they had been guilty of, in violating the law of nations, by putting the embassadors in chains) were not idle, but prepared all things necessary to defend them from the impending danger, especially a considerable navy.

Cæsar builds a navy, and marches into Gaul.

CHAP. V.

THEY flattered themselves with success in this enterprise, by reason of their strong situation; for there was no coming at them by land, because the passes were stopped up by several arms of the ocean; nor were they worse fortified on the other side, the entrance by way of the sea being very difficult and dangerous; for they had but few ports, and the Romans were altogether strangers to their coast. Besides, they were in hopes the Roman army would not be able to subsist there long without provisions, which were not to be had in the country: and though things should fall out otherwise, still they were superior at sea, to the Romans, who had but a small number of ships, were unacquainted with the flats, shallows, ports, and islands of the place where they were to engage, and found the practice of navigation in those narrow seas far different from that on the wider ocean.


Big with these expectations they began to fortify their towns, to carry all the corn out of the fields into their arsenals, and convey their shipping to Vannes, the place they were informed CÆSAR designed first to attack, having before-hand engaged the people of Landreguet, Leisieux, Nants, Lendoul, Terouënné, and Guelders to become their allies, and sent for assistance from England, which lies opposite to those countries.

The Gauls preparations and alliances.

All these difficulties concurred to dissuade CÆSAR from engaging in the war; but, on the other hand, many

E

reasons

**WAR IN GAUL.**  reasons made it absolutely necessary; first the injury offered the Roman knights by detaining them; then the rebellion raised after a general submission, and hostages given for good behaviour; and lastly, the revolt of so many cities, which, if neglected, might prove of bad example to the rest. Considering therefore that all the Gauls were prone to novelty, and easily induced to undertake a war, that it was natural to all mankind to love liberty and detest servitude, he thought it the most convenient way, before any more cities came into this alliance, to divide his army, and distribute it into several places.

Cæsar sends several parties to different places in Gaul, to cut off all succours from the enemy.

II. He sent therefore **TITUS LABIENUS** with the cavalry to Treves, which borders on the Rhine, commanding him to have an eye over the people of Rheims, and to keep the rest of the Belgæ thereabouts in obedience; and if the Germans should attempt by force to transport any troops over the Rhine, as they had been desired, he should prevent it. **PUBLIUS CRASSUS**, with twelve legionary cohorts and a party of horse, he detached to Gascoigne, to cut off all assistance from those parts: **Q. TITURIUS SABINUS**, with three legions, he ordered to Leisieux, Landreguet, and Coutances, to disappoint the rebels hopes in those countries; and having made **D. BRUTUS** admiral of the navy, and of the French vessels he had received from those of Poictou, Xantonge, and the other provinces which continued firm in their obedience, he ordered him to sail with all expedition to Vannes, himself following after by land with the foot.

## CHAP. VI.

Cæsar takes several towns, but the besieged always escape.

12. THE confederate cities, being most of them situated upon promontories, could not be attacked by land at high-water, which always happened once in six hours; nor yet by sea, for upon the ebb of the tide the ships were left upon the sands as a prey to the enemy; and whenever the Romans endeavoured to exclude the ocean by artificial mounts, which they raised to an equal height with the walls of the town, the enemy, so soon as we were prepared to enter, having plenty of shipping, quickly conveyed themselves and their effects away by sea to the next port, where they enjoyed the same advantages as before. Thus they disappointed us most part of the summer; for the Roman fleet durst not venture out of the Loire into so vast and tempestuous an ocean, where the tides were strong, the roads

roads and havens but few, and at a considerable distance from one another.

WAR IN GAUL.

13. The enemy had a great advantage over us in their shipping, which was thus built and rigged: " Their keels were flatter than ours, consequently more convenient for the shallows and low tides; their fore-castles were very high, their poops contrived to endure the roughness of the sea; the body of their vessels built of impenetrable oak: the banks for the oars were beams a foot square, fastened at each end with iron pins an inch thick: instead of cables for their anchors, they made use of iron chains, and had hides for their sails, either because they wanted linen, and were ignorant of its use, or, what is more likely, thought linen sails not strong enough to endure their boisterous seas, their impetuous winds, and carry vessels of so considerable burthen. So that whenever our ships encountered them, we only had the advantage in tacking about by the management of our oars; but in all other things they had much the better of us, being built more convenient for the nature of the place, and more able to endure a storm; their shells were so extraordinary hard, our beaks could not enter them, and their deck so high, we could do but little execution with our darts; besides, whenever a storm arose, which obliged them to submit to the pleasure of the winds, being strong built, they were better able to weather it out, and could shelter themselves with safety amongst the flats, without fear of the rocks, or those other inconveniencies which the Romans were subject to."

Description of the Gauls shipping.

# CHAP. VII.

14. CÆSAR having taken in one town after another, the enemy still conveyed themselves to the next; wherefore perceiving he spent his time to no purpose, for he could neither prevent their escape, nor do them any considerable damage, he resolved to attend the arrival of his navy; which was no sooner come, but the enemy immediately, having rigged out 220 sail of tall vessels, and equipped them with all things necessary, stood out to sea just over against us. The admiral BRUTUS, the tribunes, and centurions who commanded the Roman fleet, were so surprized at this unexpected sight, that they knew not what methods to take, or in what order to draw up their gallies; for the enemy's shipping was so strong, our beaks

The Roman navy arrives; the two fleets drawn up; they engage.



WAR IN could do them no prejudice; and had we built turrets on GAUL. the decks, as usual, yet we could not have mounted them to a sufficient height to equal that of their poops; in which particular they had a great advantage over us; for as we could not do them much prejudice by our weapons, because we lay so much lower than they, so on the contrary their darts descended on us with a much greater force. But we happened to have one sort of instrument amongst our stores, which proved exceeding useful; we had provided a great number of sharp crooked sythes, like those used in sieges, which we fixed to the end of long poles, and laying hold of their tackle, towed the vessels away by the help of our oars; thus cutting their cables, the main-yard fell down, whereby the enemy, who relied on their sails and rigging, were at once deprived of their sails, and the use of their vessels. And now the dispute depending entirely upon courage, the Romans easily got the better, and the rather, because, fighting in the view of CÆSAR and the whole army, they were assured of so many witnesses of their valour; for all the hills and rising grounds, which looked upon the sea, were covered with our soldiers.

The Romans  
take and  
sink almost  
all their  
ships.

15. The enemy's main-yards being thus cut down, the Romans endeavoured to board them, though each vessel of ours was surrounded by two or three of theirs; which the Gauls perceiving, after they had lost several of their ships, finding no other way for safety, began to tack about before the wind, but were of a sudden so becalmed, that their flight was prevented; which fell out very opportunely for the Romans, who grappling with them, boarded so many, that after the battle had continued from between eight and nine in the morning 'till sun-set, few of their number had the fortune to save themselves, and get to land by the assistance of the night.

The end of  
the war.

16. This battle put an end to the war with Vannes and the rest of the maritime towns; for at this dispute were present not only all the youth of their country, but even those of maturer years, who might assist the labouring fate of their country, either by authority or advice; and hither had they brought all the vessels they were able to rig out; which being lost, they who escaped the slaughter, not knowing whither to fly, nor how to defend their towns against CÆSAR, delivered themselves up to his mercy; towards whom CÆSAR shewed the greater severity, that he might teach such barbarians for the future to observe the law of nations, whereby the persons of ambassadors are protected;

protected; for he put all their senators to the sword, and sold the people for slaves.

## C H A P. VIII.

17. IN the mean time L. TITURIUS SABINUS WAS Sabinus's expedition to Coutances, marching with his forces to the confines of Coutances, a people subject to VIRIDOVIX, then generalissimo for the revolted towns, who had furnished him with a numerous and potent army. The senators of Eureux, Rhoan, and Leisieux, could not be drawn into this confederacy; but the common people, having murdered them, shut up their city gates, and joined with VIRIDOVIX; to whom likewise flocked great numbers from Gaul, men of desperate fortunes, and thieves, whom the hopes of plunder induced to prefer the study of war before that of husbandry and daily labour.

SABINUS, having encamped himself in a convenient place, permitted not his men to stir out of their trenches; whilst VIRIDOVIX, who lodged within two miles of him, drew his forces out every day to offer him battle; which the other so often refused, that at last he was not only suspected by the enemy, but even by his own soldiers, of cowardise; and so craftily did he act his part, that the enemy had the assurance to come even to our very trenches. The reason he gave for his conduct, was, that he did not think it justifiable for a lieutenant to engage an army so much more numerous than his own, during the absence of the general, but upon advantage of time or place.

18. Thus having confirmed the enemy in their opinion, he made choice of a subtle Gaul amongst the auxiliary Sabinus's stratagem and success. troops, whom he persuaded, by considerable presents and greater promises, to go over to the enemy, and there act according to such instructions as he should give him. This instrument being arrived at their camp, and received as a deserter, informed them how much the Romans were afraid of them, what extremities CÆSAR was driven to by the people of Vannes, and that SABINUS designed the next night privately to decamp, and make what haste he could to his assistance. No sooner had they heard this news, but they unanimously cried out, that so lucky an opportunity was not to be slipped, and that they would attack the Romans in their intrenchments. Many circumstances concurred, which induced the Gauls to embrace this resolution; SABINUS's declining battle so often, the intelligence

**WAR IN GAUL.** ingence from the deserter, want of provisions, which they had not taken sufficient care for, their hopes in their confederates of Vannes, and that credulous humour which always inclines men to believe what they wish. Spurred on by these motives, the soldiers would not permit VIRIDOVIX and the rest of the general officers to break up the council, before they had resolved upon forcing the Roman camp; which being agreed on, they went as chearfully to work, as if they had already obtained the victory; and having provided plenty of fascines, to fill up the ditches, made the best of their way to attack us.

The Gauls come to attack the Roman camp,

but are repulsed and routed,

19. The Romans were incamped on the top of a rising ground, which mounted with an easy ascent from the level; and the enemy made so much haste to prevent our having notice of their design, that they ran themselves out of breath before they came at us. SABINUS, who was better prepared to receive them than they imagined, having encouraged his soldiers, gave them the sign of battle; then falling out of two several gates of the camp at once upon the enemy (whilst they were loaden with those materials they had brought to fill up our trenches) the advantage of the ground, their faintness and want of experience, our courage and conduct, soon decided the battle in favour of the Romans; for the enemy, not being able to stand the first onset, chose rather to depend on their heels than their hands, whilst our troops being fresh and vigorous, pursued and slew great numbers of them. Nor were their horse able to preserve themselves from the same fate, for our cavalry followed them so close, that few escaped. Thus at the same time SABINUS heard of the defeat at sea, CÆSAR was informed of SABINUS's success at land.

Upon the news of these victories all the provinces which TITURIUS was sent against, surrendered themselves; for as the Gauls are eager to enter into a war, so upon the smallest turn they relent, being impatient of afflictions.

## CHAP. IX.

Crassus's expedition against the Gascoignes.

20. MUCH about the same time P. CRASSUS arrived at Gascoigne, which, as we have already taken notice, as well for the number of its inhabitants as its extent of land, deserves to be esteemed a third part of Gaul; and considering he was to manage a war in the same country where lieutenant-general L. VALERIUS PRÆCONINUS formerly


merly was defeated, and lost his life, where LUCIUS MA-  
WAR IN  
 NILIUS was glad to purchase his escape at the expence of GAUL.  
 his baggage, he thought it behoved him to take more than  
 ordinary care: wherefore having provided his army with  
 corn, having raised some cavalry, levied troops in the auxi-  
 liary countries, and sent for several brave volunteers from  
 Tholouse and Narbonne, cities next adjoining to the Ro-  
 man province, he marched his army into the confines of  
 Sots. The natives were no sooner acquainted with his ar-  
 rival, but they immediately levied a considerable army of  
 horse and foot, and with their cavalry (whom they most  
 relied on) engaged the Romans whilst they were upon their  
 march: we easily put them to the rout; but when we were  
 pursuing them, their infantry appeared in a valley where  
 they had watched for us in ambuscade, and setting upon  
 our men whilst they were disordered in the pursuit, be-  
 gan the fight afresh. The Gauls in ambus-  
cade.

21. The dispute was long and doubtful; for the enemy,  
 grown proud with the memory of their former victories,  
 thought the fate of all Gascoigne depended on their single  
 virtue; whilst the Romans, on the other hand, exerted  
 themselves to shew what they were able to do, without their  
 general, without the assistance of the rest of the legions,  
 and under the command of so young a soldier. At last,  
 the Gauls much wounded began to fly, and CRASSUS  
 having slain great numbers of them, marched directly to  
 their capital, which he invested. The besieged maintained  
 their possession with great bravery, notwithstanding we ap-  
 proached their walls with vines, mounts, and turrets; some-  
 times fallying, and sometimes undermining our works;  
 an art they are very expert in, by reason of the number  
 of copper mines in their country; but at last perceiving  
 the industry of the Romans frustrated their endeavours,  
 they sent deputies to CRASSUS, to desire he would be  
 pleased to accept of a surrender; which they obtained, on  
 delivery of their arms. The Gauls routed; they retire to their capital.  
Crassus in-vests it, and they agree to surrender.

22. But whilst the whole army expected the performance  
 of this article, ADCANTUANUS, who commanded the  
 town, endeavoured to make his escape out of one of the  
 postern gates, "with six hundred sworn friends, whom  
 the natives call Soldurii, whose custom is, to enjoy all  
 things in common with those to whom they have vowed a  
 friendship; to share always the same fortune, and kill them-  
 selves rather than survive the death of their comrades. Nor  
 has it ever been known that any of them ever failed in his  
 duty,



WAR IN  
GAUL.



duty, or declined death, when his friend was killed." But the alarm from that part of the works soon summoned our men thither, where after a warm conflict the enemy were driven back again into the town; but, notwithstanding, obtained the favour of being comprehended within the same treaty.

23. CRASSUS, having received hostages from them, left their country, to march against the people of De Buch, and Turfan.

## CHAP. X.

The Gauls rally again, send for foreign succours and captains from Spain.


THE Gauls being much disturbed, that a place so well fortified both by art and nature should fall in so small a time into the Romans hands, began to enter into mutual alliances with one another in all parts, sending embassadors, and exchanging hostages for that purpose; and having first levied what forces they could in their own country, sent deputies to Spain, and the other countries that bordered on Gascoigne, whence they received supplies with several experienced officers; upon whose arrival they began the war very briskly with a numerous army, making choice of such for their commanders, who, having served under SERTORIUS, were reputed to be men of conduct and experience in the military art. These, according to the custom of the Romans, began to pitch upon convenient places to encamp in, to intrench themselves, and intercept our convoys; which CRASSUS perceiving, thought it the safest way to give the enemy battle immediately, because his army was so small, he could not detach parties, like the Gauls, to possess themselves of particular passes, and yet leave a sufficient number to secure his camp; which would of necessity, in time, make provisions grow scarce with the Romans, whilst the enemy's power encreased: wherefore, having summoned a council of war, finding all the officers of his opinion, he appointed the day following to give them battle.

The Romans offer them battle,

24. Accordingly the next morning, by dawn of day, he drew out all his forces, and having ranged them in a double line, disposed the auxiliaries in the midst, expecting what motions the enemy would make: but the Gauls, though they fancied they might safely venture an engagement, as well on the score of their number, as of their ancient prowess, yet thought it the better way to block up all the passes, intercept the Roman convoys, and obtain a victory without the expence of blood; resolving, when the Romans should be reduced to quit their camp for want of provisions,

to

to attack their rear, whilst they were faint with hunger, weary with travel, and incumbered with their baggage. This advice seemed most agreeable to the whole council of the Gauls; and therefore when the Romans profered them battle, they kept within their camp and declined it.

WAR IN  
GAUL.  
  
but the  
Gauls re-  
fuse it.

CHAP. XI.

CRASSUS perceiving their design, and finding his men more eager for the engagement, because they thought the enemy were afraid of them, whilst they all exclaimed against delay, desiring they might immediately attack the Gauls in their camp, he encouraged their desire, and, to their infinite satisfaction, led them to the place where the enemy was lodged.

25. Whilst some were busy in filling the ditch, and others endeavouring to force the Gauls from their trenches with their darts, the auxiliaries, on whom CRASSUS had no great dependance, were employed in bringing stones and darts to the soldiers, and turf to the mount, that they might appear to be engaged as well as the rest. The Gauls in the mean time maintained their ground obstinately, doing great execution with their darts from the higher ground; which the horsemen perceiving, took a compass about to view their camp, and brought CRASSUS word, that the rampart of the Decuman port was not so strongly fortified as other places, and they believed it might easily be forced.

26. Whereupon CRASSUS, having desired the horse-officers to encourage their men by considerable rewards and promises, gave them instructions what he thought fit to have done. According to their orders, marching with four fresh cohorts that had been left in the camp, and no ways concerned in the fatigue of the day, they took a circuit to prevent being observed; and, whilst the Gauls were intent on the engagement, arrived at the place appointed, which they easily forced, and entered the enemy's camp before the Gauls could perceive who they were, or what they were doing; then giving us notice by a loud acclamation, our soldiers in the front, as they always do, when there is hope of victory, renewed the battle with fresh vigour. The enemy being thus surrounded, jumped over the rampier in despair, endeavouring to save themselves by flight; but being an open country, our cavalry pursued and killed such numbers of them, that out of 50,000 which came from Spain and Gascoigne, there hardly escaped a fourth part.

The Ro-  
mans attack  
their camp.

The Roman  
cavalry enter  
the Decuman  
port of the  
Gauls camp.

The Gauls  
entirely  
routed.

27. Upon

WAR IN  
GAUL.

(  
All Gas-  
coigne sub-  
mits.

27. Upon the news of this victory, the greatest part of Gascoigne voluntarily submitted to CÆSAR, and sent him hostages; viz. the people of Pais de Labard, Bigorre, Precins, De Buch, Turfan, Euse, Pais de Gavre, Auch, Garonne, Sibutz, and Bazadois; only some few districts that lay at a greater distance, depending on the approach of winter, held out.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsar's ex-  
pedition to  
Teroüenne  
and Guelders,

28. MUCH about the same time, CÆSAR, though the summer was almost spent, made an expedition against Teroüenne and Guelders, because they were the only provinces that had not laid down their arms, nor sent ambassadors to treat of peace, whilst all the other countries of Gaul had submitted to the Roman empire. Thinking he might dispatch this expedition in a very short time, he marched his army into their country; but, contrary to his expectation, found they had a method of making war much different from the rest of the Gauls; for, understanding that the most potent provinces in their continent that had engaged with the Romans, were defeated, they thought it the wisest way to convey themselves and their effects into the woods and bogs, whereof they had plenty in their country.

CÆSAR, so soon as he was come near the woods, began to entrench himself; but on a sudden the enemy, whom he could not discover to be there, sallied out of the thickets, whilst his men were dispersed, and employed about different charges; but they were easily repulsed to the woods, where the Romans following them unadvisedly, lost some of their men.

29 CÆSAR resolved to spend the remainder of the summer in clearing the ground; and that his army might be no more surprized whilst they were at work, he caused all the timber they cut down to be laid on each side for a fortification, and in a few days made so extraordinary a progress, that all the enemy's cattle were taken, though they themselves had the good fortune to escape into the thicker woods.

The rains  
put a stop to  
Cæsar's pro-  
gress.

The continual rains which fell soon after, put a stop to the undertaking; for the soldiers were no longer able to lie in their tents: wherefore CÆSAR, having laid their country waste, burnt their towns and houses, returned back again, and quartered his army at Eureux, Leisieux, and those other places which he had last subdued.

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C. J. CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARY  
OF HIS  
WAR in GAUL.

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The FOURTH BOOK.


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*The inhabitants of Zutphen and Hesse drive those of Guelders out of their country; but are defeated by CÆSAR. His expeditions into Germany and England.*

CHAP. I.

THE next winter, during the consulate of CN. POMPEIUS and M. CRASSUS, the inhabitants of Hesse and Zutphen, two German nations, crossed the Rhine in great numbers towards that end where it discharges itself into the sea. The reason why they left their country was, because they had been so long oppressed by the Suabians, the most potent and warlike nation amongst the Germans. “The Suabians are divided into an hundred cantons; each of these yearly bring a thousand men into the field, still retaining the same number at home, to provide for themselves and the army; who the year following go abroad, and relieve their countrymen; by which means they all obtain experience in husbandry and military affairs at once. They have no inclosure, no man has an acre of land which he can properly term his own; nor are they suffered to continue  
above

WAR IN  
GAUL.

The Germans cross the Rhine.

The customs of the Suabians.



WAR IN GAUL. above one year in the same part of the country: their chief diet is milk and flesh-meat, and their diversion hunting. The quality of their food, their perpetual exercise, and way of living (being educated to no calling, obliged to no discipline, nor restrained from any thing their inclinations prompt them to) make them very robust, and of an extraordinary stature: custom has rendered them so hardy, that they wash themselves in their rivers, and wear no cloaths even in the coldest weather, except small skins, which hardly cover one half of their bodies, whilst the rest is exposed to the weather.

2. Merchants frequent their coasts, not so much to import foreign goods, as to purchase the booties they obtain in war: Beasts of labour, which the Gauls take much delight in, and think they can never pay too dear for, the Germans never import from other countries; but make use of their own distorted cattle, which by daily exercise they inure to the hardest services. Their horsemen frequently forsake their horses in battle, to fight on foot, having managed them so well, that they stand still for their riders in the same place where they left them; nor do they esteem any thing more useless and ignominious than furniture for horses, for which reason a small party of them often venture to engage almost any number that make use of it. They allow no wine to be imported into their country, lest it should make them lazy and effeminate.

3. The greatest honour to their nation, in their opinion, is to have their territories round about lie desolate; from whence they would have you infer, that the united force of several kingdoms is not sufficient to oppose their single valour; for which reason the country on the side of Suebia lies waste for the space of 600 miles together. The other part is bounded by the Ubii, who enjoy a large and flourishing country, a people much politer than their German neighbours, because, lying nearer the Rhine, they have more commerce with merchants, and conversation with the Gauls." With these the Suabians had many disputes; and though they were so experienced foldiers, so potent and numerous a people, that they could not expel them the country, yet they made them their tributaries, and reduced them to a very low condition.

## CHAP. II.

4. THE inhabitants of Hesse and Zutphen, whom we mentioned before, were engaged in the same quarrel, and having long maintained their ground against the Suabians, were at last obliged to quit their country. Being thus compelled to seek their fortune, after three years wandering through the continent of Germany, they arrived at the territories of the people of Guelders\*, who inhabit the banks on both sides the river Rhine. The natives frightened at the unexpected arrival of so many foreigners, deserting their houses on the other side the Rhine, crossed the river, and planted themselves so as to prevent the Germans further progress; who having tried all ways, finding they had not shipping enough to force their passage, and that they could not get over by stealth, because the natives kept so strict a watch, at last feigned a retreat into their own country; but, after three days journey, returned again to the same place with their cavalry in one night's march, and surprised the natives, who being assured by their scouts of the enemy's retreat, had forgot their fears, and transported themselves to their former habitations. These being thus put to the sword, the Germans seizing their vessels, before the people on the other side knew any thing of the matter, crossed the Rhine, possessed themselves of the towns and houses there, and took up their quarters for the rest of the winter.

WAR IN GAUL.

The Germans invade Guelders.

\* Though Scaliger seems rather to think the Menapii are those that now inhabit the sea-coasts of Brabant.

5. CÆSAR having intelligence of this matter, was jealous of the levity of the Gauls, "who are so fickle in their counsels, and such passionate lovers of novelty, that they stop passengers upon the road, and oblige them to declare all the news they have heard, before they let them proceed on their journey: the mob likewise flock about foreign merchants, to enquire what country they came from, and what intelligence they bring from thence: by which reports they often govern themselves in the management of their most important affairs; consequently being swayed by uncertainties, calculated for the most part by the traveller for satisfaction of the enquirer, they must often repent of the resolutions they take."

The temper of the Gauls.

## C H A P. III.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

6. CÆSAR therefore being so well acquainted with their temper, made more haste than usual to put himself at the head of his army, where he was no sooner arrived, but he found his suspicions true, that some provinces of Gaul had already sent ambassadors to invite the Germans from the banks of the Rhine farther into the continent, promising them that every thing should be got ready which they desired; whereupon the Germans had begun to make inroads, and lay the country waste, as far as the confines of Liege, and Condrotz, which is under the protection of Treves: for which reason CÆSAR, having summoned all the princes of Gaul, took no notice of the revolt he had been informed of, but confirming them in their allegiance by a seeming approbation of their loyalty, commanded them to furnish him with a certain number of cavalry; being determined to make war on the Germans.

Cæsar  
marches to  
find out the  
Germans.

The Ger-  
man em-  
bassage.

7. So soon as he had provided his army with corn, and raised a body of horse, he marched to the place where he understood the Germans were; who, upon his arrival within a few days journey of them, sent ambassadors to acquaint him, "That as the Germans were not desirous of giving the Romans the first occasion for a war, so neither should they avoid engaging with them, if provoked to it; for it had always been the custom of the Germans to answer an enemy at his own weapons, not by treaty; though they must confess they came thither against their wills, being expelled their own country: and if the Romans would accept of their friendship, if they would either allot them land to live in, or permit them to keep that which they had obtained by the law of arms, they might find them necessary allies; for they only submitted to the Suabians, to whom even the immortal gods were not a sufficient match, but there was not another people under the sun they were not able to conquer."

Cæsar's an-  
swer.

8. To this CÆSAR answered what he thought most convenient, the substance of whose speech was to this effect; "That he could not enter into an alliance with them whilst they continued in Gaul; nor did he think it just that they who were not able to defend their own territories, should invade others; that there was not sufficient waste ground in Gaul to contain so numerous a people; but, if they pleased, they might find a welcome amongst the

the Ubii, who would receive them into their country upon WAR IN his intercession, for they had deputies at that instant in his GAUL. camp, who came to complain of the injuries they had received from the Suabians, and intreat his assistance against them."

9. The ambassadors returned with this answer to their countrymen, promising to wait upon CÆSAR again in three days time; desiring that in the mean time he would not approach with his army nearer their confines: This CÆSAR would not consent to, being informed that a considerable party of their cavalry but two days before had passed the Mose, in order to forage the country of the Ambivariti, and he suspected their design was only to gain time till their party returned.

10. "The Mose rises from the mountains of Vause in the country of Langres; and after a long course, receiving the river Vahal, a small branch of the Rhine, within its banks, it forms the isle of Holland, and, about eighteen miles below that, discharges itself into the sea. But the Rhine has its rise in the territories of the Lepontii, who inhabit the Alps, and after a long journey through Description of the Mose. Coutances, Switzerland, Franche-comte, the country of Metz, Straßburg, and Treves, coming near the sea, is divided into several branches, which form as many considerable islands, most of them inhabited by a barbarous and savage people, who are reported to feed only on fish, and wild fowls eggs; from whence by divers chanel's it discharges itself into the ocean." Description of the Rhine.

11. When CÆSAR was arrived within twelve miles of the enemy, the ambassadors came to him a second time, pressing him very earnestly to march no farther, or at least to send his cavalry orders, who were gone before the rest of the army, not to engage the Germans; and that he would agree to a truce, till they could send deputies to the Ubii, by whom they would gladly be received, on such conditions as CÆSAR should approve of, and their noblemen and senators should oblige themselves by oath to perform; nor would they desire above three days time to complete the negotiation. A second embassy from the Germans.

CÆSAR believed this was only an artifice to procrastinate for three days longer, till their cavalry returned; however, he promised not to come nearer than within four miles of their camp, where was a convenient place to water in, and ordered a considerable number of them to attend him there the next day, that he might know their demands; in the mean



WAR IN mean time he sent orders to the officers of the horse not GAUL. to provoke the enemy; and in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their ground 'till he came up to their assistance.

## C H A P. IV.

The Germans after a truce attack the Roman cavalry.

12. SO soon as the Germans saw our horse, though we had 5000, and they had not above 800 (the party which had crossed the Mose to forage not being yet returned) they fell upon our men, who expected no acts of hostility from them, because the ambassadors who agreed on a truce for a day, had not long before left our camp. Their attack was so violent, that they put out troops in disorder; and when they perceived we began to rally, dismounting, according to the custom of the Germans, they wounded our horses in the belly, so that several of the riders were thrown, and the rest put to flight; who were so dreadfully frightened, that they never looked behind till they were come within view of our army. In this skirmish we lost 74 men, amongst which number fell PISO the Gascoigne, "a man of courage equal to his noble birth, whose grandfather had formerly been a king in his own country, and honoured by the senate and people of Rome with the title of friend. Seeing his brother surrounded by the enemy, he rushed into the midst of them, and rescued him; his own horse being killed under him in the attempt, he bravely defended himself on foot, till at length after receiving many wounds, he was slain; which his brother perceiving, who was then out of danger, returned to the fight, spurred his horse in amongst the Germans, and fell a sacrifice to his deliverer, though he could not revenge his death.

The death of Piso and his brother.

13. After this battle, CÆSAR judged it not convenient either to give their ambassadors audience, or accept of any conditions from a people who had demanded a truce with a design to break it; and thinking it madness to stay while the enemy was reinforced, and their cavalry returned (especially since the Gauls were of so fickle a temper, that the Germans had already gained a considerable reputation amongst them by this small success) he resolved not to allow them time for reflection; having therefore sent for the general officers, he acquainted them that he designed to engage the enemy without further delay.

## CHAP. V.

THE next day there fell out a very lucky accident for WAR IN the Romans; all the German princes and nobility, making GAUL. use of their former dissimulation, came to our camp, under pretence of excusing themselves for what had happened the day before, in relation to the engagement with our cavalry, contrary to the truce granted at their request, and withal to desire the same might be continued: CÆSAR, not a little pleased with this opportunity, gave orders they should all be secured, and at the same time marched his army directly; the cavalry, who were daunted with the defeat they received the day before, he ordered to bring up the rear.

14. Having drawn up his troops in three lines, and passed the eight miles which were betwixt us and the Germans, he fell upon them before they dreamed of his coming. They were so surprized at our sudden arrival, so confused for want of their officers, that they knew not whether they had better draw out their forces, defend their camp, or endeavour to save themselves by flight. Their fear and disorder was no sooner perceived by the Roman soldiers, but, remembring the treachery of the preceding day, they forced their camp, where at first they met with some small resistance from such as had time to repair to their arms, who engaged them at their carriages, whilst the women and children from all sides (for the Germans had brought their whole families and effects cross the Rhine with them) endeavoured to make their escape, but CÆSAR sent the horse to pursue them.

15. The Germans, hearing a noise behind them, turned about, and saw their wives and children put to the sword; whereupon throwing down their arms, and deserting their colours, they ran away from their camp, and arriving at the river-side where the Mosse and Rhine begin to flow in one channel, they who had escaped the fury of the battle, flung themselves in the water, where all of them were drowned either by their own fear, weariness, or the strength of the stream. After this dispute, the Romans returned to their camp without the loss of a man, and with very few wounded, though the number of the Germans, computing their women and children, amounted to 430,000. The battle being over, CÆSAR gave those whom he had detained in his camp free leave to depart; but being apprehensive of the natives revenge for the injuries

WAR IN injuries they had done them, rather than fall into the hands  
 GAUL of the Gauls, they desired to stay in our army, which they  
 did by CÆSAR'S permission.

## C. H. A P. VI.

16. THE war with the natives of Zutphen and Hesse being thus concluded, CÆSAR resolved for several reasons to cross the Rhine. One of the chief motives that induced him to it was, his observing how ready the Germans were on every occasion to come into Gaul; wherefore he hoped when they perceived the Romans were able to transport an army cross that river as well as themselves, they would be more cautious how they left their own country exposed for the future; another thing was, that the enemy's cavalry, who had crossed the Mose to forage, were absent when their countrymen were defeated; and, upon intelligence of the victory, had retired into the confines of the Sicambri, where they found a reception; when CÆSAR sent to demand them, because they had been in arms against him and the Gauls, the people made answer, "That the Rhine bounded the extent of the Roman empire, and if he thought it unjust for the Germans to pass into Gaul, they knew no reason that he should assume an authority on their side the river." Besides, the Ubii, who were the only people cross the Rhine, that had sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, who had entered into alliance with him, and delivered hostages, earnestly desired his assistance against the oppressions of the Suabians; and if the publick affairs would not permit him to go in person, that he would only send his army into Germany, they would desire no greater aid or encouragement; for so considerable among the remotest Germans was the reputation which the Romans had acquired by defeating ARIOVISTUS, and by their late success, that if they appeared in defence of the Ubii, and owned them for their allies, their name alone would be a sufficient security; and they obliged themselves to furnish him with a proper number of transport-vessels.

17. For these reasons CÆSAR resolved to cross the Rhine; but he thought it neither safe to transport his army in ships, nor agreeable to his character or the dignity of the Roman empire; wherefore though he found it very difficult to lay a bridge cross so broad, so deep, and rapid a river, yet he determined to attempt it, and if he failed, not to pass over at all. The method of his contrivance was this.


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 of the Si-  
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


to face p. 67.



A. Two Pieces of timber a foot & half square, joyn'd to each other at two foot distant  
Beams two foot square laid over em. D. The Pieces of wood that joyned the  
P:sts against y<sup>e</sup> strength of the stream. G. The Pilce for defending y<sup>e</sup>  
of the Cross beams. K. Two Pillars joyn'd together. L. The little cross  
Hurdles or jascines that flood y<sup>e</sup> bridge. O. The Cross Planks for

*r's Bridge cross the Rhine.*



feet distance. B. Two others opposit to them at forty foot distance inclining at the Top. C. The  
 ynted the Pillars E. The joyses for laying y<sup>e</sup> floore on. F. The Rutterices to support y<sup>e</sup> mass  
 ading y<sup>e</sup> Bridge ag<sup>t</sup> Ships and logs. H. The forme of a single Pillar. I. The forme of one  
 k. cross peices of wood that joynd om two foot long. M. One of y<sup>e</sup> same kind single. N. The  
 nks for laying the hurdler on. P. The forme of one of y<sup>e</sup> wooden Mallets or drivers.

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main  
me  
The

“ Having joined two pieces of timber, a foot and a half square, by mortices that kept them at two foot distance from each other, he cut them to a convenient length for that part of the river he designed them for; then making them sharp at the end, caused them to be let down into the water by engines, and driven into the bottom with wooden mallets, not perpendicularly, but sloping, in compliance with the stream: directly opposite to these he placed two other stakes, joined just after the same manner, and drove them into the ground forty foot distance from the other at the bottom, causing their tops to incline towards the stream, as the others had declined from it. These double stakes, thus fix'd, he joined at top by a cross beam of two foot square, equal to the distance between them; and fastened it at either end with pins, which prevented the stakes from bending nearer one another, and made the work of so secure a nature, that the fierceness of the stream encreased the firmness of the bridge. Having observed the same method quite over the river, he covered the cross beams with planks and hurdles. As a farther security on the lower side of the bridge he drove down buttresses obliquely into the water, which were fixt to the main pillars, to prevent their giving way to the force of the current: he likewise drove in other piles at a moderate distance above the bridge, to stave off trunks of trees, and such vessels as the enemy should send down the river to destroy the work.”

WAR IN GAUL.

The description of Cæsar's bridge crosses the Rhine.

18. From the time materials began to be brought for the work, till the entire bridge was finished, was no more than ten days; when CÆSAR having left a strong garrison on both sides of the river, marched into the confines of the Sicambri: during this expedition ambassadors came to him from most places thereabouts, to desire a peace, and court the alliance of the Romans, to whom he returned civil answers, demanding hostages for their fidelity.

Cæsar crosses the Rhine.

## CHAP. VII.

WHEN the Sicambri were informed that the Romans were building a bridge, at the instigation of the people of Zutphen and Hesse, who had taken shelter amongst them, they prepared for flight, and quitting their habitations, conveyed themselves with their effects into the neighbouring woods.



**WAR IN GAUL.** 19. CÆSAR, making a short stay in their country, after he had burnt their towns and buildings, and cut down their corn, marched to the territories of the Ubii, whom he had promised to assist against the Suabians. So soon as he was arrived, they informed him, that when the Suabians heard he was building a bridge, having, according to their usual custom, called a council, they dispatched orders to all parts of their nation, commanding the natives to forsake their towns, to convey their wives, children, and effects into the woods, and that all who were able to bear arms should meet at the general rendezvous in the midst of their country, where they resolved to expect the Romans, and give them battle; which CÆSAR understanding, after he had accomplished those designs which led him into Germany, aw'd the natives, taken vengeance on the Sicambri, and set the Ubii at liberty, having spent in all eighteen days beyond the Rhine, and performed enough as well for his own honour, as the service of the republick, returned again to Gaul, and broke down his bridge.

Cæsar returns to Gaul.

### C H A P. VIII.

Cæsar's expedition into England.

20. **THOUGH** the summer was now almost spent (for the whole continent of Gaul lying northward, winter begins there very early) yet CÆSAR resolved to make a voyage to England, because he had been informed, in all the wars of Gaul, the enemy had received considerable supplies from thence; and tho' the time of year would not permit him to finish the war, yet he thought it would be worth his while to make an expedition thither only to view the island, to learn the nature of the inhabitants, to be acquainted with their coasts, their ports, and creeks, which the Gauls were almost entire strangers to; for they were seldom visited by any but merchants, who were unacquainted with all the country except the coasts, and those parts which were opposite to Gaul. Accordingly having summoned a council of merchants from all parts, he could neither be informed of the extent of the island, what nations, and how powerful the inhabitants were, how well they understood the art of war, what customs they were governed by, nor how considerable a navy their ports were capable of receiving.

## CHAP. IX.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

21. FOR this reason he thought it convenient to send out C. VOLUSENUS with a galley, to discover what he could, and immediately return with intelligence before he embarked himself: he in the mean time marched to Terouënne, from whence lay the shortest cut to England; and there he ordered several vessels from the neighbouring ports, together with the navy he had built the year before for his expedition against the Vannes, to attend him. Several provinces in England, having intelligence of these preparations, from merchants who frequented the coasts, sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, to let him know how willing they were to submit to the Roman empire, and deliver hostages for their fidelity: to these he gave a favourable audience; and, having encouraged them to adhere to their agreement by promises of considerable rewards, sent them back again to their own country; ordering COMIUS to go along with them, whom he had formerly made king of Arras, after the conquest of that place, a man of considerable interest in England, and whose virtue and fidelity he thought he might rely on. To him he gave instructions to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to accept of an alliance with the Romans, for CÆSAR himself would in a short time land in their country.

Some of the  
English send  
ambassadors  
to Cæsar in  
Gaul.

VOLUSENUS, in the mean time, having made what discoveries he could of the country, for he durst not venture himself ashore with so barbarous an enemy, after five days cruising, returned, and acquainted CÆSAR with what he had seen.

22. CÆSAR stay'd in these parts till his navy was fitted out; during which time the Terouënnois sent ambassadors to him, desiring he would be pleased to pardon their former transgressions; that a savage and unpolished people, as they were, through ignorance of the customs of the Romans they had presumed to make war upon them; but for the future they would demonstrate how ready they were to obey his commands. CÆSAR, being desirous to leave no enemies behind him, to avoid entering into a new war so late in the season, and unwilling to neglect his English expedition for such trifles, having first received a considerable number of hostages from them, took them into his favour. Having prepared eighty transport-vessels, which he thought sufficient to carry over his legions, he distributed

WAR IN his galleys to the questor, lieutenant-generals, and command-  
GAUL. ers of the horse; and eighteen transports which were wind-  
bound at a certain port about eight miles off, he appointed  
for the service of his cavalry; then committed those forces  
which he left behind, to the care of Q. TITURIUS SABI-  
NUS, and L. AURUNCULEIUS COTTA, whom he ordered  
to visit the confines of Guelders, and reduce those parts of  
Teroüenne which had not yet submitted; to lieutenant-  
general P. SULP. RUFUS he gave the charge of the port  
where he embarked, with a strong garrison to maintain it.

## CHAP. X.

Cæsar em-  
barks for  
England.

23. THUS having dispatched the necessary orders, the  
wind offering fair, he hoisted sail about one in the morn-  
ing, commanding the cavalry to embark at that port where  
the vessels lay ready to receive them, and follow him;  
which orders were not executed so readily as they ought  
to have been; but he himself arrived on the English coast,  
with his squadron; by ten of the clock the same morning,  
where he saw all the cliffs covered by the enemy in arms.  
Such was the nature of the place, that the English might  
cast their darts with great advantage from the impending  
hills; wherefore not thinking it convenient to land there,  
he cast anchor, and waited for the coming up of the rest  
of his fleet till three in the afternoon. In the mean time  
having called the lieutenants and tribunes to a council of  
war, he acquainted them with the intelligence he had re-  
ceived from VOLUSENUS, and gave them such orders as  
he thought proper for the occasion, putting them in mind  
how necessary it was in military discipline, that every thing  
should be put in execution to a moment at the general's  
signal, especially in sea affairs, which were subject to the  
greatest instability: then breaking up the council, whilst  
the wind and tide stood fair, he gave the sign for weighing  
anchor, and having sail'd about eight miles farther, arrived  
at a plain and open shore.

24. The English being apprized of CÆSAR's design,  
sent their cavalry and chariots before, which in war they  
generally make use of, and followed after with the rest of  
their army, in order to oppose our landing: which we found  
very difficult to effect for many reasons, because our ships  
being tall, required a considerable depth of water; and our  
soldiers, whilst their hands were employed and loaden with  
heavy armour, were at the same time to encounter the waves  
and

and the enemy, in a place they were not acquainted with. WAR IN  
GAUL.  
whereas the English, either standing upon dry land, or  
sallying a little way into the water in those places they  
knew to be shallow, having the free use of all their limbs,  
could boldly cast their darts, and spur their horses forward,  
who were inur'd to that kind of combat; which disadvan-  
tage so discouraged the Romans, who were strangers to  
this way of fighting, that they did not appear so chearful,  
and eager to engage the enemy, as in their former conflicts  
on dry land.

25. Which CÆSAR perceiving, gave orders that the  
gallies (a nimble sort of shipping the enemy had never seen)  
should advance a little before the rest of the navy, and row  
along with their broad-sides towards the shore, that they  
might more conveniently force the English to retire from  
the water-side, by their slings, engines, and arrows; which  
did the Romans considerable service; for the English being  
surprised at the make of our gallies, the motion of our oars  
and engines, began to give ground. But the standard-  
bearer of the tenth legion, perceiving our men were un-  
willing to venture into the sea, having first invoked the  
gods for success, cry'd out aloud, "My fellow-soldiers,  
unless you will forsake your eagle, and suffer it to fall into  
the hands of the enemy, advance; for my part, I am resolv-  
ed to perform my duty to the common-wealth and my ge-  
neral:" Having said this, he immediately leaped over-board,  
and advanced the eagle towards the English; whereupon  
the soldiers encouraging each other, to prevent so signal a  
disgrace, followed his example; which those in the next  
ships perceiving, did the like, and pressed forward to en-  
gage the enemy.

The stand-  
ard bearer  
of the tenth  
legion leaps  
into the wa-  
ter, the rest  
follow his  
example.

26. The conflict was sharply maintained on both sides, The Romans  
at first beaten  
back from  
the shore,  
though the Romans, not being able either to keep their  
ranks, obtain firm footing, or follow their particular  
standards, leaping out of several ships, and joining the  
first ensign they met with, were in great confusion: but  
the English, who were well acquainted with the shallows,  
when they saw us descend in small numbers from our ships,  
spurring their horses into the water, set upon our men in-  
cumbered and unprepared to receive them; and some sur-  
rounded us with their numbers in one place, whilst others  
flanked us where we lay most open in another. Which  
CÆSAR observing, he caused the long-boats and smaller  
vessels to be mann'd, and, where occasion required, sent  
them to assist their fellows. Thus our foremost ranks,  
having



**WAR IN GAUL.** having gained dry footing, were followed by the rest of the army, and charging the enemy briskly, put them to flight, but were not able to pursue, or take the island that time, because we had no cavalry, which was the only thing wanting to complete CÆSAR's wonted success.

The Romans gain the shore, and rout the English. The English send ambassadors to desire a peace;

27. The enemy being defeated, so soon as they had escaped beyond the reach of danger, sent ambassadors to CÆSAR to desire a peace, promising to deliver hostages for their entire submission: and with these ambassadors came COMIUS of Arras, whom, as we observed before, CÆSAR had sent into Britain, where he was imprisoned so soon as he landed with the general's commands, but set at liberty again after the battle. They endeavoured to excuse what they had done, by laying the blame upon the mob; and entreating him to forgive a fault of ignorance, but not of malice. CÆSAR at first reprimanded them for their breach of faith, that after they had voluntarily sent ambassadors to him into Gaul, to desire a peace, and delivered hostages of their own accord, they should without any reason make war upon him; he imputed it, he said, to their ignorance, and forgave them; then demanded hostages for their future carriage, part whereof they delivered immediately, and with the rest, who liv'd at some distance, they promised to return in a few days after. In the mean time, having disbanded their men, and dispersed them into their several countries, the princes from all parts came to deliver up themselves, and their estates to CÆSAR's disposal.

which they obtained on delivery of hostages.

## CHAP. XL

A violent storm disperses the ships that brought the cavalry, and the other Roman vessels on the coasts of Britain.

28. A PEACE being thus concluded within four days after CÆSAR's arrival in England, the eighteen transports appointed for the cavalry put out to sea with a gentle gale; but when they were arrived near Britain within view of the Roman camp, so sudden a storm arose, that they were all dispersed; some returning to the port from whence they came, whilst others were thrown upon the lower end of the island towards the west, where they endeavoured to cast anchor, but so much water came into them, that they were obliged a second time to commit themselves to the mercy of the waves, and make the best of their way for Gaul.

29. The same night it being full moon, at which time the tides are highest, an observation our mariners were strangers to, the galleys, which, after the men were landed, had been

been hauled up towards the shore, were filled with the WAR IN waves, and the vessels of burthen which rode at anchor, GAUL. were disabled by the tempest, nor was it possible for us to afford them any succour: Thus several of our ships were destroyed, and the rest having lost their cables, anchors, and tackle, were rendered wholly useless, which was a great affliction to the whole army; for they had no other vessels to carry them back again, and no materials to mend their own with, and they knew very well they must of necessity take up their winter-quarters in Gaul, because there was no corn nor provision to be had in England.

30. The princes of England who were assembled to perform their agreement with CÆSAR, understanding the Romans had neither cavalry, ships, nor provision, and computing the number of our men from the smallness of our camp, which was then narrower than usual, because CÆSAR had made the legions leave their heavy baggage behind them, resolved to rebel, to intercept our convoys, and delay us 'till winter; then having either defeated us, or prevented our return, they hoped to deter others, by our example, from invading England for the future.

31. Wherefore, having entered into a new conspiracy, they began by degrees to quit our camp, and privately to list their disbanded troops again.

## CHAP. XII.

BUT CÆSAR, though he knew nothing of their design, yet suspecting an alteration upon the loss of his shipping, by their delay in the delivery of their hostages, prepared for all events; causing provisions to be brought into his camp every day from the country round about, and giving order, that those ships which had received the least damage by the tempest, should be refitted and mended with the beaks and timber of those that had been shattered to pieces; he sent likewise to Gaul for such materials as he had occasion for, which were so well applied by the industry of his soldiers, that he only lost twelve ships, and made the rest fit for service again.

32. In the mean time the seventh legion, whose turn it was, went out to forage. As part were employed in the field, and the rest in carrying corn between them and the army, not in the least suspecting any acts of hostility, the outguards gave CÆSAR notice, that they observed a greater dust than usual that way which the legions went: whereupon,

Upon this news the English break the peace.

Cæsar refits his navy.

WAR IN upon, suspecting the English had revolted, as he afterwards found they had, taking along with him the cohorts that were placed for an advanced guard, he commanded two others to supply their room; all the rest to repair to their arms, and follow him as fast as they could.

The English  
set upon the  
Roman for-  
agers.

He had not marched many paces from his camp, before he saw his foragers over-charged by the enemy, driven into a small compass, and exposed to the English darts on every side: for the enemy, knowing there was only one field left which had not been foraged, concluded we must of necessity come thither; wherefore having hid themselves the night before in the woods there, they staid to expect us; and setting upon our men, whilst they were busy in reaping, and had laid aside their arms, killed some of them, put the rest in disorder, and then surrounded them with their horse and chariots.

The English  
manner of  
fighting in  
their cha-  
riots.

33. The English method of fighting with chariots is this: "In the first place, they drive up and down to all parts of the enemy's army, distributing their darts among them to the best advantage; and frequently put the foremost ranks in disorder, even with the noise of their wheels and horses; then forcing their way into the midst of the cavalry, forsake their chariots and fight on foot, performing at the same instant, the part of nimble horsemen, and that of stable foot: the charioteers in the mean while, driving a little way out of the battle, place themselves so conveniently, that if their party are too much oppressed by the enemy, they may easily retreat to them. So expert are they at this exercise by perpetual practise, that they can stay their horses upon a full stretch, even in the midst of a descent, stop short and turn, run upon the pole, rest on the harness, and throw themselves with great dexterity into their chariots."

Cæsar comes  
to the assist-  
ance of his  
foragers.

34. The Romans being disordered by this new kind of fight, CÆSAR came very opportunely to their aid; for upon his arrival the English made a stand, and our men began to forget their fears; however, not thinking it convenient to engage the enemy at that time, he maintained his ground for a while, then retreated with the legions to his camp; and the enemy likewise, whilst we were otherwise employed, thought fit to retire. The continual rains and tempests, which followed after, several days successively, kept the Romans in their camp, and the English from fighting.

## C H A P. XIII.

BUT the enemy were not idle in the mean while, for they dispatched couriers to all parts of the island, to inform the people how small an army the Romans had, how considerable a booty they might obtain, and how glorious an opportunity offered to make themselves free for ever, if they would but force the Roman camp; by which means having immediately raised great numbers of horse and foot, they came to attack our trenches.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

Now though CÆSAR foresaw that the enemy, in case they were routed, would make their escape by flight; yet having got thirty horse, part of COMIUS's retinue, he drew his legions up in order of battle before the camp; and having engaged the English, who were not able to sustain the fury of our soldiers, he immediately put them to flight, pursued till his soldiers were out of breath, and having made a considerable slaughter, burnt their towns and buildings for many miles round, and then returned to his camp.

The English  
come to at-  
tack the Ro-  
man camp;  
a second bat-  
tle, are rout-  
ed.

36. The same day he received ambassadors from the enemy, to desire a peace. Whereupon he commanded them to send him into Gaul double the number of hostages he formerly required; and because the autumnal equinox approached, not thinking it safe to take a winter voyage in his crazy vessels, so soon as the wind stood fair, which was about midnight, he weigh'd anchor, and with all his fleet arrived safe at the port from whence he had embarked, except two transports, which could not keep up with the rest, and were driven into a haven something lower in the country.

They sue a-  
gain for  
peace, which  
is granted.

Cæsar re-  
turns to  
Gaul.

37. In these two vessels were about 300 soldiers, who, so soon as they landed, endeavoured to reach their camp; but the Terouënnois, whom CÆSAR had left in a peaceable condition before he sailed for England, spurr'd on by the hopes of plunder, at first surrounded our men in small numbers, and commanded them, on pain of death, to deliver their arms; but the Romans casting themselves into an orb, instead of surrendering, bravely maintained their ground; whereupon about 6000 of the enemy, hearing the noise, came in to the assistance of their country-men. CÆSAR, having intelligence of this, detached all the cavalry in his army to their assistance. In the mean time, the Romans manfully sustained the enemy's charge, fought with unequal numbers four hours together,



**WAR IN** together, and having received<sup>th</sup> but few wounds themselves, **GAUL.** had made a considerable slaughter amongst the assailants: but the moment our horse appeared in view, the Teroüenois threw down their arms, and betook themselves to flight, in which a considerable number were killed.

## CHAP. XIV.

**Labienus**  
marches a-  
gainst the  
Teroüenois;  
lays  
their country  
waste.

38. **THE** next day CÆSAR dispatched lieutenant **T. LABIENUS**, with the legions he brought back from England, against the rebels, who being deprived by the drought of the benefit of those marshes, where they had the year before absconded, almost all of them fell under his power. But the lieutenants **Q. TITURIUS** and **L. COTTA**, who had been sent into the country of Guelders, returned without doing any other execution but cutting up their corn, laying their fields waste, and burning their towns; for the enemy had secured their persons in the woods. CÆSAR took up his quarters this winter in Belgium, where he received hostages only from two of the provinces in England, the rest neglecting their promise. The Roman senate, informed of these actions by CÆSAR'S letters, decreed a general thanksgiving for twenty days successively.



C. J. CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARY  
OF HIS  
WAR in GAUL.

The FIFTH BOOK.

*CÆSAR builds a considerable navy; he goes to Illyricum; his second expedition into England; the Gauls revolt; SABINUS and COTTA defeated; CICERO besieged, but relieved.*

CHAP. I.

**D**URING the consulate of L. DOMITIUS and AP. CLAUDIUS, CÆSAR leaving his winter-quarters to go into Italy, according to his usual custom, gave orders to his lieutenants, to whom he had committed the charge of his legions, that they should build as many ships against his return as they could, and refit the old vessels; commanding them to make the decks somewhat lower than usual in the Mediterranean, that the soldiers might embark or get on shore with greater ease; because he knew the ebbing of the tide in the British seas sometimes left but a very inconsiderable depth of water near the land. That there might be convenience for his horses, he ordered they should build them broader than ordinary, and contrive them all for oars, to which the lowness of the decks contributed. He sent for such materials as were necessary to equip them, from Spain; and having held the diet of Lombardy, went immediately to Illyricum,

WAR in  
GAUL.

Cæsar gives  
orders for  
building a  
navy.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

He goes to  
Illyricum;  
the Pirustæ  
submit.

Illyricum, because he had intelligence that the Pirustæ had made several inroads into the frontiers. So soon as he arrived there, he began to levy an army, and appointed the soldiers a general rendezvous; which the Pirustæ being informed of, immediately sent ambassadors to assure him, what had been done was contrary to the publick consent, and that they were ready to make such satisfaction for the injuries they had committed, as he should require. CÆSAR having given them audience, demanded hostages to be delivered by a certain day, or war and ruin should ensue: they obeyed his commands; whereupon he appointed arbitrators to estimate the damages the towns had received, and determine what compensation should be made for them.

2. This affair being dispatched, and treaties signed, he returned again to Lombardy, and from thence to his army: he made a review of all their quarters, and, notwithstanding the scarcity of materials, found the industry of his soldiers had already built about six hundred such ships as he had given commission for, and twenty-eight gallies, which were ready to launch within a few days. Having applauded the application of his soldiers and their supervisors, he gave them such orders as he thought convenient, and commanded they should all meet him at Boloign; from whence, he thought, lay the shortest cut to England, it being but about thirty miles there from land to land.

a Portius Itius, according to HELLWYN and ORTELIVS is Calais; but SCALIGER and SANSON prove it to be Boloign, with whom agree CLUVER, BUNO, SOMNER, BAXTER, &c.

## C H A P. II.

Cæsar  
marches into  
the country  
of Treves, to  
prevent a re-  
bellion.

HE left as many soldiers as he thought necessary for this purpose; then took his march with four legions and 800 horse into the country of Treves, because they had neither appeared at the general convocation of the states, nor submitted to the common-wealth, and were reported to solicit assistance from the Germans beyond the Rhine.

Cingetorix  
and Indutio-  
marus.

3. This country is very powerful in infantry; but the best stored with cavalry of any in Gaul; and, as we have already shewn, joins to the river Rhine. It happened that INDUTIOMARUS and CINGETORIX were disputing about this time for the superiority; the latter being informed of CÆSAR'S approach, came over to him, promising, that neither he nor any of his party would ever

be deficient in the performance of their duty or alliance with the people of Rome; and laid before him the present proceedings of his country-men.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

INDUTIOMARUS, on the other hand, began to levy what numbers of horse and foot he could; and having secur'd such persons, whose age made them incapable of bearing arms, in the large forest of Arden (which, beginning at the river Rhine, extends through the midst of the country of Treves, as far as the borders of Rheims) resolv'd to engage in a war: but finding himself deserted by several of the nobility, who out of affection to CINGETORIX, or fear of our approaching army, had come over to CÆSAR (each to solicit his own pardon, since they were not able to do it for their country) apprehending he should shortly be forsaken by all, sent an embassy to CÆSAR, to acquaint him, "That he had been one of the foremost to pay his submission, but that he thought himself obliged to stay at home, lest the giddy mob, in the absence of the nobility, should have revolted from their duty; but the whole country was now at his command; and, if CÆSAR pleas'd, he would wait upon him at his camp, to lay his own and country's fortune at his feet."

Indutioma-  
rus's politick  
embassy.

4. Though CÆSAR knew the occasion of this speech, and what reasons had induced him to change his former resolution; yet, that he might not be obliged to spend the whole summer in Treves, after he had prepared all things for his English expedition, he commanded INDUTIOMARUS to bring 200 hostages along with him; which he performed, bringing his own son and nearest relations, who had been demanded, amongst the number: whereupon CÆSAR encouraged him to continue firm in his duty to the Romans; not forgetting to send for all the noblemen of Treves, and reconcile them one after another to CINGETORIX; which he did as well on the account of his deserts, as for his own sake, because he knew the man, who had given such signal proofs of his affection, would employ his interest at home to CÆSAR's advantage. INDUTIOMARUS was not a little disturbed to find his authority thus diminished among his countrymen, and if he was our enemy before, this occasion increased his ancient malice.

5. Having settled affairs in Treves, he march'd his legions to Boloign, where he was informed, that the forty ships which had been built amongst the Meldæ, were driven back again by a storm to the port from whence they set out; him.

Cæsar  
marches to  
Boloign,  
where he had  
ordered all  
the princes of  
Gaul to meet  
him.



WAR IN  
GAUL.



out; but all the rest he found ready for sailing, well rigg'd and fitted out. Thither likewise came all the cavalry of Gaul to meet him, about 4000, with the noblemen of every province; of these he designed to leave but few behind him, whose fidelity he could depend upon; and take the rest as hostages along with him to England, apprehending some commotions in Gaul during his absence.

6. Amongst these was DUMNORIX of Autun, of whom we have formerly spoken; him of all mankind he resolved to carry, because he knew his fickle, proud, and aspiring temper, which joined with the authority he had amongst his country-men, might have proved of fatal consequence; besides, DUMNORIX had openly declared in a publick council, that CÆSAR had conferred upon him the government of Autun, which tho' the Autunnois ill brooked, yet they neither durst remonstrate against, nor by an embassy to CÆSAR deprecate. He was the first that desired leave to stay at home, pretending that not being used to sailing, he was afraid of the sea, and that he had a religious vow to perform, which would detain him: but when he found his request absolutely denied, having no hopes of obtaining his demands, he began to persuade each nobleman of Gaul apart, not to leave the continent; instilling jealousies into them, by insinuating, that CÆSAR, no doubt, had some deep design in carrying all the nobility of Gaul beyond sea with him; that because he durst not put them to death in the view of their country-men, he would do it when he had transported them to England. So far did his artifice prevail, that he persuaded them to enter into a mutual alliance, and obliged themselves by oath to consult and act by the general consent, in all things which concerned the good of their country.

7. CÆSAR was informed of this conspiracy from several hands, yet having a particular respect for the country of Autun, he resolved to try all methods to restrain and frighten DUMNORIX from proceeding in his designs; but finding his madness continued, he thought it high time to provide for the safety of his own person, and the republick; wherefore having staid about five and twenty days in the same place, for so long did the north-west wind put a stop to his voyage, the wind coming fair about, he commanded his horse and foot to embark: but whilst all people were busy in performing these orders, DUMNORIX, without CÆSAR's knowledge or consent, left the camp with the Autun cavalry, and took his march homeward;

Dumnorix  
persuades the  
noblemen of  
Gaul not to  
go with Cæ-  
sar into Bri-  
tann.

Dumnorix  
deserts.

ward; which CÆSAR being informed of, immediately put WAR IN a stop to his voyage: laying aside all other affairs, he detached a strong party of horse to pursue and bring him back again, with orders to kill DUMNORIX, if he offered to make the least opposition to his commands; for he had reason to think the man who durst disobey his orders when present, would not be very loyal in his absence. The horse having overtaken him, commanded him to return, which he refused, endeavouring to defend himself by force of arms; and often implored the assistance of his country-men, crying out that he was a free-man, born in a free country. But the Romans performed their orders, surrounded and put him to the sword, whereupon all his cavalry returned to CÆSAR.

GAUL.

Dumnorix's  
obstinacy;  
he is kill'd.

## C H A P. III.

8. THIS affair determined, leaving LABIENUS in Gaul with three legions and 2000 horse, to secure the port, to provide corn, and send him intelligence from time to time how affairs went in the continent, that he might know how to accommodate his counsels to the particular time and circumstance; with five legions, and the same number of horse he had left with LABIENUS, about sunset CÆSAR hoisted sail for England, with a gentle south-wind. About mid-night he was becalmed, and being driven by the tide 'till morning, found the island on his left; then following the return of the tide, he row'd 'till he came to the landing-place, which he found so convenient the year before; and upon this occasion the soldiers deserved applause, who labouring without intermission at the oar, made their heavy transports and tenders keep pace with the gallies. About noon we arrived with our whole fleet on the coasts, where no enemy was to be seen, though, as CÆSAR afterwards understood from the prisoners, the islanders had been there in great multitudes: but being frighted to behold so numerous a navy (which, together with the ships of that year's building, and private vessels which several persons had provided for their own use, amounted to above 800) they had left the shore, and hid themselves in the mountains.

Cæsar sets  
sail for Eng-  
land.

9. CÆSAR, having landed his army, and chosen a convenient place to encampin, enquired of some whom he had taken prisoners, where the enemy was lodged. And between three and four in the morning, having left ten cohorts and 300

The Romans  
land.

WAR IN horse, under the command of Q. ATRIUS, to secure the CAUD. navy, he marched towards the English; being the less uneasy for his fleet, as he had left them at anchor on a smooth and open shore. He had not marched twelve miles, before he saw the enemy, who having posted their horse and chariots upon an advantageous eminence by the banks of the river, gave us battle, and endeavoured to oppose our passage, but were repulsed by our cavalry, and obliged to retire to the woods; where they were possessed of a post extremely well fortified both by art and nature, which had been built in all probability during the times of their civil wars; all the passages to it being blocked up by heaps of trees, cut down for that purpose. They never ventured out of this place but in small parties, and always hindered the Romans from entering it: but the soldiers of the seventh legion having cast themselves into a Testudo, and thrown up a mount against their works, took the place, and drove them from the woods, without receiving many wounds: CÆSAR however withheld them from the pursuit, as he was unacquainted with the country, and, the day being far spent, he thought it adviseable to bestow the rest of it in fortifying his camp.

They rout  
the English.

#### CHAP. IV.

10. THE next morning early, CÆSAR, having divided his army into three battalions, sent both his horse and foot to pursue the enemy: they had not travelled far before they came within sight of the English rear; at which instant a party of horse arrived from QUINTUS ATRIUS, to acquaint CÆSAR, that the night before there had been a dreadful storm, which shattered almost all the navy, and drove the ships on shore, having lost their anchors and cables; nor was it in the power of the mariners and pilots to prevent their running foul of one another.

A storm  
which shat-  
ters the Ro-  
man fleet.

11. Upon this intelligence, CÆSAR recalling his legions and cavalry from their intended journey, returned to his fleet, where he was an eye-witness of the misfortunes the couriers and packets had brought him an account of; for forty ships were entirely lost, and he saw the rest could not be refitted without infinite trouble: wherefore having chosen some carpenters from amongst the legions, and writ for others to Gaul, he sent LABIENUS orders to build as many ships as he could with those legions he had there. And though he found it would be a very trouble-  
some

Cæsar refits  
his navy, and  
causes it to  
be haul'd up  
to dry land.

some business, yet he thought it most convenient to have **WAR IN**  
the fleet haul'd up to land, and inclosed within the forti- **GAUL.**  
fications of his camp. For this purpose, the soldiers  
laboured ten days and nights without intermission. At  
length having effected it, the shipping drawn to shore, and  
the camp very strongly fortify'd, leaving the same guard as  
formerly, he returned to the place where he had desisted  
from pursuing the enemy.

## C H A P. V.

HERE he found far greater numbers of the English  
assembled, than he left when he went to visit the fleet. By  
general consent the whole management of this war was  
committed to the care of **CASSIVELLAUNUS**, whose ter-  
ritories were divided by the river Thames from the sea-  
coasts, and extended fourscore miles into the island: for  
though he had formerly made war on the rest of his coun-  
try-men, yet upon our arrival they all united, and pitched  
upon him as the fittest person to direct them at so impor-  
tant a conjuncture.

*Cassivellau-  
nus made ge-  
neralissimo of  
the English.*

12. "The inland parts of England are inhabited by those  
that call themselves natives of the country; but the sea-  
coasts by the Belgic Gauls, who, coming over either for  
plunder or settlements, when they had ended their wars,  
cultivated the earth they were possessed of, and for  
the generality retained the names of the cities from whence  
they came. The country is well peopled, and has plenty  
of buildings, much after the fashion of those in Gaul.  
They have infinite store of cattle, and for money they use  
brass and iron rings, which they barter with by weight.  
The midland countries produce some tin; and those nearer  
the sea, iron, though not much of the latter; but their brass  
is imported. They have all kinds of wood to be met with  
in Gaul, except the fig and beach-tree: they are not al-  
lowed to eat either hare, hen, or goose; yet they breed  
all these for their fancy and diversion. The climate is more  
temperate than in Gaul, and the frosts less violent.

*Description  
of England,  
and the cus-  
toms of the  
English.*

13. The island is triangular, one side situate over-against  
Gaul, at the east corner of which, where the county of  
Kent lies, is the usual landing-place from Gaul; the other  
side looks towards the south; and from one end to the other  
reaches about 500 miles; the west angle lies towards Spain  
and Ireland, an island generally esteemed to be half as large  
as the other, and about the same distance from England as



WAR IN England is from Gaul; in the middle between these two GAULS lies the Isle of Man, besides several other smaller islands scattered up and down, of which some affirm, that for thirty days successively in winter they are deprived of light: but we received no such information during our stay, only observed from our way of measuring time by the running of water in our hour-pots, that the nights were shorter than in Gaul: The length of this side, according to their computation, is about 700 miles. The third side lies northward, and fronts the open sea, except in one angle, which points towards Germany; and the extent of this is generally computed to be 800 miles; so that the circumference of the whole island is 2000 miles.

14. The most civiliz'd people among them are the Kentish men, whose country lies altogether upon the sea-coasts; and whose customs are much the same with those of the Gauls. The inland people seldom trouble themselves with agriculture, living on milk and flesh-meat, and are clad with skins; but all of them paint themselves blue with woad, that they may look the more dreadful to their enemies in battle. The hair of their heads they wear very long, but shave all the rest of their bodies, except the upper lip. Ten or a dozen have one wife in common amongst them, especially if they are brothers, and the parents often lie with their own issue; but he who first married the woman, whilst she was a maid, fathers all the children."

## CHAP. VI.

The English attack the Romans whilst on their march, but are repulsed. They return again.

15. THE enemy's horse and chariots had a sharp skirmish with our men during their march; but the Romans repulsing them from all sides, drove them into the woods, and having slain a great many, pursued the rest so far, that they lost some of their own party. Not long after, the English returning, whilst the Romans, who little expected them, were fortifying their camp, made a sudden sally out of the woods, and fell upon our advanced guard; whereupon CÆSAR detached two cohorts, the first of two legions, to their assistance. These cohorts, were drawn up very near each other; but the enemy, whilst our men were surprized with their new way of fighting, boldly broke through the midst of them, and returned again without receiving any loss; in which action Q. LABERIUS DURUS was killed; but at last some fresh cohorts coming up to our relief, the English were repulsed.

and are again repulsed.

" This

16. "This engagement happening in the view of the whole army, every one perceived that the legionary soldiers were not a fit match for such an enemy, because the weight of their armour would not permit them to pursue, nor durst they go too far from their colours; neither could the cavalry encounter them, because the English often pretended a retreat, and having drawn them from the legions, would forsake their chariots, and fight on foot, at a great advantage; and when they were mounted, they were equally fatal to our horse, whether we pursued or fled. Another disadvantage was, that the enemy never fought in close battalions, but in small parties, at a great distance from one another, each of them having their particular post allotted, from whence they received supplies, and the weary were relieved by the fresh."

WAR IN  
GAUL.

The advantages the English had over the Romans in their way of fighting.

## CHAPTER VII.

17. THE day after the enemy lodg'd themselves in the hills, at a considerable distance from our camp, but seldom appear'd, not being so eager at skirmishing with our cavalry as before; but about noon, when CÆSAR had detach'd three legions and all the cavalry under the command of C. TREBONIUS to forage, on a sudden they assaulted our foragers from all sides, and even came up with the legions and their standards; but the Romans returning their charge very briskly, beat them back again, nor did our cavalry desist from the pursuit 'till they had entirely routed them, depending on the legions, who followed close after, to sustain them in case of necessity. They put a great many of the enemy to the sword, and pursued the rest so close, that they neither allowed them time to rally, to make a stand, or forsake their chariots. Upon this rout the auxiliary troops that had come from all parts, deserted them, nor were they ever able after this to make any considerable head against us.

The English attack the Roman foragers.

but are routed with considerable loss.

18. CÆSAR, being apprized of their intention, march'd his army into the confines of CASSIVELLAUNUS, towards the Thames, which river is only fordable in one place, and that with great difficulty. So soon as he came thither, he saw the enemy's forces drawn up in a considerable body on the opposite bank, which was fortified with sharp stakes; and they had driven likewise many piles of the same kind into the bottom of the river, whose tops were covered by the water. CÆSAR, having intelligence of

Cæsar fords the Thames.

WAR IN this from the prisoners and deserters, sent his cavalry before, commanding the legions to follow close after them; and with such expedition did they perform his orders, though the water took them up to the neck, that the enemy, not being able to sustain their assault, forsook the banks and fled.

GAUL

And puts  
Cassivellaunus  
again to  
flight;

## C H A P. VIII.

who disbands  
part of his  
army, and  
retires to the  
woods.

19. THUS CASSIVELLAUNUS, having lost all hopes of success by a battle, disbanded the greatest part of his forces, and retaining only about 4000 chariots, observed our motions from time to time, keeping himself at some distance in the woods, or such places where the Romans could have no access; from those countries to which he knew we were to march he carried off the cattle and natives beforehand; and whenever our cavalry ventured a little too far to lay the fields waste, being well acquainted with all the roads and by-ways, he would detach a party of his chariots out of the woods to attack us; nor could our horse engage them without great danger, which prevented our making such excursions as we would have done otherwise, and obliged CÆSAR not to permit his horse to go further to burn and destroy, then the legions were able to attend them.

The people  
of Essex and  
Middlesex.

20. In the mean time the Trinobantes, who possess one of the most considerable provinces in the island, sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, promising that they would submit to him, and accept his commands, desiring that he would be pleased to defend MANDUBRATIUS from the oppression of CASSIVELLAUNUS, and send him to them for their king and governor: this MANDUBRATIUS was the son of IMANUENTIUS, who formerly possessing that kingdom, was slain by CASSIVELLAUNUS; and to avoid his father's fate, had fled to CÆSAR, in Gaul for protection. CÆSAR restored MANDUBRATIUS to them, but demanded of them forty hostages, and corn for his army; which conditions they readily performed.

21. The Trinobantes thus protected from their enemies, and secured by his orders from being plundered by his soldiers, the <sup>b</sup> Cenimagni, Segontiacy, Ancalites, Bibroci,

<sup>b</sup> CAMDEN says the Cenimagni were the same with the Iceni, whose province contained Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, and Huntingdonshire. Segontiacy, he thinks, were originally the Belgæ, and places them in the hundred of Holsot in Hampshire; the Bibroci he calls those that inhabit the hundred of Bray in Berkshire; the Ancalites that of Henley in Oxfordshire; and the Cassi, the people of Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, and Hertfordshire, where the name is still preserved in the hundred of Cashow.

and Cassi, submitted themselves likewise by their embassa-  
 dors to CÆSAR. From these he had intelligence that  
 CASSIVELLAUNUS's town, which was fortified with  
 woods and marshes, and stored with plenty of men and  
 cattle, was but a small distance from his camp; for the  
 English call a thick wood, surrounded with a ditch, and  
 fortified with a rampier, a town, which they retire to,  
 when they are apprehensive of incursions from their neigh-  
 bours. Thither he marched with his legions, and found  
 the place well secured both by art and nature; however he  
 endeavoured to storm it in two several places, and the enemy  
 being no longer able to sustain the fury of the assault, fled  
 out at another part of the wood. Here we found vast  
 quantities of cattle, and many of the English, who en-  
 deavoured to make their escape, being overtaken, lost  
 their lives.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

What the  
English call-  
ed a town.

The English  
fortification  
taken.

22. CASSIVELLAUNUS in the mean time sent embassa-  
 dors to Kent, which, as we have already taken notice, lies  
 toward the sea-coast, and was governed by four kings,  
 CINGETORIX, CARNILIUS, TAXIMAGULUS, and  
 SEGONAX; whom he commanded to attack our camp,  
 where the navy was laid up, with all the forces they could  
 raise: but so soon as they arrived there, our men made a  
 sally, killed several of them, took LUGOTORIX, one  
 of their chief commanders, prisoner, and returned safe  
 again into their trenches. CASSIVELLAUNUS, upon  
 the news of this defeat, reflecting on the many losses he  
 had received, that his country was laid waste, but, above  
 all, that several provinces had already forsaken the gene-  
 ral alliance, sent ambassadors to treat of a surrender, who  
 were introduced by COMIUS of Arras. CÆSAR designing  
 to quarter that winter in Gaul, that he might prevent sudden  
 insurrections there, and because the summer was already far  
 spent, and the remainder of it might easily be spun out with  
 lays, demanded hostages, and appointed a yearly tribute  
 which the English should pay to the people of Rome; not  
 forgetting strictly to prohibit CASSIVELLAUNUS from in-  
 juring MANDUBRATIUS, or the Trinobantes.

The four  
kings of  
Kent attack  
the Roman  
camp, but

are repulsed  
with loss.  
Cassivellau-  
nus surren-  
ders, and  
Cæsar impos-  
es a yearly  
tribute on  
the English.

23. Having received the hostages, he marched his army  
 back again to the sea-shore, where he found his fleet resit-  
 ted, and caused it to be launched; but considering the  
 number of the captives was so great, and that some of  
 our ships had perished in the storm, he resolved to trans-  
 port his army at two voyages; whereby it so fell out,  
 that not one vessel was lost which carried over the



WAR IN soldiers, either this, or the foregoing year, tho' the ships were so numerous, and the voyages so frequent.

But very few of those which were sent back again from Gaul, after they had landed the soldiers that were first carried over, nor of the sixty ships which LABIENUS had taken care to build, arrived safe in England; the rest being driven back again by contrary winds: wherefore CÆSAR, having long expected them in vain, lest the winter should prevent his voyage, the equinox being near at hand, disposed his soldiers closer than he designed, and taking the opportunity of an extraordinary calm, set sail about ten o'clock at night, and arrived safe with his whole fleet at the continent by break of day.

Cæsar arrives safe with the rest of his army in Gaul.

## CHAP. IX.

24. HAVING laid up his fleet in the docks, and held an assembly of the Gauls at <sup>e</sup> Amiens, because the summer's drought had made a scarcity of corn that year, he was obliged to quarter his legions otherwise than he had done in former winters, and to distribute them into several countries; one legion, under the command of lieutenant C. FABIVS, he sent to Terouenne; another under Q. CICERO to Hainault; a third under L. ROSCIUS to <sup>d</sup> Seez; a fourth under TITUS LABIENUS, who had orders to quarter in Rheims on the borders of Treves; three others he quartered in Belgium, under the command of M. CRASSUS the questor, L. MANUTIUS PLANCUS, and CAIUS TREBONIUS the lieutenants; the legion which he had last raised beyond the Po, with five cohorts, he sent into the country of Treves, which is governed by AMBRIORIX and CATIVULCUS, the greatest part of whose territories lie between the Mosse and the Rhine; these he committed to the charge of the lieutenants Q. TITURIUS SABINUS and L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA. By this distribution of his legions, CÆSAR thought he might easily redress the want of provisions; yet all the legions lay within the compass of one hundred miles, except those whom he had sent under the command of L. ROSCIUS, in-

<sup>e</sup> Samarobrina, SCALIGER calls Amiens, others Cambray, or St. Quintin; but SANSON says positively 'tis the town of Amiens, and that it should be read Samarobrina, for Briva or Briga is an old Celtick word for a bridge; so Samarobrina is a bridge over the Samara or Soam, where Amiens now stands.

<sup>d</sup> Essui, says BAUDRAND, are inhabitants of Normandy, and their capital the town now called-Seez; but VOSSIUS think this a corruption of the text, and that it should have been Ædui, the people of Autun. SANSON thinks Essui and Sessui or Sessuvii the same people.

to a most quiet and peaceable country ; and he resolved to stay himself in Gaul, till the whole army had possessed themselves of, and fortified their winter-quarters.

WAR IN GAUL.

Tasgetius murdered by his subjects of Chartres.

25. In the country of Chartres lived TASGETIUS, a man of the best family there, whose ancestors had formerly been kings of the place ; and CÆSAR, to reward that constant virtue and affection which he had given proofs of in all the wars, had restored him to the dignity of his forefathers : but in the third year of his reign, his enemies, by the assistance of several of his subjects, who were in the conspiracy, publicly murdered him. CÆSAR had intelligence of this, and being apprehensive that since so many were concerned in the treason, the country might revolt, he commanded L. PLANCUS to march immediately with his legion out of Belgium into Chartres, to apprehend all such as had been concerned in the murder of TASGETIUS, and send them prisoners to him : in the mean time he had advice from all the questors and lieutenants, to whose charge he had committed the legions, that they had fortified their winter-quarters.

## CHAP. X.

26. OUR legions had not been settled above fifteen days before AMBIORIX and CATIVULCUS, at the instigation of INDUTIOMARUS of Treves, made a sudden insurrection, stirring up the people to rebel, after they had carried SABINUS and COTTA corn into their quarters, which were in their confines. Having surprized the soldiers who were gone to fetch in wood, they came in a strong body to storm our camp ; but the Romans immediately repaired to their arms, and ascended the rampart, whilst the Spanish cavalry issuing out from one side, got the better of their horse ; whereupon, despairing of success, the enemy retreated ; and, according to their custom, demanded a conference, pretending they had something to say which imported the publick good, and might conduce towards making a peace.

The people of Liege rebel, and assault the Roman camp ;

but are repulsed ; desire a treaty.

27. Whereupon C. ARPINIUS, a Roman knight, one of TITURIUS's particular friends, and Q. JUNIUS a Spaniard, who had frequently been sent before by CÆSAR to AMBIORIX, were deputed to treat with them : to whom AMBIORIX spoke to this effect ; " That he thought himself infinitely indebted to CÆSAR for the many benefits he had formerly received from him ; for

Ambiorix's speech to the Roman deputies.

having

WAR IN having freed him from that tribute which he used to pay  
 GAUL. his neighbours of Namur, and for setting his son and nephew  
 at liberty, who had been detained amongst the other hostages sent to that country: wherefore he had not assaulted the Roman camp out of inclination, but necessity; for such was the constitution of his government, that the people had no less power over him, than he over them: that his country had undertaken this war in compliance with the sudden and general insurrection of all the provinces of Gaul: that he was not so vain and unexperienced, to imagine it possible for him with so insignificant a force to overcome the Romans; but, by general consent, the natives had pitched on that day for attacking the Romans in their several winter-quarters, to prevent one legion from coming to the assistance of another; nor was it possible for the people of Liege to deny their countrymen any thing, especially where the recovery of their public liberty was concerned: but having now discharged the duty owing to his country, gratitude obliged him to admonish CÆSAR, and friendship to intreat TITURIUS, to consult the preservation of themselves and soldiers; for a great number of German troops, whom the Gauls had hired, had passed the Rhine two days before; therefore they might consider whether it were not better for them to leave their quarters, and march to CICERO, or LABIENUS, the first not being above fifty miles distant from them, and the other but a little further: for his part, he promised and obliged himself by oath, to grant them a safe passage through his country, by which means he should at the same instant oblige his countrymen, by freeing them from the burthen of winter-quarters, and make a grateful return for the favours he had received from CÆSAR." Thus ending his speech he departed.

## CHAP. XI.

28. C. ARPINIUS and JUNIUS made their report to the lieutenant generals, of what they had heard, who being much surprized, thought the advice not to be neglected, though it came from an enemy; and that which weighed most with them was, they could not believe so mean and obscure a people as those of Liege, would, of their own accord, presume to make war on the Romans: wherefore, having summoned a council of war, long debates ensued. LUCIUS ARUNCULEIUS COTTA, and several of the tribunes and first centurions

The Romans  
 call a council  
 of war.

were

were of opinion, "They ought to do nothing rashly, WAR IN GAUL. and that it was not proper to quit their quarters before they received commands from CÆSAR to that purpose, because they were so well fortified, that they were able to defend themselves against any number of Germans whatever; witness the brave repulse and many wounds the enemy had received at the first attack; nor did they want provisions to subsist on, till they could receive relief from CÆSAR and the neighbouring garrisons; and, in fine, that nothing could be a greater argument of levity or cowardice, than to follow an enemy's advice in affairs of the greatest importance."

29. But on the other hand, SABINUS exclaimed, Sabine's opinion. "They had but a very short time to consult in, for it would be too late to do any thing, when the enemy was grown more powerful by conjunction with the Germans, or when the neighbouring garrisons should be distressed: That he believed CÆSAR was already gone into Italy; for the people of Chartres would not have presumed to murder TASGETIUS, nor those of Liege so impudently have attempted to force our camp, if he had not been absent: That an enemy's advice weighed not with him, but matter of fact did; for the Rhine was not far off, the Germans were much afflicted for the loss of ARIOVISTUS, and disturbed at the memory of our late victories; the Gauls no less enraged, to reflect on the loss of their former military glory, and the many injuries they had received since they were reduced to the obedience of Rome: And lastly, who could believe that AMBIORIX would have engaged in such a design without certain grounds? That his opinion was safe on all sides; for, if the Gauls had no further design, they might without danger march to the next legion; but, if the whole country had combined with the Germans, the only means of safety consisted in dispatch: whereas no other event could be expected from the advice of COTTA, and those of the contrary opinion, except starving by a long siege, if they should avoid immediate danger."

30. The dispute was warmly maintained on both sides, and SABINUS's opinion strongly opposed by COTTA and the chief officers of the legion; whereupon SABINUS, that the greatest part of the soldiers might hear him, cried out aloud, "Do as you please, I am not more afraid to meet Sabine's reply. death than any of you; but let these take notice, that whatever misfortunes befall them, you are the person they must



WAR IN GAUL. must thank for them; for, did not you prevent it, they might in three days time arrive at the next garrison, share the same fate with their fellow-soldiers, and not perish by sword or famine, like an abject and abandoned people."

The council about to break up; the officers desire an union.

Cotta submits.

31. Upon this they were going to break up the council; when the rest of the officers embracing them both, intreated they would not by their obstinacy plunge their affairs into so desperate a condition: that, provided they were but of one opinion, there could be no difficulty either in staying or going; but their dissension was the ready way to ruin. The dispute continued 'till midnight; at length COTTA submitted to SABINUS's opinion, and orders were delivered out for marching by break of day. The rest of the night was consumed in watching, each soldier being employed in considering what he could carry, and what part of the necessaries provided against winter, he must be obliged to leave behind him; all things were contrived to convince the soldiers there was no staying without danger, and to encrease it by their watching and faintness.

## CHAP. XII.

Sabinus and Cotta begin their march.

EARLY in the morning they began their march, in long narrow files encumbered with much baggage, as those who had received advice from AMBIORIX their particular friend, not a treacherous enemy.

Are attacked by an ambuscade.

32. But the Gauls perceiving, by our tumultuous watching, and the noise we made all night, that we designed to decamp next morning, possessed themselves of two convenient and private places in the woods, about two miles distant from our camp, where they waited for us in ambuscade; and when the greatest part of our army had entered the valley, the enemy appearing on the rising ground on both sides, at the same instant attacked our rear, and opposed the ascent of our van-guard, engaging us in a place of very great advantage.

Sabinus's cowardice.

33. Then was the time TITURIUS perceived his error; unprepared for such an event, he ran up and down trembling, drew up his cohorts, but after so awkward a manner, that he seemed to despair of every thing, as it generally happens to those who are consulting when they should execute.

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10 face p. 23.

# *Sabinus & Gotta*





*A. Sabinus & Cottus's forces in an Orb. B. The Gauls Surrounding  
em. C. a Cohort Sallying out of the Orb.*



210

154

1

C1

10

100

97

10

414

## C H A P. XIII.

BUT COTTA, who foresaw this might possibly be the consequence of their march, and therefore had opposed it, neglected nothing which might be of advantage to the publick safety, for he performed the part of an able general in drawing up, and encouraging his men, and that of a soldier in fighting. And because the length of the army rendered it difficult for the lieutenants to visit all parts, and give the necessary orders for relief, they commanded the soldiers to quit their baggage, and cast themselves into an orb; which though proper at such a conjuncture, yet at this time the success did not answer the design, for it daunted our soldiers, and encouraged the enemy, who looked upon this expedient as the effect of despair; besides, as it always happens in such circumstances, the soldiers, forsaking their ensigns, ran to the carriages, to rescue from thence what they set the greatest value on, and the whole army was filled with clamour and weeping.

WAR IN GAUL.

The Romans  
cast them-  
selves into an  
orb; their  
confusion,

34. But the Gauls understood their business better; their officers gave orders that not a man of them should leave his ranks; that the baggage was theirs, and whatever the Romans had taken such care to lay up, would certainly fall into their hands, since all depended on the victory.

The Romans were equal to the Gauls both in courage and number; and though they were deserted by fortune and their general, still they placed their hopes of safety in their valour; and whenever a cohort of the enemy's sallied out, they made a considerable slaughter among them.

## C H A P. XIV.

WHICH AMBIORIX observing, gave orders they should cast their darts at a distance, and not approach too near the Romans; that they should give way wherever we made a sally, and pursue us when we returned again to the army; for by the lightness of their arms, and daily exercise they were so nimble, that they might easily avoid the fury of our assault.

Ambiorix's  
manage-  
ment.

35. These directions they observed so diligently, that whenever a cohort left the orb to attack them, they fled away; in the mean time, the place from whence we sallied

was

WAR IN GAUL. was left exposed to the enemy's darts, and when we en-  
deavoured to retreat again to our post, we were surround-  
ed by those we had put to flight, and the parties that  
stood next them; wherefore, to pretend to maintain our  
ground had been in vain, for we could neither have an op-  
portunity of shewing our courage, nor was it possible for  
us, though we stood ever so close together, to avoid the  
darts of so numerous an enemy. But notwithstanding we  
had so many inconveniencies to encounter, and the Romans  
had received so many wounds, having fought from break of  
day 'till two o'clock in the afternoon, during all that time  
they committed nothing unworthy their pristine courage:  
the brave TITUS BALVENTIUS, who the year before  
was primiple of a legion, a man of great authority, had  
both his thighs struck through with a javelin; Q. LUCA-  
NIUS, an officer of the same rank, fighting courageously  
to relieve his son, who was hemm'd in by the enemy, lost  
his life; and lieutenant-general L. COTTA, whilst he was  
encouraging the foldiers, received a wound in his mouth  
from a sling.

## CHAP. XV.

Sabinus  
sends to de-  
fire quarter.

Ambiorix's  
answer.

36. Q. TITURIUS, being disturbed at this ill suc-  
cess, as he saw AMBIORIX encouraging his men at a dis-  
tance, sent his interpreter C. POMPEIUS, to demand quar-  
ter for him and his soldiers; to which AMBIORIX made  
answer, "That he was ready to give him a conference if  
he desired it, and hoped he should be able to prevail with  
his countrymen to grant the Romans quarter; but as for  
TITURIUS, he would give him his oath, no hurt should  
befal him." Having received this answer, he asked COTTA  
(who before had been wounded) whether he would  
leave the battle, and go along with him to confer with  
AMBIORIX; COTTA told him he thought it not proper  
to consult with an armed enemy, and therefore resolved  
not to go.

Cotta refuses  
to go to the  
conference.

Sabinus goes  
with his par-  
ty.  
They are  
commanded  
to lay down  
their arms,

and then put  
to the sword,

37. Whereupon SABINUS commanded the tribunes,  
and first centurions, that were present, to follow him;  
being come near AMBIORIX, he was ordered to lay  
down his arms, which he did, bidding those who were  
with him to follow his example: but whilst they were  
treating about the conditions, AMBIORIX began to make a  
long speech, during which time the Romans by degrees  
were surrounded and put to the sword. Whereupon the  
enemy, according to their custom cried out Victory, mak-  
ing

ing a dreadful noise, and, charging our army with great fury, broke our ranks; at which time **L. COTTA** fighting bravely, lost his life, with the greatest part of the army; the rest retreated to the camp they had left in the morning, amongst which number **L. PETROFIDIUS**, the eagle-bearer, finding himself oppressed by the enemy, cast the standard within the rampart, and manfully sustained their fury before the camp, 'till he expired; the rest were just able to maintain their ground 'till night, at which time every man of them, despairing of preservation, fell upon his own sword: some few who had escaped out of the battle, travelled through by-ways in the woods to **LABIENUS**, and gave him an account of the action.

WAR IN GAUL.

Cotta kill'd, and the whole army entirely defeated.

The Romans that retreated to their camp, kill themselves.

CHAP. XVI.

38. **AMBIORIX** was so puffed up with this success, that he immediately went with his cavalry to Namur, the province which lay next to his country, travelling day and night without intermission, having left orders for the infantry to follow him. He gave the people an account of what he had done, and, having stirr'd them up to rebellion, arrived the day after in the confines of the Hainaulois, whom he persuaded not to omit so glorious an opportunity of freeing themselves for ever, and revenging the injuries they had received from the Romans: He acquainted them that he had already slain two of their lieutenant-generals, and put a considerable part of their army to the sword; that it would be no difficult matter for them suddenly to attack, and cut off the legion in winter-quarters under the command of **CICERO**; and that he was ready to assist them in the enterprize. The Hainaulois were easily gained over by these arguments.

Ambiorix goes to Namur and Hainault, moves the natives to rebel.

39. Whereupon immediately dispatching ambassadors to the <sup>e</sup>Centrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumosii, and Gorduni, who are all their tributaries; and having raised what forces they could, they marched with great expedition to **CICERO**'s quarters, and arrived there before he had heard the news of **TITURIUS**'s death.

<sup>e</sup> **SCALIGER** and **ORTELIUS** say the Centrones were the people of Tarentaise in Savoy; but **CÆSAR** mentions two countries of the same name, and these we are now speaking of, lived amongst the Belgæ: some critics suspect this to be a corruption of the text, but **SANSON** takes them for those that now live about Ghent; the Grudii he places at Bruges, the Levaci in the county of Waes in Flanders, the Pleumosii in the diocese of Tournay, and the Gorduni in the bailiwick of Courtray; probable conjectures taken from the situation of the place, and far fetch'd etymologies.



## C H A P. XVII.

WAR IN  
GAUL.



The enemy  
endeavour to  
storm the  
Roman camp  
under Cice-  
ro's com-  
mand; but  
are repulsed.

The Gauls  
attempt a se-  
cond storm;  
but are again  
repulsed.

Cicero's  
diligence.

HERE likewise it fell out (as of necessity it must) that the enemy's horse surpris'd some of the Romans, who were gone to fetch in timber to strengthen their fortresses: these being thus secured, the people of Chartrain, Namur, and Hainault, with all their confederates and tributaries, amounting to a great number, began to storm the Roman camp: whereupon our men immediately repaired to their arms, ascended the rampier, and with great difficulty sustained the enemy's charge, for the Gauls had placed all their hopes in dispatch, and promised themselves perpetual success, if they could but obtain the victory that day.

40. In the mean time CICERO sent away couriers with all expedition to CÆSAR, promising them considerable rewards, in case they had the fortune to arrive safe with his packets; but the ways round about were so blocked up, that they were all intercepted: however, in one night with incredible celerity, he built to the number of 120 towers (of the wood which the soldiers brought into the camp for the fortifications) to compleat his works where they seem'd imperfect. The next day the enemy, with a much greater force than before, storm'd our camp a second time, fill'd the ditch, but were again repulsed; and the same thing they attempted several days together, with the like success. The Romans in the mean while laboured incessantly at their works in the night, nor were either the sick or wounded permitted to rest; whatever was necessary to defeat the next day's assault was provided in the night, several stakes were harden'd in the fire, plenty of piles driven into the ground; the towers were boarded, the battlements and parapets fortified with breast-works of hurdles: and even CICERO, though of a weakly constitution, did not allow himself time to rest in the night, 'till the soldiers unanimously desired him to consult his health.

## C H A P. XVIII.

The Hainaultois use the same stratagem with Cicero, as Ambiorix had with Sabinus and Cotra.

41. THE Hainaultois finding themselves thus disappointed, their noblemen, who had formerly any acquaintance or friendship with CICERO, desir'd a conference; which being granted, they used the same artifice as AMBIORIX had formerly done with SABINUS: "They told him all the kingdoms of Gaul were in arms; that the Germans had

had passed the Rhine; that CÆSAR's, and the rest of the WAR IN winter-quarters were besieged; that SABINUS was killed, GAUL. and as a proof of it, produced AMBIORIX to their view; wherefore CICERO would be much in the wrong, to flatter himself with hopes of relief from those that were not able to maintain their own ground: yet such was their esteem for him and the people of Rome, that they would deny them nothing except their taking up winter quarters in their country, which they would by no means permit to grow customary; but if they had a mind to quit their garrison, the Gauls would allow them safe passage through their territories, to such place as they designed to march to."

To this CICERO only answered, "That it was not <sup>Cicero's</sup> usual with the Romans to accept conditions from an armed <sup>answer,</sup> enemy; but if they would lay down their arms, and make use of his intercession, they might send ambassadors to CÆSAR, from whose clemency he believed they would obtain such redress as they desired."

### C H A P. XIX.

42. THIS stratagem failing, the Hainaultois surrounded our camp with a rampier eleven foot high, and a ditch fifteen foot deep. This piece of fortification they had learned some years before, partly from the Romans, and partly from the prisoners they had taken; but wanting instruments proper for the occasion, they were forced to cut up turf with their swords, to dig mould with their hands, and carry it in their cloaks; from whence we may form a judgment how numerous they were; for in less than the space of three hours they had compleated a circumvallation <sup>a</sup> fifteen miles in length: the following days they raised turrets in proportion to the height of the rampier, and prepared scythes and penthouses according to the instruction of the captives.

43. The seventh day of the siege, the wind being high, they began to sling burning bullets made of clay, and red hot iron upon the Roman barracks, which after the manner of the Gauls being thatched with straw, immediately took fire, and the sparks were in an instant distributed by the wind all over the camp; whereupon the enemy, as if already secure of victory, with great clamour approached our rampier with their turrets, mounts, pent-

<sup>a</sup> But the Roman miles only consisted of 1000 paces, which is 56 paces less than ours, and their feet were about half an inch shorter than ours. Upon the whole, their mile was near a tenth less than ours, 21 English making 23 Roman miles.

WAR IN houses, and endeavoured to scale it; but so great was the GAUL. soldiers courage and presence of mind, that though they were surrounded by the flames, and overwhelmed with an infinite number of darts; though they saw their effects burning before their face, yet not a man forsook the rampier, or cast an eye upon his departing baggage, each bravely maintaining his ground against the attempt of the enemy. This was the bloodiest day our men endured since the beginning of the siege; but they had the good fortune to kill and wound considerable numbers of the Gauls, who crowded so close to the rampier, that the hindmost prevented the front from retiring: By that time the fire was a little abated, the enemy had joined one of their turrets to our rampier; whereupon the centurions of the third cohort retired from their post, and, drawing off their men, beckoned to the Gauls, and desired them to enter if they pleased; but not a man of them had the courage to move. Then our soldiers assailing them from all sides with stones, set their turret on fire.

## C H A P. XX.

Pulpio and  
Varenus.  
their gene-  
rous emula-  
tion.

44. THERE were in this legion two centurions, both men of extraordinary courage, that stood fair for preferment, T. PULFIO, and L. VARENUS. These two were continually disputing for the preference, each striving to be advanced above the other at every year's promotion: PULFIO in the heat of the attack, cried out, "VARENUS! what now detains you? what more glorious opportunity would you desire to signalize yourself? this day shall decide the dispute between us, and put an end to our emulation." Then leaving the camp, he threw himself in amongst the thickest of the Gauls, and was soon followed, at some distance, by his rival, whom honour would not permit to stay behind. PULFIO cast his pile at the enemy, and gave one of them, who was hastening to engage him, such a wound, that he immediately dropped; but they soon covered him with their shields, and all discharged their darts at PULFIO, without giving him leisure to retire; one of which piercing his shield, stuck fast in his belt, and turning aside his scabbard, hindered his right hand from drawing his sword before he was surrounded. At this instant VARENUS came to his assistance, and the enemy left PULFIO, fancying the dart had already done his business, to attack VARENUS; who having drawn his sword, killed the first that came near

near him, and obliged the rest in some measure to retreat; WAR IN GAUL. but being too eager in pressing forwards upon a descent, he fell down: W PULFIO having in the mean time recovered himself, now in his turn saved VARENUS, and both together, after they had slain several of the Gauls, and acquired infinite applause, returned safe to their trenches: So far did Fortune interest herself in this glorious contest, that she gave each an opportunity of rescuing his rival; but left it dubious which of the two merited the greater honour.

## C H A P. XXI.

45. GREAT part of our soldiers being wounded, we had very few left that were fit for service: wherefore, the hotter the siege grew, the more couriers did CICERO dispatch to CÆSAR, though several of them were taken, and racked to death within view of our soldiers. But there happened to be one VERTICO, a gentleman of Hainault, in our camp, who came over to the Romans at the beginning of the siege, and had given sufficient proofs of his fidelity: this gentleman, with promises of liberty and considerable rewards, persuaded one of his slaves to carry a packet to CÆSAR, which he tied to his javelin: being a native of the country, he passed without the least suspicion through the Hainaultois, and arrived safe at CÆSAR's quarters, who was informed by this means of the danger CICERO and his legion were in. Cicero sends Caesar word of his being besieged, by the assistance of Vertico.

46. Immediately on receipt of this packet, about five o'clock in the afternoon, he sent orders to M. CRASSUS, pay-master of the army, whose quarters were in Beauvois, about twenty-five miles off, that he should draw out his legion at midnight, and march with all the expedition he could to join him. CRASSUS immediately set out with the courier: Another was dispatched to lieutenant C. FABIVS whom he commanded to meet him on the borders of Arras, through which he designed to march: he writ likewise to LABIENUS to meet him on the confines of Hainault, if he could do it with safety. He thought it not adviseable to wait for the rest of his army, which lay at a greater distance; only sent for about 400 horse from the nearest garrisons. Caesar receives the letters, and immediately prepares to relieve him.

47. At nine in the morning he had notice from his scouts of CRASSUS's approach, and having marched that day about twenty miles, he made him governor of Amiens, and left him with a legion to take care of the baggage of the



WAR IN army, the hostages, publick papers, and all the provisions GAUL. which had been laid up there for the winter. FABIVS, according to his orders, met CÆSAR at the time and place appointed; but LABIENVS having notice of SABINVS's death, the loss of his cohorts, and understanding that all the forces of Treves were marching towards him, was apprehensive, in case he should quit his quarters, the enemy might misconstrue it for a flight, and that it would be impossible for him to sustain their assault, who were flush'd with the success of their late victory; wherefore he sent CÆSAR word of what dangerous consequence it might be to leave his garrison, after what had happened in Liege, especially since all the horse and foot of the people of Treves lay not above three miles distant from his camp.

Caesar arrives on the confines of Hainault,


sends Cicero word of his march to his relief.

Cicero finds Caesar's letter.

The Gauls quit the siege, Cicero sends Caesar word of it.

48. CÆSAR approved of his reasons, and though the expectation of his three legions was now reduced only to two, yet, placing all his hopes of the publick safety in dispatch, he arrived by long marches on the confines of Hainault, where he was informed from some prisoners, of CICERO's condition, and what danger he was in: then persuading a trooper of Gaul by considerable rewards to carry a letter to CICERO, he writ it in Greek characters, that, if it happened to fall into the enemy's hands, they might not be able to understand it; and if the messenger had not an opportunity of getting into the camp, he had instructions to fasten the packet by a string to his javelin, and cast it within the trenches. In this letter CÆSAR sent CICERO word, that he would very shortly come with his legions to his assistance, and therefore encouraged him to persevere in his wonted constancy. The Gaul being apprehensive of danger, according to orders cast his javelin within the fortifications, which by accident light upon a tower, where it stuck two days before it was observed by the Romans; but the third day one of our soldiers found the letter, and brought it to CICERO, who read it publickly to the besieged, which gave them no small satisfaction; and not long after, by the smoke of the fires at some distance, they were thoroughly convinced of CÆSAR's approach.

49. The Gauls having notice of this by their scouts, immediately quitted the siege, and marched with all their forces toward CÆSAR, which amounted to 60000 men. CICERO being now at liberty, took care to find out VERTICO's slave, the Gaul before-mentioned, and giving him directions to travel with all the caution and diligence possible,

sible, sent him with a packet to CÆSAR, informing him, WAR IN  
GAUL. that the enemy, having broken up the siege, were marching with all their forces against him. 

CÆSAR received this packet about mid-night; whereupon he communicated the contents of it to his army, and encouraged them to fight. The next day early he decamp'd, and having marched about four miles, cross a spacious vale, through which there ran a river, he descry'd the enemy; but thinking it dangerous to engage so numerous an army in a place of disadvantage, and considering that since he had already raised the siege, there was no necessity for such violent expedition, he chose as advantageous a place as he could to encamp in, which he fortified; and tho' he had hardly <sup>b</sup> 7000 men in his army, who having no baggage, could not require much ground to lodge themselves in; yet, to increase the pride of the enemy, he contracted the spaces between the tents more than usual, and in the mean time dispatched his scouts to discover which was the most convenient way to cross the valley. Cæsar en-  
camps.

50. There happened the same day several skirmishes between the enemy's cavalry and ours on the banks of the river, but both armies kept within their camp; the Gauls, because they expected the arrival of fresh recruits; and CÆSAR, because he endeavoured by a counterfeit fear to draw the enemy out of the valley, that he might have the opportunity of engaging them before his camp; or at least, if he could not effect that design, that having discovered the safest ways, he might cross the river, and pass the valley with less danger. The next morning by break of day, the enemy's cavalry marching up to our camp, engaged our horse, who, by CÆSAR's command, gave ground, and retreated into the camp; he likewise caused the rampier on all sides to be built higher, the gates to be stopp'd up, and that the soldiers, in the execution of their orders, should give all the demonstrations of fear and confusion imaginable. The Gauls  
attack Cæ-  
sar's camp.  
Cæsar's stra-  
tagem.

51. The enemy, enticed by these artifices, cross'd the river with all their forces, and drew up their army in a very disadvantageous place; our men having retired from the rampier, they approached our camp, cast their darts within the trenches from all sides, and sent heralds round about to proclaim, that if any Gaul or Roman would come over to them before nine of the clock, they would grant him quarter; but, that time once expired, it would be too late to expect it: nay, so contemptible were we in

<sup>b</sup> Then we must suppose his legions were not compleat,

**WAR IN** their opinion, that, because they fancied they could not enter the ports of our camp, which we had stopp'd up with a single row of turfs, to make a seeming opposition, some endeavour'd to scramble up the rampier without ladders, whilst others began to fill the ditch : whereupon CÆSAR, causing his horse to sally out from all the ports at the same instant, put the enemy immediately to flight, not a man of them daring to make the least opposition ; several of them he put to the sword, and others were glad to surrender their arms.

Cæsar routs  
the Hainaul-  
tois.

Marches to  
Cicero,

52. CÆSAR thought it not convenient to pursue, because of the intervening woods and marshes ; wherefore being satisfied with the execution he had already done upon the enemy in that place, he arrived safe the same day with all his forces at CICERO's camp, where he was amazed to behold the turrets, penthouses, and fortifications of the Gauls. Having drawn out the legion, he perceived not a tenth man had escaped without wounds, from whence he computed with how much valour and danger they had defended their camp ; wherefore applauding CICERO and the legion for their courage, he spoke to every centurion and tribune by name, who, as CICERO informed him, had signalized himself in the siege. Having a particular account by the captives of the fate of SABINUS and COTTA, the next day, in a publick oration, he comforted the soldiers upon so melancholy a circumstance, telling them, " They should be the less disturbed at the loss occasioned by the rashness of a lieutenant, since, by the favour of the immortal Gods, their virtue had expiated that shame, in allowing the enemy but a short time to glory in their success, or themselves to deplore their misfortune."

Cæsar's  
speech on  
Sabinus's  
defeat,


## C H A P. XXII.

Labienus  
hears of Cæ-  
sar's success.

Whereupon  
Induticma-  
rus returns  
home.

53. THE fame of CÆSAR's victory was carried with incredible speed through the country of Rheims to LABIENUS ; for though his quarters lay fifty miles distant from the place of action, which was not ended before three o'clock in the afternoon, yet before midnight at the ports of his camp were heard the acclamations of the people of Rheims, congratulating LABIENUS on CÆSAR's success. Upon this news, INDUTIOMARUS with his countrymen, who designed to have attacked LABIENUS's quarters the next day, decamped in the night, and returned to Treves. CÆSAR sent FABIVS back again, with the legion under his command, to his winter-quarters, designing to stay himself

himself with three other legions, to be lodged in several places about Amiens; and since Gaul was so full of commotions, he resolved to stay there the rest of the winter; for such was the effect of SABINUS's death, that every province of Gaul sent mutual embassies to inform each other of their designs, and where they would begin the war; so great was their diligence, they met in private places in the night, to consult of their affairs; and scarce a day passed all that winter, but what gave CÆSAR some solicitude from the intelligence he had of new resolves or insurrections in the country. Amongst the rest, he was informed by L. ROSCIUS, to whom he had given the command of the thirteenth legion, that a considerable number of Gauls from Normandy and Britain had marched within eight miles of his quarters, designing to besiege him, but having intelligence of CÆSAR's victory, returned with as much precipitation to their own country, as if they had been put to flight.

WAR IN  
GAUL.  
  
Armoricæ  
Civitates, or  
the people  
of Norman-  
dy and Bri-  
tain design  
to besiege  
Roscius;  
but on the  
news of  
Cæsar's  
victory re-  
turn.

54. Whereupon CÆSAR summoned the chief noblemen of every state, and by intimidating some, in telling them he was acquainted with their designs, and encouraging others to continue loyal, he preserved great part of the country in obedience. But the people of Sens, the most puissant and considerable province in Gaul, by general consent endeavoured to murder CAVARINUS, whom CÆSAR had constituted their king, whose brother MORITAGUS was possessed of the throne at CÆSAR's arrival in Gaul, and whose ancestors had been sovereigns there long before. The poor prince having notice of their design, prepared for his safety by flight, but they pursued him to the confines of their country, and deprived him as well of his private patrimony, as his kingdom. Having sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, to clear themselves, he commanded the whole senate to appear before him: which they refused to comply with. So far did this example prevail amongst the Barbarians, that some were so hardy as to declare open war; and so wonderful an alteration did it work through the whole country, that there was not a province which was not suspected, (except Autun and Rheims, two countries always esteemed by CÆSAR, the first for its ancient and constant fidelity to the people of Rome, the other for the late services it had done in the Gallic wars.) Which may be accounted for from several reasons, but especially from that uneasiness they felt in seeing themselves, who formerly excelled all other nations in war, so much fallen

The people  
of Sens con-  
spire against  
Cavarinus;  
expel him  
the king-  
dom.



WAR IN from their ancient glory as to become vassals to the people of Rome.

**GAUL.**  
Indutiomarus sends to Germany for assistance, but is refused.

However he raises an army at home.

55. But INDUTIOMARUS and his countrymen of Treves were very busy all the winter, in sending ambassadors cross the Rhine, to solicit the Germans by promises of money to come to their assistance; assuring them, for their encouragement, that the greatest part of the Roman army was already cut off. But not one province of Germany could they bring over to their party, for they all sent them word, they had twice experienced the courage of the Romans to their sorrow, in the defeat of ARIOVISTUS, and the people of Hesse and Zutphen; nor would they venture to try their fortunes again. INDUTIOMARUS, being disappointed of this expectation, was nevertheless diligent in raising forces at home and in the neighbouring provinces, in providing horses, and encouraging out-laws to repair to his standard by considerable rewards: so great was the credit and authority he acquired by this means throughout the whole continent, that there came ambassadors to him from every part of Gaul, as well in publick as privately, to solicit his alliance.

Indutiomarus calls a council of war.

The custom of the Gauls before they declare war.

56. Understanding that the people of Sens and Chartres of one side, push'd on by the remembrance of their late revolt, were marching to join him; that those of Hainault and Namur, on the other side, were preparing to make war against the Romans; and that he should not want volunteers, whenever he marched out of his country, he called a council of war. The custom of the Gauls, before they proclaim war is this; "They summon all the youth of the country, that are able to bear arms, to a general place of rendezvous, and he that has the misfortune to come last, in the presence of the rest is put to death with the cruellest torments they can inflict upon him." At this council INDUTIOMARUS took care that his son-in-law CINGETORIX, head of the opposite faction, who, as we have already taken notice, behaved himself faithfully to CÆSAR, should be proclaimed a rebel, and his goods confiscated: then he acquainted his countrymen, that he was called upon for his assistance by the people of Sens, Chartres, and several other provinces of Gaul; wherefore he designed to march through the confines of Rheims, and lay their country waste; but first he would besiege LABIENUS, and accordingly dispatch'd such orders as he thought most convenient.

He proclaims Cingetorix a rebel.

Labiens be- sieged.

57. LABIENUS's quarters being equally fortified both by art and nature, he was not in the least uneasy for himself

self or his legion ; but thinking it convenient to lay hold WAR IN of every advantageous opportunity, upon the intelligence GAUL. he received of INDUTIOMARUS's designs, from CINGE-  
 TORIX and some of his relations, who were present at the council, he sent commissaries to bring him cavalry from all the countries round about, to whom he appointed a certain day of rendezvous. In the mean while INDUTIOMARUS with all his horse rode about the Roman camp, sometimes to discover our situation, and sometimes to confer with, or threaten us, each of them casting his dart within our rampier ; but LABIENUS suffered not his men to move out of their trenches, and contrived all the means he could to convince the enemy of his fear.

58. INDUTIOMARUS visited our trenches each day with more contempt than before, till LABIENUS had, by the favour of the night, received the cavalry from the neighbouring countries which he had sent for ; upon whose arrival he kept so strict a guard in his camp, that it was impossible for the enemy to get intelligence of this reinforcement. In the mean time INDUTIOMARUS, according to custom, came the next morning to our camp, where he lost great part of the day, whilst his cavalry cast their darts, and endeavoured by opprobrious language to provoke our men to an engagement : but the Romans made no return 'till the evening, when LABIENUS seeing the enemy return dispersed to their camp, caused his cavalry to make an unexpected sally upon them from two several ports, having first given particular orders, that when they should have routed them, which happened according to his expectation, they should all aim at INDUTIOMARUS, and not wound any man whatever, before they had killed him, that no delay might give him an opportunity of escaping ; he promised likewise considerable rewards to the man by whose hand he died ; and sent the cohorts after the horse to sustain them, if there should be occasion. Fortune seconded his purpose, for all the Roman cavalry aiming only at INDUTIOMARUS, he was overtaken and slain while he was fording the river ; they brought his head to the camp, and then returning, pursued and slew as many of the enemy as they could. Upon the news of this defeat, the forces of Liege and Hainault returned again to their country, and CÆSAR enjoy'd more peace in Gaul than before.

Labiens des-  
 feats Indu-  
 tiomarus,

whose head  
 is cut off,  
 and brought  
 to the Ro-  
 man camp.

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C. J. CÆSAR'S

# COMMENTARY

OF HIS

## WAR in GAUL.

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The SIXTH BOOK.

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*CÆSAR having reduced the Hainaultois, and received submission of those of Sens and Chartres, defeats the people of Guelders. LABIENUS has the like success in Treves. CÆSAR makes a second expedition into Germany. The Sicambri attack his camp; which he defends with some loss; and having laid waste the country of Liege, returns to Italy.*

CHAP. I.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

Cæsar levies  
new forces,  
sends to  
Pompey for  
more.

**C**ÆSAR having many reasons to expect farther commotions in Gaul, commanded his lieutenants, M. SILANUS, C. ANTISTIVS RHEGINUS, and T. SEXTIVS, to raise recruits; and writ to CN. POMPEY, then proconsul, desiring him, since the affairs at Rome were such as necessarily detained him there, that he would list again the disbanded legions which he levied in Lombardy when consul, and send them to him: for he thought it of great importance to his future affairs, that the Gauls should perceive Italy was so powerful, that she was not only able immediately to repair any damage she received, but even send more recruits than she lost. POMPEY,

moved

moved by the publick advantage, and the friendship he bore CÆSAR, readily complied with his demands, and, before the winter expired, sent him three legions. Thus having doubled the number of the cohorts which were lost with Q. TITURIUS, he shewed the Gauls by his forces and dispatch, what might be expected from the riches and discipline of the Roman people.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

CHAP. II.

2. AFTER the death of INDUTIOMARUS, the people of Treves conferred the kingdom on his next relations, who lost no time in persuading the neighbouring Germans, by promises of money, to undertake their assistance; but finding their endeavours vain, they made their application to those that lived farther from them. At length they gained over some provinces to make a league with them, upon delivery of hostages, as a security for the pay they were to receive for their services; and the next step they took was to enter into an alliance with AMBIORIX. CÆSAR being informed of these proceedings, and perceiving what preparations were carrying on for war on all sides; that the people of Hainault, Namur, Guelders, and Germans cross the Rhine were already up in arms; that the natives of Sens, instead of appearing according to his orders, were in consultation with those of Chartres; and that the Germans were solicited by daily embassies from the people of Treves to come into Gaul; he thought it necessary to prepare for war earlier than usual.

The people  
of Treves  
send to Ger-  
many again  
for assistance  
and obtain it.

3. Wherefore before the winter was over, having drawn out the four legions which lay next his quarters, he made so sudden and unexpected a march into Hainault, that before the natives could either rally their forces to oppose him, or save themselves by flight, he had taken great numbers of cattle and prisoners; the plunder he gave to his soldiers, and having laid the country waste, obliged the people to submit, and deliver hostages for their future fidelity. This affair being thus expeditiously terminated, he sent his legions back into their winter-quarters.

Cæsar marches into  
Hainault;

which  
Tubmits.



## C H A P. III.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

Cæsar trans-  
lates the diet  
to Paris.

Marches to  
Sens :

They sub-  
mit, and are  
pardoned at  
the interces-  
sion of the  
Autunois.

Those of  
Chartres do  
the like, and  
the people  
of Rheims  
procure their  
pardon.

3. HE had before appointed the states of Gaul to assemble at the beginning of the spring ; but the people of Sens, Chartres, and Treves did not make their appearance there ; which CÆSAR esteeming as a revolt, and declaration of war, for the quicker dispatch adjourned the diet to Paris, which borders on the country of Sens, and was within the memory of man united with it, yet not suspected to be concerned in the rebellion ; wherefore having from his tribunal pronounced the translation of the diet to that place, he began his journey the same day towards Sens, and arrived there in a short time by long marches.


4. ACCO, the chief author of that rebellion, having notice of CÆSAR'S approach, commanded the people to retire into their towns ; but the execution of his orders was prevented by CÆSAR'S dispatch. Wherefore finding it in vain to resist, they sent ambassadors to beg pardon for what they had done, and prevailed with the faithful Autunois to intercede for them : CÆSAR, at such a mediation, accepted of their excuse, knowing well, that when summer was approaching, it was a season for action, not of examining delinquents ; wherefore having demanded an hundred hostages, he committed them to the custody of the Autunois. Those of Chartres did the like, and by the intercession of the people of Rheims, whose tributaries they were, on delivery of hostages obtained the same favour. After this he returned to the diet, and commanded each province to furnish him with their usual quota of cavalry.

## C H A P. IV.

5. HAVING quieted this part of Gaul, CÆSAR employed all his thoughts upon the war with Treves and AMBIORIX ; wherefore to prevent any new commotions in Sens, which might arise either from CAVARINUS'S desire of revenge, or the people's ancient malice, he commanded him to go along with him, at the head of his country's cavalry.

And having thus settled these affairs, because he was assured AMBIORIX would not give him battle, he began to provide against all his designs. Guelders joins to the confines of Liege, is fortified with plenty of woods and marshes

on every side, and this was the only province of Gaul that had not sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, to desire a peace; he was likewise informed that they entertained AMBIO-RIX, and by the instigation of the people of Treves had entered into an alliance with the Germans: but thinking it the wisest way, first to deprive AMBIO-RIX of these assistances, before he attacked him, that he might not have an opportunity of retiring to Guelders, or joining the Germans cross the Rhine; he sent the baggage of his whole army before, under the convoy of two legions, to LABIENUS, who was then in the confines of Treves, himself marching in the mean time with the other five against the people of Guelders; who, relying on the natural fortifications of their country, had raised no forces, but upon his arrival convey'd themselves and their effects into the woods and marshes.

WAR IN  
GAUL.  
  
Cæsar marches with five legions into Guelders.

6. Wherefore CÆSAR, dividing all his forces into three battalions, committed one to the care of lieutenant C. FABRUS, another to M. CRASSUS the pay-master, and having with great expedition finished his bridges, attacked them in three places at once, and set fire to their towns and buildings; he obtained a considerable booty of cattle and prisoners, which obliged the rebels to send ambassadors to sue for peace: CÆSAR, on delivery of hostages, accepted their submission, telling them he should esteem them his enemies, if they received AMBIO-RIX into their country, or any deputies from him. This affair dispatched, he left COMIUS of Arras there, with a party of horse, to keep the country in obedience, and marched himself towards Treves.

That province submits.

## CHAP. V.

7. WHILST CÆSAR was thus employed, the people of Treves, having levied considerable numbers of horse and foot, were marching to besiege LABIENUS with his single legion, which was quartered in their confines, and were already arrived within two days march of his camp, when they had intelligence that he had received two legions from CÆSAR: wherefore they encamped themselves about fifteen miles distant from the Romans, designing to expect the arrival of their German auxiliaries. LABIENUS, understanding their resolution, left only five cohorts to secure the baggage, marching towards the enemy with the other twenty-five, and a considerable number

The people of Treves march to besiege Labienus.

**WAR IN GAUL.** ber of horse; for he hoped their rashness might afford him an opportunity to engage them; and therefore encamped within a mile of the place where the Gauls were lodged. Between LABIENUS and the Gauls ran a river, which was difficult to ford, because the banks were very rough and steep; wherefore he believed the enemy no more designed to pass it than himself. The Gauls were daily in expectation of fresh supplies, for which reason he declared in open council, "Since the Germans were so near, he would neither venture the loss of his person nor army, but decamp the next morning early." 'Twas not very long e'er the enemy had notice of what passed in council; for having so many Gauls in our army, it was natural for them to favour their countrymen: but LABIENUS at midnight called a council of the tribunes, and first centurions, whom he acquainted with his design; and that the enemy might be more strongly confirmed in their opinion of the fear the Romans were in, he commanded the soldiers to remove with more noise and confusion than usual, as if they were flying rather than decamping; which the enemy, not lying far off, were informed of by their scouts before break of day.

He marches to meet, and encamps within a mile of 'em.

Labienu's artifice.

He counterfeits a retreat.

8. Our rear had hardly left their trenches, before the Gauls began to encourage each other to the pursuit; saying, "So happy an opportunity was not to be omitted; that the Romans being in so great confusion, it were folly to stay in expectation of the Germans; nor was it suitable to the honour of their country, to permit so small a party, already put to flight, and encumbered by their baggage, to escape without daring to attack them." Wherefore they resolved to pass the river, and engage the Romans, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground. LABIENUS imagining this would be the effect of his retreat, to carry on the artifice, marched slowly on till he had enticed them all cross the river; his baggage, which he had sent away before, he ordered to be placed upon a little hill; then turning to his soldiers, he said, "Fortune has blessed you with the opportunity you have so long desired; you have now drawn the enemy into a disadvantageous place; let me therefore desire you to behave yourselves with the same courage under our command, as you have done formerly when led by your general; believe him to be present, that he beholds, and will reward your virtue." Then commanding them to face about, he drew up the legions in order of battle, and having detached a small

The Gauls cross the river.

Labienu's speech to his soldiers.

Small party of horse for a guard to his carriages, disposed the rest in the two wings of his army. Our men, setting up a shout, immediately cast their piles at the enemy, who were so surprized to see the Romans, who they fancied but the moment before had fled, now come with their eagles advanced to attack them, that they had not the courage to sustain the first onset, but fled for safety to the neighbouring woods. LABIENUS pursued with his cavalry, slew great numbers of them, took as many prisoners, and in a few days after subdued the whole country; for the Germans, who were marching to their assistance, having notice of this defeat, returned home again, taking TIOMARUS's kinsmen along with them, who having been the occasion of this revolt, were forced to fly their country; and CINGETORIX, who had always given proofs of his fidelity to the Romans, was constituted king of Treves.

WAR IN GAUL.  
He engages,

and defeats the people of Treves.

Whereupon the Germans, who were marching to their assistance, return.

## CHAP. VI.

9. CÆSAR, having left Guelders, was now arrived in Treves, where he resolved to pass the Rhine, to chastise the Germans for having sent supplies to the people of that country, and prevent AMBIORIX's being protected amongst them: for these reasons he began to build a bridge a little above the place where he had crossed the river before, which was contrived after the same manner as the former, and compleated in a few days by the constant industry of the soldiers. Having left a strong garrison on the other side the bridge, to suppress all insurrections in Treves, he crossed the river with the rest of his army: so soon as he arrived in Germany, the Ubii, who had formerly delivered hostages, and were received into the protection of the Romans, sent ambassadors to inform him, that they had given no assistance to Treves, nor done any thing to forfeit their fidelity; but if he required it, they were ready to send more hostages; wherefore they humbly besought him, that he would distinguish them from the rest of the Germans, and not punish the innocent with the guilty: CÆSAR, upon further examination, found the Ubii were not concern'd in the revolt, and that the supplies were sent by the Suabians; wherefore he enquired which were the readiest accessles to their country.

Cæsar resolves to go into Germany.  
Casts a bridge cross the Rhine, and marches over it.


The Ubii send ambassadors to him,

10. Some few days after he was informed by the Ubii, that the Suabians had drawn up all their forces in one place,

He marches against the Suabians,



WAR IN  
GAUL.



place, from whence they sent orders to their tributaries, to furnish them with supplies of horse and foot; whereupon having chose a convenient situation to encamp in, he ordered the Ubii to drive all their cattle out of the fields into their towns; hoping, that so barbarous and unexperienced an enemy, being streightened for want of provisions, might easily be drawn to engage in a place of disadvantage; commanding them, in the mean while, to send frequent scouts into Suabia, to discover the enemy's motions: They obey'd his orders, and soon informed him, that the Suabians, upon notice of his arrival, had retired to a prodigious forest, called Bacenis, at the extremity of their confines, which served for a mutual frontier between them and the Cherusci, where they designed to attend the Roman army.

## CH A P. VII.

II. AS we are come to this place, it may not be impertinent to give an account of the customs of Gaul and Germany, and the different factions that reign amongst them: The Gauls are so addicted to faction, that they have not only divisions among their several provinces, cantons, and districts, but even in every family; the heads of these parties are persons of greatest interest amongst them, to whose judgment and command they submit the direction of all their affairs. This custom seems to have been instituted by antiquity, to the intent that the most obscure person in the commonwealth might be able to contend with his richer adversary; for each of these heads is obliged to protect his party, otherwise he would soon be stripped of his authority. The same custom is observed throughout the whole continent of Gaul, which is divided into two factions.

The custom  
of the Gauls.

What posture the affairs of Gaul were in on Cæsar's arrival.

12. ON CÆSAR'S first arrival in the country, those of Autun were the chief of one, the Franchecomtois of the other party; but finding themselves no equal match for the Autunois (who from all antiquity bore the greatest sway in Gaul, and had many tributary states dependent on them) pray'd assistance of ARIOVISTUS and the Germans; whom by considerable presents, and great promises, they drew cross the Rhine to their aid. After the arrival of their new allies, having fought many successful battles, the scales were so turned, that those of Franchecomte made themselves masters of several fiefs belonging

to the Autunois, obliged them to send the sons of their nobility for hostages, to take an oath of allegiance to them; usurped part of their territories, and soon obtained the sovereignty of the whole continent. Whereupon DIVITIACUS took a journey to Rome, to implore assistance from the senate, which he could not obtain: but on CÆSAR's arrival the posture of affairs was changed again, for the Autunois recovered their hostages, their fiefs, and, by CÆSAR's favour, acquired more tributaries than they had before; for such as put themselves under their protection were better used, and met with more justice, than when they were dependants on the Franche-comtois; whereby their power and reputation were soon so much encreased, that their rivals were stripped of their sovereignty. Those of Franche-comte being thus depressed, the people of Rheims, who were favoured likewise by CÆSAR, succeeded to their authority; for they, whose ancient enmity would not permit them to be vassals to the Autunois, became clients to those of Rheims, who carefully protected them; by which means they immediately grew a potent people. By this turn of affairs, the Autunois once more became head of one of the most powerful parties in Gaul, and the people of Rheims of the other.

CHAP. VIII.

13. THERE are only two degrees of men in Gaul who have the administration of publick affairs, the druids or clergy, and the \* nobility; for the commons are esteemed no better than servants, who have no manner of interest, and are never admitted to their councils; but being oppressed either by their own debts, the imposition of tributes, or the tyranny of the powerful, are obliged to become vassals to the nobility; who have the same power over them that lords usually exercise on their villains. To the druids belongs the care of divine things, of private and publick sacrifices, with the interpretation of their religion: great numbers of youth come to be instructed by them, and they are held in wonderful veneration amongst their countrymen, who submit all differences to their arbitration: let the offence be of what nature soever, if any person be killed, if the controversy relate to titles of land, or the extent of confines, these are the judges, whose sentence must decide, who pronounce rewards and punishments: and whoever refuses to abide by their

The government of Gaul.  
\* Equites.

The Druids office.

They are supreme judges of all controversies.

WAR IN decree, either lord or vassal, is excommunicated, which GAUL. is the greatest penalty that can be inflicted amongst them: <sup>a</sup> for they who lie under the condemnation of this sentence are reckoned in the number of the wicked, all people shun them, and avoid their company as contagious; they are not permitted to sue for justice, or to discharge any office in the commonwealth. The druids have a superintendent, to whom they are all subject, upon whose decease the most worthy succeeds; but if there happen to be several candidates, the election is decided by majority of votes, and sometimes by the sword. Once a year they have a general rendezvous at a consecrated place set apart for that purpose, in the confines of Chartres, which lies in the midst of Gaul; hither all repair who have any controversies to decide, which are submitted to their decrees. 'Tis thought this discipline was first instituted in England, and from thence transferred to Gaul; for even at this day, those who desire to be perfectly skilled in that science, take a voyage thither to learn it.

The privileges and immunities they enjoy.

Their doctrines.

14. The druids seldom attend the army, being exempt from that duty, and from taxes, and enjoying all manner of immunities. Excited by these encouragements, many make a voluntary choice of that profession, and others are brought up in it by their parents. Their business is, according to report, to learn a great number of verses by rote, which some have spent twenty years about, none of them being ever committed to writing; not that they are ignorant of letters, for on all other occasions they make use of Greek characters; but, I suppose, they observe this custom, to lock up their learning from the vulgar, and exercise the memory of their scholars. Their chief principle is, that the soul never dies, but transmigrates, after the decease of one body, to another; which doctrine is of great use to inspire them with courage and a contempt of death; but they have many other traditions in which their youth are instructed, concerning the stars and their motion, the extent of the world, the nature of things, and the power of the immortal gods.

<sup>a</sup> From this custom no doubt we derive our out-lawries; for by the ancient laws of England, before men were out-law'd for debt, he who lay under that sentence was reckoned a more hideous monster than an excommunicate in a Roman catholick country; *caput gerebat lupinum*, and it was lawful for any man to kill him, if he refused to surrender himself. *Braeton, l. iii. tract. 2. c. 11.*

CHAP. IX.

15. NEXT in degree to these are the nobility, who when any war breaks out, as there did almost every year before CÆSAR's arrival, either offensive or defensive, have the direction of all affairs; each being attended by a number of vassals in proportion to his estate and quality, the only mark of grandeur amongst them.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

The office  
of the nobi-  
lity.

16. The whole country of Gaul is much addicted to superstition: for which reason those who are in imminent danger, either from sickness or battle, make an oblation of some human sacrifice, or even of themselves: because they think the gods can never be appeased, but by the death of one man for another: the public offerings of this kind are committed to the care of the druids, who have large hollow images, bound about with osiers, into which they put men alive, and, setting fire to the case, suffocate them. They believe thieves, highwaymen, and other offenders, to be the most grateful offerings to the gods; but for want of such, the innocent are forced to supply their places.

Their hu-  
man sacri-  
fices.

17. MERCURY is their tutelary god, to whose honour they have many images erected; whom they esteem as the inventor of arts, their guide and protector in voyages and journeys, and believe him to have a particular influence over merchandize, and all manner of gain. Next in esteem to MERCURY is APOLLO, then MARS, JUPITER, and MINERVA, of whom they have the same notions with other countries, that APOLLO can cure their diseases, that MINERVA first taught mankind arts and manufactures, that JUPITER is the supreme deity, and that MARS presides in battle: wherefore before they commence a war, they devote great part of the spoils they shall obtain to this deity; and, when they obtain the victory, offer up all the cattle they have taken, on his altars. The rest of the prey they dispose into a place set apart for that purpose; and in several countries may be seen monuments compiled of offerings of this nature: and it seldom happens, that any neglect the performance of their vows, by concealing any part of their plunder, or presuming to carry it away; for the penalties inflicted for crimes of this nature are the most cruel that can be devised.

Their gods.  
Mercury  
their tute-  
lary god.

Apollo.  
Mars.  
Jupiter.  
Minerva.

18. The Gauls believe themselves to be descended from PLUTO, their druids having so informed them; for which

Their de-  
scend from  
Dis or Pluto.



**WAR IN GAUL.** reason they do not count time as other nations do, by days, but nights; and in the annual remembrance of their births, the beginning of their months and years, they always mention the night before the day. Another custom they have, which seems very particular; they never permit their children to appear in public before them, till they are of sufficient age to bear arms; for, the contrary they esteem dishonourable.

The disposal of the wife's fortune.

The men have power of life and death over their wives and children.

Their funerals.

19. Whatever fortune the wife brings, the husband is obliged to equal it, and both the sums together, with their annual product, are laid up for the benefit of the survivor. The men have power of life and death over their wives and children: and when any man of quality dies, his next relations assemble to enquire into the occasion of his death; upon the least suspicion they have power to put his widow to the question, with as little ceremony as if she had been one of his servants; and if they find her guilty, to burn her alive. Their funerals are very sumptuous and magnificent, in proportion to their quality; every thing the deceased party set the greatest value on, is cast into the pile, even animals; and formerly, those vassals and clients whom they held the dearest, were obliged to attend them to the other world.

20. Those provinces amongst them, which are most esteemed for prudent administration, have a law, that he who receives news from the neighbouring states, of importance to the common-wealth, shall immediately impart it to the magistrate, without divulging it to any other person; having often experienced the nature of their subjects to be such, that, frightened by false reports, they are apt to raise commotions, and put the state in disorder by their rash resolves. The magistrates therefore trust them only with such informations as they think convenient, suppressing the rest; nor do they permit any one to discourse concerning state affairs but in the council.

## CHAP. X.

The customs of the Germans.

Their gods. Sol, \* Vulcanus, Luna.

21. From these customs of the Gauls the Germans differ greatly; having neither druids to preside in sacred rites, nor troubling themselves with sacrifices: they acknowledge no gods but those they behold, and whose influence they are apparently obliged to, as the sun, \* fire, and moon, and have not so much as heard of any other: they are perpetual huntsmen and warriors; injure themselves to labour

and hardship from their childhood; and esteem those men the most, who have longest preserved their virginity, which they believe contributes to their growth, vigour, and strength of their nerves; but nothing is esteemed so ignominious amongst them, as to know a woman before they have passed the twentieth year of age; in which act they do not consult privacy, for they wash promiscuously in rivers, and only make use of skins and small mantles of fur instead of cloaths, leaving the greatest part of their bodies naked.

22. They mind not agriculture, the greatest part of them living upon milk, cheese, and flesh-meat; nor has any man fields of his own, distinguished from the common by boundaries; for the magistrates and princes yearly distribute to every canton such a portion of land as they think sufficient in some part of the country; whither they send them to continue only for one year, and remove them to some other quarter the next: which custom they observe on several accounts, lest from being attached to a place they should change their inclination for war to tillage, and think of extending their confines, to the oppression of the weak by the powerful; lest they should learn to build more elegantly than is necessary against the summer's heat and winter's cold; but chiefly to prevent covetousness, the root of all factions and discord, and preserve that equality of riches in the common-wealth, which produces peace and content.

23. Every country thinks it honourable to have their confines round about lie waste; for they esteem it an argument of their courage, to have expelled their neighbours, and struck so great a terror into them, that they dare not venture to approach their territories; besides, they think this the way to secure them from the danger of sudden incursions. Whenever a state wages war, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of an officer for that occasion, whom they invest with power of life and death; but have no such magistrate in time of peace, for the chief of every canton distributes justice, and decides all controversies amongst his own people. They esteem it not infamous to steal beyond their own confines, but rather a laudable exercise which preserves their youth from idleness; and when any nobleman declares in a general assembly that he designs to make an expedition, they who approve the leader and the cause, rise up to profer their service; for which they are applauded by their countrymen; but they who stay behind,

WAR IN GAUL.

Their chastity.

Cloathing.

Their diet.

Way of living.

Their confines lie waste for a great way round.

Robbing out of their confines no disgrace.

WAR IN hind, after they have once offered to go, are looked upon  
GAUL. as traitors or deserters, and never trusted after: they are  
strict observers of hospitality, and all their doors are open  
to such as fly to them for refuge on any occasion; whom  
they carefully protect.

24. There was once a time when the Gauls were superior in arms to the Germans, and made war upon them; scarcity of land, and multiplicity of men, obliging them to send colonies cross the Rhine: wherefore the most fertile parts of Germany about the Hercynian forest, which, I find, ERATOSTHENES and some other Grecians have mentioned by the name of Orcinia, were taken possession of by the natives of Upper Languedoc, who continue there to this day, much esteemed for their courage and justice, patient of hardships and want, like the Germans, and conforming to their way of living, as well in diet as cloathing; but the neighbourhood and commerce which the Gauls have since held with the Roman province, has taught them to live more luxuriously; by which means growing insensibly weaker, they have been overcome in several battles, and reduced to such a degree, that they no longer pretend to compare themselves with the Germans.

25. The Hercynian forest is nine days journey over in breadth, for I cannot compute it any other way, because the Germans are ignorant of the use of measure: it commences in the confines of Switzerland, Basil, and Spire, and extends along the river Danube as far as Transilvania: then turning from the river to the left, it runs through an infinite number of countries; nor has there any one of this part of Germany travelled through it or found its utmost extent, though several have gone fifty days journey in it.

Strange  
beasts in the  
Hercynian  
forest.

In this wood are several kinds of wild beasts, which are not to be met with elsewhere; of which the most remarkable are these:

Bull with  
one horn.

26. A bull, whose shape resembles that of a stag, with one horn only, planted directly in the midst of his forehead, much longer and straiter than those of our cattle; this horn is divided at the top into several branches; the males and females are both shaped alike, and their horns of the same size.

27. They have likewise another kind of animals called Alces, which much resemble the <sup>b</sup> roe-buck in shape, and

<sup>a</sup> VOSSIUS fancies the singular termination of this word should be Alx, from the German Elch; monsieur D'ARLANCOURT translates it wild asses.

<sup>b</sup> The original is not capreis, but capris, though in SALMASIUS's opinion it ought to be so, with whom VOSSIUS likewise agrees.

the various colours of their skins, but are something of a larger size; they have no horns, nor joints in their legs, and never lie down to sleep, and if they chance to fall, are not able to get up again; wherefore, when they are weary, they lean against the next tree, which serves them for a resting-place: for this reason, when the huntsmen have found out their haunts, they either loosen the roots of all the trees thereabout, or saw them almost quite off, to deceive the animal, who coming to the usual leaning-place, the prop fails, and both fall down together.

28. The third species are those creatures they call Uri, very little less than elephants; in colour, shape and kind, resembling much our bulls: they are prodigious strong, wonderfully nimble, and spare neither man nor beast that has the misfortune to come in their way; wherefore the natives are very industrious in digging pits to catch them. The youth inure themselves to this exercise, and particular kind of hunting; for he who has killed the greatest number of them, brings the horns to witness for his courage, and is highly applauded by his countrymen. So savage is the nature of these beasts, though taken never so young, that they cannot be tamed: the largeness, shape, and species of their horns differ much from those of our bulls, and are in great request; the edges of which being tip'd with silver, they use them for cups at their most sumptuous feasts.

Uri or Bufalos.

## CHAP. XI.

29. CÆSAR had notice from his Ubian scouts, that the Suabians were retired into their woods; wherefore apprehending want of provisions (because, as we have already taken notice, the Germans are but little addicted to agriculture) he resolved to march no further; but that the enemy might not be entirely delivered from their fears by his retreat, and that he might prevent their sending assistance to the Gauls, having repassed the Rhine, he only broke up about two hundred foot of his bridge, on that side next Germany, leaving the rest standing; and at the foot built a wooden tower four stories high, with other fortifications, where he left a garrison of twelve cohorts, under the command of young C. VOLCATUS TULLIUS, to defend it. When harvest approached, he detached L. MINUTIUS BASILUS, with all his cavalry, against AMBIORIX; whom he ordered to march through the forest of Arden, which is the largest in Gaul, extending above five hundred miles

Cæsar repasses the Rhine, breaks down half his bridge, and leaves a garrison there.

He detaches Basilus against Ambiorix;



WAR IN in length, from the banks of the Rhine and the confines of GAUL. Treves and Hainault. He commanded him to keep no fires in his camp, that the enemy might not have notice of his approach, hoping that secrecy and dispatch might give him an opportunity of doing some considerable exploit; and he himself designed to follow immediately after.

30. BASILUS performed his orders beyond expectation, for he arrived so quickly upon the enemy's territories, that he surprised great numbers of them in the field; and by their instruction marched directly to AMBIORIX, who had only a slender guard of cavalry about him: but as Fortune has an influence over all affairs, so she assumes a peculiar power in those of war; for as it was a most extraordinary chance, that BASILUS should fall upon the quarters of AMBIORIX, before he was prepared to receive him, and be seen, e'er his arrival was heard of; so must it be acknowledged as strange, that AMBIORIX, after the loss of his arms, horses, and chariots, should make his escape. But this was owing to the situation of his house, which was surrounded by a wood, as the Gauls generally build near a wood and a river, for coolness; for his men, possessing themselves of a narrow passage, sustained the attack of our cavalry till their master mounting a horse which was brought him, secured himself in the thickets. Thus Fortune had equally a hand in bringing him into danger, and in delivering him out of it.

who narrowly escapes being taken.

## CHAP. XII.

31. AMBIORIX, having secured his person, did not endeavour to assemble any forces, but sent messengers privately throughout the country, to command every man to provide for his own safety; thinking it either dangerous to venture an engagement, or wanting time, by the sudden arrival of the Roman cavalry, to put his designs in execution: wherefore one part of them fled for shelter to the forest of Arden, whilst the rest endeavoured to secure themselves among the wide extended marshes. Whereupon CATIVULCUS, who shared one half of the kingdom of Liege with AMBIORIX, and was now grown too old to endure the fatigues of war or flight, having bestowed many imprecations on his partner, for being the cause of that unhappy revolt, sought refuge for his cares from a poisonous draught, extracted from the yew-tree. (whereof they

Cativulcus poisons himself.

they have plenty in Gaul and Germany) and so ex- WAR IN GAUL.  
pired.

32. In the mean while the people of <sup>b</sup> Cologn and Zul- Condrusi and Segni send embassadors to Caesar to declare their innocence.  
pich, two German colonies that lie between Liege and Treves, sent embassadors to CÆSAR, to desire he would not count them amongst the number of his enemies, or believe that all the Germans on their side the Rhine were joined in one common cause; for, they assured him, they never designed to make war upon the Romans, or sent AMBRIORIX any supplies; which CÆSAR being satisfied of from examining the captives by torture, promised them, on condition they sent to him all the people of Liege, who should fly for shelter to their country; he would not commit any acts of hostility on their confines; then having di- Caesar leaves his baggage at Tongre, Atuatica. Divides his army into three parts.  
vided his army into three parts, he sent all the baggage of his legions to Tongre, which is the name of a castle almost in the midst of Liege, where TITURIUS and ARUNCULEIUS had formerly their winter-quarters. The last year's fortifications were yet intire; wherefore CÆSAR, designing to save his soldiers as much labour as he could, made choice of this place, where he left the fourteenth legion, which was one of the three he had lately received from Italy, and two hundred horse, under the command of Q TULLIUS CICERO, for a guard.

33. TITUS LABIENUS he detached with three legions Detaches Labienus towards Guelders, Trebonius towards Namur, and marches himself towards the forest of Arden.  
towards the sea-coasts, and the borders of Guelders; c. TREBONIUS, with the like number, he sent to lay the country waste on that side next Namur; resolving to march himself, with the remainder of the army, towards the river Scheld, which flows into the Mose, and to the forest of Arden, whither, he was informed, AMBRIORIX was gone with a small party of horse. When he first began his march, he designed to return again in seven days, for he had left the legion in garrison provisions for no longer time; and ordered LABIENUS and TREBONIUS, if they could conveniently, to return within the same time, that upon further consultation they might know what new methods were properest to be taken for defeating the enemy's designs.

But ORTELIIUS thinks the Condrusi are those of Condrotz,

## C H A P. XIII.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

The rebels  
hide them-  
selves in the  
woods and  
marshes.

Cæsar pro-  
claims it  
lawful for all  
the countries  
round to  
harass  
Liege.

34. THE rebels, as we have already taken notice, had no army, town, or garrison for us to attack, but were all dispersed amongst the vallies, woods, marshes, and such other places of shelter; which were well known to them from being in their neighbourhood: a circumstance that occasioned no small care in CÆSAR, not for the safety of the main body of his army (which was in no danger from a frightened and dispersed multitude) but for what concerned the welfare of it, the preservation of individuals, who were tempted from a desire of plunder to ramble through those unknown and private ways, where the thickness of the woods would not permit them to march in bodies. Wherefore, to compleat the business, and extirpate the race of so wicked a people, he found it necessary to send an infinite number of small parties against them; for so long as he obliged the soldiers to maintain their ranks, according to the Roman discipline, the very situation of the place served the rebels for a fortress, who had courage enough to lay ambuscades, and attack us on advantage when dispersed. In the midst of these difficulties CÆSAR took all the care imaginable, and though the soldiers were inflamed with revenge, yet he rather chose to omit an opportunity of injuring the enemy, than do it to the detriment of his army. Wherefore he invited the countries round about, who being attracted by the hopes of plunder, soon flocked from all sides to destroy the people of Liege; by these means he only hazarded the Gauls in the woods, preserved his own legions safe, and got the rebels surrounded, whose race and memory he resolved to extinguish, that he might revenge the crimes they had been guilty of.

## C H A P. XIV.

35. THUS their destruction went forward in all places till the seventh day was arrived, the time appointed for CÆSAR's return to Tongre; but hence may be learned what influence chance has over the affairs of war: the rebels, as we have already remarked, being frightened and dispersed, had not any body of forces to give us the least apprehensions; whereupon the Germans cross the Rhine, having notice that the people of Liege were destined to destruction,

destruction, and that all mankind were welcome to par- WAR IN  
take of the plunder; the Sicambri that lie next the river, CAUL.  
who formerly entertained the people of Hesse and Zut-  
phen, when they fled from CÆSAR, levied two thousand The Sigam-  
horse, and crossing the river about thirty miles below the bri cross the  
broken bridge, where CÆSAR had left a garrison, arrived Rhine, and  
on the borders of Liege, where they took several of the come into  
natives prisoners, and obtained a considerable number of Liege,  
cattle, a booty the barbarians are the most desirous of; nei- where they  
ther marsh nor wood put a stop to their career, so long as get a confi-  
plunder called them forward, for from their cradles they are derable  
inured to war and theft: being inquisitive to know where booty;  
CÆSAR lay, they were informed, that he and his army  
had left the country: in the midst of their progress, at but on the  
length a captive asked them, Why they would trouble advice of a  
themselves to pursue so trifling and worthless a booty, when captive, de-  
they might make their fortunes at a single stroke? for they sist from  
might arrive in three hours march at Tongre, where the pursuing  
Romans had reposed all their baggage, under the guard of those of  
so small a garrison, as was not sufficient to man the ramparts, Liege,  
so that not one of them durst venture out of their trenches. and march  
Big with expectation, they hid the booty they had already directly to  
got, and marched directly to Tongre, whither they were Cicero's  
conducted by the captive who gave them this information. quarters.

## C H A P. XV.

36. CICERO had so strictly observed CÆSAR's orders Cicero de-  
hitherto, that he had not permitted so much as a boy to stir taches five  
out of the garrison; but the seventh day he began to de- cohorts to  
spair of the performance of CÆSAR's promise, because he forage.  
was informed he had marched farther up into the country,  
and could hear no news of his return: wherefore being  
moved by the complaints of his soldiers, who began to mur-  
mur at his patience, and esteem their present confinement  
as bad as a siege, not suspecting any accident could befall  
him within so short a space as that of three miles, whilst  
an army of nine complete legions with a considerable num-  
ber of horse was abroad, which had already defeated and  
dispersed the enemy, he detached five cohorts to forage in  
the nearest corn-fields, which were divided from his camp  
only by a little hill. Most of the sick and wounded of the  
army being left in the garrison with him, they who were a  
little recovered, to the number of three hundred, were sent  
out



**WAR IN GAUL.** out on this occasion under one ensign, and were followed by a great number of beasts of burthen, and servants of the camp.

**The Germans arrive at Tongre, and endeavour to force the Decuman port.**

37. The very moment the foragers were gone out, arrived the German cavalry, who endeavoured to force their passage through the Decuman port with the same fury they had galloped thither; the woods prevented our having notice of their approach, which was so unexpected, that the sutlers, who had sheds in the counterscarp, had not leisure to save themselves by retiring within the works. Our men were extremely surpris'd at so sudden an attack, and the cohort that was placed for an out-guard could hardly sustain their first onset. In the mean time the enemy rode round the trenches, to discover some more convenient place to enter at: Our soldiers with difficulty maintained the gates; the other parts were so well fortified they needed no defence. In fine, the whole camp was frighted, every man enquired of the next he met the occasion of the tumult, and no body knew which way to advance the standards, or where to post himself; some reported the camp was already taken, others, that the Germans had defeated CÆSAR and his army, and in the plenitude of victory were falling upon them: whilst the rest, remembering that TITURIUS and COTTA had lost their lives when posted within those trenches, became superstitious, and presaged the like fate to themselves. This confusion confirmed the enemy in the belief of what the prisoner had reported, that we had no garrison within; wherefore encouraging each other not to let so rich a booty slip out of their hands, they began to storm our rampier.

**The Romans confusion.**

**Baculus, tho' wounded, leaves his tent, and places himself in the gate till the rest of the soldiers rally**

38. P. SEXTIUS BACULUS, who had been primiple under CÆSAR, whose name has been mentioned in former actions, was left behind in the camp, and was so dangerously ill, that he had eaten nothing for five days before; despairing of safety either for himself or his soldiers, he slept from his tent unarmed, when perceiving things reduced to the last extremity (for the enemy had almost forced their passage) he snatched some arms from the next soldier, and placed himself before the gate: the centurions of the out-guard followed him, and all together for a while sustained the Germans charge, till SEXTIUS, after he had received many dangerous wounds, beginning to faint, was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers; in the mean time the rest had so far recovered themselves, as to ascend the rampier, and make a shew of defence.

## CHAP. XVI.

39. IN the mean while our foragers were returning home again, and hearing a noise, sent the cavalry before to discover the occasion, who brought them word how dangerous a posture affairs were in: they were all strangely surpris'd at the news, and lamented the want of a fortification to shelter them from the enemy; but especially the new levies, who having no experience in war, impatiently waited for the tribunes and centurions orders, to know which way they must dispose themselves. The Germans, at first when they beheld our ensigns, left off the storm, fancying the legions, which the prisoners had informed them were marched further into the country, were now returned; but finding their error, and contemning the smallness of our number, they surrounded our foragers on all sides.


WAR IN  
GAUL.

The foragers returning, fall in with the Germans.

40. The soldiers servants fled for shelter to the next rising ground, whence they were immediately driven, and cast themselves for safety amongst the ranks of the maniples, which put them into more confusion than they were in before: some were of opinion 'twould be the safest method to draw themselves into a triangle, and so force their way through the enemy; because the camp was so near, that if some should fall in the attempt, the rest might secure themselves; but others thought it best to possess the hill, and all expect the same fate. The veteran soldiers, who, as we observed, went out under one ensign, could by no means approve of this advice: wherefore encouraging each other, under the conduct of C. TREBONIUS, a Roman knight, their commanding officer, they broke through the midst of the enemy, and arrived every man of them safe in the camp; they were followed with the same impetuosity by the servants and cavalry, who thus procured their safety by the soldiers courage: but they who had possessed themselves of the hill, for want of discipline, could neither persist in their own scheme of maintaining their ground, nor by one brisk effort imitate their fellow-soldiers example; but in endeavouring to obtain the camp, quitted their post of advantage: the centurions, who for their courage had been promoted from the lower order in other legions to the upper in these new troops, fought bravely to maintain the glory they had formerly acquired, and died with honour; their courage, beyond expectation, gave some of the soldiers

The veteran soldiers, drawn up into a triangle, force their way through the Germans, and arrive safe in the camp: The new levies not taking the same way, are most of them cut off.

WAR IN diers means to escape, but the rest were surrounded, and GAUL. cut to pieces by the enemy.



## C H A P. XVII.

The Ro-  
mans fear  
after the  
Germans re-  
treat.

41. THE Germans now despairing of success, since they saw our soldiers ready to defend the works, returned cross the Rhine with the booty they had hidden in the woods; but so great was the fear which possessed our men, even after their retreat, that when C. VOLUSENUS arrived from CÆSAR that night with the cavalry, they could not be persuaded that CÆSAR and his army were safe, and following him to the camp: in fine, they were so bewitched with fear that they would not believe but CÆSAR was routed, and none but the horse had escaped: for they could not conceive how the Germans durst attempt to force their trenches if he was safe; but his arrival convinced them of their error.

Cæsar re-  
turns to the  
camp,  
blames Ci-  
cero for let-  
ting his co-  
horts forage  
contrary to  
orders.

42. When CÆSAR came back, he was informed of the late action, in which he found nothing to complain of, but the cohorts foraging contrary to his orders; for the enemy's sudden attack proved how dangerous it was to trust Fortune with the most minute opportunity: he wondered extremely the Germans had so narrowly escaped him, but infinitely more, that they, who crossed the Rhine on purpose to lay waste the country of AMBIORIX, should do him the greatest service imaginable, by endeavouring to take the Roman camp.

## C H A P. XVIII.

Cæsar re-  
turns to har-  
raß Liege.

43. CÆSAR returning again to harraß the country of Liege, levied great numbers of forces in the neighbouring provinces, and sent them into all parts; not a house nor village that came in their way escaped burning; they plundered on every side: and the continual rains, as well as the number of soldiers and cattle, so effectually destroyed the corn, that they who escap'd the sword, were likely to die with fa-

The cavalry  
divided into  
small parties  
Ambiorix,  
trusting his  
person only  
to a guard of  
4 horse, of-  
ten narrow-  
ly escapes.

mine. The cavalry were divided into so many parties, that they often came to the very places where the captives informed them they had seen AMBIORIX, and that he was but just out of sight; and so desirous were some of the soldiers to recommend themselves to their general by apprehending him, that they performed wonders in their unwearyed pursuit; each moment flattered them the next would  
compleat

compleat their happiness: but AMBRIORIX, riding from one <sup>WAR IN</sup> thicket to another, and removing his quarters in the night, <sup>GAUL.</sup> escaped their most diligent search; being attended only by four horse, all the friends he durst confide in.

44. Thus CÆSAR having laid the country waste, only with the loss of two cohorts, marched his army to the capital of Rheims, where he summoned the diet of Gaul: <sup>Caesar re-</sup> When the states were assembled, he commanded them to <sup>turns to</sup> examine into the rebellion of Sens and Chartres; and <sup>Rheims,</sup> <sup>holds a diet.</sup> Acco being found the principal cause of this revolt, had the <sup>Acco sen-</sup> severe sentence passed upon him, according to ancient cus- <sup>tenced more</sup> tom, To be stripped naked, and with his neck fixed be- <sup>majorum.</sup> tween the granes of a fork, to be be whipped to death, and afterwards beheaded; some, who fled, not daring to stand the rigour of a tryal, were \* banished. Then sending two legions to take up their winter-quarters in Treves, two more to Langre, the other six to the capital of Sens; having provided his army with corn, he returned, according to his custom, to hold the diet of Lombardy.

\* Aqua & igne interdicti.





C. J. CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARY  
OF HIS  
WAR in GAUL.

The SEVENTH BOOK.

*A general revolt of the Gauls, who choose VERCINGETORIX for their leader. CÆSAR takes several places. The siege of Bourges. Divisions in Autun. The siege of Clerimont, where the Romans are repulsed with loss. LABIENUS's success at Paris. Preparations of VERCINGETORIX; and the siege of Alexia.*

CHAP. I.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

**C**ÆSAR having quieted the commotions in Gaul, went, as he designed, into Lombardy, to preside at the convention of the states; where being informed of the death of PUBLIUS CLODIUS, and the senate's decree for assembling all the youth of Italy; he resolved to raise new levies throughout his whole province. This news was soon carried into Gaul, where the natives added what they thought convenient to it; reporting that CÆSAR was detained by the troubles at Rome, and that it was impossible for him to come to his army, whilst the factions there were so hot. Encouraged by this opportunity, they who had long bemoaned their subjection to the Roman yoke, now began to consult more openly of war; and the princes of

of Gaul, having appointed private meeting-places in the woods, there communicated their mutual regret for the death of ACCO, in whose punishment they thought themselves all concerned; they lamented the fate of their country, and promised great rewards to them that would first begin the war, and venture their lives to restore their liberty. The first step to be made, in so important an attempt, was to block up CÆSAR's passage to his army, before he could receive intelligence of their design; which they imagined feasible, because the legions without their general's orders durst not leave their quarters, nor could CÆSAR come to them without a guard: in fine, they resolved to die, rather than not recover that glory and liberty which they had received from their ancestors.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

The Gauls taking advantage of Cæsar's absence and the factions at Rome, consult about a general revolt.

## CHAP. II.

2. WHEREUPON the people of Chartres declared, no danger should deter them from undertaking any enterprise that might be of service to the publick, and promised to begin the war themselves; but, to avoid delay, since they had no time mutually to deliver hostages, they desired the rest would swear upon their standards (the most solemn obligation amongst the Gauls) not to desert them after they had declared war against the Romans. The satisfaction they desired was readily complied with, they were highly applauded for their piety to their country, and so the council for that time was dissolved.

Those of Chartres first declare war.

3. At the day appointed, the people of Chartres, led on by COTUATUS and CONETODUNUS, men of desperate resolution, on a sign given, marched directly to Orleans, where they massacred all the Roman citizens, who came thither to traffick, and seized their effects; amongst the rest C. FULSIUS COTTA, a worthy Roman knight, whom CÆSAR had made commissary general of the stores. This action was quickly known all over Gaul: for when any important accident happens among them, the news is soon circulated through the country, by a shout communicated from town to town, till it is carried through the continent. So that, what was done at Orleans at sun-rise, was heard of at Auvergne, about 160 miles distant, before nine o'clock the same evening.

Cotuatus and Conetodunus massacre Fulsius Cotta and all the Roman merchants at Orleans or Genabum.

## CHAP. III.

**WAR IN GAUL.** 4. **INSPIRED** by this example, **VERCINGETORIX**, the son of **CELTILLUS** of Auvergne, a youth of the greatest authority there (whose father had formerly obtained the command of Gaul, but was slain by his own countrymen for aiming at the sovereignty) called his clients together, and easily persuaded them to rebel; but his design being discovered, the whole country repaired to their arms, and he was expelled the city of Cleremont by his uncle **GOBANITIO**, and those other noblemen who were not for embarking in so dangerous an attempt. However, not discouraged by this misfortune, he began to lift all the vagabonds and out-laws he could meet with, and having levied a considerable number of those, he easily persuaded such of his countrymen as came near him, to follow his standard, encouraging them to take arms for the common liberty of Gaul: and having now a powerful army under his command, being superior to his enemies, he drove them out of the country, who not long before had expelled him; whereupon he was complimented with the title of king. He immediately dispatched ambassadors to all the countries round, to advise them to persevere in their noble resolutions; and entered into a league with the people of Sens, Paris, Poictou, Quercy, Tours, Limosin, Eureux, Anjou, and those other countries which lay towards the sea; who by unanimous consent chose him their general. Being invested with this authority, he demanded hostages from every one of those states, appointed what quota of men they should immediately furnish him with, and what quantity of arms each should provide, by a certain day prefixed, and was particularly careful to get a number of horse. Besides diligence he made use of severity, and by pains and penalties obliged those that stood neuter, to declare themselves; such as were guilty of notorious crimes he punished with fire, and all manner of torments; and they who committed smaller faults having their ears cut off, or eyes put out, were sent back into their own countries, for an example to the rest, and to deter others, by the greatness of their punishment, from being guilty of the like offences.

5. Thus having quickly levied a considerable army, he detached one party, under the command of **LUCTERIUS** of Quercy, a man of spirit and enterprize, to Roverge, marching himself with the rest against Berry: upon his arrival

Vercingetorix takes arms, is expelled his country.

But lifting an army, he returns and drives out his enemies.

Is proclaimed king.

Enters into league, with the neighbouring states, who choose him their general.

His severe discipline.

He sends Lucterius against Roverge. Marches himself to Berry.

rival, the people of Berry, being dependants on those of Autun, sent thither for assistance, to protect them from the enemy's invasion; the Autunois, by the advice of the lieutenants whom CÆSAR had quartered among them, complied with their demands, and sent them a party of horse and foot; who arriving at the Loire, which divides the confines of Berry from Autun, staid there a few days, without daring to pass the river, then returned home again, and informed our lieutenants, they were jealous of treachery from those of Berry; for they were credibly informed, in case they passed the Loire, they should be attacked on one side by the people they went to assist, and on the other by those of Auvergne. For my part, I cannot certainly affirm whether there was truth in their excuse, or they betray'd their trust; but immediately on their departure Berry joined with the rebels of Auvergne.

Ligeris.  
The cowardice of the party the Autunois sent to assist Berry.

6. CÆSAR having notice of these transactions, so soon as he was informed that CN. POMPEY's prudence had composed the disorders at Rome, repassed the Alps: here he was greatly disturbed to contrive which way he should join his army, for he considered, in case he should send for any of his legions out of their quarters, they would be obliged, during his absence, to give the enemy battle in their march: nor did he think it convenient to trust his person, even amongst those states which had not yet rebelled.

#### CHAP. IV.

7. IN the mean while LUCTERIUS of Quercy, who was sent to Roverge, had obliged that country likewise to join with the faction of Auvergne; then marching against the Agenois and Gevaudan, he received hostages from each of those states; and having raised a considerable army, endeavoured to make an eruption into the Roman province on the side next Narbonne. Upon notice of this expedition, CÆSAR thought it highly imported him to go immediately to Narbonne: on his arrival he encouraged such as were wavering, to continue firm in their allegiance, and placed garrisons in Roverge situated in the Province, and in the lower Languedoc, Tholouse, and the other towns which were nearest the enemy; commanding part of the Provincial forces, together with the new levies he had brought from Italy, to render themselves at Vivarais, which joins to the confines of Auvergne.

Roverge submits to Lucterius, so do the Agenois and Gevaudan.

He marches to enter the Roman province.



WAR IN 8. CÆSAR having thus dispatched the necessary orders, and disappointed LUCTERIUS, who, not thinking it safe to venture among the garrisons, was withdrawing, went to meet the forces which he had sent before to Vivarais. 'Twas now the depth of winter, and though the mountains of the Cevennes, which divide Auvergne from Vivarais, were covered with snow six foot deep, which stopped all the passages; yet by the wondrous application of the soldiers the ways were opened, and he arrived in the territories of the Auvergnois, who were soon suppressed, while they scarce dreamt of his approach, thinking themselves as well secured on that side by the mountains as by a wall, since never any single man had been known to travel the same way before at that unseasonable time of the year; he then sent his cavalry out in several parties about the country, to strike as great a terror as possible into the enemy. News of this was soon brought to VERCINGETORIX, whose countrymen, full of consternation, fled to him, desiring he would consult the good of Auvergne, and not suffer them to be destroyed by the Romans, especially since the whole stress of the war depended on them: moved by their intreaties he decamped from Berry, and marched towards Auvergne.

Vercingetorix leaves Berry, and marches to Auvergne. Cæsar leaves his camp; arrives by post at Vienna or Vienne in Dauphine, and from thence to Langre.

9. But CÆSAR foreseeing what steps VERCINGETORIX would take, stay'd two days only in the country, and under pretence of raising new levies, and drawing the cavalry together, left his army to the command of young BRUTUS, whom he ordered to disperse the horse as wide as he could, that they might harass the country; promising, if possible, to return again to the camp within three days: then, without acquainting any one with his design, he took post for Vienna, where he had laid fresh horses some time before, and from thence, travelling day and night without intermission, rid through the confines of Autun to Langre (where two legions were quarter'd) that he might disappoint any attempts of the Autunois against his person by dispatch.

## CHAP. V.


BEING thus arrived at Langre, he sent to the rest of his legions, and drew them all together, before the people of Auvergne knew of his journey; but so soon as VERCINGETORIX was informed of our motions, he return'd again to Berry, and from thence marched to invest Gergovia,

Vercingetorix marches to besiege Gergovia.

a town

a town of the <sup>a</sup> Boii, built by CÆSAR after the victory he obtained over the Swifs, and by him made tributary to the Autunois.

WAR IN GAUL.



10. This affair gave CÆSAR no small occasion to consult what methods were properest to be taken; for he was apprehensive, in case he should not draw his legions out of their quarters to assist the tributaries of Autun, the whole country of Gaul would revolt, finding it in vain to expect protection from the Romans; on the other hand, if he took the field too early, he had reason to fear want of provisions: however, he resolved to undergo any difficulty, rather than suffer so ignominious and fatal a blow to the Roman interest. Wherefore having ordered the Autunois to furnish him from time to time with provisions, he dispatched a courier to inform the Boii he would quickly come to their relief, to encourage them to continue firm in their allegiance, and vigorously sustain the assault of the enemy: according to his promise, having left the baggage of his army under a guard of two legions at <sup>b</sup> Sens, he marched towards Bourbonne.

Cæsar having drawn his army out of their winter-quarters, marches to the assistance of the Bourbonnois.

11. The next day arriving at <sup>c</sup> Chateau-Landon, a town in the country of Sens, he resolved to take it in, that he might leave no enemy behind to intercept his convoys: in two days he compleated his circumvallation, and the third the besieged sent deputies to treat of a surrender, whom he commanded to deliver up their arms, horses, and 600 hostages. The execution of this treaty he left to the care of C. TREBONIUS, intending to march with what expedition he could to Orleans, a city belonging to those of Chartres; who having notice that Chateau-Landon was taken, and concluding CÆSAR would not rest there, resolved to provide a strong garrison to defend the town. Here CÆSAR

He arrives at Orleans, which he takes and sacks.

<sup>a</sup> The Boii, SANSON says, are the present inhabitants of Bourbonne, yet will have this Gergovia to be the same with that in Auvergne, which he calls Clermont, though, he confesses, others affirm this to be Moulins: SCALIGER, in his Notitia Galliae, mentions not Gergovia, believing, as I suppose, with ORTELIUS, that it was foisted into the text. VOSSIUS is of a different opinion, but says the text is corrupted, because the Greek has it Γεργόβιαι; but which of these learned gentlemen is in the right, I leave to the determination of those criticks who have more curiosity than myself: I shall only take notice, that though monsieur SANSON calls Gergovia in Auvergne, Clermont, whose interpretation I have followed in the name; yet SCALIGER, ORTELIUS, and CLUVER place Gergovia about a league's distance from Clermont.

<sup>b</sup> The capital of Sens, Agendicum.

<sup>c</sup> Vellaunodunum, by some thought to be Villeneuve in Lorraine, by others Auxerre; but SANSON, who agrees with CELLARIUS, says it is Chateau-Landon, which CÆSAR besieges and takes.

WAR IN GAUL. arrived after two days march; but being benighted, was obliged to defer his assault till the next morning; however he dispatched the necessary orders, and apprehending the besieged might steal out of the town by night, because Orleans joins to the bridge cross the Loire, he commanded two legions to lie all night upon their arms. Accordingly the citizens, a little after midnight, began to pass the river without any noise; which CÆSAR having notice of from his scouts, set the gates on fire, then ordered the legions prepared for that purpose, to enter the town; which they made themselves masters of, and took most of the enemy prisoners: for the narrowness of the bridge and passages had given but few an opportunity to escape. Having sack'd the town, he gave the plunder to the soldiers; then passing the Loire, arrived on the confines of Berry.

Then  
marches to-  
wards Berry.

## CHAP. VI.

12. **VERCINGETORIX** having notice of his approach, broke up the siege, and marched directly to meet him. **CÆSAR** was resolved to take in <sup>d</sup>Neuvye, a town belonging to the country of Berry, which lay in his road; but the people sent ambassadors to desire he would be pleased to pardon them, and preserve their lives. That he might use the same dispatch, in this as he did in all his other transactions, he granted their address, on condition they should deliver up their horses, arms, and send him hostages. Part of the hostages were already delivered, the rest were preparing, and some centurions with a small party were admitted to search the city for arms and horses; when the besieged descrying the cavalry of **VERCINGETORIX** at some distance, which marched before the rest of the army, and hoping they came to their assistance, immediately set up a shout, repaired to their arms, shut the gates, and ascended the walls: but the centurions that were in the town, perceiving by the noise, that the Gauls had some new design, drew their swords, and having possessed the gates, retreated with all their men in safety to the camp.

<sup>d</sup> Noviodunum. **CÆSAR** mentions four several towns of the same name; one in Soisson, which most people take for Noïon, but monsieur **SANSON** calls it Soisson: **SCALIGER** cannot believe that any body ever found the true name for it yet. Another town of this name in Autun, upon the river Loire, all people expound Nevers: this we are now talking of, **SANSON** calls Neuve; and the fourth, Noviodunum Diablintum, he applies to Nogent le Rotrou, the chief village of Perch, on the river Huysen.

13. CÆSAR immediately drew out the cavalry to engage the enemy's horse, and finding his men began to give ground, detached about 400 German horse to assist them: the Gauls not able to sustain the assault, lost many of their party, and being routed, fled for safety to their army. Upon this defeat, the besieged again despairing, seized all those persons who had been instrumental in raising the mob on the late occasion, sent them prisoners to CÆSAR, and delivered themselves up to his mercy. This affair dispatched, CÆSAR marched towards Bourges, the capital town of Berry, situate in a plentiful soil; not doubting but he should quickly reduce the whole country, when he had made himself master of the strongest town in that state.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

Cæsar takes  
Neuvye, and  
marches  
from thence  
to Bourges.

C H A P. VII.

14. VERCINGETORIX having received so many losses successively, as those of Sens, Orleans, and Neuvye, summoned a council; where he told his countrymen, "They must now think of making war after a quite different manner than formerly; that they must do their utmost to intercept the Roman convoys and foragers; that the season of the year would be assistant to them in this enterprise, for it being too early to cut corn in the fields, the enemy would be forced, in dispersed bodies, to seek for provisions in the villages, where they might easily defeat them with the cavalry. That they must not set a greater value on their goods than their lives, for it was absolutely necessary all the houses and villages round should be burnt, to prevent the enemy's foraging; and as for themselves, it was but reasonable they should be supply'd by the countries they defended: this counsel once put in practice, the Romans must either be obliged to starve, or forage at a great distance from their camp with infinite danger. That it would be the same thing in effect, whether they defeated them, or intercepted their convoys, for being deprived of those, they could not long subsist. And further he declared, all those towns should be reduced to ashes, whose artificial or natural fortifications could not preserve them from falling into the enemy's hands, lest they should be a refuge to those who were afraid of the perils of war, or the Romans should furnish themselves from thence with forage and plunder. For though this might appear a harsh resolution, yet they ought to consider how much better it was

Vercingetorix summons  
a council.

His speech.



WAR IN to comply with his advice, than to suffer themselves to be  
GAUL. put to the sword, and their wives and children to be made  
 slaves, the unavoidable fate of the conquer'd."

Upon his ad- 15. His opinion was approved of, and in one day above  
 vice 20 ci- twenty cities of Berry were burnt; the like was done in  
 ties in Berry other countries; in fine, nothing but conflagration was to  
 burnt: seve- be seen on all sides; which though the natives beheld with  
 ral more in some regret, yet they flattered themselves with hopes, that  
 other places, they should soon obtain the victory, and recover all they  
 had lost. The fate of Bourges was solemnly debated in

Debate whe- council, whether it should be burnt, or defended; the peo-  
 ther Bourges ple of Berry most humbly petitioned that they might not  
 should be be obliged to put fire with their own hands to one of the  
 burnt or no: most beautiful cities of Gaul, which served as well for a  
 carried in defence, as ornament to their country; especially since it  
 the negative. might be so easily maintained, for nature had fortified the  
 place on all sides, with a river and a marsh, except at one  
 narrow passage. VERCINGETORIX at first opposed them,  
 but at length being moved by their prayers, and the gene-  
 rous compassion of the army, complied with their desires,  
 and sent a garrison to defend the town.

### C H A P. VIII.

Vercingeto- 16. THIS affair determined, he followed CÆSAR by  
 rix marches small marches, till he arrived within fifteen miles of Bour-  
 towards ges, where he chose a place fortified with woods and marshes  
 Bourges; to encamp in: he had hourly intelligence by his scouts of  
 encamps the condition of Bourges, and dispatched such orders thi-  
 within fif- ther as he thought convenient. He kept a constant watch  
 teen miles upon the convoys of our provisions, which he frequently  
 of it, cut off, when necessity obliged us to seek for them at too  
 great a distance from the camp, and though we took all  
 the care imaginable to prevent his designs, by varying con-  
 tinually our seasons and places of foraging.

Cæsar sets 17. CÆSAR having encamped on that side where the  
 down before marsh and river had left a narrow access to the town, be-  
 Bourges, gan to raise a mount, to prepare his penthouses, and erect  
 two turrets, for the nature of the place prevented any cir-  
 cumvallation. He gave continual orders to those of Au-  
 tun and Bourbonne to supply him with provisions; but the  
 first of these were so negligent, they did him no great ser-  
 vice, and the other, having but a small and poor country,  
 quickly consumed all the corn in their province. Thus  
 the Autunois taking no care to perform his orders, the Bour-  
 bonnois

bonnois being poor, and the country round about laid waste by the enemy, the army was so streighten'd for want of corn several days together, that they were obliged to subsist only upon the cattle, which the foragers had brought in from the villages a great distance from the camp: yet not a man was heard to utter any complaint unworthy the dignity of the Roman empire, or the glory they had obtained in their former victories; nay, though CÆSAR himself visited all the legions in the works, and proffer'd to break up the siege, if they found the fatigue too great to be endured; "yet they all desired, he would not entertain any thoughts of that nature; for as they had hitherto behaved themselves so well under his command, as to meet with no disgrace, but to effect every thing they attempted, so now they would not make an ignominious retreat, and quit the siege; for they were resolved to endure any hardships, rather than not revenge the massacre of the Roman citizens at Orleans." The same thing they said to the tribunes and centurions, begging them to assure the general of their resolutions.

WAR IN GAUL.

The Romans want provisions.

Cæsar offers to quit the siege. The soldiers answer.

# CHAP. IX.

18. WHEN our turrets approached the walls, CÆSAR had notice that VERCINGETORIX, having consumed all the forage round about his camp, had removed nearer Bourges, and was gone out with a party of cavalry and such light infantry as used to fight amongst the horse, to lie in ambuscade for our foragers: whereupon CÆSAR marched privately about mid-night towards the enemy's camp, where he arrived the next morning early. The Gauls were soon informed by their scouts of CÆSAR's approach; wherefore having hid their baggage and carriages in the thickest part of the wood, they drew themselves up on an open hill; which CÆSAR perceiving, commanded his soldiers to dispose of their baggage, and stand to their arms.

Vercingetorix decamps, removes nearer Bourges; marches with his cavalry to attack the Roman foragers; whereupon Cæsar marches directly to his camp.

19. The post which the enemy had possess'd was a gentle rising ground, surrounded almost on all sides by a dangerous morass, about fifty foot over. Having lodged themselves on this hill, and broke down all the bridges, they confided in the situation of the place, disposed themselves according to their several countries, and sent small parties to guard all the fords and avenues; resolving, if the Romans should attempt to force their way, to pour down upon

The enemy draw themselves up on a hill surrounded by a morass.

WAR IN GAUL. upon them from the higher ground, and attack them whilst they were labouring through the mud. Any one that saw the small distance between the two armies, would think the enemy offered battle on equal terms; but when he considered the disadvantage of the place, he would see these seeming advances were nothing else but art and ostentation. However, the Romans were so enraged to see the enemy durst confront them at so small a distance, that they impatiently desired the sign of battle: "But CÆSAR informed them how many brave lives that victory would cost him; and since they were so ready to undertake any danger for his glory, he should think himself the most ungrateful man in the world, if he did not set a greater value on their safety than his own." Thus having moderated their desire, he returned to the camp, and gave such further orders as were necessary for carrying on the siege.

The Romans  
are impatient  
of the  
battle.  
Cæsar's  
speech to  
them.

## CHAP. X.

Vercingetorix  
impeached  
of treason.

20. VERCINGETORIX, on his return, was accused of treason, for having moved his camp nearer than he ought to the Romans, for marching away with all the cavalry, leaving the army without a commander, and giving CÆSAR so favourable an opportunity to attack them: that this was done from a premeditated design, and with a view to receive the kingdom of Gaul rather from his hands than from their election. To which articles of impeachment he answered, "That he decamped at their desire, for want of forage: that he had lodged himself nearer the Romans, being induced by the place, the natural fortifications of which were sufficient to defend it: that there was no occasion for cavalry in a morass, but they might have been useful in the place he carried them to: that he had left no officer to command them, lest the soldiers should have forced him to engage the enemy, which he knew they were all inclined to, the effeminacy of their minds making them impatient of further labour: that if the Romans had happened to come during his absence, he supposed they were obliged to Fortune for directing them; but if any person had invited them thither, they ought to return him thanks, for giving them an opportunity of beholding the smallness of the enemy's number from the rising ground, and from thence learning to despise their efforts; who, for fear of engaging the Gauls, had made an ignominious retreat. That he scorned to accept a kingdom from CÆSAR's gift, which he could obtain by

by victory, as he and all the Gauls were now sufficiently convinced : however, he was willing to surrender the command they had invested him with, if they did not think the advantages they received from his conduct sufficiently repaid the honours he received : and, says he, that you may be persuaded of my sincerity, hear the Roman soldiers themselves." Then producing some servants, who had been taken, not many days before, while they attended our foragers, and had since been kept fasting in irons, and instructed what answers they should make to the questions ask'd them; they declared, " They were legionary soldiers : that being driven by hunger, they privately stole out of the camp, to try if they could get any corn or cattle in the fields : that the whole army suffered under the same want : that every man was grown feeble, and unable to endure fatigue : wherefore CÆSAR had resolved, if he could not make himself master of the town within three days, to quit the siege.

WAR IN GAUL.

His stratagem.

These, said VERGINGETORIX, are the advantages you receive from the man you have accused of treason, by whose management, without the loss of your blood, you behold so powerful and victorious an army almost consumed by famine; who has likewise provided, that no country shall receive them, when they shall basely endeavour to save themselves by flight."

21. At this the whole army gave a shout, and, after the fashion of their country, clashed their arms, as they always do when they approve the harangue; proclaiming VERGINGETORIX for a great and faithful commander, whose conduct could not be excelled. 'Twas resolved that 10000 chosen men, pick'd out of the army, should throw themselves into Bourges; for since they believed the whole success of the war depended on the preservation of that town, they would not rely intirely upon the people of Berry for the publiick safety.

He is acquitted, and commended by the whole army.

## CHAP. XI.

22. THE wonderful application of our soldiers defeated all the endeavours of the Gauls, tho' they are a very industrious and ingenious people at imitating any machine they have seen. They hindered our hooks from doing execution on the walls, by catching hold of them with ropes, and pulling them with their engines into the town; our mount they undermined with the greater dexterity, as their

The industry of the besieged.



**WAR IN** their iron works had made them excellent in that art. **GAUL.** They erected towers on every part of their walls, which they covered with hides; and made frequent sallies day and night, either to set fire to our mount, or disturb our works; they daily increased their towers to an equal height with ours; and cast such plenty of sharp stakes hardened in the fire, with scalding pitch, and stones of a prodigious weight into our trenches, that they prevented us from approaching their walls.

**How the  
Gauls build  
the walls of  
their cities.**

23. Most of the cities in Gaul build their walls after the same manner. They lay along on the ground two strait beams, at two feet distance, parallel to each other, which they bind together on the inside, and cover the outside with earth. The interstices between the beams they fill with large stones, cemented with mortar; over which another row is carried on in like manner, that when the next superior beams are laid on them, they may not touch the inferior, but an uniform distance be preserved by an equal and artificial layer of wood and stones, continuing the same method till they have raised the wall to such a height as they think convenient. This way of building is as useful as beautiful; for as the variety and equal intermixture of the materials is pleasing to the eye, so the stone is proof against fire, and the beams against the battering-ram; for being fastened within the town by continual planks of forty feet long, they can neither be broke through, nor disjointed.

## C H A P. XII.

**The industry  
of the Ro-  
man soldiers.**

24. **THOUGH** the soldiers met with so many difficulties in the siege, though they were incommoded with the dirt, cold, and perpetual rains; yet by incessant labour they surmounted all these inconveniencies; and in twenty-five days compleated a mount 330 feet broad, and eighty feet high. When it almost touched the walls, CÆSAR, according to his custom, attending the works, and encouraging the soldiers to lose no time, about three in the morning perceived the mount began to smok; for the enemy having undermined and put fire to it, setting up a shout on all parts of the wall, made a vigorous sally from two several ports; some cast fire-brands and combustible matter upon the mount, some pitch, and such other materials as might serve to encrease the flame; so that we hardly knew whither to send assistance first; but CÆSAR had taken care

to

to have a constant out-guard of two legions, who relieved those that wrought in the trenches by turns; so some immediately confronted those that sallied out of the town, and others were employed in drawing off the towers, and cutting the mount, whilst the whole army endeavoured to extinguish the fire.

25. The dispute continued very warm all the rest of the night, and the enemy were still in hopes of victory, because the sheds of the turrets were burnt, nor could our soldiers manage them whilst they were exposed to the enemy's shot: wherefore they sent fresh supplies continually to relieve the weary, thinking the fate of Gaul depended on that critical minute. During this conflict there happened a memorable action, which I must not omit: One of the besieged, having planted himself before the gate, cast balls of pitch and tallow with his hands to increase the fire of the turrets, till being wounded on his right-side, with an arrow shot from a scorpion, he expired in the place: the man that stood next supply'd his post, till he met with the same fate; then succeeded a third, and after him a fourth: nor was the place left vacant, till the fire of the mount was extinguished, the enemy on all sides repulsed, and the fight at an end.

Four Gauls successively maintain the same post till they are all killed, and others do the like till they are beaten back into the town.

### CHAP. XIII.

26. THE Gauls having essay'd all methods in vain, the next day, in obedience to **VERCINGETORIX's** commands, began to consult about leaving the town; which they hoped they might do without much damage, by the favour of the night, because they had no great journey to their camp, and the morass which lay between would prevent the Romans pursuit. Night came, and the besieged were preparing for their intended march, when the women, running out into the streets, flung themselves weeping at their husbands feet, and besought them that they would not abandon their wives and children, whom nature had form'd incapable of enduring the fatigues of flight, as a prey to the enemy: but when they found them inflexible (for self-preservation and fear seldom admit of pity) they began to encrease their cries, and acquaint the Romans with their husbands design; whereupon apprehending the passages might be possessed by our cavalry, they altered their resolution.

The besieged design to quit the town, but are prevented by their wives.

27. The next day **CÆSAR** having advanced the towers, and given the necessary orders for carrying on the siege, there

**WAR** IN there fell an extraordinary rain, which he thought a convenient time for effecting his design, because he observed the watch on the walls but negligently kept; wherefore he commanded the soldiers not to labour too hard at the works: the legions being covered by the vines, he encouraged them to reap the fruit of their labours, and having promised a reward to the first that scaled the walls, they flew like lightning from all parts, and soon possessed themselves of the town.

The Romans  
scale the  
walls.

28. The enemy were extremely surpriz'd, and being forced from their turrets and battlements, drew themselves up in a triangle in the market-place, and such other streets as were broad enough for that purpose; that if the Romans should come to attack them, they might better maintain their ground, when drawn up in order of battle; but perceiving no body came near them, and that the walls were possessed by the Romans, they began to apprehend their flight might be prevented. Upon which they flung down their arms, and ran to the farthest part of the town, where pressing forward to make their escape through a narrow gate, they retarded each other, and were killed by the soldiers, as those who got out were by the cavalry; for no body minded the plunder, but enraged by the massacre at Orleans, and the fatigue they had endured in the siege, put all to the sword, without respect to age or difference of sex. So that out of 40000 scarce 800 escaped to VER- CINGETORIX, who upon the first alarm fled out of the town. These he privately received in the dead of night, sending out his servants, and the chief noblemen of each province, to meet and conduct them to those parts of the camp, where their several countrymen were quartered, to prevent any mutiny that might arise from the disgust of the army upon their return.

Storm the  
town, and  
put the be-  
sieged to the  
sword.

Out of  
40000 only  
800 escape  
to Vercinge-  
torix: his po-  
licy in recei-  
ving them.

#### C H A P. XIV.

29. THE next day, VERGINGETORIX, calling a council of war, comforted the Gauls, telling them, "They had no reason to be discouraged at their late loss, since the Romans had not succeeded by their valour, but skill in besieging of towns, which they had no experience in: that constant success was not to be expected in war; and for his part, they all could bear him witness, it was contrary to his opinion that Bourges should be defended: wherefore this loss was to be imputed to the folly of the people of Berry, and the too great indulgence of the army; however

His speech  
upon the loss  
of the town.

however he would take care to repair the damage, by a far greater advantage; for he would undertake, the other countries of Gaul, which had hitherto stood neuter, should enter into the grand alliance: that the kingdom of Gaul should join in the same design, whose force united, the whole world would not be able to withstand: that he had almost brought this affair to a happy conclusion; but in the mean time he thought it convenient for the publick safety, they should fortify their camp, to defeat any sudden excursions of the enemy."

30. This harangue was not ungrateful to the Gauls, especially since they saw their general was neither dejected after so great a loss, nor endeavoured to abscond from publick view; nor did it a little add to the reputation of his conduct, that as it was his opinion Bourges should be burnt, so he was the first that had advised them to desert the place; wherefore as ill success generally eclipses the credit of other commanders, so his, on the contrary, daily encreased with his losses: they flattered themselves on his affirmation that the other states of Gaul would join with them, and began to fortify their camp, which had never before been practised by the Gauls: being reduced to so humble a condition, that though they were not inured to labour, yet they patiently suffered whatever tasks were imposed upon them.

Vercingetorix's credit increased by the loss of Bourges.

On his advice the Gauls fortify their camp; the first time they ever did it.

CHAP. XV.

31. **VERCINGETORIX** did not design to be worse than his promise, he took abundance of pains to draw the other countries of Gaul into the same alliance, endeavouring to gain the noblemen of each state, by presents and promises; for this purpose he made choice of the best negotiators, whose craft or interest might effect his designs: for those that had escaped from Bourges, he provided arms and cloathing; and to repair the loss he received there, gave orders that each of the revolted provinces should furnish him with a certain number of recruits, to be sent to his camp by a day prefixed; and he commanded them to levy all the archers in their country, whereof they have plenty in Gaul, for his service; by which means he soon recovered what he lost at Bourges. In the mean time **THEUTOMATUS**, son of **OLLOVICO** king of Agen, whose father had formerly been styled friend by the senate of Rome, came over to him with a considerable number of horse, which he brought from Gascoigne.

He endeavours to persuade all the other countries of Gaul to revolt.

Arms and cloathes the besieged that escaped from Bourges.

Raises new levies.

Theutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges or Agen, comes over to him.

CHAP.



## CH A P. XVI.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

Caesar is in-  
formed of  
the disputes  
in Autun  
about the su-  
preme magi-  
stracy.

32. CÆSAR stay'd several days at Bourges, to refresh his army after their late labour, and want of provisions; for he found plenty of corn in the town: the winter was now almost spent, and the season invited him to take the field; wherefore he resolved to follow the enemy, to try whether he could draw them out of the woods and marches, or have an opportunity of besieging them; when the principal noblemen of Autun came to beseech him that he would assist their country, which was in a dangerous condition at that juncture; for as formerly by the custom of Autun they were always governed by a single annual magistrate, whose election invested him with regal power; now two pretended a title to the same office, both affirming, they were lawfully created: one of these pretenders was CONVICTOLITANIS, an illustrious youth of great interest; COTUS the other, of an ancient family, great authority, and powerful in relations, whose brother VEDELIACUS had discharged the same office but the year before: that the whole country was up in arms, the senate and people divided, and, should the dispute continue, it was much to be feared a civil war would ensue: to prevent which fatal consequences, they relied entirely on his care and authority.

33. Though CÆSAR thought it inconvenient to leave the war, and the enemy behind him; yet considering what effects might arise from such divisions, lest so powerful and firm allies to the people of Rome, whom he had always favoured and enriched, should fall out amongst themselves, and that party which depended less on him, pray assistance from VERGINGETORIX, he thought it necessary to put a stop to the progress of these disorders; and because the chief magistrates of Autun are prohibited going out of the country, lest they should detract from the honour of their office, he resolved to go himself in person thither; and summoned both the senate and candidates to attend him at Decise: almost the whole country came thither, and being satisfied that COTUS had been clandestinely chosen, by a few electors, at an improper time and place, and declared magistrate by his own brother, contrary to the law (which does not only prohibit two persons of the same family from executing the supreme office of magistracy, whilst he who first obtained it is alive, but even from sitting in the

Wherefore  
Caesar goes  
to Autun.  
Summons  
the candi-  
dates to at-  
tend him at  
Decetia or  
Decise.

the senate at a time) he obliged him to quit his pretensions, and gave sentence in favour of CONVICTOLITANIS, who had been created by the priests, according to the custom of the country, when the place was vacant.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

34. Having accommodated this affair, he desired the Autunois to lay aside all thoughts of faction, and give him what assistance they could towards carrying on the present war; that, Gaul being subdued, they might receive those rewards their loyalty deserved: he desired them immediately to furnish him with all their cavalry, and 10000 foot, that he might dispose them into garrisons to levy contributions: he divided his army into two parts; four legions, with half of the cavalry, under the command of LABIENUS, he detached to Sens and Paris; and with the other four marched himself to Cleremont, on the river Allier, in the country of Auvergne; which VERGINGETORIX having notice of, broke down all the bridges of the river, and marched upon the banks on the other side.

where he decrees in favour of Convictolitanis, against Cotus's pretensions.

Then orders the Autunois to furnish him with 10000 foot, and all their cavalry. He sends Labienus to Paris, marches himself to Cleremont.

## C H A P. XVII.

35. BOTH armies continually in view, encamped almost over-against each other; and the enemy's scouts were so dispersed, that it was impossible for the Romans to throw a bridge over the river: CÆSAR was very uneasy, lest he should lose the greatest part of the summer for want of an opportunity to pass the Allier, which is never fordable till towards autumn; to prevent which inconvenience, he removed his camp into a woody place, over-against one of those bridges which the enemy had cut down: the day following, concealing himself with two legions, he sent away the rest of his army, with all their baggage, as usual; having made a draught of four cohorts out of each of his legions, that the number of them might still appear complete: he commanded the army to march as far as they could, and when he computed, by the time of the day, they might be encamping, he began to rebuild a bridge upon the same piles the lower part of which the enemy had left standing; and having soon completed his work, and marched his legions over, chose a convenient place to encamp in, and recalled the rest of his army: whereupon VERGINGETORIX, that he might not be obliged to fight against his will, went a great way forward by long marches.

Cæsar's stratagem to pass the Allier.

It takes effect.

WAR IN 36. From thence in five days march CÆSAR arrived  
 GAUL. at Cleremont, where, after a small skirmish with the  
 enemy's cavalry, upon taking a view of the town, he des-  
 paired of reducing it by storm, nor did he think it conve-  
 nient to make any steps towards investing the place, before  
 he had furnished himself with such provisions as he had occa-  
 sion for. But VERCINGETORIX having encamped on the  
 hill close by the town, disposed all his army according to  
 their several districts, at a small distance from each other,  
 and having possessed all the hills round about, made a  
 formidable appearance: he obliged the chief noblemen of  
 every state, whom he made his council, to attend his le-  
 vee every morning early, either to consult or receive such  
 orders as he thought necessary; never omitting a day with-  
 out sending his horse, intermixed with archers, to skirmish  
 with our cavalry, that he might be acquainted with each  
 man's particular merit. There was a rising ground that  
 joined to the foot of the mountain the town was built on,  
 excellently well fortified by nature, and difficult of access  
 on all sides; which if our men could gain, they were in  
 hopes to cut off the water, and prevent the enemy from  
 foraging so freely as before. Upon this place the Gauls  
 had only posted a slender guard; wherefore CÆSAR, leaving  
 his camp about midnight, defeated the party that was lodg-  
 ed there, before they could be reinforced from the town,  
 possessed himself of the hill, and having left two legions in  
 the place, drew a line of communication, by a double  
 trench twelve foot broad, from the lesser to the larger  
 camp, that the soldiers might pass safely from one to the  
 other, without any annoyance from the enemy.

Caesar arrives  
 at Clere-  
 mont.

Vercingeto-  
 rix encamps  
 close under  
 the walls,

Caesar gains  
 a hill of ad-  
 vantage.

## C H A P. XVIII.

37. WHILST affairs were in this posture at Clere-  
 mont, CONVICTOLITANIS of Autun, to whom CÆSAR  
 had lately decreed the magistracy, being corrupted by the  
 people of Auvergne, endeavoured to draw in some of the  
 young nobility; the chief of these were LITAVICUS and his  
 brothers, gentlemen of the greatest family in the country,  
 with whom he divided his bribes: "He put them in mind  
 they were born free, and destined by nature for empire:  
 that Autun alone held the balance of victory, for all the  
 other provinces were restrained by her example; but should  
 she once declare, the Romans would have no footing left  
 in

Convictoli-  
 tanis per-  
 suades Lita-  
 vicus and his  
 brothers to  
 rebel.

in the country: for his own part, he must confess he had lately received a favour from CÆSAR, but such an one as the merits of his cause might challenge; yet he did not think himself obliged to shew his gratitude at the expence of his country's liberty; nor give any reason, why the Autunois should submit their laws and customs to the arbitration of CÆSAR, any more than the Romans theirs to the Autunois." His authority, and the rewards he proposed, soon prevailed; LITAVICUS with his brothers agreed to undertake the business; but first it was thought proper to consult about the means for accomplishing their designs; for they were satisfied the country would not easily be induced to declare war against the Romans: wherefore it was resolved that LITAVICUS's brothers should be sent before to CÆSAR, that himself should have the command of the 10,000 foot, which the Autunois were to furnish; and the rest of the affair should be managed as occasion offered.

WAR IN GAUL.

Litavicus made General of the 10000 foot; his brothers sent before to Cæsar.

38. Accordingly, having received the command of the army, and marched within thirty miles of Cleremont, LITAVICUS on a sudden called the soldiers together, and with tears in his eyes spoke to this effect: "Gentlemen, whither are we going? all our horse, all our nobility are already slain; EPOREDORIX and VIRDUMARUS, men of the best quality in our country, are accused of treason by the Romans, and put to death unheard: but I refer you to those who have escaped the slaughter, for further information, since grief for my departed brothers and kinsmen stops my utterance." At that, some instruments, who had been before instructed what to say, were produced; who joined in the same story with LITAVICUS and informed the army of the particulars; that the Autunois horse had been put to the sword, for holding correspondence with those of Auvergne, as the Romans pretended; that they had hid themselves in the croud, and were saved by flight from the slaughter. Upon this advice the whole army were not a little disturbed, and intreated LITAVICUS that he would contrive some means for their safety: he told them, "The present affair did not admit of any debate; that there was no other way left but to march directly to Cleremont, and join the Auvergnois; for, added he, it is not to be doubted but the Romans, having already committed so barbarous an action, will make what haste they can to put us likewise to the sword; but if we have any courage left, let us revenge the death of our injured countrymen

Litavicus's treason and dissimulation.

Litavicus persuades the forces under his command to rebel.



WAR IN GAUL. upon these villains:" Whereupon producing the Roman citizens who had taken the opportunity of their convoy, they robbed them of a considerable quantity of corn, and put them to a barbarous death; then immediately dispatched couriers to all parts of Autun, to divulge the same story, about the death of the noblemen and cavalry, and to advise them to vindicate their wrongs, as they had done.

## C H A P. XIX.

39. EPOREDORIX and VIRDUMARUS of Autun, one of an illustrious house and considerable interest in his country; the other of equal age and authority, though not so well descended, whom CÆSAR, on the recommendation of DIVITIACUS, had raised to the highest dignities, being particularly summoned, came alone with the horse. These two always rival'd each other for the precedence; in the late dispute about the magistracy, one espoused the cause of CONVICTOLITANIS, the other that of COTUS. The former having notice of LITAVICUS's design, came to CÆSAR about midnight, and discovered the plot, intreating him not to suffer the minds of a people who were his ancient friends, to be alienated by the treasonable practices of some young noblemen; for, he foresaw, that if LITAVICUS went over to the enemy, with so considerable an army, their several relations would think themselves obliged to join their defence, and consequently the affair must have a powerful influence over the whole country.

Eporodrix  
acquaints  
Cæsar with  
Litavicus's  
design.

Whereupon Cæsar marches to intercept the Autunois, before they reach Clermont, 40. CÆSAR was greatly surprized to hear that his favourite Autunois should think of a revolt; therefore he immediately drew out four light-arm'd legions, with all the cavalry; and not having time to contract his camp into a narrower space (because the whole success of his design depended on dispatch) left in garrison lieutenant C. FABIVS with two legions. He gave orders before he set out for apprehending LITAVICUS's brothers, but found they had not long before gone over to the enemy. Having encouraged his soldiers cheerfully to endure the fatigue of so necessary a march, they pursued their journey with great eagerness for xxv miles, till they arrived within sight of the Autunois; then he detached the horse before, to retard their march, commanding them not to put any man to the sword:

He meets  
the Autunois;  
they submit  
when they find  
their error.

sword: and ordered EPOREDORIX with VIRDUMARUS, WAR IN  
whom they believed to be killed, to go along with the ca- GAUL.  
valry, and shew themselves to their countrymen the Autu-  
nois; who finding their mistake, discovering LITAVICUS's  
deceit, held out their hands to signify their desire to sur-  
render, and having laid down their arms, began to beg  
their lives: LITAVICUS in the mean time, with all his  
dependants, who are not permitted by the custom of Gaul  
to desert their patron in the greatest dangers, escaped to  
Cleremont. Litavicus  
escapes to  
Cleremont.

41. CÆSAR immediately sent ambassadors to Autun, to  
acquaint the people how merciful he had been to their  
countrymen, whom by martial law he might have put to  
the sword; then having allow'd his army three hours time  
to rest, he marched towards Cleremont, and had almost  
passed one half of the journey, when a party of horse from  
C. FABIVS came to give him notice how much danger the  
camp was in, being assaulted by the enemy on all sides,  
who when their forces fainted, still supplied their places with  
fresh men; whilst the Romans with a large camp, and  
but few foldiers to defend it, were obliged, though never  
so weary, to maintain their ground: that they had already  
received many wounds from the enemy's darts and arrows,  
though their engines had done them good service: that FA-  
BIUS, at their departure, had shut up two gates of the  
camp, encreased the height of the rampier, and prepared  
for the next day's assault: whereupon CÆSAR made what  
haste he could to his relief, and arrived at the camp before  
sun-rise. Cæsar has  
notice that  
the Gauls  
attack his  
camp.  
He makes  
haste to its  
relief.

## CHAP. XX.

42. IN the mean while the Autunois, receiving LITA- The Autu-  
VICUS's news, staid not for farther confirmation; but some nois on Lita-  
prompted by avarice, others by revenge and rashness, to vicus's mes-  
which they are so much addicted, that they take every sage take  
thing for certain which they hear by report, plundered the arms, plun-  
der the Ro-  
man citizens, killed some, and sold others for slaves: man citizens,  
nor did CONVICTOLITANIS a little foment their fury,  
that by plunging them into some desperate action, shame  
might continue what madness began. They enticed CAIVS  
ARISTIUS, the tribune, who was marching to his legion, besiege A-  
and several Roman merchants, to quit Chalons, giving ristius.  
them

WAR IN them their parole that they would not disturb them in their GAUL. passage; but they set upon them on the road, robb'd them of their baggage, besieged those night and day who made opposition; and many being killed on both sides, they excited still greater numbers to take arms.

But finding their soldiers were in Cæsar's power, they send ambassadors to him to clear themselves.

43. But being informed that all their soldiers were in CÆSAR'S power, they ran to ARISTIUS, assured him nothing had been done by publick authority, called those to account who had seized the effects of the Romans, sequester'd the estates of LITAVICUS and his brethren, and sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, to clear themselves from the imputation of these tumults. All this they did to get their foldiers released; but being tainted with treason, loth to make restitution of those goods which had been divided amongst so many, and apprehensive of the punishment they deserved, they privately consulted about carrying on the war, and sent ambassadors to the states round about, to desire their assistance.

Cæsar gives them a favourable audience.

Though CÆSAR was not ignorant of their practices, yet sending for their deputies, in an affable manner he assured them, that he should not entertain an ill opinion of their country for the disorders the mob had been guilty of, or bear the less affection to the Autunois.

## C H A P. XXI.

Cæsar designs to quit the siege of Cleremont.

BEING apprehensive of fresh commotions in Gaul, that he might not be surrounded on all sides in an enemy's country, he consulted which way he might quit the siege of Cleremont, and join the rest of his army, without giving the enemy occasion to believe that he fled to avoid them.

44. Whilst he was meditating on this affair, there fell out an accident which seemed to favour his design; for going into the lesser camp to view the works, he observed a hill left naked, which but a few days before had been cover'd all over with the enemy's forces; he wondered what was the reason of their quitting it, and enquiring the cause of the deserters, who daily flock'd in great numbers to our camp, they all agreed with our scouts, that the back of the hill, from whence lay a passage to another part of the town, was an even ground, but woody and narrow: that the enemy were much afraid of losing this post, for the Romans

Romans having already made themselves masters of one <sup>WAR IN</sup> hill, should they obtain this likewise, the Gauls would be <sup>GAUL.</sup> almost surrounded, and cut off from foraging; for which reason *VERCINGETORIX* had drawn out all his forces to fortify the passage.

45. *CÆSAR* upon this intelligence detached several squadrons of horse thither at midnight, commanding them to ride up and down the place with as much noise as possible: by break of day he caused a great number of mules and beasts of burden to be led out of the camp, and the baggage to be taken from them; then furnishing the grooms with helmets, that they might resemble troopers, he caused them to ride about the hill: with these, for the greater shew, he mixed a few cavalry, commanding them to make a large tour about the place. The party was soon descry'd by the besieged, for the town commanded a view of the camp, though they could not perfectly at that distance discover what was done: after these he likewise detached one legion to the same place, whom he order'd to hide themselves in the woods and lower grounds: this increased the jealousy of the Gauls to such a degree, that they immediately drew out all their forces to maintain the post. *CÆSAR*, perceiving the camp was deserted, caused his soldiers to march in small parties from the larger to the lesser camp, with their helmets and colours concealed, that the town might take no notice of them; then calling his lieutenants together, to whom he had committed the charge of each particular legion, he gave them such directions as he thought convenient: In the first place he order'd them to restrain their soldiers from being carried too far by the desire of fight or plunder; he acquainted them with the disadvantage of the place, which nothing but dispatch could overcome; that the present was an affair which depended more upon opportunity than virtue; and giving them the sign to advance, sent the *Autunois* to meet them by another ascent on the right.

But first resolves upon an exploit.

## C H A P. XXII.

46. THE wall of the town lay 1200 paces distant from the plain below, without computing the uneven ground between, and the circuit which was necessary to be taken for moderating the steepness of the ascent, which still increased our journey. The Gauls about the middle of the



WAR IN hill, so far as the nature of the place would admit, had  
GAUL. raised a wall six foot high for a fortification; from the foot  
 of the hill to this outward wall there was nothing to ob-  
 struct our passage, but from thence to the town the upper  
 part of the hill was covered all over with little camps <sup>a</sup>. So

soon as the sign was given, our men were so alert in ex-  
 ecuting their orders, that they quickly pass'd this fortifica-  
 tion, and made themselves masters of three several camps;  
 which they did with so much dispatch, that THEUTOMA-  
 TUS, king of Agen, was surpris'd in his tent, as he was  
 reposing himself about noon, and narrowly escap'd being  
 taken; for his horse was wounded under him, and he fled  
 away half naked, not having time to dress himself.

Theutoma-  
 tus narrowly  
 escapes being  
 taken pri-  
 soner.

Cæsar  
 founds a re-  
 treat; the  
 tenth legion  
 halts, but  
 the rest pur-  
 sue their suc-  
 cess.

The confu-  
 sion of the  
 besieged on  
 the Romans  
 approach.

Lucius Fa-  
 bius's ava-  
 rice, which  
 costs him  
 dear.

He scales  
 the walls.  
 Vercingeto-  
 six's party  
 return to  
 their assist-  
 ance,

47. CÆSAR having now accomplished all he desired,  
 commanded a retreat to be sound'd; whereupon the sol-  
 diers of the tenth legion, who then attended on him †,  
 made a halt; and the other legions, though the intervening  
 valley prevented their hearing the summons, yet were com-  
 manded by the tribunes and lieutenants, according to CÆ-  
 SAR'S instructions, likewise to halt; but prompted with  
 the hopes of a speedy victory, encouraged by the flight of  
 the enemy, and flush'd with the remembrance of their for-  
 mer successes, they thought nothing too difficult for their  
 courage to accomplish, nor did they desist from the pursuit  
 before they came to the very gates and walls of the town:  
 which occasioned so great a clamour and confusion from all  
 parts, that they who were furthest from the place assaulted,  
 believing we had already forced our entrance, left the  
 town; the matrons cast their cloaths and money o'er the  
 wall, with naked breasts and extended hands beseeching  
 the Romans to have mercy on them, and not put women  
 and children to the sword, as they had done at Bourges;  
 and some of them being let down by their hands, deliver'd  
 themselves up to our soldiers. L. FABIVS, a centurion of  
 the eighth legion, was so encouraged by the plunder he got  
 at Bourges, that he was heard to say, no man should get  
 into Cleremont before him; wherefore by the assistance of  
 three soldiers of his maniple he mounted the walls, then  
 assisted them one after another to do the like.

48. In the mean time, they who were gone to defend  
 the passage on the other side of the town, hearing a noise,

<sup>a</sup> Because CÆSAR said before they were divided into several parties, each  
 country being plac'd by themselves.

† qua tum erat comitatus, Cod. Carrar. & Lipsius,

and being informed by several messengers that the Romans WAR IN GAUL. had taken possession of Cleremont, sending their horse before, followed after with all expedition; each man as soon as he arrived there, placed himself under the wall, to join with such as had already made head against the enemy; and they soon grew so numerous, that whereas the matrons, but the moment before, besought the Romans to be merciful to them, now they began to encourage their own party to make a vigorous defence, by producing their children, and shewing themselves with dishevelled hair, according to the custom of the Gauls. They assume fresh courage.

C H A P. XXIII.

THUS the dispute became unequal to the Romans as well in respect to the disparity of number, as the disadvantage of the place; nor was it to be expected, that they who had already endured such a fatigue, should be able to withstand those who came fresh to the combat.

49. CÆSAR perceiving that the number of the enemy continually encreased, and being concerned for the danger his soldiers were in, sent orders to lieutenant T. SEXTIUS, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, immediately to draw out his cohorts, and post them at the foot of the hill, over-against the enemy's right wing; that in case our men should be routed, he might put a stop to the enemy's pursuit: and he himself marching with one legion, possess'd a place not far from SEXTIUS, where he expected the event of the battle.

50. The conflict was sharply maintained on both sides, the enemy confiding in their post and numbers, ours in their courage; when on a sudden the Autunois, whom CÆSAR had before ordered to ascend by another way on the right, to give the enemy a diversion, were discover'd on the flank of our soldiers, and the resemblance of their arms to those of the Gauls, did not a little surprize the Romans; for though their right shoulders were uncovered, the usual sign of peace, yet our men were apprehensive it was now no more than a decoy. At the same time L. FABIUS the centurion, and those who had got into the town with him, being furrounded and killed, were thrown over the wall; and M. PETREIUS, another centurion of the same legion, endeavouring to force the gates, was oppressed by the enemy's numbers; wherefore despairing

L. Fabius kill'd and thrown over the wall.

WAR IN ing of safety for himself and his company, who had followed  
GAUL. him, he told them, "That since he could not save him-  
self, he would at least take care of them, whom his thirst  
for glory had brought into that danger, and advised them  
to make use of the opportunity he would procure them;"  
then rushing into the midst of the enemy, having kill'd  
two, he drove the rest a little from the gate, and per-  
ceiving his men strove to assist him, "In vain, said he,  
do you endeavour to save the man whom his blood and  
strength have already forsaken; be gone therefore, whilst  
you may, and retire to your legion:" then fighting on,  
he expired soon after, but purchased safety for his followers  
at the expence of his life.

Marcus Pe-  
treus dies  
bravely.

The Ro-  
mans, after  
the loss of 46  
centurions,  
and near 700  
men, are ob-  
liged to re-  
treat.

51. Our men being attacked on all sides, after the loss  
of forty-six centurions, were obliged to quit the place; but  
the tenth legion, which had been posted nearer the bottom  
of the hill, to cover their retreat, stopped the enemy's ca-  
reer, being sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion,  
which were drawn out of the lesser camp, and had possessed  
the higher ground. So soon as our army recovered the plain,  
they made a stand, and faced about to the enemy; upon  
which VERCINGETORIX drew off his forces from the foot  
of the hill into their camps: this day we lost almost 700  
men.

## CH A P. XXIV.

Cæsar calls a  
council,  
makes a  
speech.  
Reprimands  
the soldiers  
for transgres-  
sing their or-  
ders.

52. CÆSAR, the day after, having summoned the  
soldiers to attend him, made a speech, wherein he con-  
demned their eager pursuit, and reprimanded them for  
presuming to judge how far they were to go after a retreat  
was sounded, and their officers had commanded them to  
halt: he laid before them the dangers they were liable to  
from the disadvantage of the place, which he was so sensi-  
ble of at Bourges, that though he surpris'd the enemy there  
without either cavalry or a general, yet he thought proper  
to forego a certain victory, rather than purchase it even at  
that small expence which the difficulty of the passage would  
have cost him. He highly applauded their courage, whom  
neither the fortifications of the enemy's camp, the height  
of the mountain, nor the walls of the town could stop;  
but as much condemned their pride and arrogance, who  
fancied themselves better judges of the probability of victory  
and

and the event of affairs, than their general; for he rather desired to have his soldiers modest and obedient, than courageous and daring.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

53. In the conclusion of his speech, he comforted the soldiers for the loss they had received; telling them, they should not be dejected at their late misfortune, which was to be attributed to the disadvantage of the place, not to their want of courage. Then designing, as formerly, to quit the siege, he drew his army up in order of battle; but finding **VERCINGETORIX** was not disposed to fight him, after a small and successful skirmish between the cavalry, he withdrew into the camp again: the like he did the day following; then thinking he had done enough to encourage his own soldiers, and abate the pride of the Gauls, he decamped, and marched to Autun: the enemy did not think fit to follow us; wherefore having in three days rebuilt the bridge cross the Allier, he passed the river with all his forces.

After a successful skirmish with the enemy's horse, Cæsar decamps, passes the Allier; is informed by **Virdumarus** and **Eporodorus** of **Litavicus's** soliciting the Autunois to go a revolt.

54. He was informed by **VIRDUMARUS** and **EPOREDORIX** that **LITAVICUS** was gone with all the cavalry to solicit those of Autun to join the revolted Gauls; that therefore it would be absolutely necessary for them to go before, that they might prevent such attempts, and confirm the country in their loyalty. Though **CÆSAR** was already convinced of the infidelity of the Autunois, and plainly foresaw that **VIRDUMARUS** and **EPOREDORIX** on their arrival would but hasten the revolt, yet he thought not proper to detain them, that he might not do any thing that might reflect on their character, or give them reason to believe he suspected them. At their departure he briefly enumerated the services he had done their country; in how mean a condition he found them, shut up within their walls, robbed of their fields, deprived of their forces, made tributaries, and obliged to deliver hostages for their fidelity; whereas he had raised them to so high a pitch of grandeur, that they were not only restored to their former state, but to a greater height of glory than they ever knew: Then taking his leave, he dismissed them.

## CHAP. XXV.

55. **NEVERS** is a town of Autun, conveniently seated on the river Loire: here **CÆSAR** had lodged all the hostages of Gaul, the corn, the publick treasure, his own, and

**Virdumarus** and **Eporodorus** seize **Nevers**, put the garrison to the sword.



**WAR IN GAUL.** and the greatest part of the army's baggage, and hither he had sent a great number of horses, which he had bought up in Spain and Italy for the service. When **EPOREDORIX** and **VIRDUMARUS** arrived at this place, being informed how kindly **LITAVICUS** had been received at **Bibraçte**, the capital of **Autun**, that **CONVICTOLITANIS**, the chief magistrate, with the greatest part of the senate, were come over to him, and had sent publick embassadors to **VERCINGETORIX** to treat of an alliance, they thought proper to lay hold of so advantageous an opportunity; wherefore, having put the garrison of **Nevers** and the Roman merchants who resided there to the sword, they divided the money and horses between them, took care to send the hostages to the magistrate at **Autun**, and because the town was not tenable, lest it should be of any use to the Romans, set it on fire. What corn they had carriage for, they immediately sent away by water, and flung the rest into the river, or burnt it; then began to raise forces in the neighbouring countries, disposed parties for a guard on the banks of the **Loire**, and dispersed their cavalry all the country over, to strike a terror into the Romans, endeavouring to cut off their convoys, and reduce them to a necessity of leaving their province: they promised themselves success in this affair, because the late snow had so swell'd the **Loire**, that it was not fordable.

Divide the plunder, and burn the town.

Raise forces, and place guards on the banks of the Loire.

Cæsar arrives at the Loire;

fords the river; the enemy fly, and he marches on towards Sens.

56. On advice of these motions, **CÆSAR** thought it high time to make haste, and if he must be at the trouble of building a bridge, resolved to do it so quickly, that he might engage the enemy before they grew stronger: for he held it by no means convenient to return to the Roman province, whilst honour, the mountains of the **Cevennes**, and the difficulty of the way opposed his passage; besides, he had a great desire to join the rest of his army under the command of **LABIENUS**. Wherefore, beyond all mens expectation, marching both day and night, he arrived by long journeys at the **Loire**; where the cavalry having found out as convenient a ford as could be expected for the season, he disposed them so as to break the force of the stream, whilst the foot passed over the river, which took them up to the shoulders, leaving them only the liberty to hold their arms above the water. At the first view of the Romans, the enemy betook themselves to flight. Thus having safely passed the **Loire**, obtained a considerable booty

of corn and cattle in the fields, and refreshed his army, he resolved to march into the country of Sens.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

C H A P. XXVI.

57. WHILST CÆSAR was thus employed, LABIENUS having left those supplies, which lately came from Italy, for a guard to his baggage at Sens, marched with four legions to Paris, which is situated in an island of the Seine. Upon notice of his arrival, the enemy drew a considerable number of forces from the neighbouring countries, which they committed to the charge of CAMULOGENUS of Eureux; upon whom they conferred that honour for his singular skill in military affairs, though his age seemed to have rendered him unfit for the command: He, observing there was a large morass which joined to the Seine, and obstructed all the passages round about, lodged his army there, designing to prevent the Romans crossing the river.

Labienus  
marches to  
Paris.

58. LABIENUS was no sooner arrived there, but he began to make his approaches, under the shelter of his vines, to fill up the morass with mould and hurdles, to render the passage firm; but finding the work very troublesome, leaving his camp without noise about midnight, he marched the same way that he came, till he arrived at Melun, which is another town of the country of Sens, situated likewise in an island of the Seine, as well as Paris. Here he surprised about fifty ships, which he immediately mann'd with his soldiers; whereupon the few inhabitants that remained in the town (for the greatest part was gone out to the war) were so frightened, they immediately surrendered. After this success he repaired the bridge, which the enemy had cut down not long before, crossed the river with his army, and marched along the banks with the stream to Paris: the enemy, having notice of his motions, by some that made their escape from Melun, immediately set fire to Paris, caused the bridges to be cut down, and securing themselves in the morass, on the banks of the Seine, directly over-against Paris, placed themselves opposite to LABIENUS's camp.

Labienus  
surprises Me-  
lun, Me-  
sedum: for  
this is the  
same place  
with Melio-  
dunum.  
Vide the pre-  
face.

59. By this time CÆSAR's quitting the siege of Clere-  
mont, the revolt of the Autunois, and the second rebellion  
of the Gauls, was known all the country over; to this  
news the natives added some of their own, reporting that

CÆSAR'S

WAR IN CÆSAR'S journey was stopped by the Loire, and that for GAUL. want of provisions he was obliged to return to the Roman province. Whereupon the people of Beauvois, having notice of the defection in Autun, being naturally inclined to change, began to raise forces, and make public preparations for war. LABIENUS perceiving the face of affairs so wonderfully changed, was obliged to lay a quite different scheme than what he had first designed ; for now he did not think of making acquisitions and conquests, but of securing his retreat to Sens ; because one side of the country was possessed by those of Beauvois, reputed a warlike people ; and the other by CAMULOGENUS, who had already a powerful army in the field ; to add to these difficulties, his legions were divided from their garrison and baggage by a broad river ; wherefore he found nothing could free him from these inconveniencies but his wonted presence of mind.

The people of Beauvois prepare for war.

## C H A P. XXVII.

Labienus prepares for a retreat to Sens. Divides his army into three parties.

60. IN the evening he summoned a council of war ; and having encouraged the officers diligently to observe his orders, divided the ships which he brought from Melun among the Roman knights, commanding them to fall down the river at nine o'clock without any noise, and expect him about four miles off ; five cohorts, whom he thought least capable of service, he left for a guard to his camp ; and the other five cohorts of the same legion, with all the baggage, had directions to march up the river, with as much noise and confusion as possible ; he likewise got a number of cock-boats, which he sent the same way, commanding them to make as great bustle as they could with their oars ; and he himself, not long after, marched silently out of his camp with three legions, to the place where he had appointed the ships to meet him.

61. Here he surprized the enemy's scouts, who were placed in all parts of the river, but were prevented from making their escape by a sudden tempest ; and our foot and cavalry, by the care of the Roman knights, to whom LABIENUS had committed the charge of that affair, were soon carried over the river. It happened that the enemy, before break of day, almost at the same instant, had notice, that there was a greater noise than usual in the Roman camp ; that a considerable party were marched up the river ;

river; that beating of oars was heard the same way; and that a little lower another party had been transported cross the river: whereupon believing the Romans designed to cross the Seine in three several places at once, and retreat as fast as they could, because the people of Autun had revolted, CAMULOGENUS likewise divided his army into three bodies, one he left for a guard directly over-against our camp, and detaching a small party towards Meudon<sup>b</sup>, with orders to go as far as the boats were gone before, marched with the rest of his forces against LABIENUS.

WAR IN GAUL.

The Gauls on notice of it do the like.


62. By break of day we had transported all our forces cross the river, where we found the enemy ready to receive us. LABIENUS encouraging his men to remember their pristine virtue, the many battles they had formerly won, and to believe CÆSAR himself was present, under whose conduct they had so often met with success, gave them the sign of battle. At the very first onset the left wing of the enemy was forced, and routed by the seventh legion; but their right, with whom the twelfth legion engaged, though the first ranks were swept off by the Roman piles, vigorously maintained their ground, without the least suspicion of flight, CAMULOGENUS being present to encourage them. Here the dispute was dubious; when the tribunes of the seventh legion, understanding how our right wing was pressed, faced about, and attacked the enemy in the rear, who even then did not attempt to fly, but being surrounded on all sides, were cut to pieces with their general. The party which had been left behind, to guard the passage over-against our camp, hearing the two armies were engaged, advanced to assist their countrymen, and posted themselves on a hill; but not being able to sustain the assault of our victorious soldiers, joined the rest that fled; and those who found no shelter from the woods and mountains, were killed by our cavalry. After this success LABIENUS returned to Sens, where he had left the baggage of his legions, and from thence, with all his forces, marched to CÆSAR.

Labiens with three legions crosses the Seine, engages and defeats one third of the enemy.

Another party come to their assistance, and meet with the same fate.

<sup>b</sup> Metiosedum, which is not to be confounded with Melodunum, or Melun, as some authors have done. At § 58. the better Copies read Melodunum, and throughout distinguish it from Metiosedum.



WAR IN  
GAUL.

## C H A P. XXVIII.

The revolted  
states endea-  
vour to draw  
others in.

The Autu-  
nois contend  
with Vercin-  
getorix about  
the supreme  
management  
of affairs,  
and are over-  
ruled by ma-  
jority of  
votes, which  
again chuse  
him Gene-  
ralissimo.

Vercingeto-  
rix raises  
15000 horse.

63. THE rebels, encouraged by the revolt of the Autunois, sent embassadors to solicit all the states round about to revolt; they made use of their interest, money, and authority to effect this design, threatening those who stood neuter, that their hostages, whom CÆSAR had left at Nevers, should suffer for their obstinacy. The Autunois sent deputies to VERCINGETORIX, desiring he would come to them, that they might consult together concerning the most proper methods for carrying on the war; but the chief business, when he came thither, was to desire he would resign his command to them. The dispute was submitted to the decision of a general council of all the revolted states, to be held at Autun; great numbers flocked thither by the day appointed, the question was put to the vote, and VERCINGETORIX, by public consent, was again chosen general. The states of Rheims, Langre, and Treves were not present at this council, the first remaining faithful to the people of Rome, and those of Treves, whose country lay at too great a distance, were employed at home by the Germans. The Autunois were not a little disturbed to find themselves thus stripped of their sovereignty; they lamented the mighty change of their fortune, and began to regret the loss of CÆSAR'S favour: but having embarked in the enterprize, there was no room for a retreat; wherefore EPOREDORIX and VIRDUMARUS, two hopeful young gentlemen, were obliged, much against their wills, to receive orders from VERCINGETORIX.

64. Invested with this office, VERCINGETORIX commanded the confederates to send him hostages; and appointed a day for a general rendezvous, at which time they were to furnish him with 15000 horse; for he was contented with the foot he had already, because he did not design to try his fortune in an engagement; but hoped to intercept the Roman convoys, and cut off their foragers, when he should be so well furnished with cavalry; provided they would contentedly submit to lay their own country waste, and set fire to their buildings; which damage would soon be recompensed by perpetual liberty and enjoyment of empire. Having dispatched these orders, he commanded the Autunois and those of Lyons \*, which lay nearest the

\* Segusiani, whose territories likewise contained all the country of Fe-  
Roman

Roman province, to levy 10000 foot: these, with 800 WAR IN cavalry, he committed to the charge of EPOREDORIX'S GAUL. brother, whom he ordered to make war on<sup>d</sup> Dauphine and Savoy, commanding likewise the people of Gevaudan, and the neighbouring parts of Auvergne, to harrafs Vivarais; Sends several parties against the as he did those of Roverge and Quercy, to make inroads Roman province, and into Languedoc\*: not omitting, at the same time, under- hand to solicit the people of Dauphine and Savoy (who, he hoped, were not well satisfy'd with their subjection to the Romans) by sending their noblemen bribes, and promising the natives the sovereignty of the entire Roman province.

65. To oppose this powerful confederacy, CÆSAR had had only provided twenty-two cohorts, which he caused lieutenant LUCIUS CÆSAR to levy in the Province. The people of Vivarais, who made themselves the aggressors, by attacking their neighbours first, after the loss of several men, with C. VALERIUS DONATURUS, son of CABARUS, the principal man in their country, were obliged to quit the field, and retire within their walls. But the Dauphinois and Savoyards, having disposed several watches along the river Rhosne, preserved themselves by their extraordinary care and diligence. CÆSAR understanding that the enemy were so much superior to him in horse, and had blocked up all the passages, to prevent his receiving supplies from Italy, or the Roman province; sent to those states of Germany cross the Rhine, which he had formerly quieted, for cavalry, and such light-arm'd foot as used to fight intermixt amongst them: upon their arrival, perceiving they were but ill mounted<sup>f</sup>, he took the horses from the tribunes of the soldiers, the Roman knights, and volunteers, to furnish them with.

Cæsar levies twenty-two cohorts.

The people of Vivarais routed by the rebels.

Cæsar sends for cavalry to Germany.

# C H A P. XXIX.

66. IN the mean time the enemy's forces from Auvergne, and the cavalry, which all the confederates were to furnish, met at the general rendezvous; and CÆSAR was marching towards Franche-comte, through the extreme confines of Langre, when VERCINGETORIX, having notice of his design, endeavoured to interrupt his journey; Cæsar designs to march towards Franche-comte. ORTELIVS has mistaken this place, and condemn'd PTOLEMY without any reason.

\* That is, the Allobroges on both sides the river Rhosne.

• Read Volcarum Aremoricorum, not Volcarum ac Rhemorum, as some Editions. The people of Rheims are at a great distance from the places here mentioned.

† See before, iv. c. 2.

WAR IN and being arrived, after three days march, within ten GAUL. miles of the Romans, he sent for the horse-officers to council; "And assured them the time for victory was now

Vercingetorix designing to stop his march, calls a council of war.

The Gauls swear to ride twice thro' the Roman army.

Vercingetorix sends all his horse to engage the Romans.

The fight begins.

The German horse break the Gauls left wing, and rout them.

All the rest are put to flight.

come, for CÆSAR had left Gaul, and was flying to his province; which would certainly give them present liberty, but not secure them peace and quiet for the future; since the Romans did not design to quit Gaul, but return with more forces to carry on the war: wherefore that was the only time to attack them, whilst they were upon their march; for should their foot attempt to assist the horse, it would of necessity put a stop to their journey: but if every man should endeavour to shift for himself, which he thought more likely, they would lose both their baggage and honour together. For as for the cavalry, they might be assured not a man of them durst venture out of the body of the army: and to strike the greater terror into the enemy, he would draw all his forces out before the camp." The officers unanimously desired, that each man should bind himself to perform his duty by a solemn imprecation, "Wishing that he might never return again to his own house, that he should be disown'd by his children, wife, and relations, if he did not twice force his way through the Roman army."


67. Their request being granted, every man took the oath; and VERCINGETORIX dividing his cavalry the next day into three parties, order'd one to attack our van, the other two were to follow at a small distance on either side. On notice of their design, CÆSAR likewise divided his horse into three parties, and commanded them to meet the enemy. Both sides being closely engaged, CÆSAR ordered the main body of the army to halt, the baggage to be received in amongst the legions, and where he perceived his men to be overcharged, he immediately detached others to their assistance; which prevented the enemy's gaining ground, and encouraged our soldiers, who found themselves so carefully relieved: but at last the Germans, having gained a rising ground, pour'd down with such fury upon the enemy, that they routed, and pursued their left wing as far as the river, where VERCINGETORIX had posted himself with the infantry; which the rest of the Gauls perceiving, to prevent being surrounded, fled as their countrymen had done before them. There was a dreadful slaughter in all places; three of the chief noblemen of Autun were taken, and brought to CÆSAR; co-

TUS,






to face p. 163.



1. The Town of Alishan.  
 2. The Ditch twenty  
 feet broad.

3. The Stimuli.  
 4. The Lilia.  
 5. The Cippi.

6.  
 7.  
 8.



6. The 2 Ditches near *q* Rampier. 9. The Camp.  
 7. The Rampier. 10. The wooden Towers  
 8. The Cervier Sharp boughs. about *q* Rampier.



TUS, general of their horse, who had lately disputed with WAR IN CONVICTOLITANIS about the magistracy; CAVARILLUS, GAUL. who, after the revolt of LITAVICUS, commanded their foot; and EPOREDORIX, who was generalissimo for the Cotus, Cavarillus, and Eporedorix taken prisoners. Autunois against the Franchecomtois before CÆSAR's rival in Gaul.

68. The enemy's horse being routed, VERCINGETORIX withdrew his forces, and immediately marched to Alise, a town of <sup>f</sup> Dufemois, commanding the baggage to follow him; CÆSAR leaving his, under a guard of two legions, pursued him as far as the day would permit, and, having killed about 3000 of the enemy's rear, arrived the day at Alise. He took a view of the place, and having daunted the enemy by the defeat of their horse, in which they most confided, encouraged his men to draw a line of circumvallation about the town.

# CHAP. XXX.


69. ALISE was not to be taken without a formal siege, because it stands on the summit of a very high hill, whose bottom, on both sides, is water'd by two several rivers: before the town is a valley, which extends about three miles in length, but every part besides is surrounded by mountains of an equal height, placed at a moderate distance from each other. Under the walls, on the side of the town towards the east, lay all the enemy's forces encamp'd, who had fortified themselves with a ditch, and a wall of stones heaped up eight foot high: the Roman lines were eleven miles in circuit; their camp was in a convenient place, where they had built three and twenty towers; in these centinels were placed to observe the enemy's motions by day, and in the night they were guarded by a continual watch and strong garrisons.

70. Whilst we were employed about our works, a skirmish happened on the plain (which we observ'd extended three miles) between ours and the enemy's horse: CÆSAR perceiving his party over-powered, sent the Germans to their assistance, and drew the legions out before the camp, to be in readiness in case the enemy's foot should make a rally: our men, encouraged to see the legions ready to re-

<sup>f</sup> Mandubii. This country lies in the diocese of Langre, but has some dependence on that of Autun, according to Sanfon. Diodorus says, Alise was built by Hercules,



WAR IN  
GAUL.



The Germans return, after having made a great slaughter, with a considerable booty.

lieve them, soon routed the enemy, who crowded so close that they hinder'd each other's retreat, and stuck fast between the gates of their camp: the Germans pursued them to their fortifications, where they put great numbers of them to the sword, and some quitting their horses, endeavoured to cross the ditch, and get over the wall: whereupon CÆSAR commanded the legions, which were drawn out before the camp, to advance a little further. Nor were the enemy within the walls in less confusion than those without; believing we designed to force their camp, they sounded an alarm; some fled into the town for safety, and VERGINGETORIX was obliged to shut the gates, lest the camp should be deserted. After a great slaughter, the Germans returned with a considerable booty of horses.


### CHAP. XXXI.

Vercingetorix sends away all his cavalry; orders them to bring along with them all that were able to bear arms.

71. BEFORE our fortifications were compleat, VERGINGETORIX thought fit to dismiss all his cavalry by night: he commanded them at their departure, to return to their several countries, and raise all the men that were able to bear arms: he put them in mind of the services he had done them, and conjured them not to abandon him as a sacrifice to the enemy's rage, who had so well merited of the publick liberty; adding, that by computation he found he had only corn left for thirty days, which, by good husbandry, might hold out a little longer; but if they were negligent in performing his commands, 80000 chosen men must perish with him. Having given them these orders, he sent them out privately about ten at night, by the way where our works were not compleat. So soon as they were gone, he commanded the town, upon pain of death, to bring in all their corn, which he began to measure out very sparingly; he distributed to each of his soldiers the cattle, which had been sent in great numbers from the people of Dufemois; and received all the forces which were encamped under the walls into the town, designing there to expect relief from the confederates; and thus he resolved to manage the war.

Cæsar's works at Alife. A ditch twenty foot over with perpendicular sides.

72. CÆSAR having notice of his designs from the prisoners and deserters, prepared these fortifications to disappoint him: First he cut a ditch twenty foot over with perpendicular sides, as broad at the bottom as the top; all the other fortifications were 400 foot further off the town than



Two more  
ditches fif-  
teen foot  
broad and  
deep, the in-  
nermost fill'd  
with water.  
A rampier  
with a  
breast-work.

than this ditch; for he thought it necessary to encompass so large a circuit of ground, that his works might not easily be surrounded on all sides, nor surpris'd in the night; as likewise that the soldiers, who were employed about them, might be beyond the reach of the enemy's darts. Observing this distance, he drew two other ditches fifteen foot broad and deep, and filled up the innermost, which lay in a marshy ground, with water from the river. Behind these he cut a trench, and cast up a rampier twelve foot high, which he surrounded with a breast-work of pales and hurdles, fixed sharp forked stakes into the bank, to prevent the enemy from approaching where the rampier and breast-work joined, and surrounded the whole with turrets at eighty foot distance from each other.

73. But perceiving our men, who were obliged to forage, and provide materials at the same time for so great a work, were often cut off when they wander'd too far from the camp; and that the Gauls, sometimes making a vigorous sally from several parts of the town together, attempted to force his lines, CÆSAR thought it necessary to make more additions to them, that they might be defended with the smaller number.

Wherefore, having cut several trunks and strong arms of trees, he pointed and sharpened them at the top; then sinking several parallel ditches round the works five foot in depth, he fixed in each these trees, which he fasten'd to each other at the bottom, that they might not easily be pulled out; and left their jagged branches standing somewhat above the earth: there were five of these rows so interwoven with each other, that it was impossible for the enemy, if they came that way, not to fall on them: these the Romans called <sup>h</sup> Cippi.

Cippi.

It appears, by what follows after, that these Cippi were placed immediately next to the innermost ditch, which CÆSAR tells us had water in it, as the Lilia and Stimuli were between these and the great ditch twenty foot broad, which was the farthest towards the town.

Some old editions read here Cappos, which LIPSIVS has converted into Scapos, and I think not without reason, though VOSSIVS is very angry at him for it: Cippi were pillars sometimes set up in memory of the dead; but oftener for land-marks, as those between the capitol and Flaminian way, which had this inscription on it: ID. QVOD. INTRA. CIPPOS. AD. CAMPVM. VERSVS. SOLI. EST. A. CAESARE. AV. GVSTO. REDEMPITVM. PRIVATO. PVBLICAVIT. You may observe in the following paragraph, CÆSAR says the Lilia were so called, from the likeness their figure had to the lilly; now therefore supposing these Cippi or Scapi to have been called so upon the same account (which is but reasonable to imagine) the close branches of the trees, which were prepared

**WAR IN** Before them obliquely in order of Quincunx, were pits  
**GAUL.** dug three foot deep, <sup>i</sup> something narrower at the bottom  
 than the top; into which were driven stakes, about the  
 thickness of a man's thigh, first hardened in the fire, and  
 sharpened at the end; they were so fixt that no more than  
 four inches stood above the outer surface of the earth; and  
 one foot was sunk within the bottom of the pits; the mouths  
 of which were covered with small twigs and osiers to de-  
 ceive the enemy; eight several rows of this work were  
 made, at three foot distance from each other, which they  
 called Lilia, from the likeness they bore to that flower.

**Stimuli,**

Before these likewise were placed another kind of works,  
 called Stimuli, which were poles with iron hooks at the  
 end of them; and those they drove into the earth up to the  
 heads, all over the place, at a moderate distance from one  
 another.

**The same  
works he  
made out-  
ward.**

74. These works compleated, encompassing another  
 space of ground, as even as the nature of the place ad-  
 mitted, which extended fourteen miles in circuit, he made  
 the very same fortifications outwards; that if any accident  
 should require his absence from the camp, it might easily  
 hold out against a considerable number of the enemy's  
 forces: and that his soldiers might run no more hazard in  
 foraging than was necessary, he commanded both horse  
 and foot to be furnished with thirty days provisions.

## C H A P. XXXII.

**The Gauls  
hold a coun-  
cil:**

**Give orders  
for each  
state to fur-  
nish a parti-  
cular quota  
for the re-  
lief of Alife.**

75. WHILEST these affairs were in agitation at Alife,  
 the princes of Gaul held a general council, where it was  
 not thought proper to comply with **VERCINGETORIX'S**  
 desire, in sending all that were able to bear arms; but re-  
 solved that each state should furnish a certain quota, lest  
 it should be impossible to get provisions for so confused a

for this use, will much sooner claim kindred with Scapi or Scopi, the bushy  
 stocks on which clusters of grapes grow, than with Cippi, pillars or land-  
 marks, which were as often made of stone as wood.


<sup>i</sup> *Paulatim angustiore ad summum fastigio*, which monsieur D'ABLANCOURT  
 translates narrower at the top, *Un peu étroites par le baut*. But then what  
 will become of the likeness this sort of work should have to the lilly? **LIP-  
 SIUS** therefore would have this *summum* be converted into *imum*, which **VOS-  
 SIUS** opposes; for there is no occasion to alter the text, since *ad summum*  
*senobis*, may as well signify to the bottom of the pit, as *altum-mare* the deep  
 sea. On this occasion **VOSSIUS** has justly ridiculed **URSINUS**, for trifling about  
 the various reading of this place; but, at the same instant, has thrown away  
 above thrice the time, to confute **LIPSIUS** in a point of as little importance:  
 whom yet he has not confuted, unless *valet Ima Summis mutare*.

number

e pit<sup>s</sup>  
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number, whom the officers could not possibly know, or WAR IN  
govern by military discipline: wherefore those of Autun, GAUL,  
with their vassals, the <sup>k</sup> Segusiani, Ambivareti, Aulerci,   
Brannovices (or Brannovii) were ordered to furnish 35000:  
those of Auvergne, with the Free people of Quercy, Ge-  
vaudan, and Velais, who were formerly vassals to the coun-  
try of Auvergne, the like number: Sens, Franchecomte,  
<sup>l</sup> Berry, Xantonge, Roverge, and Chartres, each 12000:  
Beauvois and Limosin, each 10000: Poictou, Turenne,  
Paris, <sup>m</sup> Viverais, and Soisons, each 8000: Amiens,  
Metz, Perigort, Hainault, Teroüenne, and Agen, 5000  
each: Maine as many: Arras 4000: Vexen, Leifeux,  
Eureux, and Liege, each 3000: Basle and Bourbonne  
30000: Bretagne, Normandy, and the other maritime  
countries, as those of Cornoüalle, Auranches, Rhenes,  
Caux, Landreguet, Lemovices, Vannes, and Coutance,  
together, 6000: but the people of Beauvois refused to fur-  
nish the quota which was assessed them, saying, They  
would wage an independent war themselves, for they  
scorned to be commanded by any one; till out of respect  
to COMIUS they complied so far as to send 2000.

76. This COMIUS (as we have already taken notice)  
had been very serviceable to CÆSAR in his English expe-  
dition, who in return exempted his country from paying  
tribute, restored to it the use of its ancient laws and cu-  
stoms, and gave him the country of Teroüenne for his  
loyalty; but so great was the universal desire of the Gauls,  
at this instant, to recover their pristine liberty and honour,  
that neither friendship nor gratitude were sufficient to dis-  
suade any one from embarking in the publick cause, for  
the promotion whereof no man spared either money or la-  
bour. Having raised 8000 horse, and 240000 foot, they  
reviewed them in Autun, where they chose the general  
officers, the chief which were COMIUS of Arras, VIRDU-  
MARUS and EPOREDORIX of Autun, and VERGASILAUNUS  
of Auvergne, cousin-german to VERCINGETORIX; to  
these were added other officers, who were to assist at coun-  
cils.

<sup>k</sup> The Segusiani we have already explained to be the Lionois; Ambivareti  
or Ambivariti, Sanson places at Nevers; but who these Aulerci were, can  
hardly be imagined; 'tis certain, they cannot be the Aulerci mentioned be-  
fore, because of the distance of place; nor could any body ever yet determine,  
who the Brannovices or Brannovii were.

<sup>l</sup> Or rather the diocese of Bourges, which contains Berry, part of Burgundy  
and Touraine.

<sup>m</sup> I have render'd this Viverais, according to VOSSIUS's opinion, who says  
the text should not be Eleutheri Sueffones, but Helvii, Sueffones, two dif-  
ferent states; but what could make monf. D'ABLANCOURT mistake Sueffones  
for the Swiss, I cannot conceive.



WAR IN cils of war, chosen out of every country. Thus chearful, and big with expectation, they set forward to Alife, each man persuading himself that the Romans would not have the courage to face so great an army, especially when subject to a double attack, on one hand by frequent sallies from the town; and on the other from numbers of horse and foot without.

GAUL.  
March  
full of hope  
to Alife.

## C H A P. XXXIII.

The besieged  
hold a council  
of war.

Crotognatus  
his speech.

77. IN the mean time the besieged at Alife, having consumed all their provisions, the day being passed which was appointed for the return of their friends, and being wholly ignorant of what was doing in Autun, summoned a council to determine what methods they should take in that extremity: several opinions were proposed, some were for surrendering, and others were for breaking through the enemy, whilst their strength would permit. Amongst the rest I must not omit a speech remarkable for its extraordinary and inhuman cruelty, which was made by CROTOGNATUS, a nobleman of Auvergne, whose authority was equal to his birth. "I shall not, says he, trouble myself with their opinion, who colour ignoble servitude with the gentle name of surrender; men unworthy to be accounted citizens, much more to sit in this august assembly: rather let me join with those who talk of sallies, in whose advice, you all agree, remains of ancient Gallic virtue appear. Yet I must tell you, what you mistake for courage, is only the effect of that effeminacy, which knows not how to suffer want; for many of their own accord have welcomed death, whose patience would not have supported them under pain: however, for my part, I should readily submit to their opinion, if our lives only depended on the event of this affair: for I always had a particular regard for honour: but the whole kingdom of Gaul, which we have engaged in our quarrel, must receive its destiny from our resolves. Should fourscore thousand men be slain in this place, what courage, think you, could their friends and relations have, to engage the enemy almost upon their carcases? Far be it from us, therefore, to ruin those who have chearfully embraced all dangers for our preservation; let not our rashness or imbecility of mind undo our native country, and plunge it into perpetual bondage. Why should we despair of the faith and constancy of our allies, because they have not been punctual to their day? Surely it should not be taken for

an argument of the Romans courage, that they daily enlarged their outward works; if therefore they have intercepted our couriers, still let the approach of our friends be attested by their actions who shew their apprehensions by labouring both day and night to compleat their fortifications. If you would follow my advice, let us imitate the example of our ancestors, who in that far more dangerous war, with the Cimbers and Teutons, being shut up within their towns, and reduced to the same necessity, rather than surrender, sustained themselves by the bodies of those, whose age had made them unserviceable for war: and if antiquity had not furnished us with so glorious a precedent to follow, we ought to have made one ourselves, for the sake of our publick liberty, and the instruction of posterity. Gaul never was engaged in a more dangerous war, never laboured under greater extremities, than when she was harrassed by these Cimbers; yet at length they quitted their country, and marched to another, leaving us our land, our customs, laws, and liberties intire. What, I would ask, brought the Romans hither, but the desire of subduing a renown'd and warlike people, of possessing their country, and making them perpetual slaves: for they never yet made war upon any other account. If you are ignorant of their transactions in remoter countries, cast your eyes upon Gaul, within your own neighbourhood, reduced, as it is, to a province, deprived of its laws and customs, and receiving new ones from the rods and axe, those badges of eternal slavery."

78. The matter being put to the vote, it was first resolved that the sick and aged should quit the town, and that all other methods should be tried, before those propounded by CROTOGNATUS; whose advice, however, they designed to put in practice, rather than submit to a treaty or surrender. Thus the natives of Dufemois; who had received them into Alise, were expelled their own city, together with their wives and children, who approaching the Roman lines, with tears in their eyes, most humbly begg'd to be receiv'd as slaves, and saved from perishing by famine: but CÆSAR, having disposed a guard all about the works, refused them entrance.

They resolve to expel the sick and aged out of the towns.

C H A P. XXXIV.

79. IN the mean while COMIUS, and the other general officers, with all their forces, were arrived at Alise, and

The confederates arrive at Alise.

WAR IN and had lodged themselves upon a hill, not above 500 paces  
 GAUL. from our works. The day after, drawing out all their  
 cavalry, they filled the valley, which as we have already  
 said, extended three miles in length; and ranged their in-  
 fantry, not far from the same place, upon the rising ground.

The besieged  
 perceiving  
 they are  
 come, pre-  
 pare for a  
 sally.  
 Cæsar orders  
 the cavalry  
 to sally out  
 upon the  
 enemy.

Alife commanded a view of all the country round; the  
 besieged soon discovered their allies; they ran with joy to  
 congratulate each other on their arrival, and drawing out  
 all their forces before the town, began to fill up the first  
 ditch with mould and fascines, and prepare all other ma-  
 terials for a vigorous sally.

80. CÆSAR having disposed his army on both sides the  
 works, that every soldier might know, and be ready to  
 maintain his particular post, commanded the cavalry to  
 sally out upon the enemy. From those parts of the camp  
 which lay upon the higher ground, might easily be seen  
 what was done in the field; and all the infantry was  
 wholly intent on the success of the engagement. The  
 Gauls had intermixed small numbers of light-armed foot  
 and archers among their horse, to assist them, and sustain  
 the attack of our troops; who wounded several of our ca-  
 valry unawares, and obliged them to quit the battle:  
 whereupon the Gauls, believing success inclined to their  
 side, because our men were oppressed by their numbers,  
 encouraged each other by a joyful shout, which was re-  
 turned by the besieged: The place where the conflict was,  
 lay open to the view of both armies; neither noble nor  
 cowardly actions could be concealed; and the desire of  
 applause, or fear of ignominy, spurr'd on each side to do  
 their utmost. Victory had now continued dubious from  
 noon till almost sun-set, when the Germans in close united  
 ranks made a furious charge upon the enemy, put them  
 to flight, surrounded their archers and cut them to pieces;  
 our men pursued the Gauls so close, that they gave them  
 no leisure to rally, till they were arrived at their camp;  
 upon which those who had come out of the town, returned  
 melancholy into it again, in despair of victory.

The Ger-  
 mans charge  
 the enemy,  
 and rout  
 them.

The Gauls  
 attempt to  
 force the Ro-  
 man works a  
 second time,  
 but in vain.

81. After this disappointment the Gauls allowed them-  
 selves one day's respite, during which time they prepared  
 great plenty of fascines, scaling-ladders, and iron hooks;  
 then leaving their camp about midnight, with great silence,  
 they came to our outward works. So soon as they were  
 arrived there, setting up a shout, to give their allies in the  
 town notice of their approach, they began to fill up the  
 ditches with their fascines, to dislodge our men from the  
 rampier

rampier with slings, stones and arrows, and to apply all other things necessary for a storm: **VERCINGETORIX**, hearing their summons, sounded an alarm, and led all his forces out of the town. Our men, who had their several posts allotted them, repaired to the fortifications, and ply'd the enemy close with their slings, darts, bullets, and engines: it was very dark, and many were wounded on both sides; but **M. ANTONY** and **C. TREBONIUS** took care to draw out parties from the farther castles, to relieve the soldiers under their command, who were the most pressed by the enemy.

82. Whilst the Gauls were at the greatest distance from the works, they did more execution with their darts than when they came nearer; for then they run themselves un-awares upon the Stimuli, fell into the Lilies, and were wounded with the spikes, or were killed by the piles that were cast from the rampier and turrets. Many wounds had been received on both sides, and no part of our fortifications forced, when day-light appearing, the Gauls were apprehensive they should be flank'd by a sally from the higher ground, and therefore retreated; but the besieged had spent all this time in filling up the first ditch, and were informed of the retreat of their allies, before they could come near the works themselves, therefore returned again to the town without effecting any thing.

C H A P. XXXV.

83. **THUS** twice repulsed with loss, the Gauls began to consult what methods they should take; and having advised with those that knew the ground, from them they were informed of the nature of our works, the situation of our higher camp, and learnt that on the north side of Alise lay so large a hill, that the Romans could not encompass it within their works, but were obliged to take up their quarters there upon an uneven ground; that this place was guarded by the lieutenants **C. ANTISTIUS RHEGINUS**, and **C. CANINIUS REBILUS**, with two legions: whereupon having sent out their scouts for further knowledge of the place, their general drew out 55000 chosen men, from amongst those states that are esteemed the most warlike, and privately forming their design, appointed the time for the assault about noon. **VERGACILLAUNUS** of Auvergne (**VERCINGETORIX**'s relation) one of the four principal commanders, who had the charge of this party, leaving

The Gauls  
consult about  
a third at-  
tack.



**WAR IN GAUL.** ing the camp about nine o'clock in the evening, finished his journey before day; and posting his troops behind a hill, unseen by the enemy, ordered the soldiers to refresh themselves after their march. When noon approached he went to RHEGINUS's quarters; at the same instant the enemy's cavalry approached our works, and the rest of the army shew'd themselves drawn up in order of battle before their camp.

*Vergasillaunus with 55000 chosen men goes to attack Antistius's quarters.*

*The Gauls within and without at the same time assault the Roman works.*

84. Which **VERCINGETORIX** beholding from the tower of Alife, sallied out of the town, carrying along with him a great many fascines, long poles, penthouses, hooks, and such other instruments as he had prepared for that purpose. The dispute was maintained on every side at once, for the Gauls left nothing unattempted to accomplish their desire, still flocking to those parts of the works which appeared to be weakest. The Roman forces were obliged to divide themselves into several parties, nor would the smallness of their number easily permit them to be present in all places at once: the noise raised behind them infused no small terror in them, since they saw their safety depended on the courage of others; for all people are most apprehensive of dangers which are but approaching.

*Cæsar relieves his men, and encourages them to fight.*

85. **CÆSAR** having posted himself in a convenient place, from whence he might descry what was done in all parts, detach'd fresh supplies to sustain those that were overcharged, and encouraged the whole army, telling them, that was the only time to give proofs of their virtue, for if the Gauls were not able to force their lines, they would certainly despair of success, and the Romans might expect an end of their labours. The chief stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifications, where **VERGASILLAUNUS** was engaged; which, though a very small place, was of great importance, because of its declivity. Some of the enemy's forces were employ'd in throwing darts, whilst others, casting themselves into a testudo, approach'd the works, fresh men still relieving the weary. They had soon thrown up a mount, which did not only furnish them with an ascent, but covered and entirely defeated the use of those works the Romans had made in the ground. In fine, our men had been so long employed, that they had neither strength nor weapons left.

*Labiens detached to the relief of Antistius.*

86. Wherefore **CÆSAR** sent **LABIENUS** with six cohorts to their assistance, commanding him, if he found himself unable to maintain the works, to sally out upon the enemy, but not otherwise. He himself went in person to encourage

encourage the rest of the army, assuring them, that upon that hour's success depended the reward of all their former toils. The besieged having already in vain attempted the lower fortifications, were resolved to try their fortunes in the higher and uneven ground; thither therefore they brought all the instruments they had got ready, drove our men by showers of darts from the turrets, levelled the way with fascines, raised a mount, and from thence began to break down the rampier and breast-works.

WAR IN GAUL.  
The besieg'd vigorously attempt the higher works.

87. So soon as CÆSAR had notice of their effort, he first detached young BRUTUS with six cohorts to maintain the place; after him lieutenant FABIUS with seven more, and at last, when the dispute grew very warm, went thither himself in person with another supply: Having renew'd the fight with fresh vigour, and repulsed the enemy, he march'd to the place whither he had sent LABIENUS with four cohorts, which he drew out of the next turrets, commanding one party of horse to follow him, and another to take a circuit round about the outward works, and attack the enemy in the rear. In the mean time LABIENUS, finding neither ditches nor the rampier were sufficient to defend him against the enemy's assault, had drawn out thirty-nine cohorts from the nearest quarters thereabouts, and sent CÆSAR word what he thought necessary to be done; upon which he made what haste he could to be present at the engagement.

Cæsar sends Brutus and Fabius to maintain the place; comes thither himself. The enemy repulsed.

88. His arrival was soon perceived by the colour of his garments, which he used to wear in battle, and the troops of horse and cohorts which he had ordered to follow him being discovered from the higher ground, the fight began. They set up a shout on both sides, which was returned from the rampier, and all the fortifications round: the Romans having cast their Piles, fell immediately upon the enemy sword in hand: the cavalry which were sent about, soon shew'd themselves in the enemy's rear, more cohorts came up to our assistance, and the Gauls were routed: Our horse pursued and slew great numbers of them, amongst the rest SEDULIUS, prince and general of Limosin; VERGASILLAUNUS was taken prisoner, seventy-four standards were brought to CÆSAR, and very few of the 55000 escaped. The besieged, beholding with despair the rout and slaughter which was made amongst their allies, retreated from the works. On the news of this bad success, all the Gauls deserted their camp, and had not our soldiers been fatigued by perpetual labour, and relieving each other,

Cæsar goes to Labienus. Labienus falls out upon Vergasillaunus's party. Routes him. Sedulius of Limosin slain. Vergasillaunus taken prisoner. The besieg'd on this defeat retire from the works, and the Gauls without desert their camp.

WAR IN their whole army might easily have been cut to pieces: GAUL. however, about midnight CÆSAR detached the cavalry to pursue them, who falling in with their rear, took many prisoners, and slew great numbers, but the rest escaped to their several countries.

## C H A P. XXXVI.

Vercingetorix calls a general council.

The besieged send ambassadors to treat of a surrender. A life surrenders at discretion. Vercingetorix deliver'd up.

Cæsar marches to Autun, which submits, with Auvergne.

Cæsar returns them 20000 captives. Sends his legions into winter-quarters.

89. THE day after, VERCINGETORIX having summoned a general council, reminded the besieged, "That he had not undertaken that war for his own private interest, but for the sake of the publick liberty; however, since the power of fortune was not to be resisted, he would freely submit himself to be sacrificed for an atonement to the Romans, and be given to them, as it should be thought proper, either dead or alive." Upon which they sent ambassadors to know CÆSAR'S pleasure, who ordered them to surrender their arms, and deliver up their noblemen. They obeyed his commands, bringing VERCINGETORIX amongst the rest. CÆSAR, sitting in the fortifications before the camp, distributed the prisoners among his soldiers for a booty, excepting only the natives of Autun and Auvergne, hoping by their means to recover the other states.

90. This affair thus ended, he marched directly to Autun: on his arrival the country submitted, and those of Auvergne did the like by their ambassadors: he demanded a considerable number of hostages from them both, and returned them about 20000 captives; then sent his legions into winter-quarters. LABIENUS, with two legions and the horse, he sent to Franchecomte, joining M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILIUS with him for an assistant: C. FABIUS and L. MINUTIUS BASILUS, with two other legions, he placed at Rheims, to prevent any insurrections at Beauvois: C. ANTISTILIUS RHEGINUS he detached to the country of Nerves; T. SEXTIUS to Berry; and C. CANINIUS REBILUS to Rouverge; each with a single legion; Q. TULLIUS CICERO and P. SULPICIUS he detached to Chalon and Mafcon, upon the river Soan, in the country of Autun, to take care for provisions; quartering himself at the capital of the same state. So soon as the senate was informed by advice from CÆSAR of this summer's campaign, a publick thanksgiving was decreed of twenty days continuance.

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A  
SUPPLEMENT  
TO  
C. J. CÆSAR'S Commentary  
OF HIS  
WAR in GAUL.

By some attributed to A. Hirtius Panfa, by Vide Suet.  
Tranquil. in  
Vita Julii.  
others to Oppius.

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THE EIGHTH BOOK.

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*The author's preface to his book. New commotions in Gaul. Berry and Chartres laid waste by CÆSAR. Beauvois and several other states subdued. Rebellion in Poictou. Chartres, Normandy, and Britain, quell'd by C. FABIVS. A victory obtained by CANINIUS. USSeldon taken by CÆSAR. COMIUS defeated and pardoned. The following year, the whole kingdom of Gaul being quieted, CÆSAR's enemies at Rome conspire against him.*

I N compliance with your repeated desires, and that you Hirtius's  
preface. might not think my constant refusal proceeded rather from idleness than a just sense of my own inability, I have at last, BALEUS, entered on a very difficult task, no less than a supplement to our CÆSAR's incomparable memoirs of his wars in Gaul, which connects the subsequent with the former ones; and have carried on the history he left imperfect of the Alexandrian war, I cannot say to the  
end



WAR IN end of our civil dissensions (which are not yet terminated)  
 GAUL. but to that of his life. I wish my readers may consider  
 with how much reluctance I embark'd in this affair, and not impute it either to my folly or arrogance, that I have presumed to place my writings between those of CÆSAR, whose Commentaries, though only designed by him to preserve the memory of so many glorious actions, for the benefit of other historians, could never yet be equall'd by the most accurate writers: and are so much esteemed by all mankind, that they have rather deprived future authors of the opportunity, than furnished them with materials for compiling a larger history. But we, BALBUS, have more reason to admire him than the rest of the world, who see and admire the politeness and correctness of his writings, whilst we are witnesses of the celerity and ease with which he composed them. Nor was he more happy in the elegance of his style, than in laying open the springs of action and the motives of his resolutions. I had not the good fortune to be present at the Alexandrian or African wars; and though I have been partly informed of the transactions in them from his discourse, yet we are less affected with the narration of things which attract our admiration by their novelty, than with those which we design from our own knowledge to attest to posterity. But I shall add no more on this subject, lest while I officiously shew how unequal I am to CÆSAR, I should fall under the imputation of imagining it possible for any one to compare me to him, and so be thought guilty of that vanity I endeavour to avoid.

## CH A P. I.

Several  
 states revolt.

GAUL was now reduced, and CÆSAR designed to refresh his soldiers in winter-quarters, after the last summer's fatigue, which had not allow'd them a moment's respite from the war, when he was informed that several states were at the same instant conspiring a new revolt. The reason reported for the ground of this resolution was, that the Gauls were convinced no power they were able to bring into the field, was sufficient to resist the Roman forces; but hoped, if so many countries revolted at once, the Romans could neither have time, nor forces enough to subdue them all: nor ought that single state, to whose lot it should happen, refuse to submit to any inconvenience, so

to the rest might be enabled, by that diversion, to recover their liberty. WAR IN GAUL.

2. Left the Gauls should be confirmed in this opinion, CÆSAR, leaving M. ANTONY the quæstor to command his winter-quarters, quitted Autun the last of December, and went with a guard of cavalry to the twelfth legion, which he had lodged in Berry, on the confines of Autun: and having joined the eleventh <sup>a</sup> legion, which lay not far off, leaving two cohorts for a guard to his baggage, he ravaged the most fruitful parts of Berry; which being a large country, and having many towns, could not be awed into obedience, and deterred from conspiracies by a single legion.

3. It happened, by CÆSAR'S sudden arrival, <sup>a</sup> as of necessity it must, that they who were unprovided and dispersed in the fields, were surprized by the horse, before they could make their escape into their towns: for he had taken care to prohibit burning of their houses, the usual sign of an invasion, lest he should want corn or forage if he went too far into the country, and the enemy should have warning to take care of themselves. Many thousands of the natives were taken, and others, upon the Romans first coming, fled for shelter to the neighbouring states, depending either upon their ancient acquaintance, or the interest which their conspiracy had united. But CÆSAR disappointed them; for he arrived so unexpectedly, by long marches, in all the countries they had retired to, that he allow'd them no time to provide for themselves, much less to take care of their neighbours: by which dispatch he confirmed his friends in their fidelity, and obliged the wavering to accept of peace. At last the people of Berry, perceiving CÆSAR, on delivery of hostages, had pardoned and received the other states into protection, were glad to embrace the merciful opportunity for regaining his favour, and followed their neighbours example.

4. CÆSAR promised each soldier, as a reward for the hardships they had undergone in this expedition, by the season, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, the sum of 200 <sup>b</sup> sesterces; to every centurion 2000, instead of plunder; and having sent the legions back to their quarters, after forty days absence, returned to Autun. Here he was distributing justice, when ambassadors from Berry came to pray assistance against the people of Chartres, who had invaded their country. Immediately on advice of these

Cæsar marches into Berry. Lays the country waste.

Takes several prisoners. Some fly for refuge to the neighbouring states,

Berry submits.

Cæsar rewards his soldiers for the hardships they had suffered in this expedition, and returns to Autun,

<sup>a</sup> See L. vij. 81.

<sup>b</sup> i. e. at 2 d. each sesterce, 11. 13 s. 4 d. to a common soldier, and 161. 13 s. 4 d. to a centurion.

WAR IN commotions, though he had not rested above eighteen days, having drawn out the sixth and fourteenth legions from their quarters on the banks of the Soan (where he had posted them, as you may observe in the former Commentary, to take care of provisions) he march'd against the people of Chartres.

Cæsar marches against Chartres.

The people quit their towns, and disperse themselves.

Cæsar encamps at Orleans.

Disperses his cavalry into the country.

5. They upon the first notice of our approach, being terrified with the punishment others had met with, deserted those little town and villages; which they had run up, after the destruction of their more considerable buildings, to defend them from the winter's cold, and dispersed themselves into several parts of the country. CÆSAR being loth his soldiers should endure the sharp storms, which frequently happen at that season, took up his quarters at Orleans, disposing part of his army in those houses which the Gauls had rebuilt, and thatch'd the barracks with straw, which the natives had left imperfect, to shelter the rest. But his cavalry and auxiliary foot he dispersed with good success into all parts where he was informed the enemy were fled; our men often returning with considerable booties. The natives thus oppress'd by the cold of the season, driven from their houses, not daring to continue long in any place for fear of our parties, and finding no protection in the woods from the sharpness of the weather, several of them lost their lives, and the rest took refuge in the neighbouring countries.

## CHAP. II.

6. CÆSAR thought he had done enough for the season of the year, in dispersing the enemy's forces, to prevent a war; but considering how much it import'd him to take care that the rebels should not be able to make any considerable head the next summer, he left C. TREBONIUS, with two of the legions he brought along with him, at Orleans: and being informed by several messengers from Rheims, that the people of Beauvois (who are more renown'd for warlike virtue than any other state of the Belgæ) with some of their neighbours, under the conduct of CORREUS of Beauvois, and COMIUS of Arras, were raising a considerable army, and marching to a general rendezvous, in order to invade the borders of Soissons, which belonged to the country of Rheims; he thought it did not only concern his honour, but interest, not to permit such faithful allies as those of Rheims to suffer, who had merited so well from the Roman empire: Wherefore drawing the eleventh legion again out of their quarters, he sent orders to

Cæsar leaves Trebonius with two legions at Orleans, and marches against the people of Beauvois.

C. FABIVS, that he should march with the two legions under his command to Soissons, and likewise wrote to Labienus for one of his. So as his garrisons lay most convenient, when necessity required, he sometimes obliged one, sometimes another, to quit their quarters, allowing himself no intermission from fatigue.

7. Having drawn these forces together, he marched to Beauvois, and encamped in their territories, dispersing his cavalry into all parts to get prisoners, from whom he might be informed of the enemy's designs. The horse perform'd his orders, and brought him word, they could meet with very few in their houses, though they had diligently searched all places; nor were those they had surprized, left there to till the ground, but to supply the enemy with intelligence.

From these CÆSAR was informed, that all the people of Beauvois, who were able to bear arms, with those of Amiens, Eureux, Caux, Vexen, and Arras, had retired to a high place, surrounded by a marsh, where they had encamped themselves, having disposed all their baggage in the remotest woods.

That these forces were under the command of several officers, but had chosen CORREUS their generalissimo, because he was most obnoxious to the Romans: that COMIUS, not many days before, having left the camp, was gone to Germany to solicit assistance from that nation, who were their neighbours, and a numerous people: that the enemy had resolved, by consent of all their generals, and the ardent desire of the soldiers, in case CÆSAR should come only with three legions, as was reported, to offer him battle, lest they should afterwards be obliged to engage him at a greater disadvantage; but if he brought more forces along with him, to continue within their camp, to intercept his convoys, and prevent him from getting forage, which the season of the year had rendered scarce.

8. This advice being confirmed from many hands, CÆSAR found their designs well laid, and very different from those resolves which used to proceed from the rashness of the barbarous Gauls. Wherefore he determined to leave nothing unessay'd for drawing the enemy to an engagement as soon as possible, by their contempt of his small numbers. The seventh, eighth, and ninth legions were veteran troops of extraordinary courage, and the eleventh consisted of chosen men, all hopeful youths, who had made eight several campaigns, yet were not esteemed comparable to the rest for valour or experience. Calling a council, he communicated

Caesar gets intelligence of the enemy's design.

Correus and Comius chief commanders of the rebels.



WAR IN GAUL. communicated the advices he had received to all the officers, and encouraged them to behave themselves like men; then drew up his army, that he might entice the enemy to a battle, by seeing he had only three legions; the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions he placed before the baggage, which was never great amongst the Romans, and ordered the eleventh to bring up the rear, that the enemy might not discover more forces than they expected. By this disposition he modelled his army almost into an exact square, and arrived within sight of the Gauls before they expected him.

Cæsar draws up his army as close as he can, to entice the enemy to an engagement; and marches towards them in order of battle:

But they decline the fight.

Cæsar encamps over-against them.

His fortifications,

9. Seeing our forces march so suddenly to them in battle-array, and fearing the success of a battle, notwithstanding all the intrepid resolutions which had been reported to CÆSAR, either surprised at our approach, or desirous to attend the first motions from us, they drew up in order of battle before their camp, without descending from the higher ground. CÆSAR was very desirous to engage the enemy, but considering their numbers, and the disadvantage of the rising ground, which extended farther in ascent than the breadth of the valley below, he thought it convenient to encamp directly over-against them. Round about the place where he had posted himself, he drew two ditches, each fifteen foot deep, with perpendicular sides; behind them he cast up a rampier twelve foot high, furnished with a breast-work proportionable to it, and several turrets of three stories, joined to each other by galleries, which likewise had their little parapets of osiers, that the enemy might be repulsed by two several rows at the same instant: and as those in the galleries were defended by the height of them from the enemy, and enabled to cast their piles the greater distance; so they on the rampier were screen'd by the gallery from those darts which might otherwise have fallen upon their heads: over the gates he built higher towers than in any other place.

Small skirmishes between both camps.

10. CÆSAR had two designs in making these fortifications, for he hoped the strength of his works might persuade the enemy he was afraid of them, and he was assured his camp might be defended by a small number, whenever he should be obliged to make a long excursion for corn or forage. In the mean time there were several small skirmishes between both camps, sometimes our auxiliary Gauls and Germans, and sometimes the enemy, crossing the morass, pursued each other eagerly by turns, the prevailing party obliging the weaker to retire towards their camp. Here it happened, as of necessity it must, that our soldiers going out

out every day to forage in remote and straggling places, were sometimes surprized by the enemy; which losses of carriages and servants, though insignificant to us, yet puffed up the foolish Gauls with pride, which was not a little increased by COMIUS's return with the forces he raised in Germany; and though he only brought 500 horse, yet they valued themselves extremely upon such a supply.

WAR I  
GAUL.  
The Roman foragers sometimes intercepted. Comius returns to the enemy with 500 horse from Germany.

## CHAP. III.

II. CÆSAR observed the enemy had continued a long time within the morafs, and their other natural fortifications: and considering he could not force their camp without struggling with great disadvantages, nor block them up without a more considerable army, he writ to TREBONIUS to draw out the thirteenth legion, which he had quartered in Berry, with lieutenant T. SEXTIUS, and make what expedition he could to his assistance with that and the other two legions under his own command.

Cæsar sends orders to Trebonius to bring him three legions.


In the mean while he detached the cavalry of Rheims, Langre, and the other countries, from whence he had received great numbers, by turns, for a guard to his foragers, to defend them from the assaults of the enemy.

12. This he did several days successively, till daily practice had taught them that security which always attends uninterrupted success. Those of Beauvois having notice of the place where our cavalry were daily posted, chose a select number of foot, and disposed them in the woods thereabouts, sending a small party of horse thither the day after to draw our men into the ambush, that they might be surrounded on every side. This ill fortune fell upon the cavalry of Rheims, whose turn it was that day to guard the foragers; perceiving the enemies inferior to themselves in number, they pursued them with too much ardour, till they were enclosed by the foot: being thus disordered, they were obliged to retire with more precipitation than is usual in time of battle, after the loss of VERTISCUS their prince and general, who was so much superannuated, that he could hardly sit on horse-back; yet, according to the custom of his country, he would neither excuse himself by his age from accepting the command, nor permit them to engage without him. The enemy were not a little elated with this success, thinking they had done wonderful exploits, because they had killed the prince and general of Rheims. But by this disaster our parties learned more vigilance in

The enemy lie in ambush for the Roman foragers.

The cavalry of Rheims, that day appointed to guard the foragers, are defeated, and Vertiscus their general kill'd.

WAR IN fixing their stations, and more caution in pursuing a flying enemy.



The Germans skirmish with, and defeat a party of the enemy.

Drive them up to the gate of their camp.

13. Daily skirmishes went forward, in the sight of both armies, where the fords and passages of the morasses gave the combatants an opportunity of engaging. The Germans, whom CÆSAR had procured that they might fight mix'd with the cavalry, boldly passing the marsh, put those few that resisted to the sword; and pursued the rest so warmly, that not only they who had engaged man to man, and those who had been wounded with missive weapons, but even the parties which were disposed at a greater distance, as corps of reserve, basely fled to the higher ground, without looking behind them, 'till they arrived at their camp, or farther: which put their whole army into so great a consternation, that it was hard to determine, whether they were more insolent after a trifling success, or depressed by the least turn of fortune.

#### CHAP. IV.

The enemy on notice of Trebonius's approach, send away their baggage.

Cæsar endeavours to prevent their retreat.

Gains the summit of a hill near their camp.

14. AFTER they had lodged several days in the same camp, the generals of Beauvois had notice of C. TREBONIUS's approach with the legions; and fearing they should be besieged, like their countrymen at Alife, sent away the aged, weak, and unarmed by night, with the whole baggage of their army. But before this confused and troublesome party could set forward, the day appeared; for the Gauls, though ever so light armed, are always attended with a great number of carriages, and, to secure their retreat, were now obliged to post their forces before their camp in order of battle. But CÆSAR thought it not convenient, either to provoke them to fight at so great a disadvantage of place, when they were already in a posture of defence, nor yet to keep so great a distance, as to give them an opportunity of decamping without danger. But that the difficulty of passing the morass, which divided the two camps, might not retard the enterprize, he cast a bridge over it, to the side of a hill, which he perceived was parted from the enemy's camp only by a small valley; and having passed his legions over, soon gained the even ground on the summit, which was fortified on two sides by a steep descent. He marched in good order to the extreme ridge, and drew up his legions in a place, from whence, by the help of his engines, he could shoot darts amongst the thickest of the enemy.

15. The

15. The Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, **WAR IN GAUL.** resolved to engage our forces, if we ventured to ascend their hill; yet durst not file off by degrees, for fear of being attacked whilst they were in disorder, and therefore continued still in the same posture: which **CÆSAR** perceiving, commanded twenty cohorts to be always in readiness, and removing his tents thither, ordered the place to be fortified. When his works were compleat, he drew the legions up before the rampier, and appointed the cavalry their particular stations, where they were to expect his further orders, with their horses bridled. The enemy perceiving we were ready to pursue them, and that they could not conveniently lodge in that place the next night, or continue there any longer without <sup>a</sup> provisions, resolved to take this method to secure their retreat: they handed the fascines and trusses of straw, on which they sat, to each other, whereof they had plenty (<sup>b</sup> for **CÆSAR** has already taken notice in his former Commentaries, that the Gauls sit down when they are drawn up in order of battle) and placed them before the front of their army till the evening; then, upon a signal given, set them all on fire together; and so soon as the flame was sufficient to screen them from the sight of the Romans, they ran away as fast as they could.

Keeps his men in readiness to pursue them.

The Gauls stratagem to secure their retreat.

16. Though **CÆSAR** could not perceive the enemy's departure because of the fires, yet suspecting they had made them to gain an opportunity of retreating, he advanced the legions a little farther, and ordered the cavalry to pursue; he marched slowly after himself, apprehensive that the Gauls were posted not far off and designed to draw him into an ambuscade. Most of the horse were afraid of venturing through the smoak and flames, and they who were so hardy as to enter, not being able to see so far before them as their horses ears, returned again for fear of

<sup>a</sup> Instead of Cibariss, which is the vulgar lection, some criticks read Periculo: for my part, I know no reason for rejecting the word, since **HIRTIVS** tells you before, they had sent away all their baggage.

<sup>b</sup> **HOTTOMAN** thinks this place has reference to B. iii. 18. where **CÆSAR**, giving an account of **FABIUS**'s stratagem against the Gauls of Coutance, says, *Velut explorata victoria, sarmentis virgultisque collectis, quibus fossas Romanorum compleant, ad castra pergunt*: which **VOSSIUS**, in my opinion, very justly opposes; for here is not a syllable of the Gauls custom of sitting; and I can understand no more by this place, but that they provided plenty of fascines to fill up the Roman trenches: therefore, either something is lost of **CÆSAR**'s former Commentaries, or this must be a gross corruption of the text; which I am rather inclined to believe, because it is not probable an army should sit down when the enemy is drawn up in order of battle, and ready to charge them.

being



**WAR IN GAUL.** being surprized, and gave the enemy time to retreat. By this stratagem, which had an equal mixture of cowardice and craft, they escaped without any loss to a very strong place not above ten miles off. From whence sending out several ambuscades of horse and foot, they greatly annoyed the Roman foragers.

**Correus,** with 6000 foot, and 1000 horse, lies in ambush for the Roman foragers.

On notice of it, Cæsar sends the cavalry and light-arm'd foot before, following after with the legions.

**Correus** with a small party first attacks the Roman cavalry.

The dispute grows warm on both sides.

17. CÆSAR having received many losses of this nature, was at last informed by a certain prisoner, that the enemy's general CORREUS, having chosen 6000 of his best infantry, and 1000 horse, had disposed them in a place where he expected the Romans would come to forage, because of the plenty of corn and grass in that field. Upon this intelligence CÆSAR drew out more legions than usual, and sending the cavalry before, intermixed with light-arm'd infantry, followed after with the legions as fast as he could.

18. The Gauls in ambuscade had chosen a field for their design, which did not extend above a mile in length any way, beset on every side as it were with toils, either by thick woods, or a very deep river. This place they had surrounded; but our cavalry being already forewarned of the enemy's design, marched resolutely in good order to the place, prepared to engage the enemy, knowing they should be sustained by the legions. On their arrival, CORREUS thinking fortune had blest'd him with the opportunity he wish'd for, first appearing with a small party, attacked our foremost ranks: our men bravely sustained the charge, not flocking too close together, as through fear they often do, in skirmishes between the horse, to their own disadvantage.

19. The rest of the enemy's horse that lay in the woods, perceiving we engaged their foremost party in small squadrons, and prevented their surrounding us, came up to the assistance of their general; upon which the dispute grew warm on both sides: victory had for some time continued dubious, when the enemy's foot advancing to their assistance, obliged our horse to give way; but the light-armed infantry, who had been sent before the legions, came up to sustain them, and mixing themselves among the horse, stopp'd the enemy's career. Thus the battle was equal again on both sides, and our men became bolder, having so well stood the shock of the enemy's first charge, without being surprized by the ambuscade. In the mean while the legions approached, and both parties had notice by their scouts, that CÆSAR was marching with his forces in order of

of battle; whereupon our men, receiving fresh spirits from WAR IN the assistance they expected from the cohorts, renew'd their GAUL. charge with redoubled vigour, as if they were jealous left by delay they should let them in for a share of that glory which by conquest would be all their own. The courage of the Gauls began to fail them, and in vain they looked about on all sides for some way to escape; for all the avenues being stopped up, themselves were caught in the trap they had prepared for the Romans. Being overcome, routed, and having lost the greatest part of their number, they ran with confusion whither chance directed them, some to the woods, and others to the river; but were pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet CORREUS, whose mind was too great to stoop to any misfortune, could neither be persuaded to quit the field, take refuge in the woods, nor accept of quarter; but fighting obstinately, and wounding several of our men, at last provoked the enraged victors to dispatch him with their darts.

Correus routed.

His courage.

He is kill'd.

CHAP. V.

20. AFTER this defeat, CÆSAR believing the enemy, on advice of their loss, would immediately remove their camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the place where the action happen'd, resolved to pursue his success; and notwithstanding the river obstructed his march, he passed it with his forces. The people of Beauvois, and their confederates, having notice from some few, who by the shelter of the woods had escaped (though wounded) out of the battle, that all things had gone against them; that CORREUS was kill'd, their horse, with the best of the infantry cut off, and that the Romans were almost at their camp, immediately called a council by sound of trumpet, and unanimously agreed to send ambassadors and hostages to CÆSAR.

Cæsar pursues his good success.

Marches towards the enemy's camp.

They send ambassadors to sue for peace.

Comius flies into Germany.

The ambassadors of Beauvois their speech.

21. COMIUS of Arras, perceiving what would be the result of this meeting, fled to the Germans, from whom he had brought some auxiliary troops. He was no sooner gone, but they sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, "intreating him that he would be satisfied with the punishment they had already received; for had they been in his power, they were persuaded his wonted mercy would not have inflicted so severe an one upon them: that the people of Beauvois were already ruined, by the loss of their cavalry

WAR INVALRY and chosen foot; for hardly enough had escaped GAUL? to bring news of the slaughter: however they had received this benefit from their damage, that the author of their rebellion was killed; for as long as he survived, the senate was never an equal balance for the common people."

Cæsar's  
answer.

22. CÆSAR gave their ambassadors audience, but reminded them, "That in the former year, when Beauvois and the other cities of Gaul revolted, they were the most obstinate of all their countrymen, and could not be induced to surrender by the example of their neighbours: that it was an easy matter to transfer the blame upon the dead; but, he was very well satisfy'd, no single person could, without the consent of the senate, noblemen, and country wage war by the weak assistance of the common people: however he was contented with the punishment they had drawn upon themselves."

The embas-  
sadors re-  
turn, and  
send hos-  
tages.

23. The night after the ambassadors returned with this answer to their countrymen, who immediately sent hostages. Whereupon the other countries, who waited for the success of this embassy, did the like; in fine, all except COMIUS submitted, whom fear would not permit to trust his person in any one's power; for the year before, whilst CÆSAR was in Lombardy, LABIENUS understanding that COMIUS solicited several states to rebel, and had enter'd into a conspiracy against CÆSAR, thought it lawful to reward his treachery by means on other occasions not justifiable: Judging it would be to no purpose to send for him to his quarters, lest a vain attempt might have render'd him more cautious, he sent C. VOLUSENUS QUADRATUS to kill him, under pretence of a conference; picking out some centurions to attend him in the enterprise. When they came to the interview, and VOLUSENUS had taken COMIUS by the hand, one of the centurions, as if surprized at some extraordinary accident, attempted to kill him, but was prevented by his friends; however, the first blow gave him a terrible wound on the head: swords were immediately drawn on both sides, tho' each party was less eager to engage than to make their escape: The Romans, because they thought COMIUS was already mortally wounded; and the Gauls, because they were apprehensive of an ambuscade, fearing we had more soldiers there than had yet appeared. Upon which, 'tis reported, COMIUS vow'd never to hold further commerce with any Roman.

The assassi-  
nation of  
Comius.

CHAP.

## C H A P. VI.

24. CÆSAR having now subdued the most courageous <sup>WAR IN GAUL.</sup> states of Gaul, and perceiving there was no country left which presumed to take up arms against him, but that some had left their towns and country to avoid the present subjection to the Roman empire, resolved to divide <sup>Cæsar divides his army.</sup> his army into several squadrons. M. ANTONY the questor, with the eleventh legion, he ordered to attend him; C. FABIVS, with twenty-five cohorts, he sent to the farthest parts of Gaul, being informed some of the states <sup>Sends Fabius to the farthest parts of Gaul.</sup> there were up in arms, because he thought C. CANINIUS REBILVS's two legions were not sufficient to keep them in obedience. T. LABIENVS he ordered likewise to attend him, and sent the twelfth legion into winter-quarters <sup>Sends a legion to guard Provence.</sup> under his command into Lombardy, to defend the Roman colonies there, lest they should meet with the same misfortune which had befallen the people of Trieste the year before, who were plunder'd by a sudden incursion of the Gauls. He marched himself to harass the country of <sup>Cæsar marches to harass Liege.</sup> AMBIVRIX: For though he despaired of reducing him into his power, because he continually fled before him, yet he thought it imported his honour to lay his country waste, destroy his towns, cattle, and subjects; that if any should chance to survive the slaughter, AMBIVRIX might not dare to return among them, through fear of their resentment for the calamities he had brought upon them.

25. When he had dispersed his army into every part of Liege, and fill'd all places with slaughter, fire, and rapine, having kill'd and taken great numbers, he sent LABIENVS <sup>Sends Labienus to Treves.</sup> with two legions to Treves, whose inhabitants bordering on the Germans, with whom they had perpetual war, bear a great resemblance to them in their rough and unpolished tempers, and never obey but when obliged to it by a standing army.

## C H A P. VII.

26. IN the mean time lieutenant C. CANINIUS, having notice from DURACIVS, who had always continued faithful to the people of Rome, that great numbers were <sup>Dumnaeus besieges Duracius in Poictiers.</sup> up in arms on the borders of Poictou, and that part of his country



**WAR IN GAUL.** country had revolted, immediately marched towards Poitiers. So soon as he was arrived within a small distance of the town, he was informed by some prisoners, that **DURACIUS** was besieged in Poitiers by **DUMNACUS** general of Anjou, with several thousand men: but thinking his two legions not sufficient to encounter the enemy, he encamped in an advantageous place. **DUMNACUS** having notice of his approach, quitted the siege, and marched to assault his camp: but having spent many days to no purpose, and lost several men, without being able to force **CANINIUS**'s trenches, he returned again to invest Poitiers.

but is besieged himself in his camp.  
The Gauls retire to besiege the town again, not being able to force his trenches.

**Fabius** marches to assist **Caninius**.

**Dumnacus** raises his siege, and flies cross the Loire.

**Fabius** pursues him.

Sends the cavalry to fall upon **Dumnacus**'s rear.

Does the like a second time, and orders them to keep the Gauls in play till he comes up to them.

27. About the same time **C. FABIUS**, having reduced several countries, and received hostages for their obedience, had notice from **CANINIUS** of the posture of affairs in Poitou; upon which he marched to the relief of **DURACIUS**: but **DUMNACUS** being informed of his design, and despairing of safety, if he should be obliged at the same time to encounter with the Romans without, and the besieged within, immediately left Poitiers; nor did he think himself secure till he had crossed the Loire, which was not to be passed without a bridge. **FABIUS**, though he had not yet arrived within sight of the enemy, nor joined **CANINIUS**, having fully informed himself how the country lay, believed the enemy must of necessity fly the same way they had taken; wherefore he made towards the bridge, sending his cavalry before, with orders to march no farther beyond the legions than they could conveniently return again without damage to their horses, to encamp with the foot at night: they obeyed his commands, followed, and attacked the enemy, falling upon them whilst they were frightened, flying, and loaden with their baggage, killed several, gained a considerable booty, came off with glory, and returned to the camp.

28. The night following **FABIUS** sent the horse before, with orders to engage the enemy, and find them employment till he should come up to their assistance. Accordingly **Q. ATIUS VARUS**, commander of the horse, a man of singular valour and conduct, having encouraged his soldiers, pursued the enemy: part of his troops he disposed into convenient places, and engaged the Gauls with the rest. The dispute was sharp on both sides, for the enemy's horse, being perpetually relieved by the foot, fought briskly; and believing they should have no greater numbers to encounter

encounter than in their former skirmish, flattered them-  
selves that they had obtained a lucky opportunity for de-  
feating our horse : but the Romans, contemning those they  
had worsted but the day before, and remembering the le-  
gions were coming to their assistance, scorned to retire ; and  
being ambitious to engross the whole glory of the victory to  
themselves, returned the charge of the enemy's foot with  
equal vigour.

29. The conflict had been for some time obstinately  
maintained on both sides, when DUMNACUS drawing his  
army into good order, appointed the foot to relieve the ca-  
valry by turns. On a sudden the enemy saw our legions  
marching in close ranks to the assistance of our horse : upon  
which their cavalry were so frightened, and their foot so  
surprized, that forcing their way through their own bag-  
gage, every man endeavoured to escape by flight. But  
our party, who but just before had bravely engaged them,  
whilst they made resistance, having now obtained the  
victory, set up a joyful shout on all sides, and pursuing the  
enemy every way as far as their horses could carry them,  
or as long as their arms could do execution, made a dread-  
ful slaughter amongst the Gauls ; for having killed above  
12000 armed men, or such whose fear had made them  
throw down their weapons, we took their baggage entire.

The Gauls  
fly ; many  
of them kil-  
led and ta-  
ken prison-  
ers.

Their en-  
tire baggage  
taken.

30. But CANINIUS being informed that DRAPES of  
Sens, who in the first revolt of Gaul, having assembled  
from all parts men of desperate fortunes, slaves, out-laws,  
and thieves, had intercepted the Roman convoys ; toge-  
ther with LUTERIUS of Quercy, who attempted (as is al-  
ready observed in the former Commentaries) during the  
same rebellion, to make an inroad into the Roman pro-  
vince ; having both escaped the slaughter, were marching  
with about five thousand men, the remains of the last de-  
feat, upon the like design : he followed them with two  
legions, lest the Roman province should receive any dis-  
grace by being terrified and harrassed by such rapparees.

Caninius  
pursues Dra-  
pes and Lu-  
terius.

Fabius  
marches to  
Chartres.

31. C. FABIVS, with the rest of the army, marched  
towards Chartres, and those other countries which he un-  
derstood had been assisting to DUMNACUS in the late re-  
bellion ; not doubting but this defeat had taught them that  
submission, which time and DUMNACUS's advice might  
abolish : his success in this enterprize was equal to his dis-  
patch, for the people of Chartres, who, though often har-  
rassed, had not yet entertained any thoughts of peace,  
upon

WAR IN  
GAUL.

which sub-  
mits.

So do Bre-  
tagne and  
Normandy.

upon his arrival submitted, and delivered hostages: All the states of Bretagne and Normandy, which lie in the extreme parts of Gaul, towards the sea, influenced by their example, did the like without delay. DUMNACUS being expelled his country, wandering and lurking here and there, alone, was forced to seek refuge in the farthest parts of Gaul.

## CHAP. VIII.

32. BUT DRAPES and LUTERIUS, finding CANINIUS pursued them with his legions, and that it would be impossible for them either to enter the province, or plunder the country up and down, without danger, made a halt in Quercy, where LUTERIUS had, during his more prosperous days, bore a considerable sway amongst his countrymen, and been highly esteemed by the common people for being the first author of all commotions. Here he surprized Usseldon, which formerly belonged to him; and possessing it with his own and LUTERIUS's troops, soon brought the townsmen to join with him in the rebellion.

Caninius  
arrives at  
Usseldon,  
divides his  
forces into  
three parts,  
and besieges  
the town.

33. CANINIUS quickly arrived at this place; but finding it fortified on all sides by craggy rocks, so steep, that it would be difficult for any man to ascend them in armour, though no body were in the town to oppose him; and knowing that the inhabitants had very considerable effects, which they could not convey away without falling into the hands of his legions, much less of his cavalry, he divided his cohorts into three parts, and disposed them in several quarters on three eminent places, from whence he designed by degrees to draw a line of circumvallation about the town.

The besieged  
send out  
their army  
to fetch in  
corn.

34. Which the besieged perceiving, began to dread the same fate their countrymen met at Alife, especially LUTERIUS, who having felt the smart of that blockade, advised them by all means to make sufficient provision of corn: They took his counsel, resolved to leave part of their forces to guard the town and their baggage, and to march with the rest to fetch in corn: accordingly, by general consent, leaving 2000 in the place, the rest marched out of the town under the command of DRAPES and LUTERIUS. These foragers having stay'd some time in the country of Quercy, one part whereof was willing to supply them,



them, and the other not able to oppose their taking what-  
ever they had occasion for, they soon provided themselves  
with a great quantity of corn. In the mean while the be-  
sieged, sometimes sallying out in the night, assaulted our  
turrets; wherefore CANINIUS delayed his works, lest he  
should not be able to compleat them, or be obliged to dis-  
pose feeble garrisons in several places.

35. DRAPES and LUTERIUS, having got abundance of  
corn, took up their quarters about ten miles distant from  
the town, that they might have an opportunity of con-  
veying their provisions by degrees into Uffeldon: each  
took his several office; DRAPES was to stay in the camp  
with part of the army, and LUTERIUS with the rest to  
convoy the provisions to the town. Having disposed par-  
ties along the road for a guard, he set forward about four  
in the morning by narrow ways through the woods. The  
out-guards of our camp hearing a noise that way, sent out  
their scouts to discover the occasion; who, at their  
return, informed CANINIUS of the enemy's motions:  
upon which, drawing those cohorts which were ready arm-  
ed out of their turrets, he set upon the enemy's carriages  
just before break of day; who, surprized at so sudden an  
attack, fled for refuge to their convoy; which the Ro-  
mans perceiving, fell furiously upon the enemy, and re-  
fused to grant any man of them quarter: but LUTERIUS  
with a few followers, having made their escape, returned  
not to the camp again.

Luterius  
marches  
with a con-  
voy towards  
Uffeldon.

Is intercept-  
ed by Cani-  
nius.

Most of the  
cavalry kil-  
led or taken.

36. After this success, CANINIUS had notice from some  
prisoners, that DRAPES was encamped not ten miles off  
with another part of their forces. This intelligence was  
confirmed by many hands; wherefore believing that one  
general being already routed, the other being surprized,  
might easily be defeated; and though it might be too great  
a happiness to expect that none should have escaped the  
slaughter, to carry news of the action to DRAPES, yet he  
resolved, since there could not be any danger in an assault,  
to try the event of it. He sent therefore all his cavalry,  
with the nimble German foot before; and leaving one le-  
gion behind with the baggage in the three camps, followed  
after with the other himself. When he was arrived near the  
enemy, his scouts informed him, that they had encamped  
themselves, according to the custom of the Gauls, upon  
the banks of a river, and that his cavalry with the German  
foot, had surprized, and set upon them unawares; upon  
which

Caninius  
marches to  
attack Dra-  
pes.



**WAR IN GAUL.** which he marched to their assistance in order of battle. On a signal given, our men possessed themselves of the higher ground, which our cavalry and the Germans perceiving by the ensigns of the legion, fought vigorously, and our cohorts pouring down upon the enemy, either killed or took them all prisoners, obtained a considerable booty, and surprized their general DRAPES.

Routs his  
army, and  
takes him  
prisoner.

37. After this remarkable success, scarce any Roman soldier having received a wound, CANINIUS returned again to the siege; and having defeated his outward enemy, for fear of whose forces he had desisted from carrying on his works, now commanded them to be compleated on all sides; and the next day after, C. FABIVS coming to his assistance, took a part of the town to invest.

Returns to  
the siege.

Fabius  
comes to his  
assistance.

## CHAP. IX.

38. CÆSAR, in the mean time, leaving the quæstor, M. ANTONY in Beauvois with fifteen cohorts to prevent any new insurrections in Belgium, went himself to other countries, from whom he demanded great numbers of hostages; and encouraged those who were fearful, to continue faithful in their allegiance. When he came to Chartres, where in his Commentaries he has observed the revolt began, finding they were most afraid, because they were conscious of the treason they were guilty of, that he might the sooner free them from their apprehensions, he demanded them to deliver up GUTURVATUS to justice, who had been the author of that rebellion. Though this unfortunate man would not trust himself with any of his own countrymen, yet he was so diligently sought after, that he was soon brought to the Roman camp: and CÆSAR, contrary to his nature, was obliged by the soldiers (who alledg'd GUTURVATUS had been the cause of all those dangers and misfortunes they had suffered during the late war) to condemn him to be whipped to death, and then beheaded.

Cæsar  
marches to  
Chartres.

Demands  
Guturvatus,  
who is deli-  
vered up and  
put to death.

39. Here he was informed, by frequent advices from CANINIUS, of the success he had had against DRAPES and LUTERIUS, and what resolutions the people of Usseldon had taken. Now though he despised the smallness of their numbers, yet he thought it necessary to inflict a severe punishment upon them for their contumacy, lest the whole kingdom of Gaul should fancy they had constancy enough at least, though not sufficient force, to oppose the Ro-


mans;



to face p. 193.

# Uxeldoon.





A. Ufford. B. The fountain. C. The Burning Barrels. D. The Mount. E. The Towers  
to equal the height of the Fountain.





mans; and other states, following their example, should possess themselves of fortified places, and assert their liberty; especially since the Gauls knew his commission expired the next year, and had nothing to apprehend, if they could but hold out one winter. Wherefore ordering lieutenant Q. CALENUS to follow after him by moderate marches, he went before with all the cavalry as fast as he could to CANINIUS.

WAR IN  
GAUL.

Cæsar  
marches to  
the siege of  
Uffeldon.

40. Being arrived there beyond all mens expectation, he perceived the town was so well invested, it was impossible the enemy should make their escape; but being informed from the deserters, that the besieged had plenty of corn, he attempted to cut off their water. There was a river that divided the plain below, which almost surrounded the craggy hill upon which Uffeldon was built, on every side; the nature of the place prevented his diverting the stream another way, for it ran so very low, that no ditch could be contrived to drain it: but the descent to this river was so steep, that the besieged could neither come at it, nor return again, without being wounded, and endangering their lives, if the Romans opposed them. Which CÆSAR perceiving, disposed a party of archers, slingers, and some engines, over-against the places where the easiest descent lay, to prevent the besieged from coming to the river; which obliged them afterwards to fetch water all at one particular place.

Cæsar cuts  
the besieged  
off from the  
use of the  
river.

41. For close under the walls of Uffeldon, where, for the space of three hundred foot together, the town was not surrounded with the river, flowed a plentiful fountain. Whilst all men were desirous of cutting off this spring from the enemy, CÆSAR alone saw it was not to be attempted without danger. Directly over-against the hill, with great labour, and perpetual skirmishing, he began to raise vines, and cast up a mount: but the besieged descending from the higher ground, engaged our men at a distance, without danger to themselves, and wounded several that pressed forward too eagerly; yet the Romans, not deterred by these disadvantages, proceeded in their works, endeavouring to surmount the difficulty of the ascent by their labour; at the same time we made mines to the head of the fountain, which was the only work to be done without danger or suspicion. We cast up a mount sixty foot high, on which we raised a tower of ten stories, not to equal the walls, for that was impossible, but only to the top of the spring. This work being perfected, engines were planted to play

Cæsar en-  
deavours to  
cut them off  
from the  
fountain.

Raises a bat-  
tery to play  
upon the a-  
venues.

WAR IN upon the accessies to the fount, which made it so dangerous  
GAUL. for the besieged to fetch water, that not only the cattle,  
but several men perished by thirst.

The besieged  
roll fiery  
barrels down  
the hill upon  
the battery.

42. The enemy, to prevent so great an inconvenience, filled several barrels with grease, pitch, and small pieces of boards, and having set them on fire, rolled them down the hill upon our battery; fighting furiously at the same time, to divert the Romans by the danger, from extinguishing the fire. Our works immediately began to flame, for wherever they had thrown down these barrels, they set fire to that part of the mount of vines where they stuck; but our soldiers, notwithstanding the danger of the fight, and disadvantage of the ground, shewed their presence of mind; and as the action happened on an eminent place, conspicuous to the view of both armies, great shouting was heard on both sides; every man, especially the brave, pushing on, through the flames and showers of darts, to signalize his virtue.

A hot dispute.

Cæsar's feint  
to decoy the  
besieged  
from the  
battery.  
Its success.

Uffeldon  
surrenders.

43. CÆSAR perceiving many of his men were wounded, commanded his cohorts to ascend the hill on every side at once, and raise a shout, as if they intended to scale the wall; upon which the besieged being frightened, because they knew not what we were doing, recalled their forces from our battery, to man the walls; which gave the Romans leisure to quench the fire in some places, and to prevent its progress in others, by cutting off part of the works. Even after this they made an obstinate resistance, and though they had lost several of their men for want of water, resolved to hold out; but at last the veins of it being either drained by our mines, or diverted from their usual course, the fountain was immediately dried up; which reduced the enemy to despair, and obliged them to surrender; believing this was not so much wrought by the hand of the Romans, as by the particular direction of Heaven.

Cæsar cuts  
off the besieged's hands.

44. CÆSAR, being satisfied his mercy was already so sufficiently known to the world, that it would not be imputed to the cruelty of his nature, if he dealt more severely by the people of Uffeldon than he had by others; and finding no end of his trouble, if other states should follow their example, and revolt together, he resolved to deter others from being guilty of the like offence, by their usage; therefore pardoned their lives, but cut off the hands of them that had born arms against him, that their punishment might be the more remarkable,

CHAPTER XI.

DRAPES, who, I have already observed, was taken WAR IN by CANINIUS, either disdaining to bear his chains, or GAUL. through fear of some heavier punishment, refused eating a few days together, and starved himself. LUTERIUS at the same time, whom I have mentioned to have escaped out of the skirmish, falling into the power of EPASNACTUS of Auvergne, a faithful friend to the Romans (for he was often obliged to change his quarters, and trust himself to several people, because he knew it dangerous to continue long in any place after he had rendered himself so odious to CÆSAR) without the least hesitation was delivered up to justice.

Drapes refuses his meat, and starves himself.

Luterius delivered up by Epasnaactus.

45. In the mean time LABIENUS's cavalry had met with good success in Treves, where they killed several of the natives and Germans, who were always ready to assist against the Romans, and took several of their chief officers prisoners; amongst which number was SURUS of Autun, a man of equal birth and courage, and the only person of his country then in arms against the Romans.

Labiens's success in Treves.

46. CÆSAR perceiving how well his affairs succeeded in all parts, and considering that the former summers expeditions had subdued the Celtick and Belgick Gauls, but that he had never visited Gascoigne in person, having only made some small acquisitions there by P. CRASSUS, marched thither with two legions, to pass there the rest of the season. This, like his other designs, he accomplished with as much success as dispatch; for all the states of Gascoigne sent ambassadors to him, and delivered hostages. He then proceeded with a guard of cavalry to Narbon, and distributed his army under the command of his lieutenants into their winter-quarters; four legions with M. ANTONY, C. TREBONIUS, P. VATINIUS, and Q. TULLIUS, he detached to Belgium; two others he quartered in Autun, which he knew to be the most powerful country in Gaul; two more he sent to Tours, on the borders of Chartres, to keep the maritime countries on that side in obedience; and two he placed in Limousin, near the borders of Auvergne, that no part of Gaul might have an opportunity of rebelling. Having spent a few days at his government, held the convention of the states, determined the differences of the people, and distributed rewards to the meritorious (for

Cæsar marches into Gascoigne.

The country submits.

Cæsar goes to Narbon. Sends the legions into their winter-quarters.

Holds a convention of the states in his government, then returns to Arras.



WAR IN he had a perfect knowledge of every man's behaviour during the general revolt of the Gauls, which he suppressed by the sole fidelity and assistance of the province) he returned to Belgium, and took up his winter-quarters at Arras.

## CHAP. XI.

47. HERE he was informed that COMIUS of Arras had had an engagement with his cavalry; for when ANTONY came to take up his quarters in Arras, which continued loyal, COMIUS, who was always accustomed to head any rebellion his countrymen were inclined to, that they might not want a leader while they were in subjection to the Romans, after he had received the wound we mentioned, supported himself and his cavalry by plunder, intercepting several convoys of corn which were going to the Roman garrisons.

48. C. VOLUSENUS QUADRATUS, commander of the horse under ANTONY, was quartered with him, and detached by him to pursue the enemy's cavalry. VOLUSENUS very readily accepted the office; for besides the constant desire he had of glory, he bore a mortal hatred to COMIUS: wherefore having laid several ambuscades, he often obtained advantages over him. But at last the dispute growing very warm, and VOLUSENUS desiring to apprehend COMIUS, he pursued too ardently with a few followers; the other fled as eagerly, till he had drawn him from his party; then on a sudden, conjuring his men not to suffer the wound he had received from the Romans treachery to go unrevenge'd, he faced about, and out-riding the rest of his company, made towards VOLUSENUS: his men followed after, and being much superior in number to ours, obliged them to retreat: during the pursuit, COMIUS clapping spurs to his horse, ran with a full career against QUADRATUS, and struck him through the thigh with his spear. Our men perceiving their captain was wounded, rallied again, forced the enemy to give ground, and charged so briskly, that they wounded several, and routed the rest; some were dismounted in the pursuit, and trodden under foot; others taken prisoners, which misfortune COMIUS escaped by the swiftness of his horse: But VOLUSENUS, being dangerously wounded, almost beyond hope of recovery, was carried back to the camp. COMIUS having thus either revenged the injury he had received, or lost the greatest part of his men, sent ambassadors to ANTONY,

Volusenus  
sent to pursue  
Comius.

Comius  
wounds  
Quadratus.

Comius and  
his party  
routed.

to let him know he would deliver hostages for his future obedience, that he would live where, and in what manner he should think fit to prescribe, provided he would so far indulge his fear, as that he need not be obliged to behold the face of any Roman. ANTONY thought his apprehensions so justly grounded, that he accepted his hostages, and granted his desire.

WAR IN  
GAUL.  
Comius sur-  
renders.

CHAP. XII.

CÆSAR, I know, has divided each year's campaign into separate books, which I have not thought necessary, since in the following year, under the consulat of D. PAULUS and C. MARCELLUS, nothing memorable was transacted in Gaul: however, that the world might not be ignorant where CÆSAR and his army were during this time, I have added a short account to the present Commentary.

Hirtius's  
proem to the  
last cam-  
paign.

49. Whilst CÆSAR passed his winter in Belgium, he made it his chief business to keep the several states in amity, to take away all hopes of another revolt; for he desired to bring the country into so peaceable a condition, that he should not be obliged to make war at his departure, lest when he marched his army away, there might be some embers left, which the Gauls would willingly blow up, when they apprehended no present danger. Wherefore treating each country very honourably, making the noblemen considerable presents, and imposing no new taxes, he easily kept the kingdom of Gaul in obedience by his gentle usage, already tired out with so many, and so successful efforts.

50. The winter being over, contrary to his custom, he took post for Lombardy, to visit the chief towns, and Roman colonies there, to whom he had recommended his quaestor M. ANTONY's suit for the priesthood; being the more studious of gaining the people's affections, not only for the sake of his particular friend, whom he had sent not long before to make interest for that office, but to oppose a small faction, who designed, through the repulse of ANTONY, to wound CÆSAR's credit upon quitting his province. And though he was informed upon the road, before he arrived in Lombardy, that ANTONY was already made augur, still he thought it necessary to continue his journey, that he might return thanks to the chief towns and colonies for appearing and voting for his friend; as

Cæsar goes  
into Lom-  
bardy.

WAR IN GAUL. likewise that he might secure their interest on his own behalf for the honour he designed to be candidate for the ensuing year; and this the rather because his enemies made their boast that L. LENTULUS and C. MARCELLUS had been created consuls, on purpose to strip CÆSAR of all his honours and dignities: and SERGIUS GALBA put by (notwithstanding he had the majority of votes) for being his professed friend, and having served under him as his lieutenant.

He is received with great demonstrations of joy.

51. CÆSAR was received with wonderful respect and affection wherever he came, for this was the first time of his return from the general revolt of Gaul; nothing was omitted that the people could invent for the ornament of the gates, roads, and ways through which he was to pass; sacrifices were offered up in every place; all the people came out to meet him with their children; the temples and market-places were adorned with carpets, and you would have imagined preparations had been made for a glorious triumph; so great was the magnificence of the richer, and desire of the poorer sort, to express their satisfaction.

He makes Labienus governor of Lombardy.

The factions at Rome against Cæsar,

52. Having quickly visited all parts of Lombardy, he returned with great dispatch to Arras, and drawing his legions out of their quarters to the borders of Treves, went thither to review them: after which he made T. LABIENUS governor of Lombardy, that he might secure votes there for the consulat; travelling from place to place the rest of the summer, as he thought convenient for exercise and health. Though he was often informed that LABIENUS was solicited by his enemies, and assured there was a design carried on at Rome by a small faction, to take away part of his army from him, by virtue of a decree from the senate, yet he neither gave credit to what was reported of LABIENUS, nor could be induced to do any thing contrary to the senate's authority: for he doubted not but he should gain his desires, provided the senators were permitted to give their votes freely; because C. CURIO, tribune of the people, who had undertaken the defence of CÆSAR's cause and dignity, had often propounded to the senate, since they had apprehensions of CÆSAR's army, that he and POMPEY too, whose over-grown power did not a little awe the courts, might both disband their force, and lay down their arms, that the city might be entirely free: nor did he only propound this, but began to take the votes of the house upon it; but the consuls, and POMPEY's friends, to prevent any further progress, interposed, so that they broke up without coming to any resolution.

53. It was a strong argument of the senate's favour to **CÆSAR**, and agreeable to their former justice; that when **MARCELLUS** the year before, to diminish **CÆSAR**'s credit (contrary to the edict of **POMPEY** and **CRASSUS**) proposed sending a successor to **CÆSAR**'s province before his commission was expired, and took the votes of the members upon it, the question passed in the negative in a full house. Yet this did not discourage his enemies, but was rather an incitement to them to strengthen their power that they might bring the senate to a compliance.

54. Not long after the senate decreed, that **POMPEY** and **CÆSAR** should each detach a legion to the Parthian war; but it plainly appeared both were taken from **CÆSAR**; for the first legion which **POMPEY** had formerly furnished him with, was levied in **CÆSAR**'s province, and therefore properly belonged to him: yet **CÆSAR**, though all the world might see the intention of his enemies, sent **POMPEY** that legion again; and for his own part, in obedience to the senate's decree, sent the fourth legion, which was quarter'd in Lombardy, to Parthia. So that to supply its place, he detached the thirteenth to Italy. After this he dispersed his army into their winter-quarters; **C. TREBONIUS**, with four legions, he placed in Belgium; **C. FABIUS**, with as many, in Autun; for he thought it the securest way to keep the Gauls in subjection, to set a guard upon the courage of the Belgæ, and the authority of the Autunois.

55. After this, he went himself to Lombardy, where he was informed the two legions he had dismissed, which according to the decree of the senate should have been sent to the Parthian war, were given, by the consul **C. MARCELLUS**, to **POMPEY**, and quartered still in Italy. Tho' this was an undeniable proof that **CÆSAR**'s enemies prepared to make war upon him, yet he firmly resolved to endure all things, so long as there was any hope left of composing them by a civil determination, rather than have recourse to the sword.

### The End of **CÆSAR**'s war with the Gauls.



Book VIII. COMMENTARIES.  
C. J. CÆSAR'S  
COMMENTARY  
OF THE  
CIVIL WAR.

*Because this book begins abruptly, DIONYSIUS VOSSIUS has, in his remarks, collected out of PLUTARCH, APPIAN and DIO, as much as was necessary to make a connection between this and the former Commentary; which I have rendered into English, but marked with an inverted comma, to distinguish it from the text.*

The CONTENTS of the FIRST BOOK.

*The causes of the civil war. CÆSAR gains the possession of all Italy. Besieges POMPEY in Brundisium. Takes the town, but POMPEY escapes. CÆSAR's party prevails against COTTA in Sardinia, and CATO in Sicily. CÆSAR marches to Rome. Returns to Gaul. Then besieges Marseilles. His success in Spain.*

VOSSIUS's supplement.

Cæsar writes to Rome to get his commission renewed, and to obtain the consulat. "CÆSAR having now subdued the whole kingdom of Gaul, for several reasons went to his province; from whence he sent deputies to Rome, to obtain the consulat, and get his commission renewed: when his demands were propounded, POMPEY neither opposed nor furthered the motion, for though





P OF THE  
EMPIRE  
According to  
Ptolemy





11

though he was averse to CÆSAR's interest, he had not yet professed himself his open enemy. But the consuls, LENTULUS and MARCELLUS, who had already declared in favour of the opposite faction, left nothing omitted to disappoint him: nor was this the only injury MARCELLUS did him, for CÆSAR had lately planted a colony at Novo-Comum, and MARCELLUS, not contented to deprive them of the freedom of Rome, committed their mayor, nay, ordered him to be whipped, and then dismissed to make his complaints to CÆSAR; an ignominy never yet inflicted on any Roman citizen. Whilst these affairs were in agitation, C. CURIO, tribune of the people, who had done his utmost to serve the republick, and promote CÆSAR's cause, at last finding all his endeavours in vain, fled from Rome to avoid the malice of his adversaries, and to inform CÆSAR of his enemies designs against him. CÆSAR received very kindly a person of CURIO's quality and merit, and returned him thanks for the many friendly offices he had done him. CURIO advised him, since his enemies openly prepared to make war upon him, immediately to draw his army together, and rescue the republick out of the hands of that faction, under whose tyranny it laboured. But though CÆSAR was convinced of the truth of CURIO's report, yet he resolved to demonstrate so particular a regard to the republick, that no man might justly accuse him of being the cause of a civil war in it; therefore he only solicited for leave to continue in the government of the Roman province of Italy and Illyricum with two legions: which he did to compromise the differences betwixt him and his enemies in an amicable manner, and preserve the republick in peace. These demands were so reasonable, that even POMPEY himself could not oppose them; but at last, CÆSAR finding he could meet with no justice from the consuls, writ a letter to the senate, wherein having briefly enumerated the meritorious actions he had done for the republick, he intreated them that he might have liberty to put up for consul the ensuing year, without appearing in person at Rome: he assured them he should not refuse to disband his army, if the senate and people commanded him, provided POMPEY would do the like; but so long as the other kept his forces standing, there was no reason he should dismiss his soldiers, and leave his person exposed to the malice of

CIVIL  
WAR.Curio comes  
to Cæsar.  
His advice,Cæsar writes  
to the senate,

his

**CIVIL** "his enemies. This letter he committed to **CURIO**  
**WAR.** "charge, who made so much haste to deliver it, that he  
 "arrived at Rome (160 miles distant from the place where  
 "he took horse) within three days, which was before the  
 "beginning of January, and e'er the consuls had come to  
 "a final resolution concerning the renewal of **CÆSAR**'s  
 "commission. Being arrived, he kept the letter by him  
 "till it could be read in full senate, when the tribunes of  
 "the people were present, being apprehensive it might  
 "be suppressed, if deliver'd at another time."

Curio deli-  
 vers the let-  
 ter.

## CHAPTER I.

**THE** consuls having received **CÆSAR**'s letter, were  
 unwillingly prevailed on by the importunity of the tribunes  
 of the people, to suffer it to be read in open senate; but  
 would not permit his demands to be put to the vote. The  
 consuls proposed that the means for preserving the peace of  
 the republic should be the subject of their present debate.  
 Upon which the consul **L. LENTULUS** said, he should not  
 be wanting either to the senate or people, provided they  
 would deliver their sentiments freely; but if they stood in  
 awe of **CÆSAR**, or were desirous to oblige him as formerly,  
 he knew what methods to take, and would not regard  
 their authority; for he could as easily find means to render  
 himself acceptable to **CÆSAR** as any of them. **SCIPIO**  
 spoke much to the same purpose, adding, that **POMPEY**  
 would not be wanting to the common-wealth, if the se-  
 nate would stand by him; but if they would not take vi-  
 gorous resolutions, they might hereafter implore his aid in  
 vain.

2. As the senate was held in the city, and **POMPEY**  
 not far out of it, this speech of **SCIPIO** seemed to come  
 from the very mouth of **POMPEY**. But some declared their  
 minds with more moderation, amongst which number was  
**MARCELLUS**, who said, in his opinion, it was not proper  
 for the senate to deliberate on this affair, before they had  
 levied a considerable army in Italy, under whose protec-  
 tion they might vote impartially. **M. CALIDIUS** was for  
 sending **POMPEY** to his government, to take away the  
 occasion of discord; for, he said, **CÆSAR** had reason to think

<sup>a</sup> Literis a **FABIO C.** redditis, &c. **VOSSIUS** is positive (a **FABIO C.**) must  
 be an interpolation: and though they who have rendered **CÆSAR** into other  
 languages, and the nicest Latin critics have acquiesced in this lection, yet it  
 must certainly be a palpable error, for the letters were delivered by **CURIO**;  
**POMPEY** was then proconsul, and could not come into the city,

himself in danger, while POMPEY kept the two legions CIVIL  
WAR. which had been taken from him, near the city. M. RUFUS differed but little from CALIDIUS, but they were all severely reprimanded by LENTULUS, who positively refused to put CALIDIUS's motion to the vote; upon which MARCELLUS was so frightened, that he recanted what he had said. Thus the majority of the senate being intimidated by the consul's speech, by POMPEY's army and friends, at last unwillingly and with compulsion, submitted to SCIPIO's motion: "That if CÆSAR did not disband his army by a day prefixed, he should be proclaimed a traitor." But M. ANTONY and Q. CASSIUS, tribunes of the people, <sup>b</sup> interposed their authority, to prevent the passing of this vote; upon which their prerogative was likewise disputed; the debate was managed with abundance of heat, and he that spoke with the greatest virulence, was most applauded by the enemies of CÆSAR.

Cæsar ordered to disband his army.  
The Tribunes oppose it.

## C H A P. II.

3. **THUS** the senate broke up in the evening, without coming to any determination; and POMPEY having sent for those of them who were of his faction commended the forward, exhorting them to continue in their resolutions; and reproved the more moderate; he sent for many, who, having formerly served under him, obeyed his summons, in hopes of reward and dignities; and commanded likewise several out of the two legions, which had been returned by CÆSAR, to attend his orders on the day for choosing new magistrates. <sup>c</sup> The streets were crowded, and CURIO called out the tribunes of the people to be present at the election: but all the consuls friends, POMPEY's dependants, and those who bore CÆSAR any ancient grudge, flocked into the senate; by whose concurrence and votes the weak were frightened into their measures, the irresolute confirmed in them, and almost every one was precluded from a freedom of choice.

The tumults at the election of magistrates.

L. PISO the censor, and L. ROSSIUS the prætor, professed to go to CÆSAR, and acquaint him with the state of affairs, desiring only six days respite to compleat their negociation; and others proposed that deputies should be sent to acquaint CÆSAR with the pleasure of the senate.

<sup>b</sup> For the tribunes had a negative vote.

<sup>c</sup> A corrupt passage in the original: the most ingenious emendation is that of Dr. Jurin, *Complentur curiæ aditus & comitum tribunis militum, centurionibus, evocatis, &c.* i. e. the passages to the place of election were filled with military tribunes, centurions, and volunteers,



CIVIL  
WAR.Caesar's ene-  
mies.

Cato.

Lentulus.

Scipio.

Pompey.

The senate's  
decrees.

4. All these were over-ruled by the speeches of the consuls, of SCIPIO, and CATO. The latter of these was actuated by the old enmity he bore to CÆSAR, and by a spirit of revenge for having been disappointed of the prætorship; LENTULUS, by the hopes of paying his debts with the profitable command of armies, the government of provinces, and the presents he expected from those monarchs for whom he should procure the title of friends to the Roman people. He had the vanity even to boast amongst his own party, that he doubted not but to make himself a second SYLLA, and obtain the supreme authority in the commonwealth. SCIPIO was prompted with the like expectations of armies and provinces, which he promised himself he should share with his son-in-law POMPEY; with the apprehension of being called to account for his extortions; with the flattery of his dependants, and the authority of his friends, who bore a considerable sway in the commonwealth and courts of judicature. POMPEY incited by CÆSAR's adversaries, and by his own temper, which could not bear an equal in dignity, had broke off all manner of friendship with him, and joined with their common enemies, the greatest part of whom he had raised against CÆSAR during the affinity between them. On the other hand, the reflection on that dishonourable action, of converting those two legions to his own use, which should have been detached to the Asian and Syrian wars, induced him to contrive all means for promoting a civil war.

5. Thus all things were carried on with violence and confusion: CÆSAR's friends had not leisure to acquaint him with the posture of affairs, nor the tribunes to avoid the impending danger, by interposing that authority which SYLLA had left them, to defend the people's liberty: in fine, they were obliged the seventh day after the entrance upon their charge, to provide for their safety; whereas the most seditious tribunes, before that time, were never obliged to render an account of their actions, till the eighth month of their administration. POMPEY's faction had recourse to that rigid decree of the senate, which never used to be put in execution, but when the city was on fire, and all things in a desperate condition: "That the consuls, prætors, tribunes of the people, and proconsuls, should take care to preserve the commonwealth from danger." The

\* For viii<sup>th</sup> month probably should be read xii. viz. at the expiration of their office.

order for enforcing this decree bore date the sixth<sup>f</sup> of J<sup>CIVIL</sup>ANUARY; so that during the five first days of LENTULUS'S WAR. consulship, whilst it was lawful for the senate to sit (except two which had been allowed for the election of magistrates) the tribunes fly to Cæsar in a cart, disguised like slaves. dreadful resolves were pronounced against CÆSAR and the tribunes of the people, men of great worth and honour: whereupon they fled to CÆSAR, who was then at Ravenna, expecting a suitable answer to his modest demands, which he hoped might have reduced all differences to a peaceable state amongst men of the smallest equity.

## C H A P. III.

6. THE day after, the senate assembled without the walls of the city; where POMPEY, according to the instructions he had already given SCIPIO, applauded their constancy and resolution; acquainted them with the number of his forces, that he had ten legions already in arms to defend them; assured them, he was very well satisfied, CÆSAR's army was not well affected to him, and that it would not be in his power to persuade them to follow, or assist him. After this, he proposed several other things to the determination of the senate; first, that forces might be levied throughout all Italy; that FAUSTUS SYLLA might be sent proprætor to Mauritania; that POMPEY might have money delivered to him out of the publick treasury; and that king JUBA might have the title of friend and ally to the people of Rome. But MARCELLUS opposed the last of these; and PHILIPPUS, the tribune of the people, prevented the passing of SYLLA's commission, but the other motions were agreed to. Two consular provinces were decreed to those who had formerly discharged that office, SCIPIO got the government of Syria, and DOMITIUS of Gaul: but the pretensions of PHILIPPUS and MARCELLINUS were over-ruled by the prevailing faction. All the rest were prætorian provinces, to which governors were now sent without the privity or approbation of the people; for having taken the usual oath, they departed to their several commands in a military habit, without further ceremony contrary to the practice of all former ages<sup>g</sup>. The consuls left Rome, private men had Lictors marched be-

A senate held without the city.

<sup>f</sup> For vii id. Jan. should probably be read viii id. Jan. i. e. Jan. 6. because out of the five first days of Jan. the third and fourth were comitial days, as was likewise vii id. or Jan. 7. when the senate could not regularly be held.

<sup>g</sup> Read, paludatique, votis nuncupatis, exeant, quod ante id tempus acciderat nunquam, consules ex urbe proficiscuntur, &c. *Davia.*

CIVIL  
WAR.

fore them in the city and capitol, new levies were made through all Italy; each municipal town was commanded to furnish a certain quantity of arms and money; nor were the temples free from this tax, which made no distinction between things divine and human.

## CHAP. IV.

Cæsar's  
speech to his  
soldiers.

7. CÆSAR, having notice of these affairs, made a speech to his soldiers, wherein "he gave them an account how industrious his enemies had always been to injure him; that they had made a difference between him and POMPEY, who envied CÆSAR's glory and good fortune, though he always promoted POMPEY's honour. He complain'd of innovations in the state, that the authority of the tribunes of the people should be opposed by arms, and depressed by those, who not many years before restored it; for even SYLLA himself, who stripp'd the tribunes of so many prerogatives, yet left them a negative vote; which POMPEY, who pretended to renew their ancient liberties, would now deprive them of. That the decree for the magistrates to provide for the safety of the republick, whereby all people were obliged to repair to their arms, was never known to be put in practice, but in cases of imminent danger, when pernicious laws were made; when the tribunes rebelled; the people revolted, and the temples, or places of strength, were possessed by enemies of the state; crimes which posterity had been deterred from by the fate of SATURNINUS and the GRACCHI. But nothing like this was in agitation now, or even thought of; no law was published, no conspiracy was going forward, nor any revolt made. Wherefore he desired them, that they would defend the honour and reputation of their general against the malice of his enemies, under whose command they had served nine years, and after many successful battles had subdued all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which he had sent for at the beginning of the troubles, and which was then present (the others having not yet left their quarters) unanimously cried out, that they would defend their general and the rights of the people.

The soldiers  
resolve to  
stand by  
him.

## CHAP. V.

Cæsar  
marches to  
Arminium.

8. CÆSAR being assured of the soldiers affections, marched directly with that legion to Rimini, where the tribunes of the people expected him: and on his arrival, sent orders

orders for all the other legions to attend him. Young L. CIVIL  
 CÆSAR, whose father was a lieutenant-general in CÆSAR'S WAR.  
 army, came hither to wait on him; and after having acquainted him with the occasion of his coming, told him he had a private message from POMPEY to deliver; "who was desirous to clear himself so far, that CÆSAR might not think those actions designed to affront him, which were done for the service of the republick; the good of which he always preferred before his private interest: and CÆSAR was likewise obliged in honour to lay aside his passion, nor be too eager to take revenge on his enemies, at the expence of the common-wealth." Something more he added, of his own accord, to the same purpose; and the prætor ROSCIUS had a negotiation of the like nature to transact with CÆSAR on POMPEY'S account.

Pompey's  
 message to  
 Cæsar by  
 L. Cæsar.

Roscius's  
 negotiation.

9. Though these messages contributed very little towards composing the differences, yet having an opportunity of transmitting his thoughts by two such proper messengers, he begg'd the favour of them, that as they had brought POMPEY'S commands, they would likewise acquaint him with CÆSAR'S desires; for possibly so small a labour might put an end to their differences, and deliver all Italy from her fears. "That he always preferred the honour of the Republick to his own life; but he had reason to be disturbed, that the affections of the Roman people should be alienated by the malicious reports of his enemies: that half a year of his commission should be cut off, and he be commanded to return to Rome after the people had already voted him leave to be candidate at the next election for the consulate, though absent; the loss of which honour however he could willingly submit to, for the advantage of the common-wealth. That his desire, in his letter to the senate, that other armies might be disbanded as well as his, could not be granted; that new levies should be made throughout all Italy; that the two legions which were drawn from him, under pretence of being sent to the Parthian war, should be still retained, and Rome be up in arms, were circumstances which seemed to concur to his destruction. However, he was willing to accept of any conditions, and suffer any thing for the sake of his country, let but POMPEY go to his province; both armies be disbanded; Italy lay down her arms; the city be delivered from her apprehensions; the elections left free; the senate and people allowed their ancient liberty in every respect: And to the intent these conditions might be the better performed, let each oblige

Cæsar's  
 answer.



**CIVIL WAR.** oblige himself by oath to observe them: or if POMPEY thought it more convenient, he might either come nearer CÆSAR, or let CÆSAR come to him, to determine their differences by a conference."

Roscus and  
Lucius Cæ-  
sar depart  
for Capua.  
The Consuls  
Reply.

10. ROSCIUS and L. CÆSAR having received this answer, departed for Capua, where finding POMPEY and the Consuls, they delivered CÆSAR's message. After consultation upon it, they returned this reply in writing by the same messengers: "That CÆSAR should leave Rimini, return to Gaul, and disband his army; which conditions performed, POMPEY would then go to Spain. In the mean time, till CÆSAR should give security for the performance of his promise, the consuls and POMPEY should not desist from raising men."

War in Ita-  
ly.

11. CÆSAR thought these conditions very unequal; that he should be obliged to leave Rimini, and return to his government, while POMPEY held provinces, and legions which were none of his own: that he should dismiss his army, whilst the other was raising new forces; and only promised to go to his government, without fixing a day for his departure: an evasion which would have cleared him from breach of faith, though he went not thither till CÆSAR's commission expired. But he plainly perceived there were no hopes of peace, because they had neither appointed a time for a conference, nor promised to come any nearer him.

## CHAP. VI.

M. Antony  
sent to Are-  
tium.  
Cæsar takes  
in Pisaurum,  
Fano, and  
Ancona.

WHEREFORE he sent M. ANTONY with five cohorts to Arezzo, but stay'd himself at Rimini with two more; where he intended to beat up for volunteers. He soon possessed himself of Pisaro, Fano, and Ancona.

Curio takes  
in Inguvium.

Cæsar  
marches to  
Osimo, or  
Auximum.

12. In the mean time, having notice that the people of Inguvium were inclin'd to his interest, which place the Prætor THERMUS held against him with five cohorts, and had caused it to be fortified; he detached three cohorts thither from Pisaro and Rimini, under the command of CURIO: on notice of whose approach, THERMUS, doubting the affection of the people, drew his cohorts out of the town, and fled away: but the soldiers deserted in their march, and returned home again. CURIO was received into the town with great demonstrations of joy; on notice whereof, CÆSAR, relying on his interest in the most considerable towns, brought the remainder of the thirteenth legion out of garrison, and march'd to Osimo, a town possessed by ACTIVS

VARUS

VARUS with several cohorts, who had dispersed some senators round about the country of Pescara to raise recruits.

CIVIL  
WAR.

13. CÆSAR's arrival being known, the burgessees of Osimo went in a body to ACTIUS VARUS, and told him, they would not pretend to determine which party had justice on their side, but neither they, nor any of the municipal towns would shut their gates against so great a general as CÆSAR, whose glorious actions had so well merited from the republick. Wherefore they advised him to consider what would be the consequence of making opposition, and to provide for his safety. Upon this declaration, VARUS drew his garrison out of the town, and marched away: but being pursued by a few of CÆSAR's van-guard, was obliged to halt; and so soon as he began to engage them, was deserted by his party; some of them returned home, and the rest came over to CÆSAR. Amongst the number of the prisoners was L. PUPIUS, first centurion of a legion, who had formerly held the same command under POMPEY: but CÆSAR having commended those that came over to him, dismissed PUPIUS, returned the people of Osimo thanks, and promised never to forget the service they had done him.

The people  
of Osimo re-  
solve to ad-  
mit Cæsar.

Actius Va-  
rus flies a-  
way.

## CHAP. VII.

14. THIS news arriving at Rome, the whole city was so frightened, that when LENTULUS the consul, in pursuance of the senate's decree, was come to Rome, and had opened the treasury to deliver out POMPEY the money, he fled from the city with so much precipitation, that he forgot to lock the inward and most sacred chamber: for a false report was spread that CÆSAR was marching that way, and that his cavalry were already arrived within a small distance of Rome. MARCELLUS, the other consul, with most of the magistrates, followed after. POMPEY was already gone the day before to Apulia, where he had quartered the legions which he received from CÆSAR. In the mean time the levies went not forward in Rome, for no place appeared secure nearer than Capua; where they first began to rally, and to raise recruits in the colonies round about, which had been sent thither by the Julian law. LENTULUS assembling the gladiators, whom CÆSAR had bred up there to entertain the people of Rome, gave them their liberty, and mounted them for his guard. But afterwards, being advised by his friends, who all condemned the action, to

Lentulus's  
cowardice.

He takes the  
gladiators of  
Capua for  
his guard.

**CIVIL** dismisses them, he dispersed them into the neighbouring towns of Campain, to keep garrison there.

**WAR.** *W* 15. CÆSAR in the mean time, having quitted Osimo, made a tour throughout the whole country of Pescara; where he was joyfully received by the governors of every town, who furnished him with necessary provisions for his army. There came deputies from Cingulum (a town

founded and built by LABIENUS, at his own charge) to desire he would honour them with his commands: he accepted of their friendship, and demanded recruits, which

they readily sent. By this time the twelfth legion was come up to his assistance, and with these two he marched to Ascoli, another town of Pescara, which was commanded

by LENTULUS SPINTHER with ten cohorts; who, on advice of CÆSAR'S approach, quitted the town, and endeavoured to retire with his forces; but was deserted by a great part of them: and marching with the remainder, by chance met VIBULLIUS RUFUS, who had been sent by POMPEY

to encourage his party in Pescara. VIBULLIUS thus understanding the posture of affairs, dismissed LENTULUS from his charge, took the soldiers under his command, and assembled as many more of POMPEY'S levies as he could meet with in the neighbouring countries: amongst the rest, six entire cohorts under the command of ULCILLES HIRUS, who had fled from Camerin, where they had been quartered. These forces united, amounted to thirteen cohorts, and with them VIBULLIUS marched by long journeys to join DOMITIUS ÆNOBARBUS at Corfinium; and acquaint him CÆSAR was marching that way with two legions. DOMITIUS had already raised about twenty cohorts in Alba, Marfia, Pelignia, and the adjacent countries.

16. CÆSAR having taken in Ascoli, and driven LENTULUS out of the town, caused an enquiry to be made after those soldiers that deserted him, that they might be listed amongst his own troops: and having staid one day to provide himself with corn, he march'd directly to Corfinium. Upon his approach, DOMITIUS detached five cohorts to break down a bridge over the river, about three miles from the town; but being encounter'd by CÆSAR'S van-guard, they were forc'd from the bridge, and obliged to retire to the town: by which means CÆSAR pass'd the river, arriv'd at the town, and encamped under the walls.

*Cæsar marches to Corfinium, and besieges it.*

*Domitius writes to Pompey for assistance.*

## CHAP. VIII.

17. WHEREUPON DOMITIUS having engaged several couriers, who were well acquainted with the coun-

try, by considerable promises, to carry packers for him to CIVIL POMPEY; he earnestly pressed for supplies, assuring him WAR. it was an easy matter to inclose CÆSAR, by the assistance of the narrow ways, with two armies, and cut off all his provisions: the neglect of which opportunity would necessarily plunge him, thirty cohorts, several senators and Roman knights, into imminent danger. In the mean while, having encouraged his men to behave themselves bravely, he disposed engines on the walls, appointed every man his particular post, and for their encouragement, promised each private soldier four acres of land out of his own estate; and the like in proportion to every centurion or volunteer.

18. Whilst DOMITIUS was making these preparations, CÆSAR had notice that the people of Sulmo were at his devotion, but prevented from declaring by Q. LUCRETIVS a senator, and ATTIVS a Pelignian, who possess'd the town with a garrison of seven cohorts. This place lay about seven miles distant from Corfinium, and CÆSAR immediately on receipt of the message sent M. ANTONY thither with five cohorts of the thirteenth legion. On discovery of his ensigns, the Sulmonenses opened their gates, and the soldiers, as well as citizens, came out to welcome ANTONY. Whereupon LUCRETIVS and ATTIVS endeavoured to make their escape over the wall; but the latter was taken, and being brought to ANTONY, desired he might be sent to CÆSAR. Thus ANTONY having happily completed this affair, returned again the same day with ATTIVS and his troops to CÆSAR, who adding these cohorts to his own, dismissed ATTIVS in safety.

The three first days, after CÆSAR set down before Corfinium, were employ'd in fortifying his camp, and getting provisions from the neighbouring towns; for here he resolved to expect the coming up of the rest of his army. During this time arrived the eighth legion, with twelve cohorts newly raised in Gaul, and about 300 horse sent him by the king of Bavier. Upon which he made a new camp at another part of the town, where he appointed CURIO to command in chief. After this he began to surround Corfinium with a rampier, on which he erected several turrets. This work was almost compleated, when the couriers returned that had been sent to POMPEY.

19. DOMITIUS having read his letter, thought proper to conceal the truth; and declared in council, that POMPEY would immediately come to their assistance. Wherefore he encouraged them valiantly to defend the town, and

This Domitius was the person whom the Senate had appointed to succeed Cæsar in his government,

Domitius's dissimulation.



**CIVIL WAR.** obey those orders which were necessary for defeating the enemy's designs: and in the mean time privately consulted with a few of his particular friends how he might secure his escape. But his countenance and speech seem'd so different, his carriage appear'd so much more confused than before, his conferences in private with his friends were so frequent, and those with the general council so rare, that the truth could no longer be disssembled: For POMPEY, in answer to his demands, had returned, "That he would not hazard the loss of the cause upon so dangerous an issue; that it was neither his desire nor advice that DOMITIUS should throw himself into Corfinium: wherefore, if he had an opportunity of escaping, he would advise him to quit the town, and march to join his army:" Which CÆSAR resolv'd to prevent, by finishing his circumvallation.

Pompey's answer to Domitius's letter.

The garrison mutiny.

20. DOMITIUS's design having taken air, several of the soldiers in the town about evening began to mutiny, and spoke to the tribunes, centurions, and chief officers, to this effect: "That they were besieged by CÆSAR, whose fortifications were now almost compleat; but their General, DOMITIUS, on whose honour they depended, when they embark'd in this cause, without regard to their safety, was meditating an escape: wherefore they were obliged to provide for themselves." At first those of Marsia, dissenting from this resolution, possess'd themselves of the strongest part of the town: and the dispute grew so warm, that it almost came to be decided by the sword. But not long after, being informed, by the messengers that pass'd between them, of DOMITIUS's designs, which they were before ignorant of; they all unanimously agreed to secure DOMITIUS's person, and send deputies to CÆSAR, to acquaint him, they were ready to surrender at discretion, and deliver their General alive into his hands.

The soldiers seize Domitius, send to Cæsar, and proffer to surrender at discretion.

21. On receipt of this message, though CÆSAR was not ignorant of how great importance it was, to gain Corfinium with as much dispatch as possible, and unite the soldiers to his army whilst they were in the humour to come over to him, and before their minds received any fresh impressions by large promises, encouragements, or false reports (for the greatest events in war are subject every moment to change) yet lest entering the town by night his men might let themselves loose to rapine and plunder, having returned the deputies thanks for their proffer, he sent them back, desiring they would secure the gates and walls, the

the remainder of that night, with a very strong guard: **CIVIL WAR.** and he himself disposed his soldiers round about the works he had begun, not at certain distances, as usual, but in one continued rank, where the centinels, touching each other, formed a compleat circle. He ordered the horse and foot officers to patrol about the works, and be careful not only to prevent sallies, but the escape of any particular person: Nor was any man so indolent and remiss as to close his eyes that night, each impatiently expecting the event, and attending the fate of the Corfinians, **DOMITIUS**, **LENTULUS**, and the rest of the besieged.

22. About three in the morning, **LENTULUS SPINTHER** applied himself to our centinels from the walls, telling them he desired he might be indulged the liberty of speaking with **CÆSAR**: which being granted, he came out of the town, attended by some of **DOMITIUS**'s soldiers, who left him not till he arriv'd in **CÆSAR**'s presence. "He entreated **CÆSAR** to pardon his life for the sake of their former friendship; he freely acknowledg'd the great favours he had formerly received from him; that by his interest he had been elected into the college of priests, obtained the province of Spain, when his prætor's charge expired; and was assisted by him, when he was candidate for the consulate." Here **CÆSAR**, interrupting **LENTULUS**, said, "He had not left his government to do any man a prejudice, but to defend himself from the power of his enemies; to restore the tribunes, who had been driven out of Rome, to their lawful dignity; and assert his liberty, and the people's, who were oppress'd by faction." **LENTULUS**, encouraged by this answer, desired leave to return to the town, that the assurance of his safety might revive the rest of the besieged; lest despair should oblige some of them to enter upon fatal resolutions; which was granted, and he departed.

*Lentulus Spintther comes to Cæsar to beg his life.*

*Cæsar's answer.*

23. When day-light appear'd, **CÆSAR** commanded the besieged to bring out all the senators, senators children, tribunes of the soldiers, and Roman knights: amongst the number of senators were found, **L. DOMITIUS**, **P. LENTULUS SPINTHER**, **L. VIBULLIUS RUFUS**, **SEXTUS QUINTILIUS VARUS** the quæstor, **L. RUBRIUS**, besides **DOMITIUS**'s son, and several other young gentlemen, with a great number of Roman knights and chief Burgeesses\*, who had been summoned to attend **DOMITIUS** from the neighbouring towns. He protected them from the insolences of

*Corfinium surrenders.*

*\* Decuriones.*

<sup>h</sup> Which was bounded by the Rubicon that ran between Ravenna and Rimini.

**CIVIL** the soldiers, and having in a few words reminded them of their ingratitude, dismiss'd them all in safety.

**WAR.** Six millions of sesterces in gold, <sup>1</sup> which DOMITIUS had deposited in the publick treasury, were brought to CÆSAR by the duumviri, the two supreme magistrates of the town; but he returned them to DOMITIUS, though he knew they were part of the publick treasure, and had been delivered out to POMPEY for the payment of his army; to convince the world he was as generous as merciful. He commanded

the garrison to be sworn his soldiers, having stay'd only six days before Corfinium, decamped the seventh, when the town surrendered; and after a compleat day's march through the confines of Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates, he arrived in Apulia.

Caesar returns the six millions of sesterces in gold to Domitius, which were brought him.  
Marches thro' Abruzzo, and great part of the kingdom of Naples.

## CHAP. IX.

**Luceria.** 24. POMPEY, on notice of what had passed at Corfinium, leaving Luceria went to Canosa, and from thence to Brindisi, levying what forces he could in all parts of the country. And having armed about 300 slaves and shepherds, he gave them horses, and made them cavalry. In the mean while, the Prætors, L. MANLIUS, and RUTILUS LUPUS, fled away, the first from Alba with six cohorts, and the latter from Terracina, with three, who discovering CÆSAR's cavalry under the command of BIVIVS CURIUS at a distance, deserted the Prætor, and came over to CÆSAR. So the following days several other entire cohorts deserted to us, some joining our foot, and others our cavalry. C. MAGIUS of Cremona, chief engineer to POMPEY, falling in with a party of ours, upon the road, was taken, and brought to CÆSAR, who sent him back to POMPEY with this message; "That since he had not yet obtained an opportunity of conferring with POMPEY, he designed to wait upon him at Brindisi; for it was of great importance to the commonwealth in general, and every member in particular, that they should have an interview, from whence they might be enabled to conclude a treaty; which could not so conveniently be agreed on, when the conditions were to be carried backward and forward at some distance by a third person."

Canusium.  
Pompey flies to Brundisium.  
Rutilus Lupus's three cohorts desert to Caesar.

En, Magius being taken, Caesar sends him back to Pompey with a message,

25. Having dismissed MAGIUS with this message, he marched himself to Brindisi with six legions; three com-

<sup>1</sup> Sestertium sexagies, quod aurum adduxerat Domitius, i. e. about 50,000 l. of our money. Typegr.





to face p. 215



A. Brindisi B. The Haven. C. The Mountain  
up the Mouth of the Haven. D. The Island

City of Brindisi.



Mounts & floats of Timber cast into the Sea to block  
The Island over against the Haven.

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CIVIL  
WAR.Caesar ar-  
rives at  
Brindisium,  
Dyrra-  
chium.Caesar's  
blockade at  
the haven of  
Brindisi.Caesar sends  
Rebilus to  
treat with  
Libo.

posed of veteran soldiers, the others of new levies and deserters: not computing DOMITIUS's cohorts, which he immediately detached from Corfinium for Sicily. On his arrival he was informed that the consuls were gone to DURAZZO with great part of the army: but POMPEY remained in the town with twenty cohorts, yet he could not be satisfied whether POMPEY stay'd there for want of shipping to transport him over, or with a design to secure Brindisi, that he might the more easily command the Adriatick, the country of Greece, and the extreme parts of Italy, and be able to maintain the war on both sides of the gulf. However, lest POMPEY should think it was not in CÆSAR's power to oblige him to quit Italy, he resolved to block up the haven's mouth, and prevent all access to the town. "Which he contrived to do by raising two mounts on either side the mouth of the haven, where the passage was narrowest, and the shores shallow. But where the depth of water prevented works of that nature, close to the mount he placed double floats of timber, thirty foot square in surface, with anchors at each corner, to prevent their being carried away by the waves. To this float thus fixed, he added others to compleat the blockade; covered them all over with earth and fascines, that the soldiers might have the surer footing to defend them; then raised a breast-work, and pent-houses all round the work, and on every fourth float built turrets two stories high, to defend them from burning, and the violence of the ships."

26. To interrupt these works, and destroy our blockade, POMPEY sent out a squadron of large vessels that lay in the haven, on which he erected turrets three stories high, and supplied them with plenty of darts and engines. So that there passed daily skirmishes at a distance with slings, darts, and arrows: but yet CÆSAR conducted himself so prudently, as not to take away all hopes of coming to a composition by treaty. And though he wondered extremely that MAGIUS, whom he had sent to POMPEY, had not yet returned with an answer to his message; tho' he had often attempted a treaty and delayed the execution of his designs in favour of one; yet, still not desisting from the same peaceable resolutions, he sent CANINIUS REBILUS, one of his lieutenants, to confer with SCRIBONIUS LIBO, whose particular friend and near relation he was, desiring him to engage LIBO to be instrumental in bringing about a reconciliation; but above all in procuring CÆSAR an interview with POMPEY, from whence he hoped



**CIVIL WAR.** they might both consent on equal terms to lay down their arms; a mediation, which would greatly redound to LIBO's honour, if it should be so successful as to be the means of a lasting peace. LIBO, having conferred with CANINIUS, went immediately to POMPEY, and not long after returned him this answer, "That POMPEY could not treat during the absence of the consuls." Thus CÆSAR, having so often to no purpose essay'd amicable measures, thought it time to lay aside any further thoughts of a treaty, and to do himself justice by the sword.

Pompey's  
answer.

## CHAP. X.

Pompey's  
fleet returns  
to Brindisi  
before Cæ-  
sar's works  
are com-  
pleat,

Pompey  
blocks up all  
the avenues  
to Brindisi;

and prepares  
to go on  
board,

The besieged  
give Cæsar  
notice of it,

Pompey's  
soldiers go  
on board,  
and weigh  
anchor,

27. CÆSAR had already spent nine days about his works, which were almost half compleated, when the ships, which had transported the consuls with part of the army to Durazzo, returned to Brindisi; whereupon POMPEY, either apprehending the consequence of CÆSAR's works, or having long before designed to quit Italy, so soon as the fleet arrived, prepared for his departure. And to moderate the shock of CÆSAR's attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town whilst he was marching out, he stopped up every gate, with all the streets and avenues; cut ditches cross the ways, wherein he fixed sharp piles and stakes, covering the surface with turfs and hurdles, and only left two passages open leading towards the haven, which he fortified with strong palisadoes.

Having thus prepared for his departure, he commanded the soldiers to go on board without noise or tumult, leaving only small parties of light-arm'd archers and slingers on the walls, and in the turrets; with orders to quit their posts upon a certain signal, so soon as the rest of the soldiers should be shipped off, and repair to a safe place, where gallies lay ready for them to embark.

28. But the besieged, who had received many injuries and affronts both from POMPEY and his army, were well affected to CÆSAR; and therefore so soon as they knew POMPEY's designs, whilst the soldiers were preparing for their voyage, gave CÆSAR notice of his departure from the tops of their houses: whereupon he immediately commanded his soldiers to repair to their arms, and provide scaling-ladders, that no time might be lost in the execution of his design. Not long before night POMPEY weigh'd anchor, when the soldiers on the wall, receiving the intended signal, quitted their stations, and arrived at the place where

where the gallies attended them. CÆSAR's soldiers in the mean while had scaled the walls, and being advised by the besieged to beware of the <sup>2</sup> piles, which had been fixed by POMPEY's order in the ditches, made a halt, and were at last conducted by a long circuit to the haven; where, by the assistance of some small boats, they seized two of POMPEY's vessels, which stuck upon CÆSAR's mounts.

CIVIL  
WAR.

## C H A P. XI.

29. **THOUGH** CÆSAR was fully persuaded how much it would conduce towards a speedy determination of the war, to equip a fleet, and follow POMPEY cross the seas, before he could have an opportunity of joining his transmarine allies; yet he considered the time it would require to enable him to do it, because POMPEY had taken all the shipping in the harbour along with him, whereby he had effectually prevented an immediate pursuit; so that CÆSAR had no other means left, but to attend the arrival of a navy from remote countries, as Gaul, Ancona <sup>1</sup>, and the Streights, which the season of the year would render tedious and troublesome. On the other hand he thought it might prove of ill consequence to his affairs, that POMPEY's veteran army, and the two provinces of Spain (one of which had been infinitely obliged to POMPEY for many signal favours) should be confirm'd in his interest; that the enemy should have an opportunity of raising more horse, or soliciting Gaul and Italy to forsake him during his absence.

30. Wherefore he resolved at present to desist from pursuing POMPEY, and make an expedition into Spain.

Having ordered the chief burghesses of the municipal towns to provide shipping, and send them to Brindisi; he sent lieutenant VALERIUS with one legion to Sardinia; and CURIO, the proprætor, into Sicily with three more; commanding him, so soon as he should have rendered himself master of the island, to transport his army into Africk.

Cæsar re-  
solves to go  
to Spain,  
Sends Va-  
lerius to Sar-  
dinia, Curio  
to Sicily.

MARCUS COTTA was governor of Sardinia, M. CATO of Sicily; and Africk should have fallen to TUBERO's lot. The people of Cagliari, on notice of VALERIUS's expedition, of their own accord, before he had left Italy, expelled COTTA out of their town, who was not a little surprized at this usage; but perceiving the whole island was concerned in it, he left Sardinia, and escaped to Africk.

The Sardi-  
nians expel  
M. Cotta,

<sup>1</sup> Vallum Cæcum, which seems to be much the same with the lillies at the siege of Alife.

<sup>2</sup> For Ancona is the chief port of the Piseni,

**CIVIL WAR.** In the mean while CATO made great preparations; he gave orders for refitting the old galleys in Sicily, for building new, and dispersed his lieutenants to raise forces amongst the Roman citizens in Lucania and Brutia, commanding every district in his government to furnish him with a particular quota of horse and foot. His levies were almost compleated, when he received news of CURIO's arrival; whereupon he publicly complained, that he had been betrayed by POMPEY, who had plung'd the republick into an unnecessary war, assuring him and the rest of the senate, that he had taken care for all kind of necessary provisions, whereas he had provided nothing. Having thus declared his mind, he likewise abdicated his province, as COTTA had done before.

Cato's cowardice.

Valerius gains Sardinia; Curio Sicily.

Tubero disappointed of his government.

31. Thus VALERIUS found Sardinia, and CURIO Sicily, without a governor, when they landed their armies there.

TUBERO, on his arrival in Africk, found the country commanded by ACTIUS VARUS; who, as we have already remarked, having lost his cohorts at Osimo, had immediately returned into Africa, and without commission possessed himself of the government, which he found vacant. Here, by the interest and knowledge he had of the people and country, he soon levied two legions; for not long before, he had governed that province, after the expiration of his Prætorship. TUBERO arrived at Utica with his fleet, but was prohibited entering either the town or haven by VARUS, who denied him the liberty of setting his son ashore at that time under a fit of sickness, and obliged TUBERO, without further delay, to weigh anchor, and be gone.

## CH A P. XII.

Cæsar goes to Rome, and calls a senate.

His speech.

32. THESE affairs thus dispatched, that his soldiers might have some respite from fatigue, CÆSAR disposed them into the nearest municipal towns, and went to Rome: where having called a senate, he laid before them an account of the injuries he had received from his enemies. He told them, "He never had aspired to extraordinary dignities, and, content to have waited the prescribed interval of time for the consulate, desired only those privileges which were common to every citizen: that a decree had been passed by ten tribunes, empowering him, tho' absent, to be a candidate, in spite of the opposition made by his enemies, but especially by CATO, who, according to his usual custom, took up, in tedious harangues, some of the comitial days entire: a decree, I say, was made while POMPEY him-  
self

self was consul, who might have prevented its passing, had he disapprov'd it: but if he then thought convenient to allow it, CÆSAR knew no reason why he should afterwards deprive him of the benefit of the people's affections. As for him, he had given sufficient proofs of his patience, since of his own accord he had proposed, that both parties should lay down their arms; which might have been of fatal consequence to his honour and dignity. But such was the malice of his enemies, that they refused to comply with those propositions which they made to others; rather choosing to plunge all things into confusion, than part with the command of armies. Here likewise he enlarged on the injustice they had done, in taking away two of his legions; their cruel and insolent behaviour in violating the authority of the tribunes; his repeated offers of peace and a conference, which could never be granted. Wherefore he desired and conjured them, to take the Republick into their protection, and assist him to govern it: but if their fears persuaded them to decline the proffer, he should not much importune them to accept it; for he would assume the sole administration into his own hands. However, in the mean while, it was necessary to send ambassadors to treat about a composition; for he valued not POMPEY's opinion, which he had lately declared in the senate, that sending ambassadors to any one necessarily imply'd a greater power and pre-eminence in the person they were sent to, and apparent fear in the sender; since his soul was acted by superior maxims, and as he had endeavoured to surpass the rest of mankind in warlike and noble actions, so he was ambitious of excelling in justice and equity."

33. The senate approved well enough of this embassy; but no deputies could be found. For POMPEY had declared, before his departure, that he should esteem those who stay'd behind in Rome, equally guilty with those in CÆSAR's camp; which deterred every one from undertaking the office. In fine, three days were consumed in debates and excuses; for the tribune, LUCIUS METELLUS<sup>m</sup>, had been engaged by the contrary faction to protract the time, and oppose whatever CÆSAR should offer.

<sup>m</sup> This METELLUS was the person that opposed CÆSAR's taking the publick treasure, till his malice submitted to his fear: but our author has omitted this passage, for which reason some critics have taxed him with want of integrity. I should rather attribute this omission to forgetfulness, since we have so strong an argument of his plain dealing in his speech just before. CÆSAR certainly wanted not the courage to avow all his actions to posterity; and he who mistakes him for so shallow a politician, as to think he imagined he could suppress the memory of this, by leaving it out of his Commentaries, must be a very great stranger to his character.



## CHAP. XIII.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Caesar leaves  
Rome, goes  
to the fur-  
ther Gaul.

Marseilles  
shuts her  
gates against  
Caesar.  
Strabo l. 4.  
These fif-  
teen were a  
particular  
magistracy,  
as the coun-  
cil of ten at  
Venice.  
Caesar has a  
conference  
with the  
magistrates  
of Mar-  
seilles.  
Their an-  
swer.

CÆSAR perceiving their designs, after some days spent to no purpose, that he might lose no more, quitted Rome, leaving the designs unexecuted, which brought him thither, and went into the further Gaul.

34. On his arrival there, he was informed that POMPEY had sent VIBULLIUS RUFUS into Spain; who not long before had been taken at Corfinium, and dismissed; that DOMITIUS was gone to Marseilles with eight gallies fitted out at Igilium and Cosa, mann'd by his own servants, enfranchised slaves and plough-men: and that POMPEY, before his departure from Rome, having secured several young noblemen of Marseilles in his interest, had sent them thither to prevent the former offices of friendship he had done them from being blotted out of their memory, by those they had since received from CÆSAR. On receipt of this message, the people of Marseilles called in their ancient allies, the Albici, to their assistance (a barbarous people, that inhabit the mountains round about their country). set up forges to make arms, got provisions from the neighbouring fields and castles, repaired their walls and gates, refitted their navy, and refused to give CÆSAR admittance into their town.

35. Wherefore having sent for fifteen of the most considerable persons in the city, to prevent the war from beginning at Marseilles, he advised them rather to follow the example of all Italy, than be governed by any particular person; not forgetting such other motives as might incline them to embrace more prudent resolutions. The deputies returned home and brought him this answer from the government; "That understanding the people of Rome were divided into two factions, they neither had judgment nor authority sufficient to decide whether party had justice on their side; especially since POMPEY and CÆSAR, the two patrons of their country, headed the different factions: for they had been obliged to the former for the revenues of the lower Languedoc and Vivarais; and to the other, for augmenting their yearly tributes by a part of Gaul, after his conquest there. Wherefore since they were equally indebted to them both, they resolved to declare for neither, but stand neuter; without admitting POMPEY or CÆSAR into their city or haven."

Domitius  
received into  
the town,  
made Govern-  
or.

36. But whilst this treaty was in agitation, DOMITIUS arriving at Marseilles with his fleet, was received into the town, made governor of the place, and had the chief management of the war committed to his charge. He ordered the navy to cruise round the coasts, command-

ing them to seize upon all the merchants vessels they could find; and with the timber, nails, and tackle of such as were most crazy, to refit the rest. All the corn in the city, and all kind of necessary provisions, were laid up in the publick arsenal, that they might be prepared for a siege, if CÆSAR should invest the town.

Whereupon CÆSAR, provoked by these injuries, marched with three legions to Marseilles, resolved to build turrets, vines, and such other works as were necessary to storm the town; and gave orders for building twelve galleys at Arles, which were fitted out, equipped with all things necessary, and brought to Marseilles, within thirty days after the timber was felled. He made D. BRUTUS Admiral of this Squadron, and left C. TREBONIUS to carry on the siege.

Cæsar resolves to besiege Marseilles.

## C H A P. XIV.

37. WHILEST these preparations were going forward, CÆSAR sent C. FABIVS, with three<sup>a</sup> legions that were quartered about Narbon, into Spain before him; with orders to secure the passage over the Pyrenean hills as soon as possible, which was guarded by a party of L. AFRANIUS's army: and commanded the legions that lay further off to follow after. FABIVS, according to his orders, made haste to the mountains, obliged the party to quit their post, and from thence travelled by long marches towards AFRANIUS's army.

Cæsar sends C. Fabius with three legions into Spain. Fabius gains the passage o'er the Pyrenean hills.

38. We have already taken notice that POMPEY dispatched VIBULLIUS RUFUS into Spain, which he had divided between<sup>o</sup> AFRANIUS, VARRO, and PETREIUS,

<sup>a</sup> It should be four legions. See §. 40.

<sup>o</sup> In the original 'tis AFRANIUS, PETREIUS, and VARRO, but certainly the names must be transposed; for if VARRO, who is placed the third, possessed Lusitania and Vettonum Ager, or rather Bætica (for that province is divided from the Lusitania by the river Guadiana) what can be the meaning of the following sentence, that PETREIUS should march with all his forces out of Lusitania, through Bætica, to join AFRANIUS: for though I should agree that both VARRO and PETREIUS possessed different parts of Lusitania at the same time (for what else could CÆSAR mean by that division, from the Castilian forest to the Guadiana) yet I cannot conceive why PETREIUS, if he was in the northern part of Lusitania (as I shall endeavour to demonstrate) should take so unnecessary a circuit to cross the Guadiana twice, and march through Bætica to Herda or Lerida in Catalonia, since there was no enemy to oppose his passage the nearer way. CÆSAR only divides Spain into two provinces, the nearer and the farther; but CLUVER into three; Bætica, Lusitania, and Tarracoenfis. The first of these contains Granada, Andalusia, Estremadura, and part of new Castile; the second, Portugal, with part of old and new Castile; but the third, which was by much the largest, did not only contain Murcia, Valencia, Catalonia, Arragon, Navar, Biscay,

three

**CIVIL** three of his lieutenants: the first of these commanded the nearer Spain, with three legions; the second, from the Castilian forest to the river Guadiana, with two; the third, Bætica, and all the southern parts of Portugal, from the river Guadiana to the sea, with the like number. On **VIBULLIUS**'s arrival it was resolved, that **PETREIUS** should march with all his forces out of Lusitania through Bætica, to join **AFRANIUS**; whereupon **PETREIUS** began to levy both horse and foot in Lusitania, as **AFRANIUS** did in Celtiberia, Cantabria, and those other barbarous countries towards the northern sea. **PETREIUS** having compleated his levies, immediately marched through Bætica to **AFRANIUS**, and both resolved to make Lerida the seat of war, because the country lay so convenient for their purpose.

**Afranius**  
and **Petreius**  
their forces.  
Scutati and  
Cetrati.

Viz. The  
legions that  
had orders  
to follow af-  
ter **Fabius**.

**Cæsar's** po-  
lity in bor-

39. We have already observed that **AFRANIUS** had three legions, **PETREIUS** two; besides these, they had levied about eighty cohorts of small and large target-bearers in both the provinces of Spain, with near 5000 cavalry. **CÆSAR**, on the other hand, had sent his legions into Spain, with 6000 auxiliary foot, and 3000 horse, which had served under him during all his former wars, and he was furnished with the like number of volunteers from the several states of Gaul, the flower of their country; but the most warlike of these were the highlanders of Gascoigne. Having notice that **POMPEY** was marching with his legions through Africk to Spain, and would e'er long arrive there, **CÆSAR** borrowed money from the chief of

Asturia, Gallæcia, and Leon, but also part of both Castiles. This Provincia *Terracensis*; which is all one with the nearer Spain, you perceive, was entirely engrossed by **AFRANIUS**; **PETREIUS**, at the same time, commanded the Provincia Bætica with Lusitania, that is, the southern parts of Lusitania; for if he had the entire province, what would become of **VARRO**? He therefore, no doubt, commanded the northern part of Lusitania, as low as Lisbon, and from thence extending eastward, in a direct line, as far as Calatrava: for the river Guadiana divides this part of Lusitania from the Provincia Bætica, all the way between Badajos and Calatrava. But **PETREIUS**, who had part of his legions quartered in the southern Portugal, and part about Estremadura, lay ready to execute these orders, and at his departure left the entire command of the farther province, which in **CÆSAR**'s time contained both Lusitania and Bætica, to **VARRO**. One thing we may remark from this division; viz. that they who derive the original name of the kingdom of Castile from the castles that were built in that country by the Goths and Vandals, to put a stop to the incursions of the Moors, who had over-run the entire Provincia Bætica, must own themselves mistaken, till they can find out another interpretation for *Salus Castellonenfis*; for the Goths and Vandals got no footing there themselves, till about 400 years after the birth of our Saviour, and the Moors not before 320 years after them, which is about 800 years after **CÆSAR** wrote his Commentaries. Monsieur *D'ABLANCOURT* indeed has rendered this *Salus Castellonenfis*, Castlona, or his editor for him in the margin; but if Castlona be a town in Andalusia, it can never quadrate with **CÆSAR**'s meaning.

ficers

officers of his army, which he distributed amongst his soldiers: by which means he gained two considerable points at the same instant; for he made it the officers' interest to adhere to his party, and secured the soldiers' hearts by his liberality.

40. **FABIUS**, in the mean while, left nothing unattempted towards gaining the country round about to his party, by his letters and ambassadors. He had already cast two bridges cross the Sicoris, about four miles distant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, because he had consumed all the provisions on this side the river: **POMPEY**'s lieutenants, for the same reason, imitated his example, which occasioned several skirmishes between our cavalry. It happened one day, that two of **FABIUS**'s legions, being out upon duty to guard the foragers, according to custom, had passed the river, when the carriages and cavalry following after, so over-loaded the bridge, already weakened by the swelling of the river, that it broke down, and the horse were precluded from joining the foot: which **PETREIUS** and **AFRANIUS** perceiving, by the hurdles and other materials that came swimming down with the stream, immediately detached four legions with all their cavalry, cross the bridge that lay nearest the town and their camp, with orders to attack **FABIUS**'s two legions. On their approach, **L. PLAN-**

CIVIL  
WAR.

rowing money of his officers towards his Spanish expedition.

**FABIUS** built two bridges cross the Sicoris.

**FABIUS**'s foragers attacked on the breaking of the bridge.

But **FABIUS** detaches two legions to sustain his men;

whereupon the engagement ceases.

**PLAN-**cus, who commanded the foraging guard, found himself obliged to gain the higher ground, and make a double front, to prevent being surrounded by **AFRANIUS**'s cavalry. Notwithstanding the disadvantage of number, he bravely received the charge of their horse and infantry, till the standards of two legions, which **FABIUS** had sent over the further bridge to sustain his party, were descry'd at a distance; for he suspected **POMPEY**'s lieutenants would lay hold of that opportunity to fall upon his men: on the arrival of these two legions, the engagement ceased, and both parties returned to their several camps.

## CHAP. XV.

41. **WITHIN** two days after **CÆSAR**'s arrival in the camp with a guard of 900 horse, the bridge which had been broken down was almost rebuilt, and he gave orders for finishing the remaining part by night. Having taken a view of the place, he left six cohorts for a guard to his camp and baggage, and marched the day after with his army drawn up into three lines towards Lerida, where he offered

**CÆSAR** arrives in the camp, gives orders for repairing the bridge, and marches towards Lerida.

fered



CIVIL  
WAR.

Afranius draws out his forces to confront him, but does not fight.

Cæsar cuts a ditch in his rear, and encamps.

He cuts a ditch round about his camp fifteen foot broad.

Afranius draws out his forces to divert the works, to no purpose.

ferred AFRANIUS battle on an even ground : whereupon AFRANIUS drew out his forces, and disposed them on the middle of the hill before his camp. But CÆSAR perceiving he declined the engagement, resolved to encamp about 400 paces from the foot of the mountain. And lest the soldiers should be interrupted in their works by sudden attacks from the enemy, he order'd them not to throw up a rampier as usually, but only to cut a ditch fifteen foot broad in front, towards the enemy. The first and second lines, according to command, continued in order of battle, and the third had dispatched their business before AFRANIUS discovered that CÆSAR designed to encamp there.

In the evening CÆSAR drew his legions within this ditch, and ordered them to lie that night upon their arms. The day after he stirr'd not out of the place ; and because he must have been obliged to send a great way for materials to compile a rampier, he contented himself for the present, to surround his camp on all sides only with a ditch of the same breadth with the former ; and allotted a several legion to compleat each side of the work, commanding the rest of his forces to be ready to receive the enemy's charge. In the mean time PETREIUS and AFRANIUS, to divert the soldiers from going forward with the work, drew down their legions to the foot of the hill, and provoked them to engage. However, CÆSAR, depending on the three legions which were ready at their arms, and the defence of his ditch, did not omit carrying on his works : which the enemy observing, advanced no farther than the side of the hill ; where they continued not long, before they returned to their camp. The third day, CÆSAR having fortified his with a rampier, sent orders to the cohorts and baggage, which he had left behind, to decamp, and come up to him.

## CHAP. XVI.

43. BETWEEN Lerida and the next hill, where PETREIUS and AFRANIUS were encamped, lay a plain about 300 paces over ; in the midst of which was a gentle rising ground, something higher than the valley round about. CÆSAR hoped, if he could but render himself master of this place, to intercept the enemy's communication with the town and bridge, and deprive them of those convoys they used to receive from thence. Wherefore having made a draught of three legions, he ranged them in order of battle, and commanded the first line of one to

run

run before, and gain the place: which AFRANIUS perceiving, dispatched his advanced guard a nearer way to the same post: they disputed the matter warmly on both sides, but AFRANIUS's party, who came thither first, having the advantage of the ground, obliged our men to retire, and being reinforced by fresh supplies, forced them to fly for shelter to the legions.

CIVIL  
WAR.

A bloody  
skirmish be-  
tween confi-  
derable par-  
ties of both  
armies.

44. The manner of their soldiers fighting was this, first to make a furious charge, in order to gain a particular post, without regard to ranks and files, fighting desperately in small parties on every side; and if they found themselves warmly received, they thought it no disgrace to retire, being accustomed to this kind of engagement, by their frequent rencounters with the Lusitanians, and the other barbarous people of Spain: for soldiers generally acquire the particular customs of the country where they have served for a considerable time. But our men were extremely surprized at this new way of engagement; who seeing every foldier quit his rank, and run disorderly up and down, were apprehensive of being surrounded on all sides, whilst they were obliged to keep their order, and not to quit their post or standard but upon some very extraordinary occasion. Thus the first line being routed, the legion likewise in that wing gave ground, and retired to the next hill.

The way  
Afranius's  
foldiers  
fought.

45. Whereupon CÆSAR, finding the whole army surprized at this extraordinary accident, detached the ninth legion to sustain his party, and put a stop to the career of the enemy's pursuit. His orders were so well performed, that the enemy, though flush'd with success, were obliged in their turn to give ground, and retire for shelter to the walls of Lerida. But the soldiers of the ninth legion being too eager to repair the disgrace of their party, pursued the enemy till they had brought themselves into a disadvantageous place, at the bottom of the hill upon which the town was built; and as they endeavoured to retreat, found themselves charged afresh from the higher ground. The front of this ascent was rough and steep on every side, extending only so far in breadth as was sufficient for drawing up three cohorts: where it was impossible to relieve them, or to support them with the cavalry. From the town, indeed, the descent was something easier, about 400 paces in length, which furnished our men with an opportunity of extricating themselves from the disadvantage their rashness had brought them into. Here the fight was obstinately maintained, though with great inequality on our side, as well on account

Cæsar's  
party at first  
routed.

The ninth  
legion sent  
to relieve  
them.  
Rout the  
enemy.

Pursue too  
eagerly, fall  
into a disad-  
vantageous  
place.

The fight  
renew'd.

CIVIL  
WAR.

of the narrowness of the place, as the advantage the enemy had, by being masters of the rising ground, from whence no javelin fell in vain; yet our men bravely encountered with all these difficulties, and patiently endured the wounds they received: the enemy perpetually received supplies, and fresh cohorts were frequently sent through the town to relieve the wearied; which obliged CÆSAR to detach parties thither for the like purpose.

Both parties  
retreat.

ex primo  
hæcato.

The various  
opinions of  
this day's  
success.

The Sicoris  
overflows its  
banks, and  
breaks down  
both Fabi-  
us's bridges.

46. The engagement had now continued four hours without intermission, when our men, who had spent all their piles and javelins, bravely charged the enemy with sword in hand; and having killed some, obliged the rest to fly, notwithstanding the advantage of the upper ground. Thus having driven some into the town, and the rest under the walls, they easily obtained an opportunity of retreating; for our cavalry, striving against the steepness of the ascent, mounting on either side to the top of the hill, and riding between both armies, secured our retreat: so many, and so various were the turns of fortune in this rencounter. About seventy of our men were killed in the first charge; amongst which number fell Q. FULGINIUS, who had been first centurion of the hastati in the fourteenth legion, and who had raised himself from inferior ranks to the honourable post he was now in, by his extraordinary merit; and above 600 were wounded. On AFRANIUS's side were killed T. CÆCILIUS, first centurion of a legion, four more centurions of inferior orders, and above 200 common soldiers.

47. Yet so various were the opinions of this day's success, that each party thought they had the better of it. AFRANIUS's soldiers, because, though to all appearance the weaker, yet they so long sustained our assault; and because they first possessed and maintained the post, which was the occasion of the dispute, and obliged our men, on the first rencounter, to give ground: But ours, because they had maintained the fight five hours together notwithstanding the inequality of place and number; because they had forced their way up the rising ground with sword in hand, and obliged the enemy to retire into the town, notwithstanding they had the advantage of the hill. However, after the engagement was over, AFRANIUS fortified the mount for which we contended, and placed a garrison on it.

48. During the two days that this affair was in agitation, there happened a very unfortunate accident; the weather was so tempestuous, that it raised the water to a greater height than was ever known in that country; the snow ran down

down so violently from all the mountains round about into the Sicoris, that the river overflowed its banks, and in one day were destroyed both the bridges which **FABIUS** had built; which reduced the army to great extremities. For we have already observed, that our forces were encamped between the two rivers, <sup>a</sup> Cinga and Sicoris, which for the space of thirty miles together were neither of them fordable. The army being thus blocked up within this narrow compass, the countries which had declared in favour of **CÆSAR**, could not supply him with provisions; the foragers could not return again because the waters were out; nor could the convoys and recruits, which came from Gaul and Italy, find means of arriving at the camp.

To add to these difficulties, the season of the year rendered provisions very scarce, for the last year's corn was all consumed, and that on the ground was hardly ripe. All the countries round about were emptied, for **AFRANIUS**, before **CÆSAR**'s arrival, had carried most of the corn to Lerida; and that small remainder which was left, our army had already devoured. As for the cattle, which were our second dependance, the natives had removed them farther off, when their country was appointed the seat of war. Our foragers were greatly incommoded from being pursued by the light-armed Lusitanians, and Spaniards of the higher province, who were acquainted with the course of the country, and easily swam over the rivers, as they never go to war without being provided with bladders, or leathern bags for that purpose.


49. But on the contrary, **AFRANIUS** had plenty of all kind of provisions, for he had laid up great quantities of corn, often received fresh convoys, and had forage enough for his cavalry, the bridge of Lerida furnishing him with all these conveniencies without any danger; for the country beyond the river, which **CÆSAR** could not come at, was wholly untouched.

50. The waters were out several days together; **CÆSAR** did his utmost endeavour to repair the bridges, but the swelling of the river, and the parties which **AFRANIUS** had disposed on the opposite banks, prevented his design; which they might easily do, because of the nature of the river, the height of the water, and the convenience they had of casting their darts, all along the bank, on that particular place where our men were obliged to work: which rendered it

<sup>a</sup> Either here must be something added, or else there is something left out before in this book, for I don't find any mention made of the Cinga.



CIVIL WAR. very difficult for them at the same time to struggle with the force of the stream, and avoid the enemy's darts.



## CHAP. XVII.

51. AFRANIUS had notice of considerable reinforcements and convoys, which were marching to join CÆSAR; but being hindered by the waters, were obliged to make a halt on the river's side: amongst these were archers from Roverge, and cavalry from the Celtic Gaul, with great store of baggage, according to the custom of their country, besides about 6000 more of several forts, with servants and children, who marched without order; for being subject to no commander, every man followed the several dictates of his own humour, travelling up and down the country carelessly, as if the roads were secure as formerly. There were likewise many young gentlemen of quality, senators and knights sons, with ambassadors from several states, and some of CÆSAR's lieutenants; but all their journies were stopp'd by the river.

Afranius marches to attack some convoys and recruits that were coming to Cæsar.

On this advice AFRANIUS marched in the night, with three legions and all his cavalry, to cut them off, and sent his horse before, who fell upon them e'er they were ready to receive them: the Gallic cavalry soon rallied, and engaged them bravely, returning their charge, notwithstanding the disparity of number, so long as they had none but horse to encounter with; but on discovery of the legions' ensigns, some few being slain, the rest retreated to the neighbouring hills. However, this short skirmish was of great advantage to the rest of their party, for it gave them time to rally upon the higher ground: this day we lost about 200 archers, a few cavalry and servants, with a small part of our baggage.

Kills 200 archers, some cavalry and servants.

Great scarcity in Cæsar's camp.

\* About 1l. 13s. 4d. English; some copies read 40 den.

52. But this encreased the price of provisions, as well on account of the present scarcity, as the apprehension of future want: a bushel of corn was sold for \* 50 denarii, the soldiers daily grew more feeble, inconveniencies encreased every day, and a wonderful change appeared in a few days time; so much did fortune favour the enemy, that whilst we laboured under the want of all kind of necessaries, they had plenty of every thing, and were esteemed the victors. CÆSAR left nothing unaffected to redress the present scarcity; he sent to the countries that were in league with him, to furnish him with cattle in defect of corn, and dismissed those that were attendants on the camp to distant places.

53. AFRANIUS, PETREIUS, and their friends, sent CIVIL accounts of this to Rome; and so much had report enlarged WAR. the truth, that the war appeared to be almost at an end: when the couriers arrived at Rome, there was a great course at AFRANIUS's house, and mighty congratulations were made amongst their party; many flock'd out of Italy to POMPEY, some to carry the first account of this grateful news, and others to avoid coming latest, when fortune should have given judgment against CÆSAR's cause.

54. Affairs being reduced to this extremity, CÆSAR perceiving all the passes were guarded by AFRANIUS's parties, and that it was impossible to repair the bridges, gave orders for building such boats as he had formerly observ'd in use among the English; their keels and lower part made of light timber, the sides of wicker covered over with skins: which being thus finished he placed on waggons, to be conveyed by night about twenty-two miles from his camp, and then transported his soldiers in them cross the river; who immediately possessed themselves of a hill on the bank-side, and fortified it before the enemy had notice of their motions. After these, to reinforce the party, he likewise transported a legion; and beginning the work on both sides together, compleated his bridge in two days; by which means he recovered his foragers, receiv'd his convoys and recruits, and opened a passage for future supplies of corn.

55. The same day he detached a great part of his cavalry cross the river, who surprized a considerable number of the enemy's foragers and waggons, that were carelessly dispersed up and down the country; but a party of light-arm'd Spanish foot coming up to their assistance, our men divided themselves into two bodies, one to secure the booty, the other to receive, and return the enemy's charge. One of our cohorts venturing too eagerly before the rest, was surrounded and cut off; but the rest returned over the bridge in safety to the camp with a considerable booty.

## CH A P. XVIII.

56. WHILST affairs were in this posture at Lerida, the people of Marseilles, by L. DOMITIUS's advice, equipp'd seventeen gallies (of which eleven were covered) with several other smaller vessels, that they might strike a terror into our fleet by the multitude of theirs. These they

**CIVIL** mann'd with a party of archers and the Albici whom we **WAR.** have already mentioned; encouraging them with great rewards and promises. **DOMITIUS** desired a certain number of these ships for his particular use, which he filled with the shepherds and husbandmen he had brought thither along with him. Thus being compleatly equipp'd, they boldly hoisted sail in search of our fleet, which was commanded by **D. BRUTUS**, and rode at anchor at an island over-against Marseilles.

Brutus with  
the Roman  
fleet engages  
them.

57. **BRUTUS** was much inferior to the enemy in number of shipping; but **CÆSAR** had chosen the most valiant men among all his legions, as well Centurions as Antesignani, at their own request, to man his fleet: who having prepared plenty of grappling-irons, piles, darts and javelins, on notice of the enemy's arrival, put to sea, and engaged them. The conflict was briskly maintained on both sides, nor were the Albici (a hardy highland people, perpetually inur'd to arms) much inferior to our men in courage; for being come directly from Marseilles, the late promises which they had received were fresh in their memories; and **DOMITIUS**'s shepherds behaved themselves with equal courage, before the eyes of their master, in hopes of gaining from him their liberty.

The Mar-  
seillians de-  
feated; they  
lose nine  
ships.

58. Those of Marseilles confiding in the nimbleness of their ships, avoided the shock of our galleys, when we endeavoured to split them with our beaks; having sea-room enough, they drew their fleet up into a line, in order to surround us; sometimes several of them would attack a single ship of ours together; sometimes try to sweep off a bank of oars, by rushing furiously along-side of a galley; but when we endeavour'd to grapple, laying aside the skill of their pilots and mariners, they relied entirely on the courage of the mountaineers. We were greatly incommoded by the unskilfulness of our rowers and pilots, who being lately taken from on board merchant vessels, hardly knew the names of the tackle; and by the sluggishness of our ships, which being built in haste of unseasoned timber, were not so ready at tacking about: but when we came close up to them, a single ship of ours would enter between two of the enemy's, and fighting boldly from each side board them, by which means we killed great numbers of the mountaineers and shepherds; part of their vessels we sunk, some we took with the men on board, and drove the rest into the haven. In this engagement the enemy had nine ships sunk and taken.

## C H A P. XIX.

59. CÆSAR had news of this victory at Lerida, so quickly did fortune change, when his bridge was finished. The enemy fearing the courage of our horse, did not dispute themselves about the country so carelessly as usual; sometimes foraging near their camp, that they might the more easily retreat; sometimes taking a large circuit about, to avoid meeting with our parties; for if they received the least loss, or even descried our cavalry at a distance, they would forsake their waggons and fly; nay, at last they omitted foraging several days together, and detached parties in the night to bring in provisions.

60. In the mean time the people of Huesca, and those of Calahorre, their fellow-tributaries, both sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, to receive his commands; those of <sup>b</sup> Jaca, the Aufetani, and, not many days after, the Illurgavonenses, who lie near the river Ebro, followed the example of these <sup>c</sup> Tarraconenses.

From these he demanded supplies of corn, which they promised, and having got all the carriages in the country together, soon brought him provisions into his camp. One cohort of the Illurgavonenses, having notice of their country's resolution, came over to our camp with their colours \*. There was a wonderful change for the better on our side; for the bridge was perfected, five powerful states had en-

CIVIL  
WAR.

Osca in Aragon, Calaguris in old Castile, come over to Cæsar's party. Iberus.

\* Or in an intire body. The scene of affairs changed much for the better on Cæsar's side.

<sup>b</sup> Jacetani, or those of Jaca. Monsieur D'ABLANCOURT has rendered this name to the people of Barcelona; but I was rather inclined to believe CÆSAR meant those of Jaca, because the sound has no affinity at all with Barcino, or Barcelona; nor can I meet with any authority to warrant that interpretation.

<sup>c</sup> The original has it *hos Tarraconenses*, which Mr. D'ABLANCOURT and Mr. EDMONDS has rendered the people of Tarragona: But I believe CÆSAR designed it for an accusative case, and meant generally the inhabitants of the Provincia Tarraconensis; because not long after AFRANIUS, finding he could not pass the Ebro, as he designed, held a council to determine whether he should return to Lerida, or march to Tarragona; which he would hardly have done, if the latter had revolted: majority of votes indeed carried it for Lerida; but it was because that was the shorter cut. Who these Aufcitani were, for my part, I shall not pretend to determine; for I dare not affirm, with Mr. D'ABLANCOURT, that they are the people of Garrona, because he may have reasons which I am yet a stranger to; much less that the Illurgavonenses are the present inhabitants of Tortosa; for though Tortosa lies at the mouth of the river Ebro, yet it were no necessary conclusion to affirm from thence, that this must be the place which CÆSAR meant, because he says the Illurgavonenses lay near the Ebro. But might I take the liberty of changing a letter or two, I could turn the Illurgavonenses into Ilerdavonenses, and then it would be no difficult matter to expound it that part of the country of Ilerda near the Ebro, which lay the farthest off from AFRANIUS's forces.



**CIVIL WAR.** ter'd into league with us, care was taken for future provisions, the report of POMPEY's approach with the legions through Africk was now at an end, and several countries that lay at a farther distance, revolting from AFRANIUS, declared for CÆSAR.

61. Whilst the enemy was discouraged by our success, CÆSAR, that he might not be at the trouble of sending his horse so far about to forage, having chosen a convenient place, began to cut several ditches about thirty foot wide, to drain so much of the Sicoris as might render it fordable.

Afranius and Petreius resolve to remove towards Celtiberia,

This work was almost compleated, when PETREIUS and AFRANIUS, apprehending they should be cut off from foraging, because CÆSAR was so much superior to them in cavalry, resolved to decamp, and remove the war to Celtiberia. They were the rather induced to embrace this resolution, because those countries which had been subdued by POMPEY in the Sertorian war, still trembled at their conqueror's name, though absent; and those who had continued faithful to him, were since confirmed in his interest by several obligations, amongst whom CÆSAR was hardly known. Hence they expected considerable supplies of horse and infantry, and doubted not but to be able to protract the war till winter.

They give orders for transports to be prepared on the Ebro, or Iberus.

Having agreed on this resolution, they gave orders for seizing all the ships on the Ebro, and carrying them to Octogesa, a town situate on that river, about twenty miles distant from their camp, where they commanded a bridge of boats to be cast cross the water: and transporting two legions over the Sicoris, fortified their camp with a rampier twelve foot high.

Cæsar drains the Sicoris till it becomes fordable,

62. Which CÆSAR having notice of by his scouts, wrought incessantly at his drains; and by the extraordinary labour of his soldiers, who neither rested day nor night, reduced the river to so low an ebb, that the cavalry might, with some difficulty, ford it; which they ventured to do, and the infantry likewise, though the water took them up to their shoulders, and they contended with the rapidity as well as depth of the stream. So that almost at the same instant that CÆSAR was inform'd the bridge cross the Ebro was near compleated, he found a ford over the Sicoris.

## CHAP. XX.

Petreius and Afranius begin their march,

63. THE enemy thought it high time to be marching; wherefore leaving two auxiliary cohorts for a garrison at Lerida,

Lerida, they cross'd the Sicoris with all their forces, and joined the two legions which they had sent over before. CIVIL WAR. CÆSAR had now no other remedy left, but to detach his cavalry, to interrupt the enemy's march: but because crossing the bridge would oblige them to take so large a circuit, that AFRANIUS would arrive at the Ebro before them a nearer way, he ordered they should ford the river. Cæsar detaches his cavalry to pursue them. About one in the morning, just as PETREIUS and AFRA- NIUS had decamped, our cavalry descried their rear, which they endeavoured to surround, that they might delay their march.

64. So soon as day-light appear'd, from the rising ground, near our camp, we discovered the enemy's rear warmly engaged by our horse, who sometimes obliged them to halt, and disordered their ranks; on the other hand, sometimes our party were forced to give way to the furious charge of their cohorts; but so soon as the enemy endeavoured to pursue their march, our cavalry again attacked them. The infantry, who beheld this action from the camp, were got together in parties, much concerned to think the enemy should thus escape; which would necessarily prolong the war. Wherefore they intreated the centurions and tribunes to acquaint CÆSAR, "That they were ready to ford the river where the horse had pass'd before them; and begg'd he would not be so careful to avoid exposing them to danger or labour." CÆSAR, incited by their importunity, though he was unwilling to hazard the safety of such a number of men in fording so deep a river; yet judging it expedient to try his fortune, caused the weakest soldiers to be drawn out of every century, whose courage or strength were incapable of that expedition; and these, with one legion, he left behind to secure his camp and baggage: then drawing out the rest of his forces, he disposed a great number of waggons both above and below the ford, to break the force of the stream, and marched his legions cross the river. The legions desire leave to ford the river, and pursue the enemy. Some few of our infantry being carried away by the impetuosity of the current, were preserv'd by the cavalry, so that not a single man perished in this attempt. When he arriv'd on the other side the river, he disposed his army into three lines; and so eager were the soldiers in the pursuit, that though they had taken a circuit of six miles about, and had lost much time in fording the river, yet they came up with the enemy (who had begun their march by one that morning) before three in the afternoon. Cæsar grants their request. They cross the river, and come up with the enemy.

PETREI-

CIVIL  
WAR.Afranius,  
being warm-  
ly pursued,  
is oblig'd to  
encamp.

65. PETREIUS and AERANIUS descrying our legions at a distance, were not a little surpriz'd; wherefore having gained the higher ground, they drew their army up in order of battle. CÆSAR having refreshed his army in the field, that they might not be obliged to engage before they had recovered their fatigue, so soon as the enemy renewed their march, pursued them afresh; which oblig'd them to encamp earlier than they designed: for there were several hills not far before them, and about five miles off the passages were narrow and difficult. They retired within these mountains, that they might avoid being attacked by our cavalry, and disposed parties in the avenues, to put a stop to the march of our army, hoping by this means to secure their retreat cross the Ebro; which it highly imported them to endeavour by all the means they could invent. But being fatigu'd by their continual marches and skirmishes all the day, they deferred the execution of their design till the day after, and CÆSAR encamped on a hill which lay near them.

Afranius  
designs to  
decamp pri-  
vately.

66. About midnight a small party of theirs, which went out a little distance from their camp to fetch water, was surpriz'd by our cavalry. By these CÆSAR was informed, that the enemy were silently decamping. Whereupon he likewise commanded the signal for removing and packing up the baggage to be given, according to the Roman discipline.

but is pre-  
vented.

The enemy taking the alarm, apprehending they should be attack'd, and obliged to fight, whilst they were loaden with their baggage, or else block'd up in the narrow passes by CÆSAR's cavalry, made a halt, and returned to their camp.

## C H A P. XXI.

Parties sent  
out on both  
sides to view  
the country.

THE day after PETREIUS went privately out with a small party of horse, to take a view of the country; and CÆSAR likewise detached another for the same purpose, under the command of L. DECIDIUS SAXA. Both returned the same account to their several camps, that for five miles together the country was open and campaign, but after that very rough and mountainous; and whatever army first possess'd the streights, might easily prevent the others marching that way.

67. On this advice, the enemy's generals held a council of war, wherein the time for beginning their march was debated.

debated. The majority were of opinion it would be most convenient to set out by night, for they might possess the avenues before CÆSAR could have notice of their departure. But others declared, it was impossible to decamp so silently, but they would be discovered, as appeared by the last night's alarm in CÆSAR's camp; besides, the enemy's cavalry were patrolling all night about the ways and passages; and night engagements were always to be declined, because the soldiers in civil dissensions would be guided by their fears more than any religious obligation<sup>d</sup>: whereas in the day, each man having the dread of dishonour before his eyes, would be restrained from flight and a neglect of his duty, by the presence of his officers. Wherefore it was absolutely necessary to make the attempt by day-light, and though they might receive some small loss, yet the body of the army would obtain a safe retreat, and possess the post desired.

68. The latter of these opinions being embraced, they resolved the next morning by break of day to begin their march: and CÆSAR having viewed the country, set forward about the same time, taking a considerable circuit, and observing no particular rout; for the direct way to the Ebro and Octogesa was block'd up by the enemy's camp, which obliged us to march over several hills and dales; and such craggy rocks frequently lay in the road, that the soldiers were obliged to deliver their arms to a third person to hold, whilst they helped each other to ascend the crags. These difficulties we had to encounter with, the greatest part of our march; yet the whole army cheerfully endured the fatigue, in hopes of putting a speedy period to their labour, if they could but gain the Ebro before the enemy, and intercept their convoys.

69. AFRANIUS's soldiers, overjoy'd at first to see we marched the contrary way (which we did on purpose to deceive them) ran forth from their camp, and derided us, saying, we were obliged to fly, and return to Lerida for want of provisions: nor were their generals less satisfied, to think how prudently they had acted in not decamping. They were confirmed in this opinion, because they found we had neither baggage nor carriages along with us, which they concluded was a proof that we had left our camp through necessity. But when they observed we began by degrees to wheel about to the right, and that our advanced

CIVIL  
WAR.

Afranius holds a council of war to debate the time for decamping.

Cæsar decamps, and seems to march the contrary way to the Ebro.


Afranius's soldiers laugh at Cæsar's:

But when Cæsar began to wheel about, perceive their error.

<sup>d</sup> Veget. lib. ii. cap. 5. The soldiers swear vigorously to perform all their general's orders, never to desert or refuse death for the service of the republick.



CIVIL  
WAR.



guard had already gained the ground beyond their camp; no one was so stupid or lazy, as not to perceive the necessity of opposing our further march without delay. An alarm was sounded, and the enemy leaving only a few cohorts for a guard to their camp, marched their forces directly for the Ebro.

70. Thus the whole issue of the business depended on dispatch, the contest being whether party could first possess the straits and mountains. CÆSAR had the difficulties of the way to struggle with; but on the other hand, AFRANIUS's march was retarded by CÆSAR's cavalry. However, if the enemy could have gained the hills first, as they designed, they might have secured their retreat, though they must of necessity have lost their baggage and the cohorts which were left behind in their camp. CÆSAR had the good fortune to arrive first at the place, and having possessed himself of a plain, which terminated in great rocks, drew up his army in order of battle.

Afranius  
halts, and  
detaches a  
party of foot  
to gain a rising  
ground,

AFRANIUS perceiving our army in his front, and finding his rear attacked by our cavalry, began to halt, taking the advantage of a rising ground: from hence he detached four cohorts of Spanish foot, to gain another hill, which appeared higher than any of the rest; they were commanded to dispatch these orders with all expedition, for he would come thither himself afterwards with his army, and by another way than he had formerly designed, on the ridge of the mountains, reach Oſtogeſa.

but they are  
cut to pieces  
by Cæſar's  
cavalry.

The enemy's cohorts were taking a circuit to the place, when our cavalry, perceiving their design, charg'd them with such violence, that they were not able to sustain their fury, but being surrounded, in the sight of both armies were cut to pieces.

## C H A P. XXII.

Upon this  
advantage  
Cæſar is im-  
portuned to  
fight, but  
declines it.

71. THIS no doubt was a happy opportunity for effecting something extraordinary, nor was CÆSAR ignorant of it; for the enemy was certainly daunted to see their party defeated before their eyes, and find themselves surrounded by our cavalry in an equal, and open place, where the dispute might have been decided by a battle. CÆSAR was strongly importuned to an engagement by his lieutenants, centurions, and tribunes, who all urged that the soldiers were in high spirits and eager for it; whereas AFRANIUS's army had given undeniable proofs of their fear,

ſince

since they neither detached supplies to sustain their party, nor moved from the rising ground to which they had first retreated, and hardly sustained our cavalry's attack, but crowded their standards confusedly together, without observing rank or order : but if the disadvantage of the ground was of such moment, that could not long obstruct the design, since AFRANIUS would be obliged to remove for want of water.

72. But CÆSAR, hoping he should effect the same business without an engagement, since he had cut off the enemy's provisions, told them, " He had no occasion to purchase victory at the expence of any man's life, or to let those who had deserved so well at his hands, run the hazard of a wound ; or lastly, to let fortune have any share in the decision of a battle, especially since it redounded more to a general's honour, to overcome by conduct than by force : besides, he was moved with compassion for those many Romans, who, he foresaw, must be sacrificed to that day's success, which he would rather obtain without bloodshed." CÆSAR's opinion was generally disliked, and some of the soldiers openly declared, since he had omitted so glorious an opportunity, they would decline an engagement when he should be disposed to it. However, he continued firm in his resolution, and retired some small distance from the place, to free the enemy from their apprehensions. PETREIUS and AFRANIUS laid hold on this occasion to retreat to their camp : and CÆSAR having disposed parties in all the passes to the Ebro, lodg'd himself as near as he could to the enemy.

73. The day after AFRANIUS and PETREIUS being much disturb'd to find their convoys intercepted, and all the passages to the Ebro block'd up, consulted what methods they should take, and found they had only two ways left, to return to Lerida, or march to Tarragona. But whilst they were debating, they had notice that the parties they had sent out for water were attack'd by our horse : whereupon they resolv'd to line the road to the water with guards of horse and foot, with some legionary cohorts intermix'd ; and began to draw a line of communication by a rampier from thence to their camp ; that afterwards they might fetch it at any time securely without placing such stations. PETREIUS and AFRANIUS each chose their particular part of this work, which obliged them to be at some distance from their camp.

74. In the mean while the soldiers of both armies having

CIVIL  
WAR.



His reasons.

The soldiers  
disgusted at  
it.

Both armies  
again en-  
camp.

Afranius  
and Petreius  
consult a-  
bout making  
their re-  
treat ;

but hearing  
their foragers  
were cut off,  
resolve to  
draw a line  
of communi-  
cation to the  
river.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Afranius  
and Petreius  
being absent  
from their  
camp, the  
soldiers of  
both armies  
have a con-  
ference.

Send several  
centurions  
to treat with  
Cæsar about  
a surrender.

Mutual  
entertain-  
ments a-  
mong the  
soldiers of  
both armies.

All things  
seem to tend  
towards a  
reconcilia-  
tion.  
Now Cæsar's  
mercy is ap-  
plauded.

But Petreius  
breaks the  
conference.  
Drives Cæ-  
sar's soldiers  
from the  
rampier of  
his camp.

ing an opportunity of conferring with one another, frequently came out of their camps, and enquir'd after their fellow-citizens and former acquaintance. First AFRANIUS's men return'd ours thanks for sparing them the day before, when they were in such great consternation; and freely owned they were obliged to us for their lives; then enquiring how they might safely submit to CÆSAR, declared they were sorry they had not at the beginning joined their relations and acquaintance. Having gone thus far, they then demanded CÆSAR's parole for the lives of their generals PETREIUS and AFRANIUS, that they might not be branded with infamy, for betraying their officers. On security for the performance of these conditions, they promised to come over to us in an entire body, and accordingly sent several centurions of the first degree to treat with CÆSAR about a peace.

In the mean time the soldiers of both sides made mutual entertainments for each other, so that both the camps appeared united in one: several of their tribunes and centurions came to pay their court to CÆSAR; the like did many noblemen of Spain, who had been summoned to attend AFRANIUS, and were detain'd in his army in the nature of hostages; all of them enquiring for their particular friends and acquaintance, who might recommend them to CÆSAR. And AFRANIUS's son, a young gentleman, treated with CÆSAR, by SULPICIUS the lieutenant, to obtain a pardon for himself and his father. In fine, nothing but mirth and joy were to be seen in both armies; in theirs, because they had escap'd so imminent danger; in ours, because we had effected so important an affair without the hazard of a battle: and now every man applauded CÆSAR's judgment, who had reap'd so extraordinary advantage from the clemency of the preceding day.

## C H A P. XXIII.

75. AFRANIUS having notice of these proceedings, desisted from his works, and retired to the camp again, where, with an equal mind, he seem'd to expect whatever event should befall him: but PETREIUS neglected not his own safety on this occasion; having armed his servants, with them, and a prætorian cohort of target-bearers, and a small party of Spanish cavalry, his dependants, who always used to attend him as his guard, he repaired with all the dispatch he could to the rampier, where surprizing the

the soldiers of the two armies talking together, he obliged them to retire from the camp, and put those he could apprehend to the sword. But the rest, who had an opportunity of rallying, depending on the nearness of their camp, wrapp'd their cloaks about their left-arms, drew their swords, and defended themselves from PETREIUS's party, till they had retreated to our advanced guard, by whom they were protected.

76. After this PETREIUS visited every maniple, called the soldiers about him, and, with tears in his eyes, conjured them not to forsake him, or their absent general POMPEY, and deliver them up a sacrifice to the enemy. Whereupon there was an immediate concourse of soldiers about the general's pavilion, and PETREIUS demanded every man should take an oath not to desert, betray the army, or their generals, nor enter into any private consultation without the publick consent: to set an example, he first took the oath himself, then obliged AFRANIUS to do the like; the centurions and tribunes followed after with the soldiers according to their several centuries.

When the whole army had sworn, it was proclaimed, that whoever had any of CÆSAR's soldiers should deliver them up, and those they found were publickly put to death before the generals tents: but most of the soldiers concealed our men, and dismiss'd them privately at night over the rampier. Thus the terror which their generals had struck into the army, the severity they had shewn in punishment, and the new oath they had obliged them to take, for the present defeated all hopes of a surrender, changed the soldiers minds, and reduced the war to its pristine state.

77. CÆSAR caused diligent enquiry to be made for such of AFRANIUS's soldiers as came to his camp during the truce, and ordered them to be returned in safety to their general. But some of the tribunes and centurions voluntarily chose to stay with him; whom afterwards he treated very honourably, promoting the centurions to higher ranks, and to such as were Roman knights he gave tribunes commissions.

78. AFRANIUS's parties were much incommoded by our men when they went either to forage or fetch water: his legionary soldiers indeed had a small quantity of corn left, because they had been commanded to bring two and twenty days provision with them from Lerida. But the target-bearers, and auxiliary forces had none at all; for they

He visits every part of the army, and dissuades them from surrendering. He administers a new oath of fidelity to the whole army.

Cæsar's soldiers which were found in Petreius's camp put to death.

Cæsar dismisses Afranius's soldiers that were in his camp.



**CIVIL WAR.** they neither had opportunities of supplying themselves, nor were their bodies inured to carry heavy burthens; which made them daily desert in great numbers to CÆSAR.

## C H A P. XXIV.

Afranius  
and Petreius  
resolve to  
return to  
Lerida.

AFFAIRS being reduced to this extremity, of the two methods which had formerly been proposed, it was thought the more convenient to return to Lerida, where they had left some provisions behind them; and there to concert the best measures for the future management of the war: besides, \* Tarragona lay farther off, and consequently might expose them to fresh dangers; wherefore they resolved on the former, and decamped.

Cæsar pur-  
sues them,  
sends his ca-  
valry before.

CÆSAR having sent his cavalry before, to retard the march of their rear, followed after himself with the legions. The enemy were continually employ'd by our horse, and the manner of engaging was this:

79. The light-arm'd cohorts closed their rear, and where the country was even, they confronted our cavalry; whenever they were to ascend a rising ground, the nature of the place sufficiently screened them from danger, for the foremost ranks could easily defend the hindmost: but when they came to a valley, or descent, where the foremost ranks could be of no assistance to the rear, and our men cast their darts with advantage from the higher ground, then they were in imminent danger; their only resource was, that on their approach to any such places, the legions were ordered to face about, and with all their force to repel our horse: the moment we began to give ground, they would run down into the valley, thence gain the next rising ground, and face about again. For of so little use were their cavalry to them, of whom they had considerable numbers, that they were obliged to receive them into the midst of their army, and defend them with their infantry, so much were they intimidated by their ill success in former skirmishes: but if any of them chanced to straggle out of the main body, they were immediately taken by CÆSAR's horse.

Afranius  
obliged to  
halt.  
Pretends to  
encamp.

80. The skirmishes continuing thus without intermission, the enemy could march but slowly, being often obliged to halt, to relieve their rear, as happened at this time. They had not marched above four miles, when finding themselves overcharged by our cavalry, they posted their army on a

\* A sea-port in Catalonia, between Barcelona and Tortosa.

very high hill, and drawing their front up in order of battle, began to intrench themselves without unloading their baggage. But so soon as they perceived that we were encamped, that our tents were pitched, and the cavalry were dispersed to forage, about noon on a sudden they dislodged: which CÆSAR observing, drew out his legions and pursued them, leaving a few cohorts for a guard to his baggage, with orders to recal the foragers about four in the afternoon, at which time he commanded the horse should follow him. Accordingly the horse perform'd their orders, immediately return'd to their former charge, and attacked the enemy's rear so vigorously, that they almost routed them; for they killed several soldiers, some centurions, and the rest of our forces followed close after, threatening a total defeat to their army.

CIVIL  
WAR.

So soon as  
Cæsar does  
the like, en-  
deavours to  
pursue his  
march.

Cæsar's ca-  
valry sets up-  
on their rear  
with good  
success,

81. In fine, having neither convenient ground to encamp on, nor an opportunity of marching further, they were obliged to halt, and intrench themselves in a disadvantageous place, far from any water. However, CÆSAR, for the same reasons that moved him to refuse the engagement before, now likewise declined offering them battle. He would not that day permit the soldiers to pitch their tents, that they might be readier to pursue the enemy, if they should endeavour to make their escape, either then, or in the night.

Afranius  
again obliged  
to halt and  
encamp,

The enemy, observing the defect of their camp, labour'd all the night in advancing their works more forward, and bringing their trenches nearer to ours: the same thing they did the day after from sun-rise till the evening. But it happened very unfortunately for them, that the farther they advanced their lines, the greater distance they were from the water; and remedied one evil with what in its consequences would be a worse. The first night no one went out for water; but the day after, leaving only a small guard in their camp, they drew out all their forces towards the river, yet sent no parties out to forage.

## C H A P. XXV.

THOUGH CÆSAR would rather have obliged them to capitulate by these inconveniencies than by force, yet he endeavoured to hem them in with a rampier and a ditch, that he might the more easily prevent their sudden sallies and eruptions, which he believed they must at last have recourse to.

Cæsar en-  
deavours to  
surround  
them with a  
work.

CIVIL  
WAR.

They kill all  
their beasts  
of burthen,  
because fo-  
rage is  
scarce.  
Draw out  
their forces  
to interrupt  
Cæsar's  
works.  
Cæsar does  
the like.  
But no bat-  
tle ensues.

The enemy were reduced to great necessities for want of forage, and that they might more readily make their escape, killed all their mules and sumpter-horses.

82. Two days were consumed in forming, and executing this resolve; but the third, perceiving great part of our works were already compleated, to prevent our further progress, about two in the afternoon, they drew out their legions in order of battle before our camp. Upon which CÆSAR, having recalled his from the works, and commanded the cavalry to attend, did the like: for he had already found the inconvenience of appearing unwilling to engage the enemy. However, for the same reasons which had before dissuaded him, he was not even now inclined to fight, and the less, since there was so small a distance between the two camps, that if he routed the enemy, he could not obtain a compleat victory; for the armies lay within two thousand foot of each other, of which the legions, when drawn out, took up about two thirds, and the rest only was left for the soldiers to give their charge in: so that, had he engaged them, the nearness of their camp would have furnished them with an easy retreat. Wherefore CÆSAR resolved to stand upon his defence, and not begin to to charge AFRANIUS first.

The order  
Afranius dis-  
posed his ar-  
my into.

83. The enemy had disposed their forces into a double line, consisting of five legions, and the cohorts which used to be disposed in the wings, now formed the reserv'd body.

Cæsar's dis-  
position.

CÆSAR's army was drawn up in three lines, the first consisting of four cohorts, detached out of each of the five legions, the second of three, and the third of the like number; the archers and slingers were disposed in the midst, and the cavalry on either side. Thus both armies being ranged in order of battle, each general seemed to obtain his desire: CÆSAR, not to engage, unless he was obliged to it; and AFRANIUS, to prevent the progress of our work: but having continued in this posture till sun-set, they both returned to their respective camps.

Both armies  
retire into  
their camps  
again.  
Cæsar goes  
on with his  
works.

The next day CÆSAR went on with the works he had begun, and the enemy in the mean while endeavoured to find out a ford cross the Sicoris; which CÆSAR observing, detached his light-arm'd Germans with some cavalry cross the river, and disposed several parties along the banks to observe their motions.

Afranius de-  
sires a cease-  
rence.

84. At length, finding themselves besieged on all sides, having had no forage four days together, themselves want-  
ing

ing water, wood, and corn, AFRANIUS desired a private CIVIL  
parley out of the soldiers hearing; but CÆSAR would a- WAR.  
gree to no conference, unless in publick. Whereupon  
AFRANIUS having sent his son for a hostage, they had an  
interview at the place appointed: where, in the presence of  
both armies, he thus addressed himself to CÆSAR.

“ That he had no reason to be angry at him or his sol- His speech,  
diers, for having behaved themselves faithfully to their ge-  
neral POMPEY: but they had already given sufficient proofs  
of their constancy, and suffered enough for his cause, by  
the want of all kind of provisions; being caught like beasts  
in a toil, imprisoned in their trenches, and prevented from  
fetching water: wherefore they could no longer support  
themselves under these afflictions of mind and body, but  
must confess the power of their conqueror; whom they  
most humbly besought and conjured to have so much mer-  
cy, as not to force them to despair.”

All this he delivered in a very modest and submissive ac-  
cent;

85. But CÆSAR made him this answer:

“ That AFRANIUS, of all mankind, had least reason Cæsar's an-  
to complain, and implore his compassion, who had hither- swer.  
to shewn the least inclination to mercy. CÆSAR, for his  
part, had declined fighting upon advantage of time and  
place, that he might conclude a peace without the effusion  
of Roman blood: his army, after injuries received, when  
they knew their comrades were killed, dismissed AFRA-  
NIUS's men that were in their power, untouched; nay,  
even his own party did their endeavour to conclude a peace,  
whereon they thought their safety depended: in fine, both  
armies had demonstrated their desire of a reconciliation,  
whilst AFRANIUS and PETREIUS only would not endure  
the thoughts of treaty, broke the truce, and barbarously  
murdered those innocent persons whom the interview had  
enticed to their camp. Wherefore, they had justly shared  
the usual fate of the obstinate and haughty, to be ob-  
liged to have recourse to those conditions, and ear-  
nestly desire those very terms, which not long before they  
despised. However, he scorned to take the advantage of  
their submission, in order to advance his own authority  
and reputation: he only desired that the army might be  
disbanded, which had been so many years maintained  
against him: for to what other purpose were six le-  
gions sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, so many  
powerful navies equipped, so many great commanders and



**CIVIL** experienced officers sent thither? These preparations could **WAR.** not be made to reduce or guard the provinces of Spain, which having long enjoyed a peace, had no occasion for such extraordinary forces; but he had long foreseen they were brought in for his destruction. Innovations had likewise been made in the republick, in order to effect this design; for one person commanded not only in Italy, at the gates of Rome, but at the same time, though absent, held the two most warlike provinces of Spain for many years together: the ancient institution of distributing governments to the consuls and prætors, after the discharge of their office, was laid aside; and some being clandestinely chosen by a private faction, were sent to the provinces: the excuse of old age was not allow'd of, but even they who deserved a glorious ease, by the proofs they had formerly given of their courage, were obliged to bear arms, and compleat the number of the troops: and he alone had been denied that justice, which no other general before him ever was refused, to disband his own army, and return home with honour, or at least free from ignominy, after he had successfully served the commonwealth. All which injuries he had patiently endured; neither did he now endeavour to take their army from them, and entertain them in his pay, which would be no difficult matter for him to effect, but he only desired they might no longer bear arms for his enemies against him; wherefore let them quit the kingdom of Spain, and disband their forces: which conditions performed, he would injure no man; but these were the only terms of peace he would condescend to."

Evocat.

## C H A P. XXVI.

86. **THESE** conditions were very grateful to **AFRA-**  
**NIUS's** army, who, when they had reason to expect the  
 The articles agreed upon. usage which attends the conquered, instead of it obtain'd the liberty of quitting their arms. They gave evident proofs of their satisfaction; for when the place of disbanding was debated, ascending the rampier, by words and signs they unanimously desired it might be done immediately; since no security could be given for the performance of this promise in futurity. The dispute was soon decided, it being agreed, "That they who had settlements in Spain, should be disbanded there; the rest at the river Varus: that no person should be molested or injur'd, nor any man obliged to bear arms under **CÆSAR** contrary to his own inclinations.

The articles.

Which divides Gaul from Italy.

87. That

87. That CÆSAR, from the day of their surrender till their arrival at the Varus should furnish them with corn.<sup>22</sup> And of his own free will he promised to restore to every man whatever he had lost during that war, if any of his soldiers had it, to whom he paid an equal value by way of satisfaction.

After this, if the soldiers chanced to have any dispute amongst them, they immediately had recourse to CÆSAR, and submitted their differences to his arbitration. So when they were ready to mutiny for want of pay, and AFRAANIUS and PETREIUS affirmed there was nothing due to them, because the day of payment was not come, the generals desired CÆSAR might determine the matter, which the army readily agreed to, and both parties were content with the judgment he pronounced.

About a third part of their forces being dismissed within two days, CÆSAR commanded two of his legions to march before the remainder of them, his other legions to follow after, and always to encamp very near them. The charge of this he committed to lieutenant Q. FUSIUS KALENUS; who attended them to the river Varus, where the rest of the army was disbanded.



# C. J. CÆSAR'S COMMENTARY OF THE CIVIL WAR.

## The SECOND BOOK.

*Marseilles closely besieged. On NASIDIUS's arrival, a second sea-fight, with ill success on the side of the besieged. TREBONIUS's wonderful works. The besieged demand a truce; which they break themselves, but at last surrender. VARRO deserted, falls into CÆSAR's power. CURIO at first has good success in Africk; but engaging rashly, afterwards, is cut to pieces with his whole army.*

### CHAP. I.

**CIVIL WAR.** **W**HILST these affairs were in agitation in Spain, lieutenant C. TREBONIUS, whom CÆSAR had left to carry on the siege of Marseilles, had begun to raise mounts, vines, and turrets, in two several places against the town; one near the haven where the ships lay, and the other near the <sup>a</sup> mouth of the river Rhosne: for Marseilles is fortified almost on three several sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is all the access it has by land: Part of this avenue, which led to the tower, being equally fortified by nature and a very

<sup>a</sup> For SCALIGER is of opinion these words, *Ex Gallia atque Hispania ad id mare quod attigit*, ought to be expunged,

deep ditch, required a long and difficult siege to take CIVIL  
WAR.  
it in. For perfecting these fortifications, TREBONIUS  
dispatched orders to the whole province to furnish him with  
men, carriages, rods to make hurdles, and several other  
necessary materials to compleat the work; which being  
prepared and brought together, he cast up a mount about  
eighty foot in height.

2. But so great plenty of all kinds of ammunition had the  
besieged formerly stored up in their magazines, so many  
engines had they prepared, that no vines made of hurdles  
were sufficient defence against them; for their <sup>b</sup> Balistæ shot  
wooden bars about twelve foot in length, headed with iron,  
which would force their way through four several rows of  
hurdles into the ground: Wherefore the Romans were  
obliged to cover their galleries with beams of timber twelve  
inches square, under whose covert they handed earth and  
other materials from one to another, for compleating the  
mount. A Testudo likewise, sixty foot in length, was  
moved on before them, to secure them in levelling the  
ground, built of strong timber, and fortified with all mate-  
rials necessary to defend it from the fire and stones which  
the enemy cast from the walls. But the largeness of our  
works, the height of their wall and towers, with the multi-  
tude of their engines, made our fortifications proceed but  
slowly: Besides, the Highlanders often sallied out of the  
town, and set fire to our mount and turrets; though our  
soldiers easily extinguished it, and repulsed them back into  
the town with considerable loss.

## C H A P. II.

3. IN the mean time, NASIDIUS being sent by POM-Nasidius ar-  
PEY to the assistance of the besieged with a fleet of six-  
teen ships, of which number some were beaked with iron, <sup>fleet to the</sup>  
passed the streights of Sicily before CURIO\* had notice of <sup>assistance of</sup>  
his expedition; and putting in at Messina, struck such a <sup>the besieged.</sup>  
terror into the inhabitants, that the magistrates and per-  
sons of best quality deserted the town; which gave him an  
opportunity of surprizing one of the gallies in the haven:  
adding this to the rest of his fleet, he pursued his voyage  
to Marseilles, and detached a small vessel before, to give  
DOMITIUS notice of his approach, and encouraged the  
besieged to venture a second engagement with BRUTUS  
after they should have joined his fleet.

\* LIPSIIUS observes the Balistæ were chiefly for shooting stones: here we find  
them applied to other uses.



**CIVIL WAR.** 4. The Marseillians, since their defeat, had repaired the loss, by taking other ships to make up their former number, out of the docks, which they equipped with great diligence. They had likewise prepared great numbers of rowers, mariners, pilots, and several fishermens vessels, which they filled with archers and engines; these they covered with a penthouse, to defend the rowers from our darts and javelins.

Their fleet being thus fitted out, the Marseillians, incited by the prayers and tears of the old men, virgins, and matrons, to defend their country in its extremity, went on board with no less valour and assurance than they did before. The arrival of NASIDIUS had inspired them with fresh courage; for we naturally believe those things we cannot see, more considerable than they really are, and our hopes or fears still bear a proportion to our fancy. The wind offering fair, they weighed anchor, and sailed after NASIDIUS at Tauroenta, a castle belonging to the people of Marseilles: the two fleets being joined, they encouraged each other vigorously to attack their enemy, and having held a council of war, it was resolved the Marseillians should command the right, and NASIDIUS the left squadron.

They join  
Nasidius's  
fleet.

5. BRUTUS, having notice of their motions, made up towards them; for he had encreased the fleet built at Arles by CÆSAR, with six other ships, taken from the enemy, which he repaired since the last engagement. Having encouraged his men to despise those whom they had already conquered when in their best condition, he bore up briskly to them. From TREBONIUS's camp, and the higher ground, might easily be discovered what was doing in the town; from thence our soldiers observed, that all the youth who remained in Marseilles, the old men, women, children, and the guards, with extended hands upon the walls, or prostrating themselves before the images at their temples, besought the gods to grant them victory. Every one believed the fate of their country depended on that day's success; young gentlemen therefore, and persons of the best quality of all ages, were desired to go on board, that nothing might be wanting for the preservation of their fleet in case of an emergency: for could they but obtain this victory, either by their own valour, or the assistance of their allies, they had no reason to despair of preserving their city from falling into CÆSAR's hands.

## C H A P. III.

6. IN this engagement, the Marseillians did not betray the least want of courage, but remembering the exhortations lately given by their friends, fought as resolutely as if they meant not to engage a second time, or as if he who fell now, only anticipated the fate of his countrymen for a short moment, who must all submit to the same decision of war, if fortune should deliver the town into the enemy's hands. Our gallies moving but slowly, their pilots had the greater opportunity of shewing their skill, and the nimbleness of their ships: whenever we endeavoured to board one of them, immediately the rest from all sides came up to defeat our design; but when we grappled, the Albici behaved so bravely, that they proved themselves but little inferior to our men; who at the same time were not a little annoyed by showers of darts, which poured upon them from the smaller vessels. Two of their largest gallies, spying our admiral's ship, which might easily be discerned by the flag, attempted to run foul on her, and crush her between them: but BRUTUS, being aware of their design, made a shift to get out of the way the moment they were coming towards him with all their speed, which made them run upon each other with so violent a shock, that one of their beaks was broken, and the whole vessel almost shattered to pieces; which our men observing, they that lay nearest, immediately attacked and sunk both of them before they could recover their disorder.

CIVIL  
WAR.The fight  
begins.Two Mar-  
seillian gal-  
lies design to  
attack Bru-  
tus, but fall  
foul upon  
each other.

7. NASIDIUS's gallies proved useless, and therefore immediately left the fight, not having those powerful incentives, the sight of their country, and the adjurations of their kindred, to support them in the last extremity: he therefore lost none of his number; but of the Marseillian fleet, five ships were sunk, four taken, and one ran away with NASIDIUS, who steered directly for the nearer Spain. Of those which were saved, one was sent before to Marseilles to carry the news; upon the sight of which all the people ran out to meet it. No sooner was the melancholy report spread, but the whole city was in such a consternation, as if at that instant it had been taken by the enemy. The inhabitants however soon began to make such preparations for their defence as was necessary.

Nasidius's  
fleet, their  
fleet defeat-  
ed, five sunk,  
and four  
ships taken  
by Brutus.

## C H A P. IV.

8. THE legionary soldiers, to whose care the right side of the works was committed, observed it would be of infinite

**CIVIL** finite use, if instead of their small fortress, they built under the walls a tower of brick, to defend them against the frequent sallies of the besieged. This at first they raised to no considerable height, designing it only for that particular purpose; and here they took shelter, and from the top of it defended themselves whenever they were overpowered; and from hence issued forth again, when they were to repel or pursue the enemy. This tower was thirty foot square, and the walls five foot in thickness; but afterwards, as experience improves all things, so it was found necessary to carry this up to a greater height, which was thus effected:

**WAR.**

The soldiers build a tower to defend them from the sallies of the besieged,

which they afterwards raised to a greater height.

9. As soon as the work was raised to a sufficient height for a story, the joists were so disposed in the wall, that the brick-work should cover them, and no fire from the enemy catch hold of them. This floor compleated, they proceeded in raising the wall as high as the mantlets would permit; and upon this flooring fix'd two transverse beams, whose ends extended almost as far as the wall would permit; which were to sustain the uppermost floor, designed for a roof to the turret; and upon these beams they laid joists cutting each other at right angles, which they boarded with planks: they were contrived something longer than the rest, and jetted a little further out than the wall, for the convenience of fastening penthouses to them, to defend the workmen whilst they compleated the walls between those two stories. This uppermost floor they paved with lime and tiles, that the fire might have no power over it; and laid mattresses to break the force of darts and stones, which the enemy should shoot from their engines. After this, for their better security, they prepared curtains woven of strong cords, about four foot in breadth, which they hung about those three sides of the turret next the enemy, on high poles; for this kind of defence, they had formerly experienced, could not be pierced by any dart or engine whatever: when one part of the tower was finished and compleatly fortified, they removed their penthouses to another side. So high as these curtains would permit, and under their coverture, they elevated the roof intire by the help of screws, and finished the wall between: then screwing up the top a second time, they continued raising the wall, till they had built it to a convenient height for another story, which was floored like the rest: after this they screwed the roof and curtain still higher, by which means, without danger of being wounded, they compleated six several stories, leaving loop-holes in convenient places to play the engines.

10. Believing

WAR.

The soldiers build a tower as defend, pole; and here they took shelter, and from the top of it descended themselves whenever they were empowered; and hence issued forth again, when they were to repulse the enemy.

which they afterwards called to a further height.



the walls a tower of brick, to defend them against the frequent sallies of the besieged. This at first they failed to build a tower considerable height, deeming it only for that particular purpose; and here they took shelter, and from the top of it descended themselves whenever they were empowered; and hence issued forth again, when they were to repulse the enemy. This tower was thirty foot square, and the walls five foot in thickness; but afterwards, as experience improves all things, so it was found necessary to carry this up to a greater height, which was thus effected.

As soon as the work was raised to a sufficient height for a story, the joists were so disposed in the wall, that the brick-work should cover them, and prevent from the enemy reach hold of them. The first observation, that proceeded in raising the wall as high as the masons were permitted, and upon the spire, had two windows being whole ends extended almost over the uppermost floor, designed which were to furnish the uppermost floor, designed for a roof to the tower, and upon these beams they laid joists cutting each other at right angles, which they boarded with planks: they were contrived together, longer than the rest, and jettied a little further out than the wall, for the convenience of fastening penthouses to them, to defend the workmen whilst they completed the walls between the two stories. The uppermost floor was paved with stone and tiles, that the rain might run down and flow out, and masons to work the tower, and from which the enemy should shoot down their cannon. And that for their better shelter, they put down a frame work of strong cords, about four feet in breadth, which they had about broke three sides of the tower, near the enemy, to high poles; for the fourth side, being an engine wheel, penthouse, could not be placed by any means, or engine wheel: when one part of the tower was finished and completely finished, they removed the penthouses to another side. So high as these windows would grow, and upon their convenient, they elevated the roof upon the jettied beams, and finished the wall between these two stories, the top a second time, they continued raising the wall, they had built it to a convenient height for another which was shored like the first, after this they raised the roof and carried still higher, by which means, without any of being wounded, they completed the tower, leaving the holes in convenient places for the soldiers.



to face p. 251.

A. The form of a *Murcellus*.



B. the Brick Tower. C. the Curtain woven of Cords.  
D. the Roof raised higher by degrees till it was finished.

10. Believing they should be able, by the help of this tower, to defend all the works about it, they resolved to build a Musculus sixty <sup>CIVIL</sup> foot long, of timber two foot square, to extend from the brick turret to the walls of the town; <sup>WAR.</sup> which they built after this manner: First two beams of an equal length were laid upon the ground, at four foot distance, on which small pillars five foot high were erected; which were braced with cross beams, on which the rafters which were to bear the roof of the Musculus were to rest: upon these beams were fixed rafters two foot square, which were fastened by iron plates and nails, and the roof was covered with laths four fingers square, to bear the weight of the tiles that were to be laid upon them. Thus the engine being regularly built with a sloping roof, they covered it with clay, to defend it from fire; upon the tiles, they laid hides, to prevent the cement from being washed away by spouts of water; and over the hides, to prevent the force of stones and fire, laid mattresses. The work was begun close by the tower, finished under the protection of the vines, before the enemy had notice of it; and immediately removed by rollers and leavers, as ships are usually launched, so near their tower, that it touched the wall.

The Musculus described.

11. The besieged were not a little disturbed at this: wherefore they provided the largest stones they could get, and with leavers heaved them over the wall upon the Musculus: but perceiving the work was so substantial, that it did not give way to the weight of the stones, which fell upon it but slid from the ridge again, they resolved to take another method, to sling down burning barrels of pitch, grease, and other combustible matter; nor did this stratagem answer the design, for they slid likewise off from the roof, and falling on the ground, were thrust away from the works with forks and long poles. In the mean time our soldiers, under the protection of this machine, began to undermine the foundation of the enemy's turret. Our men from the brick tower defended the Musculus, and drove the besieged from their walls and turrets, so that they were obliged to abandon the defence of them: and several stones being pulled out of the foundation of their tower, part of it immediately fell down, and the rest leaned, as if it would soon follow.

The besieged endeavour in vain to destroy the Musculus.

The Romans undermine a turret; which falls.

\* For LX Lipsius reads RX, because it would be difficult to get timber LX foot long; and two foot square; and because such a length bears no proportion to the width, which was but four foot. See his Poliorc. l. i. dial. ix. Typogr.

## C H A P. V.

CIVIL  
WAR.

The besieged  
surprized,  
beg a peace  
till Cæsar's  
arrival.

12. THE besieged, astonished at so sudden a calamity as the downfall of their tower, possessed with a belief that the gods were angry with them, and dreading the next evil, the plunder of their city, came out unarmed, array'd in sacred attire, extending their hands to the lieutenant-generals for mercy. Upon so extraordinary a sight, all acts of hostility ceased, and the soldiers dropped their fierceness to hear the purport of so solemn an embassy. So soon as the besieged came to the camp, they threw themselves at the lieutenants feet, most humbly beseeching them to grant a truce till CÆSAR'S arrival; since their city seemed already taken, our works to be perfected, and their turret destroyed, they should make no longer defence: that the delay they asked could be of no ill consequence, for if upon CÆSAR'S arrival they did not comply with his commands, they would still be open to destruction: but should their turret be now demolished, it would be impossible to restrain the soldiers from rushing into the town and plundering it. This, and more to the like purpose, they spoke with persuasive tears, and a moving accent, as people that understood the arts of address and politeness.

A truce  
granted till  
Cæsar's ar-  
rival.

13. Whereupon, the lieutenants, moved with compassion, withdrew their soldiers from the walls, desisted from carrying on the siege, left a guard to protect their works: and having granted them a kind of a truce out of pity, resolved to expect CÆSAR'S arrival. No darts passed from our works to the town, nor any from the walls to us; all men were as careless as if the place had been actually ours; for CÆSAR had given particular orders to TREBONIUS in his letters, not to let Marseilles be taken by storm, lest the soldiers, enraged at the enemy's rebellion and contempt, and regretting the pains themselves had taken in the siege, should put all that bore arms to the sword; which was what they now threatened, and could hardly be restrained from executing, and much resented their being prevented by TREBONIUS.

## C H A P. VI.

The besieged  
break the  
truce, set  
fire to Tre-  
bonius's  
works.

14. BUT the treacherous enemy only watched a fit opportunity to break the truce. Within a few days after, when our soldiers were grown remiss, when several were dispersed,

disperſed, others laid down to reſt themſelves, and all the arms laid up, about noon they ſallied out of the town, and ſet fire to our works. The wind, which was very high, and blew in our faces, ſo diſperſed the flames, that in an inſtant the mount, teſtudo, mantlets, tower, and engines, all were fired and conſumed before we were ſenſible of the occaſion of it. Our ſoldiers, alarmed by this ſudden turn, immediately ſeized ſuch arms as they could find, and charged the enemy, but were prevented from purſuing them, by darts and engines from the town: the beſieged retired under their walls, and there, without danger, put fire to the Muſculus and brick turret. Thus in a moment perished the effects of ſeveral months labour, by the perfidiouſneſs of the enemy, and the violence of the wind. The day after, the wind continuing ſtill in the ſame corner, the Marſeillians made the like attempt again, and ſallying out with greater aſſurance than before, brought plenty of fire to conſume the other mount and tower. But our men, admoniſhed by the laſt day's action to be more careful for the future, had prepared all things neceſſary for their defence: wherefore having killed great numbers, they obliged the reſt to retreat into the town without effecting their deſign.

15. TREBONIUS now began to rebuild what had been conſumed by the fire; and the ſoldiers gave greater proofs of their induſtry than before; enraged to ſee their former labours brought to nothing, their courage derided, and the truce broken by the perjured enemy, ſince there were no materials left for building a new mount (all the timber round about having been cut down, and applied to the former work) they began to raiſe a new-ſhioned one, never ſeen before, with two ſide-walls of brick, each ſix foot thick; theſe they joined together with floors almoſt at the ſame diſtance as the other which had been made of timber: but wherever the ſpace between the walls, or the weakneſs of the work ſeemed to require it, piles were driven in, and croſs beams laid over them, to add farther ſtrength. The flooring was laid with hurdles, which were afterwards covered with clay.

16. Thus our men being defended on the right and left by the walls, and in front by the mantlets, ſafely brought the materials which were neceſſary for carrying on the work. Every thing was diſpatch'd with vigour, and the painful labours which the enemy had deſtroyed were ſoon repaired by the indefatigable care and application of the ſoldiers.


CIVIL  
WAR.  


Trebonius  
repairs his  
works.

The works  
finished.



**CIVIL** soldiers. Portals were left in convenient places to fall out  
**WAR.** from upon occasion.

 But the besieged perceiving those works compleated in a few days, which they flattered themselves could not be rebuilt in a much longer time; finding there was now no room for deceit or sallies, that it was not in their power to oppose our soldiers, or put fire to our works; considering that by the same methods, all that part of Marseilles which was accessible by land, might likewise be blocked up with a wall and turrets, from whence darts might be cast into the town by the soldiers hands, whilst the nearness of the place would render their engines useless, which they had so much relied on; that our men would enjoy the same advantage of fighting from the turrets, as they from their walls, and that they were no match for us upon equal terms, they again had recourse to the conditions they had broken.

## CHAP. VII.

**Varro's**  
**trimming.**

17. **AT** the beginning of the civil war, **M. VARRO**, who possess'd the farther province of Spain, understanding how affairs went in Italy, and doubting the success of **POMPEY**'s cause, used to speak very favourably of **CÆSAR**: that **POMPEY** having retained him for his lieutenant, he was obliged to be faithful to him; but his private inclinations made him wish well to the other: for as he was not ignorant of a lieutenant's duty, who was entrusted by his superior officer, and of his own power; so neither was he a stranger to the affection which the whole province bore to **CÆSAR**. This was the subject of his discourse in publick, without declaring for either side. But afterwards, when he understood **CÆSAR** was detained at Marseilles, that **PETREIUS** and **AFRANIUS** were joined, that they had considerable reinforcements come in to them, that the nearer province had unanimously resolved to support them, with an account of what afterwards happened, when **CÆSAR** was reduced to such straits at Lerida, which was set off to the best advantage in **AFRANIUS**'s letters, he began to change his principles with fortune.

**His prepara-**  
**tions on the**  
**news of Cæ-**  
**sar's ill suc-**  
**cess,**

18. He raised forces throughout his whole province; to the two compleat legions which he had with him, he added thirty auxiliary cohorts, and prepared a great quantity of corn, as well for the relief of the Marseillians as of **PETREIUS** and **AFRANIUS**. He commanded the people of

Cadiz

Cadiz to equip ten galleys, and gave orders for building several more at Seville: he removed all the money and ornaments out of the temple of HERCULES into the town of Cadiz, detached six cohorts thither for a garrison, and made CAIUS GALLONIUS, a Roman knight, who had been sent thither by DOMITIUS to recover an estate that belonged to him, governor of the town; giving orders that all the arms of the city, as well publick as private, should be lodged in GALLONIUS's house. He himself in the mean time spread reports to CÆSAR's disadvantage, often declaring in council, that he had certain assurances of his being several times defeated, and that multitudes of deserters flocked from his army to AFRANIUS. By which means he so terrified the Roman citizens of his province, that they were compelled to promise him<sup>d</sup> one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand weight of silver, and one hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat.


On those countries which he thought well affected to CÆSAR he laid heavier taxes, and quartered his soldiers; and gave judgment himself upon several private persons. He confiscated the goods of those that had spoke openly against the government; and obliged the whole province to swear allegiance to himself and to POMPEY. Having notice at last how affairs went in the further Spain, he prepared for war; which he resolved to manage thus: to retire with his two legions to Cadiz, where all the shipping and provisions lay; for he knew the whole province was inclinable to CÆSAR's interest; but he hoped he might easily prolong the war in that island, being so well stored with corn and shipping.

## C H A P. VIII.

CÆSAR, though he found himself called upon for many reasons to return to Italy, yet resolved to leave no

<sup>a</sup> The number of these sesterces is almost incredible, considering how much they would amount to; therefore I dare say this must be a corruption of the text: but what the certain number should be, I shall not pretend to determine. Every sestertium, in the neuter gender, according to BUDÆUS, was of the value of five pounds sterling; or, as others will have it, seven pounds ten shillings. BLADEN: who having first translated cxc HS. by 190,000 sesterces (much too little) confounded them with so many sestertia, a thousand times as much, and then was startled at a sum which amounts to 1,425,000 l. of our money, reckoning what he calls sestertium at 7 l. 10 s. HOTOMAN interprets it *centies nonagies*, 19,000,000 of sesterces, which at 2 d. each comes to 158,333 l. 6 s. 8 d. But why may not the reading of the old edition be the true? cxc millia, which I would interpret *centies nonaginta millia nummum*, 10,090,000 HS. or 84,083 l. 6 s. 8 d. The 20,000 weight of silver by the same computation comes to 6666 l. 13 s. 4 d. *Typogr.*

**CIVIL** members of a war in Spain behind him, knowing well that the farther province had many obligations to POMPEY, and that he had still several well-wishers there.

**WAR.**  
  
 Cæsar resolves to march against Varro, who is retired to Cadiz.

Summons the states to meet him at Cordova.

They assemble, and shut the gates against Varro. Carmona revolts to Cæsar, expels Varro's garrison.

Cadiz does the like.

The Legio Vernacula deserts from Varro, marches to Seville.

Varro finding himself blocked up on all sides, surrenders.

19. He sent therefore two legions before, under the command of Q. CASSIUS, tribune of the people, and he himself followed by long marches with six hundred cavalry, having published a proclamation, whereby he appointed all the magistrates and nobility of the country to meet him on a day prefixed at Cordova. This proclamation being dispersed throughout the whole province, every state sent part of their senate thither to represent them, and all the Roman citizens of note appeared there, by the day appointed. The states being thus assembled, of their own accord shut the gates of Cordova against VARRO, disposed centinels on the walls and in the turrets, and retained two cohorts called *Colonicæ* (which were accidentally marching that way) to protect the town. About the same time the people of Carmona, which is the strongest town in the whole province, drove the three cohorts VARRO left there, out of their citadel, and shut the gates of the town against them.

20. All these circumstances obliged VARRO to make more haste to Cadiz with his legions, lest he should be intercepted in his march, or in his passage over from the continent. So general and so great was the affection, which the whole province shewed to CÆSAR, that he had not marched far before he received letters from Cadiz, acquainting him, that immediately on receipt of his proclamation, as well the inhabitants as garrison, had agreed to expel GALLONIUS, and secure the town and island for him: that they had civilly acquainted their governor with this resolution, advising him to quit the island, whilst he might with safety; which if he refused to do, they should be obliged to take other methods: whereupon, GALLONIUS, intimidated with this message, had fled from Cadiz. On receipt of this news, one of VARRO's legions, called *Vernacula*, taking up their ensigns, quitted the camp whilst VARRO stood by, and marched directly to Seville, where they sat themselves down in the market-place and publick streets, without doing hurt to any one; which the Roman citizens residing there, were so well satisfied with, that every one was desirous to quarter them in their houses. VARRO being uneasy to see himself in so ill a situation, began to think of retreating to Niebla; but upon enquiry found all the passes thither prepossest: being thus locked up on every side, he sent a messenger to CÆSAR to acquaint

quaint him he was ready to deliver the legion under his CIVIL command to whom he should please to appoint: upon WAR. which he sent SEXTIUS CÆSAR to receive it. VARRO having surrender'd up the legion, went himself to Cordova to wait upon CÆSAR; where he laid before him an account of his administration, and of the publick treasure; which he delivered into his hands: he likewise informed him what store of corn and shipping he had provided, and where they were.

21. CÆSAR in a publick oration at Cordova, returned thanks to all in general; to the Roman citizens, for taking care to secure the town in their own custody; to those of Carmona, for expelling the garrison; to the people of Cadiz, for disappointing the designs of his enemies and vindicating their own freedom; to the tribunes of the soldiers and centurions, who came thither to guard the place, for confirming the town in their affections to him, by their counsel and example. After this he remitted the tax, which VARRO had imposed on the Roman citizens; caused their goods to be restored, who, he understood, had been fined for their freedom of speech; to some distributing publick, to others private rewards, he revived the hopes of the rest of the province; and after a stay of two days at Cordova, took his journey to Cadiz. On his arrival there, he caused the money and ornaments, which had been taken out of the temple of HERCULES and laid up in private hands, to be carried thither again. He committed the province to the care of CASSIUS, with an army of four legions; and embarking on board the gallies which VARRO had caused to be equipped at Cadiz, arrived within a few days at Tarragona, where embassadors from most of the states in the nearer province expected him. Here likewise having conferred several marks of his favour upon every state, he left Tarragona, and marched from thence by land to Marseilles, where he first received news of the edict for constituting a dictator, and that M. LEPIDUS, the prætor, had named him for the person.

Cæsar makes a speech at Cordova, returns every one thanks.

Cæsar goes to Cadiz, and from thence to Tarragona.

Cæsar arrives at Marseilles, is made dictator.

## CHAP. IX.

22. THE people of Marseilles, being wearied out with all kinds of evils; reduced to great straits for want of corn; twice defeated at sea; often repulsed with loss when

The Marseillians resolve to surrender.

<sup>a</sup> The dictators used always before to be named by the consuls in the night, but the necessity of the time dispensed with the usual form.



**CIVIL WAR.** they sallied; afflicted with a dreadful pestilence, occasioned by their confinement, and change of diet (for they subsisted wholly upon old meal, and musty barley, which had been long before laid up in their magazines against the siege;) their tower being undermined; great part of their wall fallen down; and despairing of those supplies from the two provinces of Spain, which they understood were now in CÆSAR'S power; resolved to surrender in good earnest. But a few days before, L. DOMITIUS having notice of their design, got three ships, accommodated his friends with two of them, and embarking in the third himself whilst the sea was rough, endeavoured to make his escape: some of BRUTUS'S gallies, which perpetually cruised about the mouth of the haven, perceiving this, weighed anchor and followed him; whereupon two of DOMITIUS'S ships were frightened back into the haven again, but that where he was on board made the best of her way, and by favour of foul weather got out of sight.

Domitius escapes out of the town.

The Marseillians, as they were commanded, surrendered their arms and engines, delivered up the ships which were in their harbour, together with the publick treasure: whereupon CÆSAR, being willing to save the town, rather for the sake of its name and antiquity, than any merit the people could plead, left a garrison of two legions there, sent the rest of his army into Italy, and went himself to Rome.

## CHAP. X.

Curio sails to Africk.

23. IN the mean time CURIO had sailed from Sicily to Africk, and, despising the forces of P. ACTIUS VARUS, only transported two of the four legions which he received from CÆSAR, with five hundred horse. Having been two days and three nights at sea, he arrived at Aquilaria, about twenty-two miles distant from the \* Clupei; who have a very convenient harbour for ships in summer time, sheltered on each side by two eminent promontories. Here LUCIUS CÆSAR, the son, expected his arrival with ten gallies, which had formerly been taken from pirates, and repaired by VARUS at Utica; but frightened at the number of CURIO'S fleet, he ran his galley on shore; and leaving her there, marched by land to Adrumetum, a town possessed by C. CONSIDIUS LONGUS, with a garrison of one legion. The rest of CÆSAR'S fleet, seeing their ad-

Lucius Cæsar the younger, on notice of Curio's approach, runs his galley on

a So called from its shape like a shield. Naturalists say, scorpions will not live near this place.

mural run away, put into Adrumetum: M. RUFUS, the CIVIL quaestor, by CURIO's orders pursued L. CÆSAR with twelve WAR. ships, which came from Sicily as a convoy to the transports and tenders; but finding the galley upon the sand, she towed her off, and returned again to the fleet.

shore, and flies to Adrumetum.

24. CURIO sent RUFUS before with the navy to Utica, whither he designed to march with his army by land: in two days journey he arrived at the river <sup>b</sup> Bagrada, where he left C. CANINIUS REBILUS with the legions, and went before with the cavalry, to take a view of the Cornelian camp; which was esteemed a very convenient place to take up their quarters in: for it is the ridge of a very steep hill jetting out into the sea, difficult of access on all sides, but that towards Utica; whence there was a gentle descent, and not above a mile's distance from the town, the direct way: but in the midst, between this place and Utica, was a fountain towards the sea, which discharging itself into the plain, made a marsh, that obliged the traveller to take a circuit of six miles, before he could arrive at Utica.

Adrumetum is now called Mahometa. Curio sends Rufus to Utica with the fleet, and marches thither by land. Encamps at the Cornelian camp.

25. From hence CURIO beheld VARUS's camp, which joined to Utica at the gate called Bellica, and was strongly fortified by the nature of the place; for on one side it was defended by the town, on the other by a theatre, which stood without the wall, and took up so large a compass of ground, that it rendered the avenues to the camp very narrow and difficult. Hence likewise he observed great store of carriages making towards the town, from the country, upon this alarm; whereupon he detached some of his cavalry to plunder them. About the same instant VARUS had likewise sent a party of 600 Numidian horse, with 400 infantry, which he had lately received from king JUBA, to guard the roads. This prince was equally moved to assist VARUS, by the friendship which had been between his father and POMPEY, and the hatred he bore CURIO, who when tribune preferred a law for sequestering his kingdom. In fine, the cavalry on both sides met, but the Numidians were not able to sustain our charge; about 120 of them being killed, the rest escaped to the town.

A skirmish between Curio's cavalry and the Numidian horse.

26. In the mean time our gallies being arrived, CURIO caused it to be proclaimed, That such <sup>c</sup> victuallers as rode at anchor at Utica (being about two hundred in number)

Curio's party gets the better.

<sup>b</sup> Or Magrada: this river flows between Carthage and Utica: here REGVLUS killed the serpent above 220 foot long.

<sup>c</sup> These victuallers did not belong to him, as appears by his speech afterwards.

**CIVIL** which did not immediately hoist sail for the Cornelian camp; **WAR.** should be esteemed as enemies: on notice of this order, they all immediately weighed anchor, left Utica, and repaired to the place appointed, which furnished the camp with plenty of provisions of all kinds.

26. After this he returned to Bagrada, where by universal consent of the whole army, he was saluted with the title of <sup>d</sup> Imperator.

## CHAP. XI.

**THE** next day **CURIO** marched his whole army towards Utica, and encamped near the town; but before the fortifications of his camp were compleated, the outguard of the cavalry brought advice, that considerable reinforcements, both horse and foot, were marching towards the enemy from king **JUBA**: at the same time a dust was seen to arise at a distance, and presently the front appeared. **CURIO** being a little surprized at this, sent his cavalry before to receive the enemy's charge, and find them employment till he could dispose his legions in order of battle. The horse engaged, and, before the legions could be drawn up, routed the king's forces; who marched very carelessly, and without any manner of order: several of the foot were slain, but the enemy's horse being nimble, most of them made their escape along the shore into the town.

A considerable party of Juba's routed by **Curio's** cavalry.

Two centurions deserted to **Varus**.

27. The next night, two centurions of the country of **Marisia** deserted from **CURIO**, and went over to the enemy with two and twenty maniples: these, either out of a design to please **VARUS**, or because it was really their opinion (for we easily believe what we wish, and hope other men are of the same opinion with ourselves) positively affirmed, that the legions were disaffected to **CURIO**; wherefore it might be of great advantage, if both armies were drawn out, and could come to conference with each other. **VARUS** believing their intelligence, early the day after drew out his legions; **CURIO** did the like, and both armies were disposed in order of battle in a small valley, not far from one another.

Both armies drawn out.

28. **SEXTUS QUINCTILIUS VARUS**, who, as we have already observed, had been taken at **Corfinium**, was now in the enemy's army; for being dismissed by **CÆSAR**, he had sailed into **Africk**. It happened, **CURIO** had transf-

<sup>d</sup> A mark of honour the soldiers paid the Generalissimo after some successful enterprize.

ported

CIVIL  
WAR.

Quintilius's  
speech to  
Curio's sol-  
diers.

ported those legions that CÆSAR took at Corfinium, which were still commanded almost by all the same officers. QUINCTILIUS therefore thinking this a happy opportunity, went up and down CURIO's army, and "besought the soldiers to remember the first oath they had taken to DOMITIUS and him, their pay-master, not to bear arms against them, who had shared the same fortune and suffered in the same siege together; nor assist those, who had formerly reproached them with the name of deserters." To this speech he added some promises of rewards, which they might expect from his generosity, if they came over to him and VARUS. Such was the harangue of QUINCTILIUS, but none of CURIO's soldiers made him an answer; so both armies retreated again into their camps.

29. However, CURIO's camp was possessed with strange apprehensions, which were quickly increased by variety of discourses; for every man framed different conceits, and every report was augmented by fear. In fine, what was first invented by one, came to be talk'd of by so many, that there appeared to be several authors of the same notions: "That it was lawful for every man, in a civil war, to do what he thought convenient, and choose his own party; that these two legions not long before belonged to POMPEY; and since CÆSAR offered governments, even those that were his enemies, such favours should teach them not to neglect their ancient friendship and acquaintance." But they came not all from Marlia and Pelignia, as those who had deserted the night before: therefore some reprimanded their fellow-soldiers for talking so freely; and others, who would appear more diligent in their duty than the rest, enlarged these discourses in their informations to the officers.

A mutiny  
in Curio's  
camp.

## CHAP. XII.

30. UPON this CURIO immediately summoned a council of war, to consult what methods were proper to be taken. Some were of opinion, "'Twas necessary forthwith to attack VARUS in his trenches, because nothing could so effectually banish these notions out of the soldiers heads, as employment." Some, "That it was much better to put their fortune upon the hazard of a battle, than prolong the time till they should be deserted, and exposed to the fatal consequences that must necessarily follow." Others voted for "retreating to the Cornelian camp about one the next

Curio calls a  
council of  
war; various  
opinions,

\* All the rest of this paragraph is so corrupted and confused in the original, it cannot be rendered into English; but I have aimed at CÆSAR's meaning as near as I could.



CIVIL morning, that the soldiers having time to consider, might  
WAR. return to their duty; and if any inconvenience should happen, being near the fleet they might easily retire to Sicily."

Curio's  
speech to the  
council.

31. But CURIO approved of none of these, for he thought one opinion as void of courage, as the other of conduct; since one advised a shameful retreat, and the other attacking an enemy at so great a disadvantage. "With what assurance, said he, can we expect to take the enemy's camp, which is so well fortified by art and nature? And what will be the consequence of returning with loss from the attempt? As if the affection of an army to their general, did not depend on his good or bad success. But then, as to decamping, what construction can be made of it, but cowardice and despair? And what the effect, but the contempt of the soldiers? The obedient and loyal soldier should never think he is mistrusted; nor the refractory know he is feared; which serves only to encrease the arrogance of the one, and alienate the affections of the other. But taking it for granted that the army is so ripe for mutiny, as we are informed (which account, for my part, I believe either wholly false, or much less than report has made it) how much more were it for our interest to hide and dissemble, than confirm it? We ought to conceal defects in our forces, with the same industry as the wounds of our body, that we may not give the enemy new hopes. But what could they design, that advised decamping about midnight; except affording those who had a mind to mutiny, the better opportunity to do it? For disorders of this nature are often suppressed either by shame or fear, which are both concealed by darkness. For these reasons, I neither am so desperate as to attack the enemy in their trenches, without any manner of prospect, nor so oppressed with fear, as to be wanting to myself: wherefore I shall experience all methods before I agree to the opinions proposed; and I doubt not, but the majority of you will agree in my resolution."

### CHAP. XIII.

Curio's  
speech to the  
soldiers.

32. UPON this, dismissing the council, he caused the soldiers to be assembled, and made an harangue to them, wherein he reminded them, "What a signal piece of service they had done CÆSAR at Corfinium: that their friendship and authority had induced a considerable part of Italy to declare in his behalf; for, said he, all the municipal towns immediately followed your example; wherefore you were justly

justly esteemed as much by CÆSAR, as you were CIVIL  
 hated by his adversaries. For POMPEY, without losing a WAR.  
 battle, was obliged by your revolt to quit Italy; whereupon  
 CÆSAR, out of his particular affection to me, committed  
 me to your protection, and with me the provinces of Sicily  
 and Africk, without which he could neither preserve Rome,  
 nor the rest of Italy. 'Tis true, you have been advised to  
 leave us; and certainly nothing could be more grateful to  
 our enemies than to ruin us, and at the same instant bind  
 you to their interest, by making you commit so vile an  
 action. Let me tell you, 'tis a proof that they entertain  
 but a very base opinion of you, to think you could be in-  
 duced to betray those, who own themselves indebted to you  
 for every thing; and put yourselves again into their power,  
 who declare you have ruined them. Have you not been  
 informed of CÆSAR's success in Spain? that he has con-  
 quered two armies, two generals, and reduced two pro-  
 vinces, within forty days after he first beheld the enemy.  
 If they who had never been worsted before, were not able  
 to resist him, how shall the defeated do it? And will you,  
 who generously ran the hazard of CÆSAR's fate, desert  
 him, after fortune has decided the cause in his favour, and  
 the time is arrived for rewarding your services; to embrace  
 the conquered party, who remind you of your former oath,  
 and brand you with the names of traitors and deserters?  
 But did you desert DOMITIUS, or DOMITIUS his soldiers?  
 Were you not ready to have endured the last extremities,  
 whilst he privately endeavoured to escape? Were you not  
 betrayed by him, and saved by CÆSAR's mercy? And how  
 can the oath any longer oblige you, when he to whom you  
 swore, having thrown aside all marks of consular dignity,  
 became a private person, and a captive to another? You dis-  
 charge yourselves from your last oath, to revive the obli-  
 gation of a former, which was cancelled by the submission  
 of your general, and the forfeiture of your liberties. But per-  
 haps you approve of CÆSAR's cause, yet dislike your gene-  
 ral: For my part, I shall not recount the obligations you have  
 to me, because they are much inferior to my own desire and  
 your deserts: though soldiers always used to attend for their  
 rewards till the war was determined; the success of which,  
 in my opinion, you have now no reason to doubt of. Shall  
 I take notice, to how fair a prospect my diligence has al-  
 ready brought you? Are you sorry that I have safely trans-  
 ported the army hither, without the loss of a single vessel?  
 That on my first arrival I put the enemy's fleet to flight?  
 That I was twice successful over their cavalry in two days

**CIVIL** time? That I brought two hundred victuallers and tenders  
**WAR.** out of the enemy's port, and reduced them to such necessities, that they could neither be supplied by sea nor land? Will you therefore desert all this good fortune, will you quit the general that has done these things, and return to those who delivered up Corfinium with so much ignominy, who fled from Italy, surrendered Spain, and share with them the ill success of the African war? For my part, I desired no greater name than that of CÆSAR's soldier; you thought fit to honour with me that of Imperator: but if you repent of what you have done, I shall freely surrender the title: give me back my name again, that you may not appear to have advanced me only to make my fall the greater."

## C H A P. XIV.

The effect  
 the speech  
 had upon the  
 soldiers,

33. **THIS** speech had so extraordinary an effect upon the soldiers, that they often interrupted him, to express their grief for being suspected: and, when he had finished his oration, unanimously desired him to depend upon their fidelity, and engage the enemy. Thus all peoples minds being changed, and the army's affection confirmed, **CURIO**, by general consent, resolved to lay hold of the first opportunity for giving **VARUS** battle: wherefore, the day after he drew out all his forces in the same place as formerly: and **VARUS** did the like, either designing to obtain another conference with our soldiers, or to embrace an occasion for engaging us upon equal terms.

Both armies  
 drawn up,

The battle  
 begins.

**VARUS**'s  
 horse routed,

34. The valley between the two armies, as we have already taken notice, was not very large, though of difficult ascent; therefore both expected which would first endeavour to pass it, that they might encounter each other to the greater advantage. At length **VARUS**'s cavalry, mixed with the light armed foot, which was the left wing of his army, descended from the hill: **CURIO** sent his horse, and two cohorts of the Marrucini to engage them; whose first charge their cavalry were not able to sustain, but clapping spurs to their horses, retreated as fast as they could to the main body; leaving the infantry that came along with them to the mercy of our soldiers, who surrounded and cut them to pieces, in view of their own army. Upon which, **REBILUS**, one of **CÆSAR**'s lieutenants (whom **CURIO** had brought along with him out of Sicily, on account of his great experience in military affairs) cried out; "**CURIO**, you see fear has possessed the enemy, why don't you immediately lay hold of this happy occasion?" **CURIO** took his advice,

vices, and only staying to put the soldiers in mind of their promise made the day before, advancing himself before the rest, commanded them to follow him. The ascent was so steep, that the foremost could hardly get up without the assistance of those that came after; but the enemy were so frightened with the rout and slaughter of their men, that they did not endeavour to oppose us. In fine, they thought themselves already surrounded by our cavalry; and before a dart was thrown, or we approached them, the whole army turned their backs, and retired into their camp.

35. During the pursuit, **FABIUS** a Pelignian, a soldier of the lowest rank amongst **CURIO**'s forces, coming up with the first troop of the enemy, called aloud upon **VARUS**, as if he had been one of his own party, and had something extraordinary to impart to him. **VARUS** hearing himself called so often, stood still, and looking back, demanded his business: upon which **FABIUS** made a stroke at his shoulder which was unarmed, and had certainly killed him, had not the other received the blow upon his shield; but he was soon surrounded, and cut to pieces by the soldiers that stood next him. The gates of their camp were immediately thronged by those that fled, who hindered each other; and more were crowded to death, than fell either in the battle or pursuit. We had almost taken their trenches, and some of them fled directly into the town; but the nature of the place, and the fortifications which **VARUS** had thrown up, prevented the entrance of our army which had been drawn out only to fight a battle, and wanted materials to fill up the ditches: wherefore **CURIO** retreated to his quarters again, without the loss of a man, except **FABIUS**: but on the enemy's side were six hundred killed, and a thousand wounded; who upon **CURIO**'s departure went into the town, with many others who retired thither out of fear, though under another pretence. Which **VARUS** perceiving, and taking notice of the consternation his army was in, led them out silently about midnight, and marched into the town, leaving only a trumpet in the camp, with a few tents for a shew.

## C H A P. XV.

36. THE next day **CURIO** resolved to besiege **Utica**, and draw a line of circumvallation about it. The town had many inhabitants, whom a long peace had made wholly ignorant of war; and having formerly received several favours

CIVIL  
WAR.His whole  
army flies.Fabius's at-  
tempt on  
Varus's life,His design  
misses, and  
he is killed.The enemy  
routed, they  
crowd one  
another to  
death in the  
pursuit.Curio besie-  
ges Utica.



**CIVIL** vours from CÆSAR, stood well-affected to his interest:  
**WAR.** the common-council, which consisted of <sup>8</sup> several sorts of  
 people, were so frightened with the ill success which they  
 had hitherto met with, that they talked publicly of sur-  
 rendering; and desired VARUS not to ruin them by his ob-  
 stinacy. But whilst this was in agitation, a messenger ar-  
 rived from JUBA, assuring them, that he was coming to  
 their assistance with a considerable force, and encouraging  
 them to hold out; which news dissipated their fears, and  
 gave them fresh courage.

*The town  
 designs to  
 surrender;  
 but on news  
 of Juba's  
 approach,  
 change their  
 resolution.  
 Curio will  
 not believe it  
 at first.*

*Retreats to  
 the Corne-  
 lian camp.*

37. CURIO likewise had notice of this, but confided so much in his good fortune, that at first he could hardly believe it: for the news of CÆSAR'S success in Spain being now publicly known in Africk, he could not be persuaded JUBA would attempt any thing against him. But at last being satisfied the king was already arrived with his army within twenty-five miles of Utica, he quitted his works, and retreated to CORNELIUS'S camp. Here he began to intrench himself, to provide corn, and immediately dispatched away messengers into Sicily for the other two legions, and the rest of the horse he had left behind him. The camp was very advantageously fortified to protract the war, both by art and nature, lying near the sea, plentifully stored with water and salt, whereof store had been lately imported from the neighbouring salt-pits: In fine, he neither could want wood, trees, nor corn, wherewith the adjacent fields abounded: wherefore, by general approbation, here CURIO resolved to expect the arrival of the rest of his forces, and prepare for the war.

*Curio re-  
 ceives false  
 intelligence.*

*He resolves  
 to fight Sa-  
 bura.*

38. Having resolved upon this scheme by publick consent, he was informed by some deserters from the town, that JUBA was obliged to return home to defend the borders of his kingdom, and compose the disputes amongst the Leptitani; but had sent his general SABURA with a small number of forces, who were marching towards Utica. CURIO giving too easy credit to this intelligence, altered his former design, and now resolved to try the event of a battle: his youthful ardour, greatness of mind, former success, and dependance upon his good fortune, precipitated him upon this enterprize. Induced by these motives, at the beginning of the night he detached the cavalry before to the enemy's camp, at the river Bagrada; where SABURA, whom we mentioned but now, commanded in chief. But

<sup>8</sup> As well natives as Roman citizens, like that at Seville.

UBA himself followed after him, and had taken up his quarters not above six miles off. Our horse performing their journey before day-light, surprized and set upon the enemy unawares: for the Numidians, being a barbarous people, observed no manner of order; which gave our men an opportunity of killing great numbers, whilst they were dispersed and asleep; others, being frightened, betook themselves to flight; and thus the cavalry returned to CURIO with several prisoners.

39. CURIO, by break of day, with all his forces had quitted his camp; leaving only five cohorts behind to guard his baggage. He had not marched above six miles before he met the horse, who gave him an account of the action; whereupon he examined the captives to know who commanded their camp at Bagrada; to which they answered, SABURA. Eager to pursue his journey, he stayed to ask no more questions, but turning about to the troops next him, said, "Observe, gentlemen, this account of the prisoners agrees exactly with what we received from the deserters: the king is absent, and their forces must of necessity be inconsiderable, which were not able to repulse so small a number of cavalry. Wherefore let us hasten to obtain the spoil and glory, that I may the sooner reward, and render you thanks for the services you have done."

CIVIL

WAB

Sends the

horse before,

who have

good success.

They return

with some

prisoners to


Curio.

Curio's  
over-eager-  
ness.He exhorts  
the soldiers  
to make  
haste.

## C H A P. XVI.

40. TO give the cavalry their due, they had obtained a considerable booty, and done wonders, considering how far inferior they were to the Numidians in number. But however, they enlarged a little in their accounts of the action; for men naturally represent themselves to the best advantage. The horse made their appearance, and the prisoners they had taken were produced to inflame the army, and make them believe each moment they lost, retarded them so long from victory: thus the ardour of the soldiers became equal to the hopes of their general. He commanded the horse to follow after, and marched before himself with the infantry as fast as he could, that he might have an opportunity of falling upon the enemy, whilst they were flying, before they could recover their surprize: but the horse being fatigued by their last night's expedition, were not able to perform his orders, some staying behind in one place, others in another; yet even this could not diminish CURIO's expectations,

In

CIVIL  
WAR.

In the mean time JUBA, having notice from SABURA of the last night's engagement, had immediately sent two thousand Spanish and French cavalry, his own life-guard, together with a select battalion of foot to his assistance: suspecting CURIO was not far behind his horse, he himself followed gently after with the rest of his army, and sixty elephants. SABURA having drawn up his forces, commanded them at first to retreat, as if they were afraid; for he would give them the sign to engage when he should think convenient, and distribute the necessary orders. CURIO by this decoy being confirmed in his former hopes, and believing the enemy fled, drew his army down into the plain from the higher ground.

Curio and  
Sabura en-  
gage.

41. At length, having marched a considerable way, and weakened his soldiers with a journey of sixteen miles, he made a halt. Upon which SABURA put his army in order, rode up and down to every company, and having encouraged them to fight, gave the sign of battle: but he only sent the cavalry to charge our men, keeping his foot at a distance for a shew. CURIO wanted not presence of mind, he advised his men to repose all the hopes of safety in their courage: Nor did the foot, though wearied with their march, or the cavalry, though few in number and fatigued with the duty they had now gone through, betray want of courage, or inclination to engage. Of the latter were only two hundred left, for the rest had halted by the way; yet wherever they charged, they obliged the enemy to give way; but their horses were so tired they could not pursue them far.

Curio sur-  
rounded by  
Sabura.

In the mean time SABURA's horse began to surround our army on both sides, and gall us in the rear: whenever our cohorts issued out to charge them, the Numidians, being fresh, avoided the attack by their nimbleness; but when our men endeavoured to return again to the main body, they were environed and intercepted: so that we could neither maintain our ranks, nor charge their forces with safety.

## CHAP. XVII.

THEY received fresh supplies perpetually from JUBA, whilst our men began to faint with the fatigue they had sustained; and our whole army being beset by their horse, even they that were wounded could neither quit the field, nor retire to a place for security. Wherefore despairing of safety, as men usually do when they are dying, they bemoaned their

their own fates, and wished their friends better fortune, if it were possible for any of them to escape the slaughter. In fine, the whole army was sunk with grief and fear.

CIVIL  
WAR.

42. CURIO perceiving the soldiers in so great a consternation, that they gave ear neither to his commands nor intreaties, as the last refuge gave orders they should gain the neighbouring hills: but they were already possessed by SABURA's cavalry, which reduced our men to the last degree of despair; part endeavouring to escape, were killed by the enemy's horse; and others, to preserve themselves from the like fate, fell prostrate on the earth. Whilst affairs were in this desperate condition, CN. DOMITIUS, *Curio routed.* commander of the horse, having only a few of his followers <sup>ed.</sup>

left, advised CURIO to save himself by retreating to the camp, and promised not to forsake him. But CURIO, having lost the army which CÆSAR committed to his charge, resolved never to behold his face again; wherefore fighting bravely, he expired. Some few of the cavalry escaped the slaughter; and they who stayed behind to refresh themselves, perceiving at a distance that the army was routed, retreated in safety to the camp, but every man of the foot was cut to pieces.

He dies  
bravely.  
Part of the  
cavalry  
escape to the  
camp.

43. M. RUFUS, the quæstor, whom CURIO had left behind in the camp, exhorted the soldiers not to be dejected: they begged to be transported to Sicily, and he promised they should. Whereupon he ordered the captains of the ships to bring their boats to the shore so soon as evening approached. But so great confusion were they in, that some affirmed JUBA was almost at the camp with his army; some, that VARUS with his legions was coming that way, and that they perceived the dust occasioned by his march; but these reports were both of them false: others again were apprehensive that the enemy's fleet would immediately be with them. Thus all being frightened, every man consulted his own preservation; those who had embarked were for hoisting sail immediately; and their weighing anchor made the transports in haste to follow after. A few small *The transports go off, and leave greatest part of them behind.* tenders obeyed RUFUS's orders, and stayed: but the strand was so crowded, and every one so eager to get on board before the rest, that some of these vessels were sunk, and others were afraid to come nearer shore.

44. Thus it happened that a few soldiers and aged men, who were received on board, either through interest or compassion, together with such as were able to swim to the transports, got safe into Italy. But the rest having sent  
their



**CIVIL** their centurions that night as deputies to VARUS, surrendered.

They surrender to Varus; but are killed by Juba, after quarter granted.

Juba makes his entry into Utica.

Returns to his own kingdom.

The day after, JUBA, seeing these cohorts before Utica, and claiming them as part of his booty, commanded several to be killed, and sent others, whom he selected out of the number, into his own country. VARUS in vain interceded, affirming his honour was engaged for them; but durst not oppose the king's resolutions; who made his entry into the town on horseback, attended by several Roman senators, among which number were SERVIUS SULPICIUS, and LICINIUS DAMASIPPUS: having given such orders for the government of the place as he thought convenient, after a few days stay, he returned to his own kingdom with all his forces.



# C. J. CÆSAR'S COMMENTARY OF THE CIVIL WAR.

## The THIRD BOOK.

CÆSAR and POMPEY, *their preparations.* CÆSAR goes into Greece. *The siege of Salona.* POMPEY retires to Durazzo. BIBULUS dies. *Propositions of peace rejected.* Tumults at Rome composed. ANTONY and KALENUS join CÆSAR. SCIPIO'S tyranny in Asia. *His arrival in Macedonia.* POMPEY besieged by CÆSAR at Durazzo quits the siege. Draws POMPEY into Thessaly. Engages and defeats him. LÆLIUS besieges Brundisium. CASSIUS burns CÆSAR'S ships in Sicily. POMPEY killed in Egypt by ACHILLAS and SEPTIMIUS. CÆSAR goes to Alexandria, where he is engaged in another war.

## CHAP I.

THE dictator, CÆSAR, presiding at the assembly for election of magistrates, himself and P. SERVILIUS were chosen consuls; for this year it was <sup>a</sup> lawful for him to be admitted to that office. This being over, CÆSAR perceiving commerce was at a stop in Italy, because no body paid their debts,

CIVIL  
WAR.

Cæsar and  
Servilius  
chosen con-  
suls.

An. U. C.

<sup>a</sup> Viz. According to SYLLA'S law, whereby it was enacted, No person should enjoy the consulate a second time, till ten years after his first election.

decreed

705.

**CIVIL** decreed that arbitrators should be appointed for setting such  
**WAR.** an estimate on the estate and goods of debtors, as they were  
 really worth before the war began; and delivering them at  
 that value to the creditors. This he thought the properest  
 method for preserving the reputation of the debtor, and  
 taking away all apprehension of a law for pardoning debts,  
 as usually happens in civil wars. He restored to the præ-  
 tors and tribunes their ancient right of appealing to the  
 people. He likewise reversed some judgments given against  
 persons accused of bribery in elections, by virtue of the Pom-  
 peian law, whilst POMPEY kept his legions in the city; be-  
 cause the merits had often been heard by one judge, and  
 sentence pronounced the same day by another, who knew

Makes a law  
for payment  
of debts, re-  
stores ap-  
peals to the  
people.

Reverses  
judgments  
given in  
Pompey's  
time.

Gets those  
cleared by  
the people  
who were  
condemned  
for proffering  
their service  
to him.

nothing of the cause. And thinking himself as much  
 obliged to those who had proffered their service to him at the  
 beginning of the war, as if he had accepted of their friend-  
 ship, he resolved to free them from the sentence they lay  
 under upon his account: but thought it more convenient to  
 have them acquitted by the votes of the people, that he  
 might neither seem ungrateful, nor appear to assume too  
 great authority.

## CHAP. II.

He lays  
down his  
Dictator-  
ship; goes  
to Brindisi.

2. THESE affairs, together with the <sup>b</sup> Latin festivals;  
 and the rest of the elections, took him up eleven days; af-  
 ter which, having laid down his dictatorship, and left the  
 city, he went to Brindisi; where he had appointed twelve  
 legions, with all the cavalry, to meet him. But he found  
 so few transports in the haven, they were hardly sufficient for  
 carrying over twenty thousand legionary soldiers, and six  
 hundred horse: which was the only thing CÆSAR had need  
 of, to enable him to put a speedy end to the war. Besides,  
 those troops which went on board wanted recruits; for the  
 wars of Gaul, and long marches from Spain, had killed  
 many; and an unhealthful autumn about Brindisi and Apu-  
 lia, with the change of so wholesome an air as that of Gaul  
 or Spain, had made the whole army out of order.

Pompey's  
preparations,  
his forces.

3. POMPEY had now had a twelve-month's time, free  
 from all interruption, to raise an army in; which he em-  
 ployed to the best advantage: for he got a considerable fleet

<sup>b</sup> Feasts instituted by Tarquinius Superbus to Jupiter Latiaris on his conquest  
 of Hetruria. They were kept on mount Alba, to which forty cities of La-  
 tium, Hetruria, the Volsci, and Hernici, sent their deputies, with some contri-  
 bution towards the sacrifices.

together,

together, from Asia, the Cyclades, Corfu, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, Egypt; and had given orders for building several ships in other places. He had raised a great deal of money in Asia and Syria, besides what he received from all the Kings, Dynasts, Tetrarchs, and Hans-towns of Achaia; he likewise extorted great sums from the corporations or societies of the provinces under his command.

4. He had levied nine legions of Roman citizens; five he brought along with him from Italy; one veteran legion came from Sicily, called the Gemella, because it consisted of two others; another from Candia and Macedonia, of old soldiers, which had formerly been disbanded there by other generals; and two more from Asia, which had been raised by LENTULUS's care. Besides these, he had considerable numbers from Thessaly, Bœotia, Achaia, and Epirus; which he distributed amongst his legions by the way of recruits, together with <sup>b</sup> ANTONY's soldiers.

His land-  
forces.

Over and above all these, he expected two legions under SCIPIO's command from Syria, with archers from thence, Candia, Lacedæmon, Pontus, and other countries, to the number of three thousand; with six thousand slingers, two thousand hired soldiers, and seven thousand horse. Six hundred of the latter came along with DEIOTARUS from Gaul; five hundred with ARIOBARZANES from Cappadocia; the like number from Thrace, sent by COTUS, under the command of his son SADALIS; two hundred from Macedonia, led by the famous RASCIOLIS; six hundred Gauls and Germans from Alexandria, whom A. GABINIUS had formerly presented PTOLEMY with for a guard; POMPEY's son brought eight hundred in his fleet, whom he had levied amongst his slaves and shepherds; TARCUNDARIUS CASTOR and DOMILAUS furnished three hundred Galatians; the first of these came himself in person, the latter sent his son; two hundred, most of them archers, were sent from Syria, by COMAGENUS of Antioch, who had been infinitely obliged to POMPEY. To these were added the Dardani, with more from Macedon, Thessaly, and other countries, part volunteers, and part mercenary troops, which completed the number of cavalry above-mentioned.

Rascus's  
brother, who  
was of Cæ-  
sar's side.

5. He had provided great quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Candia, Cyrene, and other countries: he resolved to quarter his army that winter at Durazzo, Apollonia, and

<sup>b</sup> Surrendered up to him at Corfu, by the treachery of T. Pulcio, but the narration of which is omitted in the Commentary, but hinted at § 10.



**CIVIL WAR.** the other maritime towns, to prevent CÆSAR's passing the sea; for which purpose he took care his fleet should cruize perpetually about the coasts. POMPEY, the son, was admiral of the Egyptian Squadron; D. LÆLIUS and C. TRIARIUS of the Asian; C. CASSIUS of the Syrian; C. MARCELLUS and C. COPONIUS of the Rhodian; SCRIBONIUS LIBO and<sup>c</sup> M. OCTAVIUS of the Liburnian and Achaian fleets: but M. BIBULUS was high admiral, whose orders the rest were to observe upon all occasions.

His fleet.

Bibulus High Admiral.

### CHAP. III.

Cæsar desires the legions to leave their baggage behind.

He embarks for Greece.

He lands at Pharalus.

This word all mankind agree to be corrupted, yet no body knows how to mend it.

Kalenus sent back with the fleet to fetch the rest.

6. CÆSAR, upon his arrival at Brindisi, called the soldiers together; and desired, since their labours and dangers were now almost at an end, they would be content to leave their baggage behind them in Italy, that the greater number might embark, and expect all things from conquest and his liberality: they unanimously exclaimed, Let him command whatever he pleased, they were ready to obey his orders. Wherefore (<sup>d</sup> as we have already remarked) having put seven legions on board, the fifteenth of October<sup>e</sup> he weighed anchor, and arrived the day after at the promontory of Ceraunium; where he obtained a quiet harbour amongst the rocks and unfrequented places: apprehending all the ports were prepossessed by the enemy, he fell down to a place called Pharalus, where he landed every man of his army in safety.

7. LUCRETIVUS VESPILLO and MINUTIVUS RUFUS, vice-admirals to D. LÆLIUS, were both at Oricum, with eighteen of the Asian ships; and M. BIBULUS with an hundred and ten at Corfu. But the former had not the courage to attack CÆSAR, though he had only twelve gallees for a convoy; one whereof he was on board himself: nor could BIBULUS get out soon enough, his fleet being out of order, and his sailors dispersed: in short, CÆSAR was landed before the news of his approach was heard of on the continent.

8. Having set his soldiers on shore, he sent the fleet back the same night to Brindisi, to fetch the other legions

<sup>c</sup> Once joint consul with Cæsar.

<sup>d</sup> This has reference to the twenty thousand men spoken of before: for he said the legions were not complete.

<sup>e</sup> Pridie non. Jan. The Roman calendar was now grown so confused, that the calends of January fell on October 11, of our Julian year, consequently pridie nonas Jan. on Oct. 15. U. C. Var. 705. See more Afric. war, 1. 2. and Whier's Annals, Per. Jul. 4665. *Typegr.*

and cavalry. The care of this business was committed to CIVIL lieutenant FUSIUS KALENUS, who had orders to make what WAR. dispatch he could. But the fleet weighing anchor too late, and losing the advantage of the wind, which offered fair that night, miscarried in their return. For BIBULUS, who lay at Corfu, being assured by this time of CÆSAR's arrival, was in hopes of intercepting some part of our fleet: he took about thirty; but finding them empty of soldiers, he set them on fire, together with the masters and mariners, to satisfy his spleen for having slipped so happy an opportunity, and to deter others from transporting any more of CÆSAR's forces. After this, he disposed his men of war all along the coasts between Salona and Oricum, to guard the shore with more diligence for the future: he himself continued on board in the coldest weather, not declining any fatigue, so<sup>t</sup> he might but intercept the supplies CÆSAR expected.

9. After the Liburnian galleys were gone, M. OCTAVIUS, Octavius be- with the rest of the squadron under his command, which sieges Sa- came from Illyria, sailed to Salonæ; where having raised the Dalmatians, and other barbarous people, he drew ISSA to revolt from CÆSAR. But finding he could not prevail with the inhabitants of Salonæ to do the like, he resolved to invest the town. Salonæ is situate on a hill, and well fortified by nature; but the Roman citizens residing there, to make the place better able to hold out, immediately surrounded it with several wooden towers. After they had re- The valour ceived many wounds, finding their number not sufficient to of the be- maintain the town, as their last refuge, they enfranchised all sieged. their slaves that were of age to bear arms, and cut off their women's hair to make cords for the engines. OCTAVIUS, finding them so obstinate, sat down before the town with five different camps; designing at the same time to distress them by blockade and storm. The Salonians were resolved to endure the last extremities, and wanted nothing but corn; wherefore they sent to CÆSAR for supplies; all other inconveniencies they patiently endured. They had now been in- The besieg'd vested a considerable time, and the enemy was grown re- make a vigo- mifs; when taking the opportunity, about noon they dis- rous sally, posed their wives and children upon the walls to supply their and rout places; and making a vigorous sally with their enfranchised Octavius.

<sup>f</sup> The editions read, *Neque subsidium expectans, si in Cæsaris complexum venire possit.* But must of necessity be corrupt; therefore CIACCONIUS and URSINUS have mended it thus; *Ne quod subsidium expectabat Cæsar, in conspectum venire possit.* BLADEN. Dr. Jurin, with less alteration, *neque subsidium expectans, si Cæsaris commectus impedire possit.* Typogr.

CIVIL WAR. slaves, forced the enemy's next quarters, then attempted the next, after that the third, and so the rest with equal success; and having killed great numbers of OCTAVIUS's men, they obliged him to fly to his ships. Thus ended the siege, and winter drawing on, OCTAVIUS despairing of success, after having received a considerable loss, retreated to POMPEY at Durazzo.

## CHAP. IV.

10. WE have already taken notice, that VIBULLIUS RUFUS, one of POMPEY's officers, had twice been taken by CÆSAR, and as often dismissed, once at Corfinium, and another time in Spain. CÆSAR therefore thought him a proper person to carry some proposals to POMPEY, as well in regard of the favours himself had conferred upon him, as of the interest he had in that general. The message was to this effect: "It was time for them both to lay aside their obstinacy, quit their arms, and tempt fortune no longer; since both of them had been sufferers. POMPEY had been expelled out of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and both the provinces of Spain, in which countries he had lost near a hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens: and CÆSAR had reason to bemoan the fate of CURIO and his army in Africk, with the surrender of his forces at Corfu. Wherefore they would both do wisely, to consult their own interest, and that of the commonwealth; they had experienced the power of chance in war, and ought to improve by their own misfortunes; this was the only time for treating, whilst the balance of success was equal; for should fortune incline the least to either side, he who seemed superior would not be contented with half, so long as there was a prospect of obtaining all. That since the conditions could not sooner be agreed on, they should be referred to the senate and people of Rome. In the mean it would be but just to the commonwealth and themselves, that both should publickly swear to dismiss their armies in three days time; for when their own forces were disbanded, and the auxiliaries they depended on, they must of necessity submit to the judgment of the senate and people. And to shew how ready he was to perform these proposals, for his part, he would immediately discharge all his troops in garri-son, and in the field."

Cæsar sends  
proposals to  
Pompey by  
Vibullius  
Rufus.

‡ There is no mention made of his being taken in Spain, therefore something must be wanting.

II. VIBULLIUS having received these commands from CIVIL WAR. CAESAR, thought it more necessary to give POMPEY speedy notice of his approach, that he might be provided to receive him, than to perform his commission: wherefore he posted day and night towards POMPEY, frequently taking fresh horses for the greater expedition, to acquaint him that CAESAR was coming that way with all his forces. Vibullius's haste to acquaint Pompey of Caesar's approach.

POMPEY had been in Candavia, from whence he was marching through Macedonia towards his winter-quarter in Apollonia and Durazzo: and being concerned at the receipt of this unexpected news, he hastened his journey towards Apollonia, to prevent CAESAR's making himself master of the sea-coasts.

But CAESAR having landed his forces, marched the same day towards Oricum; when he came thither, L. TORQUATUS, whom POMPEY had made governor of the town, with a \* Parthenian garrison, designing to shut the gates, and defend the place, commanded the soldiers to repair to their arms, and man the walls: but they refusing to fight against the people of Rome, and the citizens, of their own accord resolved to admit CAESAR into the town. Wherefore TORQUATUS, despairing of relief, opened the gates, surrendered both himself and the place at discretion; and CAESAR took care no injury should be done him. Caesar takes Oricum. \* A people of Illyria.

12. Having taken in Oricum, he immediately marched to Apollonia. On notice of his arrival, L. STABERIUS, governor of the place, ordered the castle to be fortified, water to be carried into it, and demanded hostages from the townsmen: who were so far from complying, that they declared "They would not shut their gates against the consul, nor take resolutions contrary to those of all Italy, and the people of Rome." Upon this reply, the governor thought it high time to prepare for his security by flight: when he was gone, the inhabitants sent deputies to CAESAR, and received him into the town. The Bullidenfes, Aman-tiani, with the rest of the neighbouring countries, and all Epirus, followed their example, sending embassadors to let CAESAR know, they were ready to receive his commands. And Apollonia.

13. POMPEY, in the mean time, having notice of what passed at Oricum and Apollonia, and being in pain for Durazzo, marched thither as fast as possible: it was reported likewise that CAESAR was not far off. Which meeting with more credit, because POMPEY had ordered them to march day and night, put his whole army into so great a consternation, that several of his troops left their



**CIVIL** ensigns behind them in Epirus, and the bordering states, whilst others threw away their arms, and all went forward with so much precipitation, as if they fled rather than marched. Nay, even when they were arrived near Durazzo, and their general gave orders for laying out the camp, they had not recovered their disorder: which **LABIENUS** perceiving, stepp'd forth, and obliged himself, by oath, never to desert **POMPEY**, but to share whatever fortune should befall him; the other lieutenants followed his example; the tribunes and centurions did the like, as well as the rest of the army.

**WAR.**

The disorder of his army.

**Labienus** first takes an oath never to desert him.

All the rest do the like.

**Cæsar** encamps at the river **Apfus**.

**Pompey** does the like.

**Kalenus** weighs anchor, but on advice of the coasts being guarded, puts in again.

One vessel taken; all on board killed by **Bibulus**.

**CÆSAR** finding **POMPEY** had reached Durazzo before him, began to march more leisurely; and having encamped at the river **Apfus** (that he might the more easily cover the countries he had been so much obliged to) there resolved to quarter that winter, and expect the arrival of his other legions from Italy. **POMPEY** did the like, and having pitched his tents on the other side the river, there assembled all his troops and auxiliaries.

14. **KALENUS**, in the mean while, according to **CÆSAR**'s orders, having embarked as many of the legions and cavalry at Brindisi, as his transports would hold, had weigh'd anchor; but sailed not far, before he received letters from **CÆSAR**, informing him that all the Grecian coasts were guarded by the enemy's fleet: whereupon he recalled his ships, and returned again into the haven. But one private vessel, which carried no soldiers, and was not subject to **KALENUS**'s command, pursuing her voyage to **Oricum**, was taken there by **BIBULUS**; who granted quarter to none that were on board, putting even servants and children to death. So narrow an escape had the whole army.

## CHAP. V.

**Bibulus** master of the sea, and **Cæsar** of the coasts.

**Bibulus**'s fleet reduced to great extremities.

15. **BIBULUS**, as we have already observed, lay with his fleet at **Oricum**, and as he deprived **CÆSAR** of all intercourse by sea, so **CÆSAR** having disposed parties along the shore, prevented him from landing: so that he could neither get wood, fresh water, nor anchor near the coast upon any occasion. This put their fleet to many inconveniencies, and reduced them to the last extremity for want of necessaries; for they were obliged to send for all manner of provisions, even wood and water, as far as **Corfu**. Nay, once they were forced to relieve their thirst by the

the dew which fell upon the hides that covered the decks, CIVIL WAR.  
 a thing never practised but in cases of the utmost necessity:  
 yet they patiently endured all these difficulties rather than  
 leave the coasts open, and ports unguarded.

Whilst they laboured under these straits, LIBO having Libo and he  
 joined BIBULUS, they called from on board to M. ACILIUS desire a con-  
 and STATIUS MURCUS, two of CÆSAR's lieutenants, ference with  
 who guarded the walls of Oricum and the sea-coasts, ac- Cæsar.  
 quainting them, they had something extraordinary to offer  
 to CÆSAR, if they might have an opportunity of speaking  
 with him; giving intimations, that they designed to treat  
 concerning a peace. In the mean time, they earnestly de-  
 sired a truce; which was granted them, since their business  
 had the appearance of so great consequence, and was such  
 as MURCUS and ACILIUS knew would be extremely grate-  
 ful to CÆSAR, the effect, as they believed, of VIBULLIUS's  
 negotiation.

16. CÆSAR was then at Buthrotum, directly over- In the ori-  
 against Corfu, whither he had marched with one legion, to ginal it is  
 take in the farther countries, and supply himself with corn; Ribulus, but  
 which began to grow scarce. Here, having received an the error is  
 account of the demands of LIBO and BIBULUS, he left manifest.  
 the legion, and returned to Oricum. When he arrived  
 there, and the time appointed for the conference was come,  
 LIBO only came to the interview, making an apology for A sham trea-  
 BIBULUS's absence, as well on account of his cholerick ty to gain a  
 temper, as of the private pique between him and CÆSAR, truce.  
 ever since his discharging the offices of ædile and prætor;  
 wherefore he avoided the conference, lest the hopeful pro-  
 gress of so important an affair might be interrupted by his  
 presence. Then declared how desirous POMPEY had al-  
 ways been of a treaty and cessation of arms: but as he had  
 not given him a commission to act in his name, he could  
 not conclude any thing without him; since the <sup>h</sup> council  
 had conferred the sole management of the war upon POM-  
 PEY. But if CÆSAR would acquaint him with his de-  
 mands, he would take care to transmit them to POMPEY,  
 who, he doubted not in the least, would comply upon  
 BIBULUS's and his persuasions. Wherefore he desired a Libo's de-  
 truce, till such time as he could receive an answer. After mands.  
 this, he added something about the justice of their cause,  
 the strength of their forces and auxiliaries.

17. To which CÆSAR did not then think proper to

<sup>h</sup> VOSSIUS says, CÆSAR calls POMPEY's party the Council, instead of the Senate, by way of derision.

**CIVIL WAR.** make any reply, nor is it worth his time now to trouble the reader with one.

*Caesar's answer.*

“ But he desired they would either grant his deputies a passport to POMPEY, or undertake they should be conducted to him in safety. As to the truce insisted on, he told them, the present state of the war was such, that on one hand they commanded the sea, and prevented his receiving any supplies that way; on the other, he being master of the coasts, prohibited them the use of land and fresh water: wherefore it was but reasonable, if they expected he should give them the liberty of landing, that they in return should leave the seas open to him: nor would he part with his advantage upon any other terms. However, though they could not agree on that point, the treaty might still proceed.”

*Caesar perceives their design, and disappoints them.*

But they would neither grant his lieutenants a passport, nor oblige themselves to conduct them in safety; referring the whole matter to POMPEY: yet insisted much upon the truce. CÆSAR perceiving that this parley was only made use of as an artifice, to deliver them out of the present danger and difficulties they laboured under, and that no terms of peace were offered, began to think of prosecuting the war,

## CHAP. VI.

*Bibulus dies,*

18. BIBULUS, by being long out at sea, had contracted a dangerous sickness, from cold and constant fatigue: and as he could not be cured on board, and he resolved not to relinquish his charge, the violence of the distemper carried him off. After his decease, no one had the sole command of the fleet, but every admiral acted separately with his own squadron. The surprize being now over, which CÆSAR's sudden arrival had occasioned, VIBULLIUS took the first opportunity, when LIBO, LUCCEIUS, and

*Vibullius's negotiation ineffectual.*

*Pompey's answer.*

THEOPHANES, POMPEY's greatest confidants, were present, to deliver the commission he had received from CÆSAR: but POMPEY soon interrupted his discourse, saying, “ What satisfaction can I have, either in life, or in the enjoyment of Rome, when the world shall believe I have been beholden to CÆSAR's mercy for both? which notion can never be blotted out, till I shall go back a conqueror into Italy, from whence I was expelled.” CÆSAR had notice of this from some that were present at the debate; which yet did not make him desist from endeavouring to obtain a parley by several other methods.

Nothing

19. Nothing parted the two camps but the river Apsus, CIVIL WAR. the soldiers frequently discoursed with each other, and by compact amongst themselves, cast no darts on either side during the conference. Wherefore CÆSAR sent lieutenant Vatinius sent to demand a conference; P. VATINIUS to the banks of the river, with orders to omit nothing which he thought might conduce towards an accommodation; and to demand with a loud voice, "Whether it was not lawful for Romans to send deputies to treat of peace with their fellow-citizens? a privilege which had never been denied even to out-laws and highway-men on the Pyrenæan mountains, and was much less to be opposed, when the design of the conference was to prevent the effusion of Roman blood by Romans." VATINIUS having spoken a great deal to the same purpose in a very submissive speech, as became him when he treated about so great a concern as his own and the publick safety; a profound silence ensued on both sides, and he received this answer: that VARRO would appear the next day at the conference; where deputies might attend with safety which is agreed to; on both sides, and make their demands. A certain time was appointed for the meeting; which being come, multitudes crouded to the place, and all men seemed disposed to a peace. TITUS LABIENUS, advancing before the rest, began a gentle and amicable conference with VATINIUS; but in the midst of it was interrupted by the darts that came flying from every side; which danger VATINIUS escaped, being covered by the shields of the soldiers: but many were wounded, as CORNELIUS BALBUS, M. PLOTIUS, and L. TIBURTIUS, the centurions, with some private soldiers. Then exclaimed LABIENUS, "Let But perfidiously interrupted. us talk no longer of treaties; for till CÆSAR's head be cut Labienus's malice. off, we can never think of peace."

## C H A P. VII.

20. IN the mean time at Rome, M. CAELIUS RUFUS, M. Caelius Rufus, occasion an insurrection. the prætor for foreigners, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on his entrance into his office, caused his tribunal to be fixed near that of the city prætor, C. TREBONIUS; and promised, if any person should appeal from the estimation and orders of the arbitrators for payment of debts, whom CÆSAR had appointed, he would relieve them. But TREBONIUS pronounced his judgments with so much equity and compassion, which was very necessary in those ticklish times, that no body thought of appealing.  
For



**CIVIL** For to have pleaded poverty, misfortunes, the hardness of the times, or the difficulty of putting their effects to auction, would have been an argument of meanness of spirit: but to have owned themselves indebted, and yet have desired to keep their possessions intire, would have been unreasonable to the last degree: therefore no body made any demands of this nature.

Cælius's fedition; the mob rises.

But CÆLIUS was very hard upon those for whose benefit this law was intended: agreeably to his first setting out, and that he might not desert the cause he was engaged in, he made a law, whereby it was enacted, That debtors should compound for half they owed, without interest<sup>i</sup>, and make their payments at three different times.

21. But the consul SERVILIUS, and the rest of the magistrates opposing this edict, he found it had not the effect upon the people he designed: therefore annulling that law, he published two others; one for discharging all tenants from paying their rents, the other for cancelling debts. These had the desired effect, they raised the mob, who assaulted C. TREBONIUS, and having wounded some that were about him, pulled him out of his tribunal. The consul SERVILIUS laid this before the senate, who thereupon resolved CÆLIUS should be removed from his office; by virtue of which decree, the consul expelled him the house, and caused him to be taken from the rostrum, as he was going to harangue the people.

Cælius expelled'd Rome; he joins with Milo.

Afflicted with this disgrace, CÆLIUS pretended he would go to CÆSAR; but instead of that, privately sent messengers to invite MILO into Italy; who stood condemned for the murder of CLODIUS, and had gained the remainder of the gladiators, by considerable presents, for his guard. On his arrival he joined him; and having sent him to Turenne, to solicit the shepherds to take arms, went himself to<sup>k</sup> Cassiline. On his arrival there, he had notice, that his arms were seized at Capua, his partisans at Naples, and

<sup>i</sup> The text is *Sexies seni dies sine usuris creditæ pecuniæ, solvantur*; which is a manifest corruption. Cujacius therefore has made it *Sexagies senis diebus*; MANUTIUS, *Sexenni die*; others, *Sexpensionibus*, whom M. D'ABLANCOURT agrees with; but I rather chuse to follow VOSSIUS, who corrects it, *Sex mensium die*, i. e. should pay what they owed in six months. BLADEN. But how then was RUFUS hard on the creditors, for whose benefit CÆSAR's law was made? One MS. reads *ut se exisseti dies*, whence J. F. GRONOVIVS reads, *ut sessisset in dies sine*, &c. De Pec. Vet. l. iv. c. v. *in dies* he interprets the stated times of payment, which generally used to be divided into three parts, one to be paid each year. *Typogr.*

<sup>k</sup> Famous for being besieged by HANNIBAL, long ago reduced to ashes; but the present Capua now stands in the same place where this town was formerly situate.

their design of betraying the town discovered; wherefore finding himself shut out of Capua, his counsels exploded, and apprehending some danger, because the Roman citizens had already taken arms, and looked upon him as an enemy; he changed his resolution, and desisted from the journey.

22. MILO, in the mean while, having sent his circular letters to the municipal towns, pretended he had a commission from POMPEY for what he did, and received his instructions from BIBULUS. He endeavoured to draw the debtors over to his party; but finding he could not prevail, enfranchised some slaves, and with them went to besiege Cosa in Turene. The town was commanded by the prætor Q. PEDIUS with a garrison of one legion; and here MILO died by a wound he received from a stone thrown by an engine from the walls. CÆLIUS, having given out that he was gone to CÆSAR, came to Thurium, where, endeavouring to corrupt the inhabitants and the Spanish and Gallick horse, whom CÆSAR had left there in garrison, they killed him; which put a speedy end to those dangerous beginnings, that found the magistrates so much work, and alarmed all Italy.

Milo killed.

Cælius killed.

C H A P. VIII.

23. LIBO, leaving Oricum, with a squadron of fifty ships under his command, failed to Brindisi, and possessed himself of an island directly over-against the mouth of the haven. This he esteemed a very important post, because our fleet must of necessity pass that way; and therefore by guarding that single place, he did as much in effect as if he had actually blocked up all the ports and shores on the other side. His arrival being unexpected, he surprized a few transports, which he burnt, carried off one vessel that was loaden with corn, put our men into great disorder; and having landed some foot with a party of archers, in the night, defeated our guard of cavalry. Flushed with this success, he writ POMPEY word, he might draw the rest of the navy on shore, and careen them if he pleased; for he alone was able, with his squadron, to intercept CÆSAR's supplies.

Libo blockades Brindisi.


His success and vanity.

24. ANTONY happened to be then at Brindisi, who confiding in the courage of his soldiers, prepared about sixty pinaces and long-boats, which he armed with penthouses and breast-works of hurdles; and having put a select number

Antony's attempt and success.

ber

CIVIL  
WAR.



He takes  
one of Li-  
bo's galleys,  
and obliges  
him to quit  
the block-  
ade.

Cæsar's un-  
easiness for  
want of the  
rest of his  
legions.

ber of soldiers on board, disposed them in several places along the shore. He had taken care to equip two galleys at Brindisi with three banks of oars, and these he commanded to row to the mouth of the haven, by way of exercise. LIBO, perceiving they ventured boldly, hoped to intercept them, and therefore detached five four-bank'd galleys to attack them. But so soon as they approached us, the veteran soldiers that were on board, retired within the haven: the enemy, eager of the pursuit, followed too rashly; for immediately, upon a sign given, all ANTONY's boats made up to their galleys, and having taken one, with the sailors and soldiers on board, obliged the rest to make an ignominious retreat: to add to this loss, ANTONY, having disposed parties of cavalry along the banks, prevented LIBO from getting fresh water; which forced him to quit the blockade of Brindisi with disgrace.

25. Several months had now passed, and the winter was almost spent, yet neither the legions nor navy were come from Brindisi. CÆSAR believed his lieutenants had let some opportunities slip; for during all that time the wind had certainly offered fair, to whose mercy they must be obliged to trust at last. The longer they omitted coming, the more careful were POMPEY's admirals to guard the coast, and the greater hopes they had of intercepting them. POMPEY likewise, to increase their diligence, writ frequently to reprimand them for letting the former troops pass by, and to remind them of being more careful of seizing the remainder, especially since the season growing milder, would give them a better opportunity of looking out, and the enemy less of escaping.

## CHAP. IX.

Sends posi-  
tive orders  
for the fleet  
to set sail the  
first fair  
wind.

U. C. Var.  
706.

Antony and  
Kalenus  
weigh an-  
chor, and  
arrive safe at  
Durazzo.

CÆSAR therefore, being very uneasy, writ sharply to his officers, commanding them to weigh anchor the first fair wind, if they could but reach the coasts of Apollonia, and run the ships on shore there at any rate, since those places were less guarded by the enemy's fleet, who durst not venture too far from the havens.

26. The soldiers, who were eager for the voyage, and ready to undertake any danger for CÆSAR's sake, assuming their wonted courage, under the conduct of ANTONY and KALENUS, weighed anchor with a southern wind, and the day after passed by Apollonia and Durazzo, where Q. COPONIUS, admiral of the Rhodian squadron, lay; who,

so soon as they were descried from the continent; put out to sea; and the wind growing slack, had almost overtaken our fleet, when a fresh gale delivered them out of danger. COPONIUS however did not desist from the pursuit, but hoping to overcome the winds by the industry of his rowers, followed after, though we had already passed Durazzo: Our men, who were apprehensive of falling into the enemy's hands if the wind grew gentle again, laying hold of the favourable opportunity, put into Nymphæum, about three miles beyond Lissus: which is a dangerous haven when the wind blows south, but safe enough during a south-west: however, they thought they had less to apprehend from the fury of the tempest, than that of COPONIUS. But the moment they were got into the port, by incredible good fortune, the south-wind, which had continued two days without intermission, veered about to south-west.

CIVIL WAR.

Coponius pursues them close;

but they get safe into Nymphæum.

27. This was a very remarkable turn, for we, who but a moment before had reason to dread a tempestuous road, by this accident were sheltered from all danger; and they, who just before threatened destruction to our fleet, were now obliged to prepare for their own security. For the same wind which protected us, so scattered the Rhodian Squadron, that out of sixteen not one escaped shipwreck.

28. Two of our transports that were but slow sailers, and could not keep up with the rest, not knowing where they had put in, cast anchor over-against Lissus. Whereupon OTACILIUS CRASSUS, governor of the place, sent out several boats and small vessels to seize them, promising quarter if they would surrender. One of these vessels carried two hundred and twenty new levies; the others something less than two hundred veteran soldiers. In these different troops we may see the safety and advantage of habitual courage. The new levies, frightened at the number of the enemy's boats, and sick with their voyage, on assurance of their lives upon oath, surrendered to OTACILIUS, and were afterwards, contrary to faith and agreement, every man of them put to the sword. But the old legionary soldiers, though disordered by the storm and noisome stink of the pump, still retained their pristine virtue, prosecuted some part of the night under pretence of a treaty and surrender; then obliged the pilot to run the vessel on shore, and having got a convenient place to land on, staid there the remainder of the night. OTACILIUS, by break of day, detached about four hundred horse to pursue them, with some part of the garrison, which were stationed to defend

Two of Cæsar's fleet, that lay behind, attacked.

One surrenders on promise of quarter, and the soldiers in her put to death. The other escapes by the courage of the veteran soldiers.



**CIVIL WAR.** defend that part of the coasts. But the Veterans made a brave defence, and having killed some of the enemy's men, secured their retreat to the rest of our forces.

Lissus surrenders to Antony.

29. Upon this success, the Roman citizens residing at Lissus, to whose charge CÆSAR had formerly committed the defence of the town, which he had taken care to fortify, opened their gates to ANTONY, and furnished him with all kind of provisions: whereupon OTACILIUS left the place, and fled to POMPEY. ANTONY having landed all his forces, which consisted of three veteran legions, one new, besides eight hundred horse, sent most of the transports back again to Italy, to fetch the rest of the foot and cavalry. But he left the <sup>1</sup> Pontones, a kind of French vessels, at Lissus, that if POMPEY, through an imagination that Italy was left unguarded, as most people believed, should transport his army thither, CÆSAR might not be deprived of the means of following him; ANTONY withal immediately acquainted him where he had landed, and how many men he had brought over.

## CHAP. X.

Pompey and Caesar both have notice of Antony's arrival.

Caesar marches to join him. Pompey to intercept their meeting;

but with ill success.

30. CÆSAR and POMPEY had both advice of ANTONY's arrival almost at the same instant. For his fleet had been descried passing by Apollonia and Durazzo, and followed along the coasts: but no body knew, till some time after, what haven they had put into. On the first news of his landing, CÆSAR and POMPEY took different resolutions, the first to join ANTONY, the other to prevent their joining, either by force or stratagem. Both quitted their camps at Apsus about the same time; POMPEY privately by night, CÆSAR publickly in the day-time: but he had the longer circuit to take before he could ford the river; whereas POMPEY, having no occasion to cross the Apsus, marched by long journeys towards ANTONY, who so soon as he had intelligence of his approach, chose a convenient place to encamp in, and gave orders there should be no fires, that the other might know nothing of his being there. But ANTONY was soon informed of his design by the natives; and having communicated an account of the enemy's motions to CÆSAR, stayed one day within his camp. On advice of CÆSAR's arrival, POMPEY, to prevent being blocked up by two armies, removed with all his forces to Asparagium, a town belonging to the people of Durazzo, where he pitch'd his tents in an advantageous place.

<sup>1</sup> Pontones; these were not like our pontones now-a-days, but rather a kind of lighters.

## C H A P. XI.

31. IN the mean time SCIPIO, after the several losses he had received near mount Amanus, styled himself Imperator, and exacted great sums of money from the states and princes of that country. He obliged the receivers to pay in the two years taxes which lay in their hands, and advance a third, by way of loan. He likewise distributed orders to the whole province for levying cavalry; and so soon as they were raised, leaving his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians, behind him, who not long before had defeated M. CRASSUS, and besieged BIBULUS, he marched out of Syria with his horse and legions. When he came into the province \*, he found the natives very uneasy for fear of the Parthian war; his army likewise declared, though they were ready to march against an enemy, yet they would not bear arms against the consul and their fellow-citizens. But to secure them in his interest, he gave them considerable presents; and having quartered them at Pergamus, and the richest towns, gave them free liberty to plunder.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Scipio's avarice and heavy impositions.

\* Asia,

32. In the mean time he omitted not laying heavy taxes upon the province; for he made both slaves and free-men, without distinction, pay poll-money. Imposts were laid upon pillars and doors of houses, upon corn, watermen, arms, engines, and carriages; in fine, nothing that had a name escaped being taxed, not only in cities, but little towns and villages: and he that collected these subsidies with the greatest rigour, was esteemed the honestest man and best citizen. The province swarmed with catchpoles, officers, collectors, and overseers; who, besides the publick impositions, exacted money for their own private use; but to colour their extortions, alledged extream poverty, and their being expelled their own country. To add to these inconveniencies (as it generally happens during war-time) very high interest was paid for money, it being all drawn out for the publick use. Insomuch, that if a debtor desired farther time, that indulgence was reckoned as a new loan. Thus, in two years time, the debts of the province were doubled. Nor were the Roman citizens only liable to these taxes; for certain sums of money were demanded from every state and corporation, as a loan on the credit of the senate's decree; and the receivers had orders to advance the next year's tribute upon interest.

The villainy of his collectors.

Not

CIVIL

WAR.

The treasure  
of Diana at  
Ephesus nar-  
rowly escapes  
him.

Not content with these sums, he gave orders for taking all the money and images of DIANA, out of her temple at Ephesus, which had long been treasured up there.

33. But he no sooner came into the temple, attended by a great many senators, than he received an express, that CÆSAR was landed with his legions, that therefore he should come away immediately with his army, and make what dispatch he could to join POMPEY. On receipt of these letters, he dismissed the senators, marched directly towards Macedonia, and arrived there within a few days. Thus the temple of Ephesus escaped being plundered.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsar and  
Antony join-  
ed.

34. CÆSAR having joined ANTONY, thought it convenient to march further up into the country, and try the affections of the Greeks: wherefore he drew the legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guard the coasts.

Theßaly and  
Ætolia de-  
clare for Cæ-  
sar.

Embassadors soon came to wait upon him from Theßaly and Ætolia, promising to declare for his party, if he would send them garrisons to defend their country. Whereupon he detached L. CASSIUS LONGINUS with the twenty-seventh legion, new levies, and two hundred horse into Theßaly: C. CALVISIUS SABINUS, with a small party of horse, and five cohorts, into Ætolia: desiring they would take particular care to furnish him with corn, because those provinces lay the nearest to his army. He likewise sent CN. DOMITIUS CALVINUS with the second, eleventh, twelfth legions, and five hundred horse, into Macedonia: for MENEDEMUS, the greatest man of that part of the province, which is called The Free, being sent ambassador to CÆSAR, had assured him of his countrymens affections.

Calvisius ar-  
rives in Æ-  
tolia.

35. CALVISIUS, upon his arrival in Ætolia, met a welcome reception, and made himself intire master of the country, after having expelled the enemy's garrisons out of Calydo and Naupactum. But CASSIUS, when he came with his legion into Theßaly, found two factions there, one headed by EGESARETUS, a man of established credit, for POMPEY; the other by PRETEUS, a noble youth, who employ'd his utmost interest for CÆSAR's service.

Cassius in  
Theßaly.

Domitius  
comes into  
Macedonia.

36. DOMITIUS, about the same time, arrived in Macedonia; and whilst ambassadors from all parts were attending him, news arrived of SCIPIO's approach with his legions, which alarmed the whole country: for same generally renders

renders things more dreadful than they really are. **SCIPIO CIVIL**  
 marched by long journies, without intermission, towards **W. A. R.**  
**DOMITIUS**; but when he was arrived within twenty miles  
 of him, on a sudden wheeled about for Thessaly: which **Scipio**  
 he did with so much expedition, that **CASSIUS LONGINUS** marches to-  
 had no notice of his marching that way, before he was wards him;  
 actually come thither. For **SCIPIO**, that he might make but wheels  
 the more dispatch, left his baggage behind him at the river about for  
**Haliacmon**, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, with Thessaly.  
 a guard of eight cohorts, under the command of **M. FAVONIUS**; Leaves his  
 whom he ordered to erect a fort there. At the same time baggage at  
**COTUS**'s \* cavalry, which frequently made inroads into Thes- **Haliacmon**  
 faly, came to attack **CASSIUS**'s camp; who terrified at with **Favo-**  
 the news of **SCIPIO**'s arrival, upon sight of these horse, **nus.**  
 presently concluded they were his, and made the best of his \* King of  
 way towards the mountains to surround Thessaly; design- **Thrace.**  
 ing from thence to march towards Ambracia. But **SCIPIO**,  
 whilst he was closely pursuing **CASSIUS**, was informed by  
 a courier, that **DOMITIUS** was marching to besiege **FAVO-**  
**NIUS**, who was not able to defend himself without **SCIPIO**'s  
 assistance. Whereupon changing his resolution, he desisted  
 from the pursuit, and returned to **FAVONIUS**. Marching  
 day and night, he arrived so opportunely to his relief, that  
 the dust of **DOMITIUS**'s army, and **SCIPIO**'s van-guard,  
 were descried at the same instant. Thus **DOMITIUS**'s care  
 preserved **CASSIUS**, and **SCIPIO**'s dispatch **FAVONIUS**. But on no-  
 tice of **Domitius**'s  
 coming to  
 besiege **Fa-**  
**vonius**, re-  
 turns,

## C H A P. XIII.

37. **SCIPIO** stay'd two days with **FAVONIUS** on this **Scipio and**  
 side the **Haliacmon**, which parted his from **DOMITIUS**'s **Domitius**  
 army: but the next day, early in the morning, he forded **both draw**  
 the river; and the day after, drew his forces up in order of out their ar-  
 battle before his camp. **DOMITIUS**, being ready for an en- mies.  
 gagement, did the like; and, because there was a <sup>m</sup> large  
 field between the two armies, he led his legions close up to  
**SCIPIO**'s camp.

The enemy moved not from their rampier; yet **DOMI-** **Domitius's**  
**TIUS** could hardly restrain his soldiers from fighting, though soldiers ea-  
 a rivulet, with steep banks, opposed their passage. **SCIPIO** ger to fight;  
 observing how eager our soldiers were for the engagement, but he re-  
 strains them,

<sup>m</sup> The original is *Campus circiter millium passuum sex*, but must be a cor-  
 ruption of the text; for the last chapter tells us, he was so near **FAVONIUS**,  
 that the dust raised by his march was perceived; which could hardly be at six  
 miles distance: and to what purpose did **SCIPIO** draw his army up in order of  
 battle, or how could **DOMITIUS** see it, if he had been so far off?



**CIVIL WAR.** that he might not be obliged the next day either to fight against his will, or remain with disgrace within his trenches; after he had raised great expectations by his seeming forwardness, retreated with no small disgrace; being obliged to escape by night cross the river Haliacmon, without giving the usual sign for decamping, for fear of alarming DOMITIUS. After this, he encamped upon a rising ground, near the banks of the river; and having remained there a few days, laid an ambush of cavalry for our foragers,

Scipio's disgraceful retreat.  
Domitius's foragers rout a party Scipio had laid in ambush.

where they usually came. When Q. VARUS, general of DOMITIUS's horse, according to his daily custom, was come to the place, they immediately discovered themselves: but our men soon rallying in good order received and returned their charge with equal vigour. We killed about eighty of the enemy upon the spot, put the rest to flight, and returned again to the camp, with the loss of only two on our side.

Domitius's ambush,

38. DOMITIUS, after this success, that he might entice SCIPIO to fight, pretended to be much streightened for want of corn; and having given the sign for decamping, marched about three miles, where he drew his infantry and horse up in a private and convenient place. SCIPIO being ready to follow, detached a party of horse, and light-armed infantry, to discover what way he had taken. They had not marched very far, before their van-guard came within reach of our ambush, when suspecting something, from hearing our horses neigh, they began to retreat; which those that followed at some distance perceiving, made a halt likewise. Whereupon our men, finding themselves discovered, and thinking it in vain to expect the rest of the army, intercepted two troops which were in their power. Among these was M. OPIMIUS, general of SCIPIO's horse [\* who made his escape;] the rest were either killed or taken prisoners.

with pretty good success.

\* Which is not in the text, but must be added, to agree with what follows.

Young Pompey's exploits.

39. IT was before observed, that CÆSAR having drained his garrisons along the sea-coasts, had only left three cohorts to defend Oricum, and the gallies which he brought out of Italy. This business was committed to the charge of ACILIUS, who, for the better security of the shipping, had caused them to be haul'd up into that part of the haven which is behind the town, and fastened to shore: he likewise sunk a transport in the mouth of the haven, to block up the entrance; where he fixed another at anchor, upon which he built

## CHAP. XIV.

built a tower, and filled it with soldiers, to prevent surprize. CIVIL WAR.

40. POMPEY's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having notice of this, came to Oricum; where he weighed up the vessel that was sunk, and after a great deal of trouble, took the other, which had been placed by ACILIUS for a guard to the haven: for he attacked it with several of his ships together, whereon he had likewise erected turrets to an equal height with ours; he took care to relieve his men perpetually; and, to divert us from doing the like, stormed the town at the same instant both by sea and land: but all our soldiers that were on board escaped in small boats. After this, possessing himself of a natural mole on the other side, which almost formed a peninsula over-against Oricum, he caused four little gallies to be heaved over the neck of land upon rollers, into the inner-part of the haven, that lay behind the town: they assaulting the gallies on both sides at once, which were empty and fastened to the shore, he carried away four, and burnt the rest. Enters the haven of Oricum.

After this, leaving D. LÆLIUS, with a small squadron, to intercept all provisions from Bullis and Amantia, he sailed for Lissus; where he burnt the thirty transports which ANTONY had left in that haven. He endeavoured likewise to take the town; but the garrison and Roman citizens made so vigorous a defence, that after three days labour lost before it, they obliged him to desist from the attempt. Carries off four of Cæsar's gallies, burns the rest. Burns thirty transports at Lissus.

## CHAP. XV.

41. CÆSAR, having notice that POMPEY was at Asparagium, marched thither with his army; and having taken in the capital of Parthenia by the way, where POMPEY had left a garrison, he arrived in three days in Macedonia; where he encamped not far off the enemy. The day after, drawing out all his forces, he offered POMPEY battle; but finding he declined it, CÆSAR retired into his camp, and began to think of other measures. The next morning therefore he removed, and taking a large circuit about, through rough and narrow roads, marched towards Durazzo; hoping either to oblige POMPEY to follow him thither, or else to cut off his communication with the town, where he had reposed his magazines for the war: which happened accordingly; for POMPEY at first not perceiving his design, because he had taken a different rout, believed he was obliged to decamp for want of provisions; but being better Cæsar marches towards Asparagium; offers Pompey battle; which he declines. Cæsar marches to Durazzo, to cut off Pompey's communication with the place.

**CIVIL WAR.** informed by his scouts, he broke up from Asparagium the day after, hoping to disappoint him, by marching the nearer way. Which CÆSAR suspecting, encouraged his soldiers patiently to endure the fatigue; and having allowed them but a small part of the night to refresh themselves in, arrived the next morning early at Durazzo, where he encamped, before POMPEY's van-guard could reach the place.

Pompey encamps on the Petra.

42. POMPEY's communication with Durazzo thus intercepted, and his design defeated, as the best method which was left, he resolved to possess himself of the Petra, a rising ground, that has a tolerable good haven, which is sheltered from some winds. Here he gave orders for part of his gallees to attend him, and corn to be brought from Asia, and those other countries which were subject to his command. CÆSAR apprehending the war would be tedious, and despairing of supplies from Italy, because the coasts were so straitly guarded by POMPEY's fleet, and his own ships, equipped the last winter in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy, were not arrived, dispatched two legates Q. TULLIUS and L. CANULEIUS to Epirus for corn. But because that country lay at so great a distance, he caused granaries to be built in several places, and ordered the neighbouring countries to furnish him with waggons; not omitting to gather what corn was to be found in Lissus, the country of Parthinia, and the adjacent states; which was but inconsiderable, for the soil being mountainous and barren, the natives were obliged to relieve themselves by imported grain: besides, POMPEY, who foresaw CÆSAR's occasions, had already ravaged those places, and, after pulling down the houses, his cavalry had carried off all the corn the country afforded.

Cæsar sends Canuleius into Epirus for corn.

## C H A P. XVI.

Besieges Pompey in his camp;

43. WHEREFORE CÆSAR resolved upon a certain expedient, which the nature of the place suggested. POMPEY's camp was surrounded by steep and high mountains; on these CÆSAR first disposed parties, and erected castles; designing, as the nature of the place would permit, afterwards to draw lines of communication from one turret to another, and enclose the enemy with a ditch and a rampier. The reasons which moved him to take this resolution were, that as he was much distressed for want of corn, he might with less difficulty supply his camp, whilst POMPEY's cavalry, of which he had great numbers, were shut up, and prevented from foraging; and that he might detract from that credit which

His reasons for it.

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
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
to face p. 293.

# Pompey's Interco



A. Durazzo B. Caesar's Camp. C. Pompey's only Peha D. 15 Miles within m. E. G. The two armies drawn out. part of Caesar's works next y Sea I. Pompey forces C drawn from y Camp to y River L. Caesar's Camp to y assistance of his Party N. the Peha & it's haven

ercourse with Durazzo cut off.



a. D. Caesar's Lines. E. Pompey's 24 Castles inclosing a Circuit of  
 about Pompey's close to his Rampier. H. Pompey's attempt on that  
 forces Caesar's ninth Legion from the hill & fortifies it. K. his Line  
 camp over against him. M. the fifth Legion detached by Pompey  
 haven. O. of River whose Course Caesar has stop'd.



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which POMPEY had acquired amongst foreign nations; CIVIL when it should be reported through the world, he was besieged by CÆSAR, and durst not venture an engagement. WAR.

44. POMPEY in the mean time resolved neither to quit the advantage of the sea, nor Durazzo, where he had stored all his preparations for the war, as darts, arms, engines, with corn both for his fleet and army: nor could he prevent the progress of CÆSAR's works without fighting him, which he thought at that time inconvenient. The only refuge therefore he had left, was to enclose as many hills, and take in as much ground within his works as possible; that he might disperse CÆSAR's forces. The design Pompey succeeded; for having erected twenty-four castles, and enclosed a circuit of fifteen miles, he had room enough for his cavalry to forage in; besides, great part of the ground was cultivated. Whilst our men were drawing their circumvallation, they were uneasy, lest they should have left any part of the work imperfect, which might furnish the enemy an opportunity of fallying, and attacking them from behind. Nor were POMPEY's soldiers less careful in perfecting their lines to defend themselves from the like inconvenience. But their works went faster on than ours, as they had more hands, and a smaller space of ground to enclose. Wherefore when CÆSAR attempted to gain any place, though POMPEY designed not to give battle, yet he endeavoured to interrupt his progress, by detaching parties of archers and slingers, which he had plenty of, to oppose him. Many of our men were wounded, and the rest put into so much fear, that they made themselves coats of mail, or thick leather, to defend them from danger.

45. Both generals endeavoured to make themselves masters of every post; CÆSAR, that he might block up POMPEY in a narrow compass; and POMPEY, that he might gain as much liberty as possible; which occasioned many skirmishes. Cæsar encloses Pompey's works within his fortifications.

## C H A P. XVII.

AMONGST other rencounters, it happened, as A skirmish CÆSAR's ninth legion had possessed themselves of a piece of ground, and were going to fortify it, POMPEY gained the opposite mount, and began to interrupt their works. A party of Our Pompey's.



CIVIL  
WAR.

Caesar's at  
first have  
the worst.

Pompey's  
vanity.

But Caesar  
secures their  
retreat.

Our hill on one side was of easy access; that way therefore he first detached parties of archers, slingers, and afterwards a strong battalion of light-armed foot; plying us warmly at the same time with his engines: nor was it easy for our soldiers at once to sustain their charge, and go forward with their lines. CÆSAR perceiving his men were wounded from all sides, sent them orders to quit the place and retire: but the descent being very steep, the enemy believing we gave ground for fear, pursued so close, that they allowed us no time to retreat. 'Tis reported that POMPEY should vainly say upon this occasion, to those that were near him, "He would forfeit his reputation as a general, if CÆSAR's legions could extricate themselves from the danger their rashness had plunged them into, without a considerable loss."

46. But CÆSAR, solicitous for bringing off his soldiers in safety, caused hurdles to be placed on the ridge of the hill, between them and the enemy; then having sunk a trench behind of a pretty good breadth, and laid as many obstacles as he could to retard the enemy's pursuit, he disposed slingers in convenient places to cover his men, and commanded a retreat. Which POMPEY's party perceiving, eagerly pursued, and pulling up the hurdles, attempted to get over the ditch. Whereupon CÆSAR, apprehending this disorderly retreat might be misconstrued for a rout, which would have been a great disgrace, ordered ANTONY, who commanded that legion, to encourage his men, and give them the sign of battle; upon which, after they had retired half way down the hill, they rallied, cast their piles, and charged the enemy so briskly, that they routed them notwithstanding their advantage of the upper ground; nor were POMPEY's men a little incommoded by the hurdles, stakes, and trenches, in endeavouring to make their escape. But our soldiers, content to secure themselves, after they had killed several of the enemy, and lost only five of their own number, quietly retired at some paces distance; where, having gained other hills, they proceeded with their lines.

## CHAP. XVIII.

47. THE management of this war was particularly new and unusual, as well in respect of the number of castles, which

which enclosed so vast a circuit of ground, and the nature of the works, as of other circumstances that attended it. For generally they who besiege another, do it with a design to cut off his provisions, grounding the attempt upon their own superiority of forces, or on the fear or weakness of the enemy, after the loss of a battle, or on some other disadvantage which has daunted him. But CÆSAR besieged POMPEY, when he was inferior to him in number, whilst the other's troops were entire, in good order, and had plenty of all kind of provisions: for several ships arrived every day from all parts, which supplied them with what they wanted; nor could any wind blow, but would waft their convoys from one place or other. Whereas CÆSAR's army, having consumed all the corn round about, were reduced to the last necessities; which they endured with singular patience, remembring they had laboured under the same inconveniencies in Spain but the year before; and by surmounting them all, had brought an important war to a happy conclusion: That they had undergone great difficulties at Alise, and much greater at Bourges, and yet returned victorious over powerful nations. They were content with pease or barley; and thought themselves feasted when they got any cattle, which Epirus furnished them with in great numbers.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Cæsar's army reduced to great straits for want of provisions.

Their extraordinary patience,

48. During this extremity, VALERIUS's men found out certain roots, called Charæ; which, mingled with milk, was a great relief to them, and served instead of bread. Of these the country afforded plenty; and whenever POMPEY's men reproached us with being starved for want of provisions, our soldiers, to repress their insolence, would fling these loaves at them.

49. Now the corn began to ripen, and the prospect of immediate plenty made our army endure the present want with chearfulness: they would often declare in their discourse with each other, or when they were upon the guard, "that they would relieve their hunger with the barks of trees, rather than suffer POMPEY to escape them." In the mean time, we were frequently informed by the deserters, that it was with difficulty they supported their horses, that the rest of the cattle were actually dead, and the army much disordered by being enclosed within so narrow a compass, that they were annoyed with the noxious smells which proceeded from dead carcasses; fatigued by perpetual labour, which they were not used to; and lastly, reduced to great extremities for want of room and water.

Pompey mightily incommoded for want of room and water.

**CIVIL** for want of water: For CÆSAR had either turned the  
**WAR.** course of all the rivers which discharged themselves that way  
 into the sea, or damm'd up their currents. The ground  
 being mountainous, with some few narrow intervening  
 vallies, like so many dens, he stopped the course of the  
 water through them, by making dams of piles, which he  
 fenced with hurdles, and covered with earth. By these  
 means the enemy had a new daily task, being obliged to  
 search for low and marshy places to dig wells in, which  
 yet lay at a considerable distance from some parts of the  
 army, and were soon dried up by the heat of the weather.  
 But CÆSAR'S army was in perfect health, and plenty of  
 water, and all kinds of provisions except wheat, which the  
 season of the year promised them plenty of in a very short  
 time, by the approach of harvest.

50. In this new-fashioned way of waging war, both ge-  
 nerals made use of several stratagems: they observing by  
 our fires that our cohorts guarded the lines in the night-  
 time, silently approaching the works, discharged a flight  
 of arrows upon our men, then retreated as fast as they  
 could within their own fortifications. But our soldiers,  
 who wanted not experience, soon found out a remedy  
 for this mischief, by watching in one place, and making  
 fires in another.

## CH A P. XIX.

51.<sup>d</sup> . . . . In the mean time P. SYLLA, whom CÆSAR  
 had left to command the camp during his absence, having  
 notice how the engagement stood, came to the assistance of  
 the cohort with two legions; and easily repulsed POM-  
 PEY'S forces, who, terrified at the sight, were much  
 less able to sustain the charge of our soldiers. Their first  
 ranks being broken, the rest turned their backs and were  
 routed: but SYLLA, to prevent his mens pursuing too far,  
 sounded a retreat. 'Twas generally believed, if he had  
 pushed his success, that day might have determined the  
 war: yet he was not to be condemned, because the offices  
 of a lieutenant and a general are very different; the first  
 ought never to exceed his orders, but upon a very extraor-  
 dinary occasion; but the other may act without restraint.

*Sylla re-  
 moves his  
 party, then  
 retreats.*

*The differ-  
 ence be-  
 tween a lieut-  
 enant and a  
 general.*

Here is a great deal wanting; I suppose CÆSAR'S attempt upon Du-  
 razze,

SYLLA

SYLLA thought he had done enough to deliver his own party out of danger, and had he gone further, perhaps he might have been reflected on for assuming a greater power than belonged to him. POMPEY's men found great difficulty in retreating; for having mounted to the top of a hill, when they came to descend again, our soldiers had a great advantage over them: the dispute continued till almost sunset; for the hope of accomplishing their design made them maintain the fight with great obstinacy. But POMPEY at last, finding no other way, possessed himself of another hill, beyond the reach of darts and engines from our turret. Here he sat down, fortified the place, and brought all his forces together.

52. Our men were engaged in two other places at the same time; for POMPEY attacked several castles at once, to divert our forces, and prevent one party from sending relief to the other. VOLCATIUS TULLUS, in one place, sustained and repulsed the charge of an entire legion with three cohorts; in another, the Germans fallying out, slew several of the enemy, and returned safe again within our lines.

53. Thus in one day CÆSAR had six engagements, three at Durazzo, three at his works; and computing the slain on both sides, it appeared POMPEY had lost two thousand; in which number were several centurions and volunteers: particularly VALERIUS FLACCUS, the son of LUCIUS, who was formerly governor of Asia; with six standards. On our side, not above twenty were killed, but not a soldier in the fort escaped being wounded: Four centurions in one cohort lost their eyes, who as an argument of their courage and the dangers they had gone through brought CÆSAR about thirty thousand arrows which had been shot into the castle, with the centurion ° SCAEVA's shield, which had two hundred and thirty holes in it. CÆSAR therefore, to reward a person who had so well merited of him and the republick, presented him with P six hundred

CIVIL  
WAR.Volcatius  
Tullus re-  
pulses a le-  
gion of Pom-  
pey's with  
three co-  
horts.The number  
of the slain  
on both  
sides.Scæva's  
courage.

and reward,

° The number of these arrows, and the holes SCAEVA had in his shield, are almost incredible; but the encrease no doubt is owing to those that have transcribed the original; some manuscripts reduce these holes to 120, which agrees with the number mentioned by SUTTONIUS.

P The original is *millibus ducentis aris*. Mr. D'ABLANCOURT translates this *deux mille ecus*, two thousand crowns; Mr. EDMUNDS 600 l. But if THOMASIIUS's account be true, whose excellent (though short) dissertation on Latin monies, I dare venture to rely on, both these gentlemen must be mistaken, especially the French; for computing their crowns at English value, which they fall considerably short of, the sum will but amount to 500 l. BLADEN.



**CIVIL WAR.** sixty-six pounds, thirteen shillings and four-pence sterling; and promoted him from being an eighth centurion to be first centurion of the legion; for his courage had contributed much to the saving of the fort. As for the cohorts, he decreed them double pay, and double allowances for meat and cloathing, with many other military ornaments.

54. POMPEY, having wrought all night to compleat his trenches, built his turrets afterwards, and raising his fortifications fifteen foot high, covered that part of his camp with mantlets. Having staid there five days, by the favour of a very dark night he retreated in silence to his former works, after he had closely blocked up the gates of his camp, to prevent a pursuit.

## CHAP. XX.

55. LONGINUS and CALVISIUS having possessed themselves of Ætolia, Acharnania, and Amphilochis, CÆSAR thought it convenient to pursue his good fortune, and attempt the gaining of Achaia: wherefore he sent FUSIUS KALENUS, Q. SABINUS, and CASSIUS thither, with a detachment. On notice of their approach, RUTILIUS LUPUS, who commanded that province for POMPEY, lodged himself in the Isthmus, hoping to stop their passage. But Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, of their own accord submitted to KALENUS; some states he obtained by force, and to others sent ambassadors, persuading them to embrace CÆSAR's interest. This was FUSIUS's concern.

56. CÆSAR, in the mean time, omitted not drawing out his forces every day, offering POMPEY battle on equal ground; and, to provoke him to accept it, led his army up so near the enemy's camp, that his van-guard was almost within engine-shot of their rampier. POMPEY, indeed, to save his credit, drew out his legions too; but so close to their trenches, that his third line touched their rampier, and all his army might have been covered by the weapons cast from thence.

All these gentlemen proceed upon one common interpretation, viz. that *millibus ducentis aris* means 2000 asses, and only differ in the value of the *ar*. But it was the custom of CÆSAR's age to compute by sesterces, not asses. Accordingly some MSS. omit *aris*. If it is retained, the meaning is the same, *aris* being added in conformity to the original valuation of the sesterces, which was two brass asses and a half. Thus Plin. N. H. l. v. c. ii. *aris nostri summa est HS. CCCIII.* Now 200,000 sesterces at 2 d. each, is 1666 l. 13 s. 4 d. CÆSAR gave SCÆVA half a knight's estate, and preferred him to a military honour next that of knighthood. *Typogr.*

57. Such was the posture of affairs in Achaia, and at Durazzo, when SCIPIO arrived in Macedonia: upon notice of which CÆSAR still retaining the same peaceable desires, dispatched away CLODIUS to him, an intimate friend to them both; whom CÆSAR had entertained upon SCIPIO's recommendation. Before his departure, he gave him a letter to deliver, with other instructions to this effect; "That he had left nothing unattempted to obtain a peace, though he believed his endeavours had been frustrated by the neglect of the persons he had employ'd; who durst not mention his demands to POMPEY at a proper time; but he knew SCIPIO's power to be so considerable, that he could not only freely advise, but enforce the execution of his own counsels, and oblige POMPEY to hearken to reason. For as he had the independent command of an army, he could back his authority by arms, and had it in his option to bless Italy and the provinces with peace, and make the whole empire a debtor to him alone for her safety."

CIVIL  
WAR.

Caesar sends  
Clodius to  
Scipio to  
treat about a  
peace.

His message;

CLODIUS performed his commission, and at first met a favourable audience, but afterwards could not be heard by means of FAVONIUS, who reprimanded SCIPIO for bearkening to a negociation, as was discovered after the conclusion of the war.

which proves  
ineffectual.

58. CÆSAR in the mean time, that he might the more easily shut up POMPEY's horse in Durazzo, and prevent their foraging, blockaded all the roads (which we have already said were narrow) with strong works, on which he erected castles. But POMPEY, finding they could not effect what he had designed, conveyed them by sea from Durazzo to his camp again. Forage was so scarce, they were obliged to feed their horses with green reeds, or leaves taken off the trees; for all the corn they had sown within their lines was consumed, and they were obliged to send a great way about by sea for forage to Corfu and Acharnania; which falling short, they mixed it with barley, to support their horses. But afterwards having consumed all their barley, grass, herbs and boughs of trees, their horses being almost dead with famine, POMPEY thought it high time to make an eruption.

Extream  
want of fo-  
rage in Pom-  
pey's camp.

## C H A P. XXI.

59. IN CÆSAR's camp were two Savoyards, who came along with the cavalry which their country sent, ROSCIL-

LUS

**CIVIL** **WAR.** **L**US and **ÆG**US, sons of **ADBUCILLUS**, who were for many years together had borne the most considerable sway of any person in Savoy. These were gentlemen of extraordinary courage, and had done **CÆSAR** particular service during his wars in Gaul; for which reason he had rewarded them with great offices, and taken care to get them elected into the senate, contrary to the usual order; and not only presented them with large sums of money, but raised their fortunes by ample grants of the enemy's forfeited estates; nor had their personal merit gained them less credit with the army than with **CÆSAR**; but presuming upon his favour, and growing barbarously proud and haughty, they despised their countrymen, cheated the cavalry of their pay, and applied the money to their own private use. Whereupon the soldiers complained of this usage in a body to **CÆSAR**, taxing them, amongst other articles, with making false musters.

**R**oscillus and **Ægus** cheat their countrymen the Savoyards of their pay.

**Cæsar** reprimands them for it.

60. **CÆSAR**, thinking it no proper time to enquire farther into their crime, and having a particular respect for the persons complained of, took an occasion to reprimand them in private, for making a property of the soldiers; advising them to trust to his friendship for the reward of their services, which they might in some measure estimate from the earnest they had already received. However, this affair disgusted them, because it diminished their former credit; for consciousness of the fact rendered them as uneasy as the reflections that were cast upon them for it. Thus prompted by shame, and perhaps by fear, not believing themselves cleared, but that their punishment was only deferred to another time, they resolved to desert, and try their fortunes elsewhere, in search of new friendships. Having communicated their design to a few of their clients, whom they could entrust with so important a project, they at first attempted to murder **C. VOLUSENUS**, general of the horse (as was discovered, when the war was over) that they might render themselves more welcome to **POMPEY** by so signal a piece of service. But finding this design impracticable, for want of an opportunity to accomplish it, they borrowed great sums of money, on pretence of making restitution to the soldiers they had injured; and having purchased with it great numbers of horses, they went over to **POMPEY**, with those they had admitted into the secret.

They design to murder **Volusenus**, and then desert.

They desert to **Pompey**;

61. **POMPEY**, because they were persons of quality, liberally educated, came well attended with servants and horses,

horses, were reputed men of courage, and in great esteem CIVIL WAR. with CÆSAR, waited on them round about his works, to shew them to his soldiers, as a very unusual sight: for before that time neither horse nor foot soldier had ever deserted from CÆSAR to him, though deserters flocked almost every day from POMPEY to CÆSAR, especially from amongst the new levies in Epirus, Ætolia, and those countries that had declared for his interest.

The Savoyards, having accurately remarked all the strong places and defects in our works, the particular times, distance of place, the strength and vigilance of the guards, with the character of each individual officer, gave POMPEY an exact account.

give him intelligence where Cæsar's works are strong, and where the weakest.

CHAP. XXII.

62. UPON this intelligence, POMPEY resolved to put his former design of sallying forth in execution: wherefore he commanded the soldiers to cover their helmets with osiers, and prepare fascines; which being done, so soon as it was dark, he put on board some small vessels a strong party of light-armed infantry and archers, with materials for filling up CÆSAR's trenches; and about midnight made a draught of sixty cohorts out of his larger camp, and sent them to that part of CÆSAR's lines which were nearest the sea, and lay farthest from his head-quarters. There he ordered the vessels with the light-armed infantry, and the galleys which lay at Durazzo, to meet him; giving them their several instructions how to act. The works which POMPEY designed to storm, were guarded by the quaestor LENTULUS MARCELLINUS, with the ninth legion, who had taken FULVIUS POSTHUMUS for his coadjutor, because he found himself indisposed.


Pompey's preparations for a sally.

A description of the place Pompey stormed.

63. Here was a ditch fifteen foot deep, with a rampier ten foot high, and of an equal breadth: about two hundred yards within them was another rampier something lower than the former, and with a contrary front, which CÆSAR had raised not many days before, to prevent the ships from being surrounded, and defend his men if they should be attacked by a double assault at once. But the extent of the lines, and the perpetual fatigue the soldiers had endured in inclosing a circuit of eighteen miles, had interrupted this work: so the cross rampier, which should have made a communication between these and the rest of our lines,

was



**CIVIL WAR.**  was not compleat: this POMPEY had notice of from the Savoyards, which was of fatal consequence to us. The out-guards of the ninth legion, by break of day, discovered POMPEY's forces; which surprized them extreamly; for at the same instant the foot and archers from on board cast showers of darts upon the outward rampier, those that came thither by land were filling up their trenches, fixing their scaling-ladders, and driving our soldiers from the inner works by their darts and engines; having first disposed considerable numbers of archers on both sides our fortifications. The only refuge we had left in this extremity, was to ply the enemy with stones; but the officers they had wound about their helmets, prevented our doing any great execution. To add to these misfortunes, having descried the defect in our lines, they landed their men between the two rampiers, attacked our soldiers in the rear, and obliged them to quit both sides of the works.

The courage  
of the Eagle-  
bearer,

64. MARCELLINUS, on notice of this disorder, sent a party to sustain his out-guards; which arrived not before they were routed; and could neither persuade them to rally, nor were able themselves to maintain their ground. The more supplies he sent, the more confusion he created; for they were no sooner arrived, but they were infected with the same fear that possessed their fellow soldiers, and only served to prevent each other's retreat. During this engagement, the eagle-bearer of the legion, finding himself mortally wounded, and almost spent with loss of blood, thus addressed the cavalry: "Many years have I carefully guarded this ensign, and now I surrender it to CÆSAR before I die: let me conjure you to deliver it safe to him, nor suffer so great an ignominy to befall him as the loss of an eagle, which was never yet heard of in his army." Thus the standard was preserved, though all the centurions of the first cohort, except the primiple, were killed.

65. The enemy, having made a dreadful slaughter amongst our men, had almost forced their way to MARCELLINUS's quarters, and struck no small terror into the rest of the cohorts of that legion; when M ANTONY, who guarded the fort next to MARCELLINUS, on advice of the dispute, descended with twelve cohorts from the higher ground to his relief. ANTONY's arrival soon put a stop to their career, and inspired our party with fresh courage. Not long after, CÆSAR, having notice of distress by the smoke of the castles, the usual signal upon such occasions, drew some cohorts

cohort out of the lines, and came up to the assistance of **CIVIL**  
his soldiers. **WAR**

## C H A P. XXIII.

**CÆSAR**, after he had informed himself of the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that **POMPEY** was now no longer confined within his lines, and was encamped so conveniently near the sea, that his horse had liberty enough to forage, and he still enjoyed the same use of his shipping as before, altered his former scheme, which had proved ineffectual, and encamped as near the enemy as he could.

**Pompey**  
breaks out  
of the forti-  
fications.

66. When his camp was fortified, he had notice from his scouts, that a certain number of the enemy's cohorts, which to them appeared a compleat legion, were retired behind a wood into the works that had formerly been deserted. For some few days before, **CÆSAR**'s ninth legion (as was mentioned) being attacked by a party of **POMPEY**'s, whilst they were carrying on the lines, retired a little farther off, and encamped themselves upon another hill, adjoining to a wood, not above four hundred paces distant from the sea: but afterwards, **CÆSAR**, for certain reasons, removed beyond that place, which **POMPEY**, not many days after, possessed himself of: and because the works were not large enough to contain so many legions as he designed to lodge there, leaving the old rampier standing, he cast up another beyond it, designing the first should serve instead of a citadel; from the left angle of his camp he had likewise drawn a line of communication to the river, about six hundred foot long, that his army might fetch water without danger. But some time after, changing his mind for some reasons not necessary to be mentioned at present, he left the place: so the camp, with all the works, remained several days entire.

**Cæsar and**  
**Pompey's**  
new camp.

See § 45,

67. Hither the scouts reported they saw the standard of a legion carried, which was confirmed by advice from the higher turrets. This place was about five hundred paces distant from **POMPEY**'s new camp; **CÆSAR** therefore, being desirous to repair the loss he had sustained, and hoping he might surprize this legion, left only two cohorts, for a blind, to carry on the works; and taking a different rout, marched as privately as he could with thirty-three more (amongst which number was the ninth legion, that had suffered so severely in the late action, by the loss of several

several

**CIVIL WAR.** several centurions and soldiers) he led them, ready drawn up in two lines, to the lesser camp, where POMPEY's legions had lodged themselves. Nor was CÆSAR deceived in his opinion, for he arrived at the place before POMPEY could have notice of his design; and though the fortifications were strong, yet the left wing, where he himself was present, briskly charging the enemy, obliged them to quit the rampier: but the port being stopped by a <sup>a</sup> turnpike, gave them an opportunity to maintain their ground, and oppose our entrance. Here T. PULCIO, who betrayed ANTONY's forces, gave signal proofs of his courage. But at last the virtue of our men prevailed; and having forced the bar, they first entered the outward trenches, afterwards the inner works or citadel, and killed several of the enemy, for thither they had retired.

Caesar's attempt to cut off a party of Pompey's. He has great success at first.

68. But Fortune, whose influence is powerful in all things, especially in war, where she causes the greatest revolutions in a moment, now exerted her prerogative. For the right wing of CÆSAR's party, being unacquainted with the place, seeking for another gate, followed the rampier, which led to the river, where they arrived before they perceived their mistake: then finding no body to oppose them, got over the rampier, and were followed by the horse.

### CHAP. XXIV.

But fortune turns about.

69. IN the mean time POMPEY, having sufficient notice, detached the fifth legion to relieve his party. Thus, at the same instant, his cavalry approached ours, and our soldiers, who had possessed the camp, descried the fifth legion marching to the place of action in order of battle; which immediately changed the posture of affairs. For the enemy, encouraged by hopes of speedy relief, possessed themselves of the decuman port, and charged our cohorts. Our cavalry having got over the rampier into a narrow passage, fearing they could not secure their retreat, first began to fly; the right wing perceiving their disorder, and finding themselves cut off from the rest of their party, to prevent being set upon in so disadvantageous a place, followed their example; several of them, to avoid being shut up between the two rampiers, which were ten foot

and Pompey gets the better.


<sup>a</sup> Eritius, which SUTTONIUS calls Ericus, and differs not much from the modern Cheval de Frize.

high,

high, cast themselves from thence into the trenches; where the first ranks being trodden to death, procured a safe retreat to those that came after. In the mean time the soldiers of the left wing, perceiving POMPEY's approach, and observing the confusion of the right, apprehending they should be enclosed, and attacked from without, as well as within, began to think of retreating the same way they came thither: in fine, nothing was to be seen but fear, flight, and disorder. And when CÆSAR, to put a stop to it, laid hold of the ensigns, commanding them to halt, some quitted their horses, and ran away on foot; others were so frightened, they let the ensigns drop, and no one had the courage to make a stand.

70. Whilst affairs were in this desperate condition, it happened very fortunately, to prevent all our party from being cut off, that POMPEY, who just before saw his soldiers flying out of his camp, finding now every thing turn in his favour so much beyond his expectation, apprehended an ambuscade, as I suppose, and durst not for some time approach his works. His cavalry was prevented from pursuing by the narrowness of the way, and the difficulty of passing the portals, where CÆSAR's soldiers were planted. So small a matter happened to be of great importance to both parties. For as the works which led to the water, deprived CÆSAR of the victory he had obtained, so they preserved his men by retarding the enemy's pursuit.

71. In the two engagements of this day CÆSAR lost thirty-two standards, with nine hundred and sixty men, amongst which number fell many Roman knights of note, as FELGINAS TUTICANUS GALLUS a senator's son, C. FELGINAS of Placentia, A. GRAVIUS of Puteoli, M. SACRATIVIR of Capua, besides thirty tribunes and centurions: but the greatest part of them died without wounds, being lost in the trenches, works, and river, ruined by their own fear and disorderly flight. After this engagement POMPEY was saluted by the name of Imperator, a title he bore ever after; however he used it not in the style of his letters, nor suffered laurel to be carried before him in his consular rods. But the traitor LABIENUS, having begged the prisoners might be delivered into his hands, caused them to be brought out for ostentation, and calling them fellow-soldiers, demanded, in a haughty manner, whether veteran soldiers used to fly; then caused them to be murdered in the presence of the whole army, that he might gain himself the greater credit with POMPEY.


CIVIL  
WAR.

Pompey obtains the title of Imperator.

Labienu's cruelty to Cæsar's soldiers that were taken.



CIVIL  
WAR.

  
Pompey's  
party proud  
of this suc-  
cess.

72. The enemy were so puffed up with this success, that they thought no longer of carrying on the war, believing themselves compleat victors already: not remembering the inferiority of number on our side, their advantage of place, the inconvenience of the passage, their being first masters of the camp; nor our confusion within and without the fortifications, with the separation of our forces that could not relieve each other, which were the real causes of the defeat: not considering the battle was managed with no manner of order, no formal engagement; that our soldiers did themselves more harm in the narrow passes, than they received from the enemy: and lastly, they made no allowance for the common events of war; where the most insignificant causes, groundless suspicions, surmizes or scruples, prove of fatal consequence; where an army is often lost by the fall of a general, or the error of a tribune: but, as if the success of the day was wholly owing to their own bravery, and fortune had no further power over them, divulged the fame of this action throughout the universe.

### C H A P. XXV.

Cæsar de-  
camps, first  
makes a  
speech to his  
soldiers.

73. CÆSAR's former scheme thus rendered ineffectual, he resolved to think of other methods; wherefore, having drained all his forts, and quitted the siege, he appointed a general rendezvous of his soldiers, to whom he made an harangue, "encouraging them not to be dejected at what had happened, but to oppose their continued series of success to this small disappointment. That they should reflect on their obligations to Fortune, for the reduction of Italy without bloodshed; for the acquisition of Spain, though guarded by two powerful and experienced generals; and for the friendship of the neighbouring provinces, which furnished them with corn, and other supplies. That they should remember how they had escaped falling into the enemy's hand, when they sailed through the midst of their squadrons, which possessed all the coasts and havens; and endeavour to overcome ill fortune by their industry, attributing the damage to her alone, not to him, who had led them to an advantageous place, possessed himself of the enemy's camp, expelled and overcome them that opposed him: but whether the loss of the victory he had actually obtained was owing to the confusion his soldiers were in, to their mistake, or fortune, it imported them all to endeavour to retrieve it by their application: which might turn

the scales again to their advantage, as it happened at Clermont; where, of their own accord, they offered the enemy battle, with whom not long before were afraid to engage."

74. After he had ended this speech, he cashiered some ensigns: but the soldiers in general were so sensibly afflicted at the disgrace they had received, and so desirous to regain their credit, that there was no occasion either for the tribunes or centurions to remind them of their duty; every man imposed a harder task upon himself, as a punishment for the late dishonour, than either his duty or CÆSAR required from him; all were eager to engage the enemy, and some officers of note were so affected with CÆSAR's speech, that they desired him upon the spot where they were to venture a battle. But he thought it not convenient to depend upon an army which had been so lately intimidated, before time had recovered their spirits; besides, having quitted his works, which before inclosed POMPEY, he was now apprehensive his convoys might be cut off by the enemy.

Cæsar  
cashiers  
some en-  
signs.  
The soldiers  
desire to re-  
dress the  
loss.

75. Wherefore having taken care of the sick and wounded, without further delay, as soon as night approached, he sent away all his baggage under a guard of one legion towards Apollonia, with orders not to halt till they should have performed their journey. This affair dispatched, keeping only two legions, about three in the morning he drew out the main body of the army at several gates of the camp, and ordered them to follow the same rout the baggage had taken. Soon after these had begun their march, that military discipline might be observed and the news of his removing known as late as possible, he ordered the usual sign for decamping to be given; and then set out with the rest of his forces.

He decamps.

POMPEY immediately took the alarm, and hoping to surprize CÆSAR's army during their march, whilst they were incumbered with their baggage, drew out all his forces, sending his cavalry before to interrupt our rear: but CÆSAR having disposed of his carriages, marched with so much dispatch, that he arrived at the river Genusus, before the enemy's horse could come up with him. Here they charged his army in the rear; but he sent his cavalry intermixt with a party of his light-armed first line, to sustain their charge, who obliged them to retreat; and after having killed several of them, returned safe again to the main body.

Pompey's  
cavalry at-  
tack his  
rear, but are  
defeated.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Caesar encamps over-against Asparagium.

76. CÆSAR, having marched as far as he designed that day, and crossed the Genusus, took up his quarters in his old camp, over-against Asparagium. He commanded all the foot to keep themselves within the rampier : but sent out the cavalry to forage, with orders to return immediately by the decuman port.

## C H A P. XXVI.

Pompey does the like.

POMPEY likewise, having compleated his day's journey, lodged himself in his former camp at Asparagium ; but his soldiers, finding themselves at leisure, because the works were entire, some made long excursions to fetch wood or forage, and others, having set out upon so short notice, that they were obliged to march without their baggage, enticed by the nearness of the place, laid down their arms, and went back again to fetch what they had left behind them.

Caesar gains a day's march before him ;

CÆSAR, foreseeing the absence of the soldiers would prevent POMPEY's pursuit, about noon gave the sign for decamping, and drawing out his army, marched twice as far as the day before, being eight miles removed from POMPEY, who by reason of the absence of his soldiers was not able to follow him.

and he cannot overtake him again.

77. The day after CÆSAR decamped again about four in the morning, having sent away his baggage over night, that, in case he should be obliged to engage the enemy, he might the better prevent a surprize, having no carriages to hinder him. This order he observed in his march every day, by which means he crossed the deepest rivers, and most rugged passes, without the least inconvenience. For POMPEY, having entirely lost the first day, and in vain attempted by long journies to overtake CÆSAR afterwards, finding he could not accomplish his desires, resolved the fourth day to pursue no farther.

Caesar calls at Apollonia ; from thence marches to join Domitius.

78. CÆSAR was obliged to halt at Apollonia, to leave the wounded there, to pay his army, confirm his friends in their fidelity, and dispose garrisons for the safety of the country. But he allowed no longer time for these affairs than was absolutely necessary : and apprehending DOMITIUS might be surprized by POMPEY, he made all imaginable haste to join him. For the scheme which CÆSAR proceeded on, was this ; that POMPEY would either follow him, and, being drawn far distant from the sea, and those provisions which he had treasured up at Durazzo, be reduced by want of subsistence to engage him upon equal terms ;

or

or that he would cross the seas for Italy; in which case CÆSAR, in conjunction with DOMITIUS, would pursue him through Illyricum. But should POMPEY invest Apollonia or Oricum, and endeavour to deprive him of the sea-coasts, then CÆSAR would besiege SCIPIO, which would oblige POMPEY to desist from that attempt. Wherefore having wrote to DOMITIUS, to acquaint him with his design, and left a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, of one at Lissus, of three at Oricum, and disposed of the sick and wounded, he marched through Epirus and Acarnania.

## CHAP. XXVII.

POMPEY likewise guessing at CÆSAR's design, thought it necessary to make what haste he could to SCIPIO's relief, if CÆSAR marched that way: but if he resolved not to quit Corfu and the sea-coasts till he received the legions and cavalry he expected, then POMPEY would attack DOMITIUS.

79. Thus the affair depended on dispatch, for it highly imported each army to relieve their friends, and not lose a moment, which might furnish them with an opportunity of surprizing their enemies. CÆSAR went somewhat about by going through Apollonia. Whereas POMPEY marched the nearest way through Candavia for Macedonia; and it happened very unluckily, that DOMITIUS, who for many days together hath encamped over-against SCIPIO, was now gone to Heraclea Sentica, a fief of Candavia, to provide his army with corn: so that fortune seemed to throw him directly in POMPEY's way, of which CÆSAR had then no intelligence. POMPEY had taken care to send letters before him to every state and province, with an account of the action at Durazzo; wherein he enlarged so much to his own advantage, that it was generally believed CÆSAR was put to flight with the loss of almost all his forces. This report made some states come over to POMPEY, and secure the passes of their country; so that several expresses which were sent between CÆSAR and DOMITIUS, were all intercepted: but the Savoyards under ROSCILLUS and ÆGUS, (who were before mentioned to have gone over to POMPEY) meeting DOMITIUS's courriers on the road, either out of vain glory, or ancient friendship (as they had served together in Gaul) gave them an exact account of the posture of affairs, of CÆSAR's march, and POMPEY's approach. Thus DOMITIUS, obliged to the enemy for his intelligence,

Pompey  
marches to  
Macedonia.

See § 59.



CIVIL WAR narrowly escaped the danger, when he was not above four hours march from POMPEY, and arrived at Æginium,

a town situate on the frontiers of Thessaly, where he joined CÆSAR, then hastening to meet him.

Domitius narrowly escapes him by advice from some of his own party. Cæsar and Domitius joined.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

Cæsar marches in to Thessaly.

Androsthenes shuts the gates of Gomphi against him.

Cæsar storms the town in four hours time.

Metropolis surrenders.

80. THE two armies in conjunction marched to Gomphi, the first town in Thessaly towards Epirus; which nation, not many months before, of their own accord had sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, making a tender to him of what their country afforded, and desiring he would send some forces to defend them. But hither likewise had the same of the battle of Durazzo extended, and ANDROSTHENES, prætor of the province, chusing rather to be a companion of POMPEY's success than CÆSAR's adversity, summoned all the servants and children out of the fields into the town, and then shut the gates against CÆSAR, having dispatched messengers to POMPEY and SCIPIO to send him support: he durst rely, he said, upon the fortifications of the town, provided they would come immediately, but it would be impossible for him to hold out any time. Now SCIPIO, on advice of the army's quitting Durazzo, had marched to Larissa; and POMPEY was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Wherefore CÆSAR having encamped himself, caused all things necessary for a storm to be prepared; then, to encourage his soldiers to make a vigorous assault, he told them what importance it would be of, to render themselves masters of so rich a town, stored with provisions sufficient to relieve all their wants; that the taking it would strike a terror into other states; and that it must be done before the enemy came to their relief. The soldiers were so alert, that though they began not the storm till three in the afternoon, the very day they arrived before the place, yet they carried it before sun-set. As a reward for their valour, CÆSAR gave them free leave to plunder; and having decamped, marched to Metropolis, not allowing same time enough to acquaint them with the fate of Gomphi before his arrival.

81. The inhabitants, moved by the same reasons, at first denied him entrance, and manned the walls with soldiers; but afterwards, being informed from the prisoners whom CÆSAR brought from Gomphi, that their city was sack'd, they opened the gates, and CÆSAR took care the soldiers should commit no excesses among them. The other states

of Thessaly, reflecting on the different usage Metropolis and Gomphi had met with, one for receiving, the other for opposing CÆSAR, all immediately submitted to him, except Larissa; which SCIPIO possessed with a considerable army. Thus CÆSAR having rendered himself master of a plentiful country, where the corn was almost ripe, here resolved to take up his quarters, and attending POMPEY's arrival, bring the weight of the war to this place.

CIVIL WAR.

All the states of Thessaly, except Larissa, do the like.

## C H A P. XXIX.

82. POMPEY, not many days after, coming into Thessaly, joined SCIPIO, and assembling both armies, made a speech to the soldiers, wherein "He first returned thanks to his own for the services they had done; then encouraged SCIPIO's to come in for sharers of the booties and rewards, which would follow the victory now put into their hands. Having received both armies into one camp, he divided his command with SCIPIO, ordering a Prætorian tent to be erected for him, and the trumpets to attend him. POMPEY being thus strengthened by the union of two such powerful armies, the soldiers were confirmed in their favourable prepossessions, and made themselves so sure of victory, that every moment seemed to delay their return to Italy; wherefore when POMPEY acted slowly, or with consideration, they would often say, the business was only such as might be dispatched in a day; but that POMPEY was in love with authority, and cared not how long he detained the consuls and prætors amongst the number of his servants. They began already to dispute in publick about the rewards they were to have, and the disposal of the priesthods, nominating who should succeed to the consulate for several years successively. Others laid claim to the goods and houses of those that were of CÆSAR's party: and it was warmly debated in council, whether L. HIRRUS, whom POMPEY had sent against the Parthians, should stand the next election for prætor by proxy: some urged POMPEY's promise in his behalf; and desired their friend, who depended on the general's honour, might not find himself deceived; others opposed it, saying, since he was not the only person that embarked in that dangerous enterprize, there was no reason he should be preferred before the rest.

Pompey arrives in Thessaly; joins Scipio; his speech to his soldiers.

Hot disputes in Pompey's army about the sharing of offices.

83. DOMITIUS, SCIPIO, and LENTULUS SPINTHER, Flamen Di- were perpetually contending for CÆSAR's priesthood, so alia.

**CIVIL WAR.** far as to proceed to high words concerning it; LENTULUS urging the respect due to his age, DOMITIUS the interest he had at Rome, and SCIPIO depending on his alliance with POMPEY. ATTIUS RUFUS accused L. AFRANIUS for betraying the army in Spain; and DOMITIUS moved in council, there might be a high-commission of senators erected, who had been present in the war, for trying not only such as had staid at Rome, but those likewise that attended POMPEY, and had not performed their duty; and that these commissioners might be entrusted with a triple power, to acquit, condemn to death, or impose fines. In short, the whole army was taken up with the thoughts of rewards, honours, and revenge; not contriving how to gain the victory, but how to employ it.

## C H A P. XXX.

*Cæsar daily offers Pompey battle; which is not accepted.*

84. CÆSAR, having now provided himself with corn, and allowed the soldiers sufficient time to re-assume their courage after the battles of Durazzo, resolved to make some trial of it, as well as of POMPEY's disposition to fight. Wherefore having drawn out his forces, he ranged them in order of battle near their own trenches, some distance from POMPEY's: but the following days he led them up to the foot of the rising ground where POMPEY was encamped; which daily augmented their spirits. His cavalry being much inferior to POMPEY's in number, he observed his former discipline, of mingling the stoutest and most active of the Antesignani amongst them, who by daily practice and skirmishes became expert in that way of combat. Thus he rendered his cavalry so hardy, that though they were but one thousand, they would upon occasion sustain the charge of POMPEY's seven thousand, even in open field, without being terrified at their numbers. For several days they skirmished with good success, and killed one of the Savoyard brothers who deserted to POMPEY, with several others of his party.

85. POMPEY having lodged himself upon a hill, formed his army at the foot of it, expecting to draw CÆSAR into a disadvantageous place. But CÆSAR, finding he could not persuade POMPEY to accept of battle, thought it the most convenient way to remove, and always be upon the march; hoping his frequent decampings might furnish him more commodiously with corn, and perhaps with an opportunity of fighting; at least he was sure of harrassing POMPEY's army,

army, who were not inured to so much fatigue. Moved CIVIL WAR. by these reasons, he gave the sign for decamping; but the tents were no sooner struck, but it was observed, that POMPEY, contrary to his usual custom, had drawn his legions out at a farther distance from his camp, and seemed to offer battle upon equal terms. Upon this CÆSAR addressing himself to the soldiers, when the army was just ready to march out of their trenches, said, "We must not think of decamping at present, but of giving the enemy battle, which we have so long desired; we shall not easily find such another opportunity as this again; let us therefore prepare to engage them." This being said, he immediately drew out his forces.

86. POMPEY likewise, as was afterwards known, had resolved to offer battle, in compliance with the repeated desires of his friends. He had declared in council, "He would defeat CÆSAR's forces before both armies could engage." But observing several could not conceive his meaning; "I am sensible, said he, that my promise almost exceeds belief; but I will give you my reasons, that you may fight with the more assurance. I have taken care our horse, when they approach the enemy, shall flank their right wing, and enclose them behind: this they have promised to perform, which must certainly disorder them before the foot can meet each other. Thus, added he, we shall decide the dispute without hazarding the legions, and almost without receiving a wound. Nor can there be any difficulty in the design, since we are so much superior to them in cavalry. Be ready therefore for the combat to-morrow, since the happy occasion you have so long wished for is come; and behave yourselves worthy of that opinion the world has of your valour and experience."

87. Here ended POMPEY's speech, when LABIENUS, as well to applaud his design, as to discredit CÆSAR's army, began thus: "Think not, POMPEY, you are to engage the conquerors of Gaul and Germany: I was present at all those battles, and of my own certain knowledge can affirm, there are but few of that army now remaining: many have been killed, as must of necessity happen in so many conflicts; many were carried off by the plague in Apulia; many have quitted their arms; and several are left behind to guard Italy. Have you not been informed that the cohorts at Brindisi consist of invalids? and the forces which you now behold, are composed of new levies, raised in Lombardy, and the colonies beyond the Po. For the

Cæsar designs to decamp; but perceiving Pompey had drawn out his forces, does the like.

Pompey boasts he will defeat Cæsar without engaging both armies.

Labienus's speech.



CIVIL WAR. the flower of CÆSAR'S army fell in the two defeats at DURAZZO." Having finished what he had to say, LABIENUS took an oath never to return to the camp again, unless victorious; and desired all the rest of the council might do the like. POMPEY so well approved the motion, that he was the first who followed his example. Thus the council broke up full of joy, and big with expectation; assuring themselves of victory, being persuaded so great a general would not deliver his sentiments upon slight grounds, in an affair of such importance.

He swears never to return to the camp, unless victorious.

## C H A P. XXXI.

The disposition of Pompey's army.


88. CÆSAR approaching near POMPEY'S camp, perceived this to be the disposition of his forces: The first and third legions, which CÆSAR, at the beginning of the wars, in obedience to the senate's decree, had delivered to POMPEY, formed the left wing, where he himself commanded: SCIPIO was in the middle, with the Syrian legions; and AFRANIUS in the right, with the Cilicians, and the cohorts brought from Spain; which POMPEY esteemed his best troops: the rest of his forces were disposed between the two wings, and middle squadron; amounting to fifty-five thousand men, or an hundred and ten cohorts, besides two thousand volunteers, which he had dispersed amongst the whole army; for he had left his other seven cohorts, to secure his camp and the adjoining forts. His right was defended by a river with steep banks, wherefore he had placed all his cavalry and archers in the left.

Of Cæsar's.

89. CÆSAR, according to his former custom, disposed the tenth in the right wing, and the ninth legion in the left, though considerably weakened by the action at DURAZZO; but he joined the eighth so very close to it, that they were almost united into one, and had orders to relieve each other. His whole army consisted of twenty-two thousand men, or eighty cohorts; two being left behind to guard his baggage. He gave the command of the left wing to ANTONY, of the right to P. SULLA, and of the main body to CN. DOMITIUS, posting himself directly over against POMPEY. Having drawn his forces up in this order, to prevent his right wing from being surrounded by the enemy's horse, he detached a cohort from every legion in the third line, and of them composed a fourth, to engage the cavalry, giving them proper orders how to act, and


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# The Batt



A. Pompey's Army, with his Right wing con-  
 -felves in order to surround Casars Right  
 reserved to oppose Pompey's horse.

# Battle of Pharsalia.



*towards y<sup>e</sup> River .B. his Cavalry in the Left extending them  
 right wing .C. Casars army .D. his Cav alry .E. the six Cohorts*



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and reminding them that the success of the day would depend on their courage. He commanded the whole army not to begin the battle, till he should see convenient to give them the signal. CIVIL WAR.


90. After he had encouraged his soldiers, as military discipline required, and laid before them the many favours they had from time to time received at his hands; he told them, "They themselves could witness for him, how earnestly he had sought a peace; how he had employed VATINIUS to demand a conference, had sent A. CLODIUS to treat with SCIPIO, and how eagerly he had pressed LIBO at Oricum, to admit deputies to pass between them. He had always been desirous to prevent the effusion of his soldiers blood, and the loss to the republick of either army." Having ended this speech, in compliance with the ardent desire of the soldiers he commanded the trumpet to sound a charge. Caesar's army drawn up; his speech.

## C H A P. XXXII.

91. IN CÆSAR'S army was one CRASTINUS, a volunteer, a man of extraordinary courage, who the year before had been primiple of the tenth legion. So soon as the signal was given, "Follow me, cried he, you that were formerly under my command, and do your utmost for the man you have chosen for your general: this battle once decided, he shall recover his dignity, and we our freedom." Then looking back upon CÆSAR, "This day, my general, added he, I will so behave myself, that you shall return me thanks alive or dead." Having said this, immediately he rushed from the right wing, attended by an hundred and twenty select men of the same legion, who voluntarily followed him, and began the fight. Crastinus's character and courage. The sign of battle given. Crastinus begins the fight.

92. Between the two armies was space enough for both to meet and attack each other; but POMPEY had enjoined his men to receive our onset, without stirring out of their posts till our army should be disordered. This he did, upon C. TRIARIUS'S advice, that the force of our first excursion being broken, and our army in confusion, they might attack us in good order, with the greater advantage: besides, they thought our piles would do less execution so, than if they advanced to meet them; flattering themselves with the hopes that our soldiers would be out of breath, and wearied with running twice as far as usual. But in my opinion this was a very shallow project, for there is a natural

The battle of Pharsalia. Pompey orders his men to receive Caesar's charge without moving out of their places.

CIVIL  
WAR.

The battle  
begins.

tural ardor and alacrity of mind planted in every man, which is roused and inflamed with his zeal for the fight; and should not be suppressed, but rather encouraged by a general: our ancestors therefore wisely ordained, that trumpets should sound on every side, and all the soldiers raise a shout, as well to encourage their companions, as daunt the enemy.

93. On the signal given, our men rushed forward with their piles ready to be thrown; but observing the enemy did not advance to meet them, taught by experience in former battles, they halted of their own accord about the middle of the way, that they might not spend their vigour before it could be effectual; having allowed themselves respite enough to take breath, they renewed their course, cast their piles, and immediately charged the enemy sword in hand, as CÆSAR had commanded them. Nor did POMPEY's men betray want of presence of mind upon this occasion, for they maintained their ranks, sustained our charge, received our piles, and having cast their own, had immediately recourse to their swords.

Pompey's  
cavalry broken.


His left  
wing surrounded.

At the same instant all POMPEY's cavalry sallied from the left, according to their orders, attended by the archers. Our men, not being able to maintain their ground, retreated a few paces, which made the enemy pursue more eagerly, dividing themselves into several squadrons, and endeavouring to inclose that extremity of our army. Which CÆSAR observing, gave the fourth line, which consisted of six cohorts, the appointed signal: upon which they charged POMPEY's horse so vigorously, that they routed and obliged them to fly for refuge to the highest mountains. Their retreat left the archers and slingers defenceless and exposed to the fury of our soldiers, who cut them to pieces; and pursuing their success, surrounded POMPEY's left wing, and attacked his army in the rear, notwithstanding all their endeavours to prevent us.

His whole  
army intirely  
routed.

94. At the same instant CÆSAR ordered the third line to advance, which hitherto had had no share in the action: thus the enemy were entirely routed; for our men being relieved by fresh supplies, and their army surrounded, they could no longer maintain the dispute.

Nor was CÆSAR deceived in his opinion, that the cohorts, which he disposed in the fourth line against the enemy's horse, must make the first step towards the victory, as he had publicly declared in his speech to them: for they repulsed the cavalry, cut the archers and slingers  
to

to pieces, surrounded the enemy's left wing, and were the CIVIL first that obliged them to fly. But POMPEY perceiving his WAR. horse was routed, and that part of his army which he most depended on disordered, despairing of the rest, forthwith  Pompey retreated on horseback into his camp. As he entered the Pompey retreats into the camp. Prætorian port, he spoke aloud to the centurions who guarded it, that the soldiers might hear, "To take particular care to secure the camp against all accidents which might happen; that he would visit all the other gates himself, and distribute the like orders." Having said this, he retired to his pavillion, despairing of success, yet waiting the event.

## C H A P. XXXIII.


95. POMPEY's soldiers thus obliged to retreat within their trenches, CÆSAR allowed them no time to recover their disorder, but encouraged his men to push their fortune, and storm the camp; who, though greatly fatigued with what they had already done, the fight having continued almost till noon, yet cheerfully obeyed his orders. The cohorts, who were left to guard the camp, made a vigorous resistance; and the Thracians and barbarous allies did wonders. As to those who had fled thither from the battle, most of them, being weary and terrified, had laid down their arms and ensigns, and were meditating rather their escape than the defence of the trenches. At last those that guarded the rampier being no longer able to stand the showers of darts which our soldiers poured upon them, after receiving many wounds, quitted the camp, and under the conduct of the tribunes and centurions, betook themselves to the highest neighbouring mountains.

96. Having forced the trenches, we found several tables The luxury of Pompey's sumptuously spread, side-boards adorned with abundance of camp. plate, and the tents strewed with fresh herbs; that of L. LENTULUS, and some others, were shaded with ivy; several other proofs of luxury, and too great assurance of conquest, appeared, from whence we may conclude they little dreamed of such ill success, who had taken so much care to provide for their appetites. Yet these very men had often upbraided CÆSAR's army with excess, which always wanted even some necessaries.

When our men had got over the rampier, POMPEY Pompey escapes to the mounted his horse, having laid aside all the distinguishing sea-side. marks of a general, and setting out from the decuman port, galloped towards Larissa, where he made no longer stay



CIVIL  
WAR.



Complains  
of his caval-  
ry for decei-  
ving him.

stay than to take fresh horses, being attended only by thirty followers that escaped the slaughter; from thence he posted day and night till he arrived at the sea, and embarked in a tender; "Often complaining, how much he had been mistaken, in those from whom he expected the victory, who beginning first to fly, almost persuaded him he had been betrayed."

### C H A P. XXXIV.

Cæsar hav-  
ing gained  
the camp.


divides his  
army into  
three parts,  
one to pur-  
sue, and one  
to guard  
each camp.

97. CÆSAR having rendered himself master of POMPEY's camp, begged of his soldiers not to be so intent upon the plunder, as to omit putting the last hand to the business: they granted his request, and according to his orders began to draw lines about the mountain, to which POMPEY's forces had retired. Which they perceiving, reflecting that the place wanted water, quitted it, and hastened towards Larissa. Whereupon CÆSAR, dividing his army into three squadrons, left one in POMPEY's camp, another in his own, and went with four legions a nearer way, to intercept the enemy. Having marched about six miles, he drew his forces up in order of battle; which they no sooner observed, but they possessed themselves of a neighbouring hill, the foot of which was washed by a river. CÆSAR, though his men had been fatigued all the day, and night approached, encouraged them to cut off the enemy's communication with the water, that they might not have an opportunity of fetching any in the night. When our works were perfected, they sent deputies to treat of a surrender: but some few senators that were of their party, escaped by favour of the night.

Some of the  
enemy's for-  
ces that had  
attempted to  
escape, sur-  
render.

98. Early in the morning CÆSAR commanded them all to descend from the hill, and deliver up their arms. They immediately obeyed his orders, and prostrating themselves at his feet, with tears in their eyes, besought him to grant them their lives. He comforted them, commanding them to rise; then saying something of his inclination to mercy, that he might give them immediate hopes of it, he saved them all; ordering his soldiers neither to plunder, nor do them any injury. This affair so happily dispatched, he sent for other legions to relieve those he had with him, whom he ordered to return to the camp for refreshment, and arrived the same day at Larissa.

Arrives at  
Larissa.

99. In this battle, on CÆSAR's side, fell only two hundred CIVIL  
 soldiers, but he lost thirty centurions, men of singular WAR.  
 courage. Here CRASTINUS likewise, fighting bravely,   
 lost his life, being run thro' the mouth with a sword; nor only 200 in  
 did he falsify the promise he made CÆSAR, when he rushed the battle,  
 into the battle; for he certainly behaved himself to ad- with thirty  
 miration, and gained as much applause as man could merit. centurions  
 On POMPEY's side were killed fifteen thousand, and above and Crasti-  
 twenty-four thousand were taken prisoners, for those that were nus.  
 left to guard the forts surrendered to SULLA; though many  
 escaped into the adjacent countries: a hundred and eighty  
 ensigns were brought to CÆSAR, besides nine eagles.  
 And L. DOMITIUS, whose strength failed him as he was Domitius  
 flying to the mountains, was killed by our cavalry. killed.

## C H A P. XXXV.

100. WHILST these affairs were transacting, D. LÆ- Lælius bloc-  
 LIUS arrived with his navy at Brindisi, and possessed him- kades Brin-  
 self of the island at the mouth of the haven, as LIBO had dissi, as Libo  
 formerly done. VATINIUS, governor of the place, had done.  
 following ANTONY's example, equipped several boats, and  
 having enticed some of LÆLIUS's ships within the haven, Vatinius  
 took a five banked gally, and two smaller vessels that had takes three  
 ventured farthest within the port: then disposing his caval- of his ships,  
 ry along the shore, prevented the fleet from getting fresh  
 water. But LÆLIUS having chosen a more convenient  
 season of the year for sailing, supplied his ships with water  
 from Corfu and Durazzo; nor could he be persuaded  
 to quit the blockade, by the disgrace of losing his ships, or  
 want of provisions, till he had notice of the battle of Phar-  
 salia.

101. About the same time likewise CASSIUS came to Cassius with  
 Sicily with a squadron of Syrian, Phœnician, and Cilician his squadron  
 ships; where CÆSAR had a fleet commanded by P. SULPI- comes to  
 CIUS the prætor, and M. POMPONIUS; the first of these lay Sicily.  
 at Vibone in the streights, the other at Messina, where  
 CASSIUS arrived before POMPONIUS had notice of his com-  
 ing. Having surprized him in this disorder without any  
 guards, he took the opportunity of the wind, and sent se- Burns 35 of  
 veral fire-ships into the port where POMPONIUS's fleet lay, ships at  
 which immediately burnt them all: they were thirty-five in Messina.  
 number, amongst which were twenty men of war. Almost sur-  
 action struck such a terror into Messina, that though a le- town.  
 gion

**CIVIL WAR.** *From thence he goes to Vibone.* *Burns five of Sulpicius's galleys, but loses four of his own.* *On news of Cæsar's victory, quits the place,* legion was there in garrison, the place had certainly surrendered, had not an account of the action in Thessaly opportunely arrived to encourage them. From hence CASSIUS went to Vibone, where he found SULPICIUS's fleet hauled on shore for fear of such a misfortune; but the wind offering fair, he put the same stratagem in practice he had made use of at Messina, sending forty fire-ships into the harbour, the flame of which catching hold on both sides, quickly reduced five galleys to ashes: the wind had already begun to disperse the fire farther, when the veteran soldiers, who had been left in garrison there for the recovery of their health, no longer able to see such a disgrace, embarked of their own accord, and weighing anchor, attacked CASSIUS's fleet so furiously, that they took two three-banked galleys, and as many of the four-bank'd, in one of which latter was CASSIUS himself, but he made his escape in the boat. Not many days after, the news of CÆSAR's victory was so strongly confirmed, that it met with credit even amongst POMPEY's party; who before believed it a false report, spread abroad by CÆSAR's friends or lieutenants; upon which CASSIUS left Vibone.

## C H A P. XXXVI.

*Cæsar pursues Pompey.*

*Pompey issues a proclamation for raising all the youth in Amphipolis.*

*From whence he sails to Mitylene.*

*From thence to Cyprus.*

102. CÆSAR, laying all other thoughts aside, resolved to pursue POMPEY so close, wherever he went, as not to allow him time to levy new forces, and renew the war: he marched, therefore, every day as far as his cavalry could hold out, commanding one legion to follow after by lesser journeys. POMPEY issued a proclamation at Amphipolis, for raising all the Grecians and citizens of Rome that were able to bear arms: but whether he did this the longer to conceal his design of flying, or that he might with these new forces keep possession of Macedonia, if he was not pursued, is hard to determine. One night lying at anchor at Amphipolis, he sent for his old friends and acquaintance, of whom he borrowed money for his necessary occasions: and on notice of CÆSAR's approach, hoisted sail for Mitylene, where he arrived in a few days after. Here the wind detained him two days; but having encreased his fleet with a few galleys, he sailed to Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus, where he had notice that the townsmen and Roman citizens at Antioch, by general consent, had seized the castle, being determined to defend the town against him, and had sent orders to such of his party as had taken refuge in the neighbouring countries, not to come near

Antioch

Antioch at their peril. L. LENTULUS, who had been consul the year before, and PUB. LENTULUS, of no less dignity, with some others, met the like reception at Rhodes, whether they followed POMPEY; for they no sooner landed, but they were denied admittance, messengers being sent to bid them quit the island; which obliged them, much against their wills, to weigh anchor: for by this time CÆSAR's pursuit was known amongst all the countries round about.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Lentulus  
shut out of  
Rhodes.

103. POMPEY, on these advices, altering his design of going to Syria, seized all the money he found in the publick bank, borrowed as much more as he could of his acquaintance, sent great quantities of iron on board for military uses, and having raised two thousand soldiers amongst the publick officers of the place, merchants, servants, and such other persons as he thought fit for his purpose, went to Pelusium. Here by accident, was king PTOLEMY, a youth under age, at war then with his sister CLEOPATRA, and encamped with a considerable army near her, whom, not many months before, by the assistance of his friends and relations, he had expelled the kingdom. POMPEY sent to demand his protection and assistance, desiring to be admitted into Alexandria, on account of the ancient friendship which had subsisted between him and the young king's father. But his deputies having performed their commission, began to discourse too freely with the king's soldiers, advising them also to assist their master, and not to condemn the low ebb to which fortune had reduced him. In PTOLEMY's army there were many who had formerly served under POMPEY, whom GABINIUS had brought from Syria to Alexandria, and, after the war was ended, left in the late king's service.

Pompey fails  
to Pelusium.

Demands  
Ptolemy's  
protection.

104. PTOLEMY's friends, who were protectors of the kingdom during his minority, having notice of this, either out of fear, as they afterwards declared, lest POMPEY should corrupt the army, and render himself master of Alexandria and Egypt; or, despising his low condition (for generally friends turn enemies when fortune frowns) gave the deputies a grateful answer in publick, ordering POMPEY to attend the king; but privately contrived to send ACHILLAS, captain of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness with SEPTIMIUS, tribune of the soldiers, to murder him. They spoke him very fair; and POMPEY having formerly known SEPTIMIUS, who commanded a company under him in the war with the pirates, was easily persuaded

Is invited on  
shore.



CIVIL WAR. to go on board a small vessel, with a slender attendance, where he was killed by ACHILLAS and SEPTIMIUS. L. LENTULUS likewise being taken by the king's command, was put to death in prison.

## C H A P. XXXVII.


105. ON CÆSAR'S arrival in Asia, he found T. AMPIUS had summoned all the senators in the province to attend him, that in their presence he might take the money out of the temple of DIANA at Ephesus; but the news of CÆSAR'S approach interrupted his design, and obliged him to fly: thus CÆSAR twice preserved the treasure of DIANA. It was remarked in the temple of MINERVA at Elis, upon a just calculation of the time, that the very same day CÆSAR defeated POMPEY, the image of victory, which fronted MINERVA, turned her face towards the portal of the temple. At the same instant such a noise of fighting and trumpets alarmed the inhabitants of Antioch in Syria, that they repaired to their arms, and manned the walls. The like happened at Ptolemais: and at Pergamus, in the remote and hollow places of the temple, called by the Grecians *ἀδύρα*, where none, except the priests, may enter, was heard the beating of drums. But in the temple of Victory in Tralles, where a statue was consecrated to CÆSAR, a palm had sprouted between the joining of the stones that paved the floor.

106. CÆSAR, having staid a few days in Asia, on advice that POMPEY had been seen at Cyprus, imagining he might be gone from thence to Egypt, because of the interest he had in that kingdom, and the advantage of the place, went to Alexandria with two legions, one brought from Thessaly, the other detached from lieutenant FUSIUS'S army in Achaia; and eight hundred horse, ten Rhodian galleys, and a few from Asia. In these legions were not above three thousand two hundred men, the rest were either disabled in the former actions, or so fatigued with long marches, they could not travel any farther. But CÆSAR depending on the fame of his former exploits, made no scruple of embarking with so small an army, believing every place would gladly receive him. At Alexandria he had news of POMPEY'S death: He was no sooner landed, but he heard a noise amongst the soldiers, whom PTOLEMY had left to guard the town; and found himself surrounded by a concourse of people, who thought the king's authority diminished,

Ampius prevented from taking the treasure of Diana's temple by Cæsar's arrival. See § 33. Strange prodigies that happened the same day Cæsar defeated Pompey.

Cæsar follows Pompey to Alexandria.

Hears the news of his death.

diminished, by CÆSAR's having the <sup>CIVIL</sup> ax and bundle of rods carried before him. This tumult was soon appeased; but there were other commotions amongst the people every day after; and many of CÆSAR's soldiers were murdered in several parts of the city. <sup>WAR.</sup>  <sup>Insurrections in Alexandria,</sup>

107. This obliged him to send for those other legions out of Asia, which he had levied amongst the remainders of POMPEY's army. But he was prevented sailing from Alexandria himself by contrary \* winds.

In the mean time, considering the dispute between the king and his sister belonged to the jurisdiction of the people of Rome, and to him as consul, and more particularly as the senate had entered into league with PTOLEMY the father during his former consulate, he gave the king and CLEOPATRA to understand, they ought both to disband their armies, and submit their cause to his decision, rather than that of the sword. <sup>\* Call'd by them the sea.</sup> <sup>Cæsar summons Ptolemy and Cleopatra to attend him.</sup>

108. POTHINUS the eunuch, governor to the infant, was entrusted with the administration of affairs during his minority. He thinking it below the king to plead his cause before CÆSAR, first began to complain of the order; and having raised a faction amongst the council, sent privately for the army from Pelusium to Alexandria; and having constituted ACHILLAS, whom we spoke of before, general of the forces, engaged him by promises both from himself and the king, to execute such orders as should be sent him. PTOLEMY the father, by his last will had divided his kingdom between the eldest of his two sons, and the eldest of his two daughters; and in the same will conjured the people of Rome, by all the gods and by the league between them, to see his testament performed. A duplicate of this will he sent by his ambassadors to Rome, that it might be repositied in the treasury; which the confusion of the times preventing, it was left with POMPEY: another copy sealed up, was kept at Alexandria. <sup>Pothinus sends to Achillas to bring the army to Alexandria.</sup> <sup>The late king's will,</sup>

109. Whilst this affair was depending before CÆSAR, and he doing all he could to compose the differences between the two antagonists, on a sudden he was informed the army was arrived at Alexandria. CÆSAR's forces were Achillas arrived so small, he could not run the hazard of a battle without the river. town; his business, therefore, was to contain himself within the walls, to secure the most convenient posts, and

\* The Egyptian priests had a prophecy, that when the ax and bundle of rods entered Alexandria, their kings authority should cease.

CIVIL  
WAR.

Dioscorides  
and Serapion  
sent to de-  
mand his  
business.

One killed,  
the other  
wounded.  
Cæsar gets  
the young  
king into  
his power.

there get intelligence of ACHILLAS's designs. However, he commanded all the soldiers to repair to their arms; and desired the king to send some persons of the greatest authority about him, to demand what ACHILLAS meant. DIOSCORIDES and SERAPION, who had both been ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with PTOLEMY the father, were employed on this occasion. They no sooner arrived in ACHILLAS's presence, but, without staying to hear their business, he commanded them to be seized and murdered: one was killed on the spot, but the other, having received a dangerous wound, was carried off for dead by his attendants. Upon which CÆSAR endeavoured to get PTOLEMY into his hands, thinking his name and title might be of great authority amongst the people; and that the war would then appear the contrivance of a few villains and malecontents, begun without the king's knowledge or approbation.

## CH A P. XXXVIII.

An account  
of Achillas's  
forces.

The licen-  
tiousness of  
the Alexan-  
drian army.

Achillas en-  
ters the  
town.

II0. THE forces under ACHILLAS's command were not to be despised for want either of number, courage, or experience. He had twenty thousand men, part consisting of GABINIUS's troops, who, by staying so long in the country, had forgot the Roman name and discipline: most of them had married wives there, by whom they had children, and were become perfect Egyptians in their licentious way of living. To these were added many Buccaneers from Syria, Cilicia, and the neighbouring countries, with several outlaws and condemned persons. For all our refugees were sure of reception, and entered into pay at Alexandria, immediately upon giving in their names. If any of their companions chanced to be apprehended by his master, all the rest would rescue him from justice, knowing themselves in the same condition. These would often take upon them to demand the heads of chief ministers, to plunder the rich that they might encrease their pay, to besiege the king in his palace, to banish some, and send for others home; which liberties the Alexandrian army claims by prescription. Besides these forces, he had likewise two thousand horse, veteran troops, perpetually inured to war; who restored PTOLEMY the father to his kingdom, killed BIBULUS's two sons, and put an end to the Egyptian war; sufficient proofs of their experience.

III. Depending on this army, and despising the small number of CÆSAR's troops, ACHILLAS entered Alexandria,

III.


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


# Alexandria no




A. Alexandria B. the Kings Palace . C. the Theater adjoyning  
 Town it to y<sup>e</sup> Town E. Caesar saves his life by Swimming . F.  
 of Pontus in y<sup>e</sup> Left I. Caesar's line of Reserve K. 22 Egyptian  
 Caesar vessels and fire Ships N. the Morass in the Town  
 taken possesed by Caesar. Q. that by the Alexandria

*now Scanderia*



adjoining to it: D. the Island Pharos. E. The narrow way that  
 ming. G. The nine Rhodian ships in it Right wing. H. Right  
 2 Egyptian ships in front. I. their Ships of Reserve. M. their  
 the South of Alexandria. O. Cæsar's works. P. that side of the  
 ridians.

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dria, and having stormed that part of the city which was CIVIL WAR. possessed by CÆSAR's soldiers, attempted to break into the palace, where he himself had taken up his quarters: but having disposed his cohorts in the streets and avenues, he prevented his design. At the same instant ACHILLAS likewise attacked us from the side next the sea; where the conflict was long maintained with great obstinacy. The dispute grew warm in several places at once, for the enemy detached a strong party to seize the fifty gallies which had been sent to POMPEY's assistance, and returned home again after the battle of Pharsalia: most of these were three and five-banked gallies well equipped: besides them were twenty others in the port, which served as a constant guard to Alexandria; and had ACHILLAS rendered himself master of them and CÆSAR's fleet, the sea and haven being entirely his, he might have intercepted all our supplies. Storms Cæsar's quarters; but is repulsed.

These motives induced each party to exert themselves; they in hopes of a speedy victory by gaining this one point; we for the security of our lives. But success attended CÆSAR, and because he was not able to defend such an extent with so inconsiderable a number of forces, he set the shipping on fire, with all the vessels riding at anchor in that road; then landed a party at Pharos. The fight warmly maintained. Cæsar burns the Alexandrian fleet.

112. This is a tower of a prodigious height, standing in an island from whence it takes its name, which, lying directly against Alexandria, forms a haven: former kings have enlarged it nine hundred paces in length, by raising great mounts in the sea, and brought so near Alexandria, that they are joined together by a bridge. This island is inhabited by Egyptians, who have built a town in it, and live by plundering the ships which are so unfortunate as to be thrown upon their coast either by mistake or tempest. And the entrance into the port is so narrow, no vessel can put in without leave from those that are masters of the island. Gains Pharos: its description.

CÆSAR therefore, considering the importance of this place, whilst the enemy were engaged in the assault, landed his soldiers, took the tower, and put a garrison there. Thus he secured access by sea for supplies of men and corn, having dispatched messengers to all the adjacent states for assistance. In other parts of the town victory remaining dubious, both parties gave over with equal loss, the narrowness of the passes having enabled our men to maintain their ground: a few therefore being killed on both sides, CÆSAR secured the most necessary places, and fortified them in the night. In this quarter was contained a Secures access by sea, and sends to the adjacent states for supplies. small



**CIVIL** small part of the king's palace, where CÆSAR had been  
**WAR.** lodged upon his first arrival, to which joined the theatre,  
 and fortifies which served instead of a fortress, commanding an avenue  
 his quarters. to the port and arsenal. The following days CÆSAR em-  
 ployed in enlarging his works, and building a wall, that he  
 might not be obliged to fight against his will.

Ptolemy's  
 youngest  
 daughter  
 goes over to  
 Achilles, in  
 hopes of be-  
 ing queen.  
 They fall  
 out.

Pothinus  
 killed.

In the mean time PTOLEMY's youngest daughter, ho-  
 ping the throne would be vacant, escaped out of the palace  
 to the army, where she joined ACHILLAS; but they  
 soon disagreed, which made well for the soldiers, whose af-  
 fections were dearly bought by either party. Whilst these  
 were the transactions of the camp, POTHINUS, the infant's  
 governor and protector of the kingdom, sent messengers,  
 through CÆSAR's part of the town, advising ACHILLAS to  
 go on with his enterprize, and not despair of success; but  
 his courier being surprized, confessed the design; upon  
 which CÆSAR put POTHINUS to death; and thus began  
 the Alexandrian war.



# HIRTIUS PANSÆ, or OPPIDIUS COMMENTARY OF THE ALEXANDRIAN WAR.

## THE CONTENTS.

*The war continued. CÆSAR's success at sea. He narrowly escapes by swimming. The king set at liberty, turns an enemy. An end of the war. The defeat of DOMITIUS CALVINUS. CASSIUS LONGINUS's extortions in Spain occasion an insurrection. The defeat of PHARNACES, and CÆSAR's return to Italy.*

## CHAP. I.

**T**HE Alexandrian war declared, CÆSAR sent to Rhodes, Syria, and Cilicia for his fleet; to Crete for archers, and to MALCHUS, king of Nabathæa, for cavalry; not omitting to get engines, corn, and all kind of provisions. The works were daily encreased, and such parts of the town as appeared less tenable, were strengthened with testudo's and mantlets. Holes were made in the walls, to let the battering-rams through; and whatever ground was laid waste, or taken in by force, he encompassed within the fortifications. Alexandria is almost proof against fire, the houses being built without wood, and standing at a moderate distance from each other; for the stories are supported by arches, and the roofs either tiled or plaistered. CÆSAR left nothing unattempted

ALEX.  
WAR.

Cæsar's preparations for the war.

Their manner of building in Alexandria.

**ALEX. WAR.** ed to enclose the smallest part of the town within his lines, which is divided from the rest by a morass towards the south; that his forces might not only lie more compact together, and relieve each other, when overpowered by the enemy, with greater ease, but be supplied with water and forage; both which the morass abounded with, and they extremely wanted, especially the former.

The Alexandrians preparations.

2. In the mean time the Alexandrians were as busy as CÆSAR, for they sent deputies to raise forces in all parts of Egypt and the neighbouring countries; they stored their magazines with darts and engines, and set numbers of hands on work to make more; all their slaves that were fit for service, maintained at the richest citizens expence, were ordered to bear arms. These were employed to guard the remotest parts of the town; but the veteran cohorts were quartered in the most spacious places of the city, that, whatever side was stormed, they might readily come to maintain it. All the avenues and gates they fortified with a triple rampier, built of square stones, and raised compleatly forty foot high. The lower parts of the town were secured with turrets of ten stories; besides, they built several castles upon wheels, of an equal height with the former; and where the streets were even, drew them up and down with horses, to what part they thought convenient.

Moving towers.

The industry and ingenuity of the Egyptians.

3. The city being rich and populous, furnished them with all materials they had occasion for. The inhabitants were so ingenious and acute, they made whatever they saw us do, with so much dispatch, that we rather appeared to imitate them, than they to copy after us: besides, their own fancy supplied them with several machines; by which they at once defended their own, and assaulted our fortifications.

The noblements arguments to prompt the people to be laborious.

The nobility were a spur to the people's industry, declaring at council, and in their harangues, "That the Romans, according to their ancient custom, were come to render themselves masters, by degrees, of the country: that GABINIUS, not many years since, was sent with an army into Egypt; that POMPEY retreated thither after his defeat; and CÆSAR followed him with his forces, but did not think fit to return though he heard of his rival's death; therefore they might depend upon it, unless they immediately expelled him their country, from a kingdom they would find themselves reduced to a province: for nothing but the season of the year prevented his receiving supplies from beyond sea."

4. In the mean time, the misunderstanding between

ACHILLAS

ACHILLAS, who commanded the veteran army, and AR- ALEX-  
SINOE, the king's younger sister, daily encreased; each WAR.  
laid wait for the other, striving to engross the supreme au-  
thority; but ARSINOE, by the assistance of her governor, <sup>Achillas</sup>  
the eunuch GANYMEDE, prevailed and killed ACHILLAS. <sup>killed by</sup>  
After his death she ruled without a competitor, and con- <sup>She makes</sup>  
ferred the command of the army upon GANYMEDE; who <sup>Ganymede</sup>  
on his entry into that office advanced the soldiers pay, and <sup>general in</sup>  
discharged all other parts of his duty with equal diligence. <sup>his stead.</sup>

CH A P. II.

5. THE greatest part of Alexandria is undermined, The aquæ-  
having aquæducts that furnish private houses with water ducts at A-  
from the Nile, which, after it is settled, becomes very alexandria,  
clear. This is preserved for the use of the master and his Nile.  
relations; for, when the water first comes in, it is so thick  
and muddy, it breeds several distempers; however, the  
servants and meaner sort are forced to be contented with it,  
since there is not a fountain in all the city. The river lay  
on that side the town which was possessed by the Egyp-  
tians; whence GANYMEDE was in hopes he might deprive  
our army of fresh water; who being distributed into several <sup>Ganymede</sup>  
streets, and quartered in private houses, for the easier de- <sup>endeavours</sup>  
fence of the works, made use of the water they found in <sup>to deprive</sup>  
the drains and cisterns. <sup>the Romans</sup>  
<sup>of fresh wa-</sup>  
<sup>ter.</sup>

6. His project being approved, he began a very difficult  
and laborious task. Having stopped up the conduits which  
were all in his possession, and supplied our part of the  
city, he drew great quantities of water out of the sea, by  
the help of certain engines, to the higher ground; from  
whence he continually poured it down into CÆSAR's aquæ-  
ducts. This immediately making the water saltier than <sup>The Ro-</sup>  
usual in the nearest houses, occasioned great wonder a- <sup>mans</sup>  
mongst the soldiers, and enquiry concerning the reason of <sup>strangely</sup>  
it, who could hardly believe their senses, when they found <sup>surprized.</sup>  
the cisterns something lower in the town still tasted as usual:  
it was common for them to compare them together, and  
make observations on the difference between them. In a  
little time the water in the upper cisterns became so very salt,  
it was impossible to drink it; and that in the lower began  
now to be infected with the same brackish taste.

7. This immediately convinced them of the reason, and  
struck such a fear into them, that they thought themselves <sup>Desirous to</sup>  
reduced to the last extremities. Some wondered why <sup>quit the</sup>  
<sup>place.</sup>

CÆSAR



**ALEX. CÆSAR** delayed going on ship-board, and others apprehended something worse would follow, because it was impossible to conceal their retreat from the Alexandrians who were so nigh them, or to embark whilst they pursued: for there were several of the townsmen within CÆSAR'S fortifications, whom he had permitted to stay in their houses, because they openly pretended to be in his interest, and desert their fellow-citizens. But I shall not throw away my time in defending either their integrity or their conduct, since they who are acquainted with their country and temper, know them to be the fittest instruments in the world for treason.

*Cæsar's  
speech; he  
persuades  
them to the  
contrary.*

8. CÆSAR took care to make his soldiers easy, by comforting and reasoning the case with them. "He assured them that by digging wells they might easily procure sweet water, and that all sea coasts naturally abounded with fresh springs; but should the soil of Egypt be different from all the world besides, they had no reason to despair, since the sea was open; the enemy had no fleet to prevent their fetching water either from Parætonium on the left, or Pharus on the right; which places lying different ways, the wind would perpetually serve fair for one or other of them. But as for retreating, that thought should not find entertainment with such as had any respect for their lives, much less with those who preferred their honour before any other considerations: for if they found it so difficult with all the aid of their works to repulse the enemy, those once deserted, they must not expect to be equal to them either in advantage of situation or in number. Besides, going on board would be a work of delay and difficulty, since they must be obliged to get into the boats before they could embark: whereas the Alexandrians were very nimble, understood the nature of the place and could take advantage of the several edifices, and being flushed with success, would certainly possess themselves of every eminence, annoy them from the tops of their houses, and effectually prevent their retreat. Wherefore they must lay aside all designs of that nature, and think of nothing but the necessity of conquering."

*He commands them  
to sink  
wells, and  
they find  
water.*

9. Having encouraged his men by this harangue, he commanded the centurions to employ the soldiers day and night in sinking wells, without suffering any avocation to interfere. The work begun, every one cheerfully undertook his share of the labour, and in one night's time was discovered a spring which furnished the army with plenty of fresh

water:

water : so easily was the Alexandrian project, with all their labour and machines, defeated!

ALEX.  
WAR.  


CHAP. III.

TWO days after, the thirty-seventh legion, part of POMPEY's troops that had surrendered themselves, arrived on the African coasts, a little above Alexandria; whither being sent by DOMITIUS CALVINUS, with corn, arms, darts, and engines, they were prevented from finishing their voyage by an easterly wind, that had continued several days together; but the coasts thereabout are excellent good for riding at anchor. They had now been detained a considerable time, and fresh water began to grow scarce; wherefore they sent a small vessel to row against the wind, and carry CÆSAR notice of their being there.

The thirty-seventh legion arrives on the coast of Africa.

Sends Cæsar word they want water, and are detained by contrary winds. Cæsar embarks to meet them.

10. Without consulting any one but himself, he immediately hoisted sail, and commanded all the fleet to follow him, leaving his land-forces behind, being not willing the works should be naked during so long an absence. When he arrived at \* Cherfonefus, he sent his sailors on shore to get fresh water; some of these venturing too far within the land for plunder, were taken by the enemy's horse; who learned from them that CÆSAR was on board, without any soldiers. On this advice, they thought fortune had blessed them with an happy opportunity; wherefore they manned all the vessels they had ready equipped, and met CÆSAR as he returned. But he declined fighting at that time, because he had no soldiers with him; and it being past four in the afternoon, the approaching night would add confidence to the enemy, who were best acquainted with the place; and he should want the common incentives to his men, when neither valour nor cowardice could be distinguished. Wherefore he drew all his ships to the shore, where he imagined the enemy would hardly follow him.

The enemy having notice of his voyage, resolve to intercept him. Cæsar declines fighting,

11. But one Rhodian galley of his right wing stood out at some distance from the rest. The enemy observing this, could not contain themselves any longer, but immediately detached four large ships, with several smaller vessels, to attack her. Which obliged CÆSAR to send her assistance, to prevent so great a disgrace as the loss of one of his gallies within his own view; though, if she had fallen

One Rhodian galley attacked, but rescued.

\* This is neither the Taurica, Cimbrica, nor Græca Cherfonefus; nor to be found in any geographer but PROLEMY. l. iv. c. 5. situated near Alexan-  
dia to the east.

**ALEX. WAR.** a prey to the enemy, it was no more than she had brought on herself by her temerity. Thus the fight began, and the Rhodians bore briskly up to the enemy; for as they were noted for their valour and experience in sea engagements, they now willingly endured the burthen of the day, that it might not be reported the Romans had suffered by their mismanagement.

**The enemy engaged and defeated.** In fine, we got the better, took a four-banked galley, and sunk another, after having killed all the men on board: we made a great slaughter likewise amongst the soldiers that were in the other galleys, and had not night protected them, should have taken all their fleet.

**Cæsar gets safe with his transports to Alexandria.** Whilst the enemy were surprized with this disaster, the wind blowing gently, CÆSAR towed his transports with his galleys to Alexandria.

## CHAP. IV.

**The Egyptians repair their fleet.** 12. THE Egyptians were so terrified at this defeat, finding themselves not only out-done in the courage of their soldiers, but experience of their pilots, <sup>b</sup> that they immediately repaired to the higher ground, to the tops of their houses, and made blockades to defend them: for they were apprehensive of being attacked by our fleet, even at land. But GANYMEDE, having encouraged them, by promising in council he would not only restore the vessels they had lost, but encrease their number, they began with great hope and cheerfulness to repair their old ships, and to put their marine in a good condition; not discouraged in the least with the loss of above a hundred and ten galleys in their ports and arsenal. For they knew, if they became masters of the sea, they could easily intercept all CÆSAR's supplies. Sailors, of whom there was plenty about Alexandria and the adjacent coasts, and who had been brought up to the sea from their infancy, cheerfully lifted themselves for their country's service: remembering what exploits they had formerly done, even with their little ships, they set all hands on work towards equipping the fleet.

**Their industry.**

13. All the vessels that use to receive toll at the seven mouths of the Nile, were recalled to Alexandria; the old galleys, which had long been laid up in the king's private arsenals, were refitted; and finding they wanted oars, they made use of planks, pulled off from the portico's,

<sup>b</sup> Here is something wanting in the original, and to me the text likewise appears corrupt: this I suppose to be the meaning of the author; but I leave every one to make use of his own opinion,

schools, and publick buildings, to serve the present occasion: for they knew they were not going a long voyage, being to engage almost in the haven. Thus their natural genius supplied their necessities. In a very few days, beyond expectation, they had equipped two and twenty four-bank'd and five-bank'd gallies, with several smaller vessels. ALEX. WAR. Their expedition, and number of their ships.

They tried in the haven how well they could row; and having put a sufficient number of marines on board, prepared themselves for the engagement. CÆSAR had nine Rhodian gallies (for of ten which the islanders sent him, one foundered on the Egyptian coast) eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from Asia: but amongst these he had only five gallies with five banks of oars, and ten with four; all the rest were smaller ships, and most of them without decks: however, depending on the courage of his soldiers, and having already tried the enemy's forces, he resolved to give them battle. Cæsar's fleet.

14. Thus both natives promising themselves success, put out to sea: CÆSAR sailing round Pharos, drew his gallies up over-against the enemy in this order. He placed the Rhodian Squadron in the right, that of Pontus in the left, about four hundred paces distant from the other, that they might have room enough to tack about: in a second line behind these he disposed the rest of his ships for a reserve, giving each of them orders to attend and relieve such particular gallies. The Alexandrians, who left the port with no less assurance, disposed two and twenty gallies in the line of battle, placing the rest behind: but besides these, they had a great many boats and smaller vessels to carry fire and \* arrows loaden with combustible matter, that burnt whatever they fixed to; designing by their number, noise, and flames, to strike a terror into our gallies. Between both navies on the African side (for half of Alexandria is in Africk) were certain flats, and each expected a considerable time whether should pass them first; because they who came over them, would find it a difficult matter to retreat again when they desired it. Both fleets drawn up. Cæsar's. The Egyptians fleet.

15. EUPHRANOR was admiral of the Rhodian Squadron, who for his greatness of mind deserved rather to be ranked amongst the Romans than the Grecians; and had deservedly been constituted admiral for his courage and experience. He, perceiving CÆSAR's design, said; "You seem apprehensive, Sir, that if you cross the shallows first, you will be obliged to engage the enemy before the rest of the fleet comes up to your assistance. Commit that affair to \* Malleoli. Euphranor's speech to Cæsar.



**ALEX.** to my charge, I will sustain their attack till the other gallies get over, and shew you, my countrymen deserve your good opinion: for we can no longer endure the disgrace of being thus insulted by the Egyptians." **CÆSAR** having applauded and encouraged his design, gave the signal. So

*He begins the fight.*

*The dexterity of the Rhodians.*

Soon as the four Rhodian gallies had passed the flats, they were surrounded by the Alexandrians, who attacked them with great fury; but they quickly extricated themselves, and were so very dextrous, that notwithstanding the disparity of number, they lost not an oar, never giving the enemy an opportunity of driving down athwart them, but always receiving them on their beaks: by this time the rest followed after, and the place being narrow, art was obliged to give place to courage. All the Alexandrians, and our soldiers who were left behind to guard the fortifications, attending with great impatience the success of the day, mounted to the tops of the highest houses, that commanded the farthest prospect, where both sides earnestly besought the gods for victory.

16. But the battle was very unequal, for a defeat would have deprived us of all hopes of retreating either by sea or land; and on the other hand, a victory could secure us nothing: whereas, had success attended their fleet, they had been entire masters of all; and though they were defeated, they had it still in their power to try their future fortune. Add to this the hardship of so many persons safety depending on so few, whose want of courage must have proved fatal to those, who had not the liberty of fighting for themselves. These arguments **CÆSAR** had urged some days before, that they might maintain the fight with greater valour, since the lives of their companions were committed to their charge; and each private soldier, following his example, conjured his comrade to behave himself worthy of the trust reposed in him, by those who ventured the fate of a battle upon his courage. Spurred by such powerful motives, they fought so bravely, that neither the enemy's numbers nor experience availed them any thing; nor could so great a multitude produce men enough to equal ours in valour. In this battle we took a five-banked and a two-banked galley, with all the soldiers and sailors on board, and sunk three others, without the loss of a single vessel. The rest escaped to the town, being sheltered by the mole and forts, which hindered our pursuit.

*Cæsar gets the victory, takes two ships, sinks three.*

CHAP. V.

17. TO prevent the like inconvenience for the future, **ALEX.**  
**CÆSAR** thought it of great importance to render himself **WAR.**  
 master both of the mole and island: the greatest part of his  
 works being already finished, he believed his forces were  
 sufficient to maintain their ground, and assault the isle. **Cæsar at-**  
 Having resolved upon the attempt, he ordered ten cohorts, **tacks the**  
 with some select light-armed cavalry of Gaul, to embark **mole;**  
 in boats and small vessels; and at the same time, to di-  
 vide the enemy's forces, attacked the island on the other  
 side with his galleys; promising great rewards to him that  
 first obtained the land. At first the Egyptians returned our  
 assault with equal fury; for the same instant they cast darts  
 upon us from the tops of their houses, they likewise main-  
 tained the shore; which being steep, our soldiers could not  
 easily ascend it. In the mean time they dexterously de-  
 fended the entrance to the port, by the assistance of their  
 boats, and five galleys. But the coast being fathomed,  
 and the shallows discovered, a few of our men recovered  
 the shore; they were immediately followed by others, **routs the**  
 who vigorously charged the islanders that stood upon the **Pharians,**  
 higher ground, and routed them. These being put to **gains the**  
 flight, the rest no longer troubled themselves to secure the **island,**  
 haven, but quitting their galleys, hastened to the town to  
 defend their houses.

18. Nor were they able long to secure their fortifica- **and the**  
 tions, though their turrets (if we may compare small **town.**  
 things with greater) resembled those of Alexandria; and  
 being joined together, supplied the want of a wall. Our  
 soldiers had neither scaling-ladders, nor any other things  
 necessary for an assault; but fear, which often deprives  
 men both of their senses and limbs, so insatuated the ene-  
 my, that they, who but the moment before thought them-  
 selves an equal match for us upon the even ground, being  
 terrified with their flight, did not think themselves now se-  
 cure on the tops of their houses thirty foot high; but de-  
 scending to the mole, plunged into the sea, and swam  
 eight hundred paces to the town. However, several were  
 taken and killed, but the number of the prisoners did not  
 amount to above six hundred. **Several ta-**  
**ken and**  
**killed.**  
**Cæsar forti-**  
**fies the ca-**  
**stle at the**  
**foot of the**  
**bridge near-**  
**est Pharos;**  
**attacks the**  
**other,**

19. **CÆSAR** having given the soldiers free leave to plun-  
 der, commanded the houses to be levelled, but fortified the  
 castle at the foot of the bridge which was nearest Pharos,  
 and

ALEX.  
WAR.

Gains the shore, stops an arch up under the bridge, and begins to throw up a rampier.

All the enemy's forces sally from the town, to attack the Romans likewise from on board.

Several of Cæsar's seamen come on shore, at first make the enemy retreat;

but are routed, and occasion the loss of the place.

Cæsar's soldiers fly with great confusion.

Some vessels overloaded and sunk.

and placed a garrison in it. Thus the Pharians deserted their quarters; but the strongest part of the bridge was still possessed by the Alexandrians. This CÆSAR likewise assaulted the day after, knowing when he had obtained them both, he should effectually prevent all excursions and surprizes. He quickly cleared the shore of the enemy, by the darts and engines from on board, obliging them to retreat into the town; and having landed about three cohorts (for the place was so narrow it would contain no more) the rest were left behind to guard his ships. Having gained the shore, he commanded that part of the bridge which was next the enemy to be secured by a rampier, and the arch to be stopped up with stones, where their vessels usually got out. His orders were so well performed, that not a cock-boat could get through; and the other part of the work was already begun, when all the Alexandrian forces sallied out of the town, and posted themselves in an open place opposite to the bridge, attacking the mole at the same instant, from on board the vessels which they usually sent through the arches to burn our transports. Thus they assaulted us in their ships, and from the platform: we from the bridge and mole returned their charge.

20. Whilst CÆSAR was employed in encouraging his men, and distributing the necessary orders, several of the rowers and sailors leaped on shore, some out of curiosity, others to defend the place. At first they repulsed the enemy's vessels from the mole with stones and slings, doing great execution at the same instant with their darts. A few of the Alexandrians ventured to land at a small distance from that post, designing to attack our men on the flank; but as they made a disorderly sally, observing neither ranks nor files, so they now began to retreat to their gallies with the utmost precipitation. Provoked at this, more of them made a descent from their ships, and attacked our men thrown into disorder by the eagerness of the pursuit; upon which, those we had on board the gallies hauled up the ladders immediately, and put off from shore, to prevent the enemy's boarding them. The three cohorts posted on the bridge and the mole, terrified with the noise behind them, seeing their party routed, and themselves plying with showers of darts, apprehended they should be surrounded, and have their retreat cut off by the departure of the ships; wherefore they quitted the works, and retired as fast as they could towards the gallies. Some getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded and sunk them;

them; others disputing with themselves, whether they should maintain their ground or no, were cut to pieces by the Alexandrians: some had the good fortune to preserve their lives, by getting into empty vessels that rode at anchor; others by the assistance of their shields and their resolute bravery reached the nearest galleys.

21. CÆSAR, who shared with his soldiers in the danger of this enterprize, did his utmost endeavour to stop their flight from the bridge and fortifications; but finding the rest were gone, he likewise retreated to his galley. He was followed by such a crowd, that the sailors had neither room to work, nor thrust the vessel from shore; whereupon CÆSAR, suspecting what afterwards happened, flung himself into the sea, and swam to another ship further off: from thence he sent several boats to the assistance of his men, and preserved some; but the vessel itself with most of those on board was sunk. In this action we lost about four hundred legionary soldiers, of sailors and rowers something above that number. The Alexandrians having gained their point, fortified the castle with strong works and engines, pulled out the stones from under the arch, and made the passage clear as formerly.

Cæsar escapes by swimming.

Cæsar lost eight hundred in this action.

CHAP. VI.

22. OUR soldiers were so far from being discouraged by their late misfortune, that it only served them for a spur to assault the enemy's works with greater vigour; and in their daily skirmishes they were successful, taking many of the Alexandrians prisoners. In fine, they were so eager to regain their credit, that CÆSAR's edict to the contrary could not put a stop to their labour or desire of fighting; whence it plainly appeared, the legions had more occasion to be restrained from the most dangerous enterprizes than excited to embark in them.

The Romans courage.

23. The Alexandrians perceiving nothing could daunt the Romans, that success confirmed their resolutions, and ill fortune served but to quicken their revenge; prompted, as we imagine, by the king's officers that were in CÆSAR's quarters, or of their own motion, which was privately ratified by the king, sent ambassadors to CÆSAR desiring he would grant their king his liberty, and suffer him to come to his people, who were all ready to obey his royal plea-

The Alexandrians desire their king's liberty.

<sup>c</sup> The text in this place is so corrupt, all we can do is to guess at the author's meaning.



ALEX. fure, being wearied out under the government of a girl,  
 WAR. in submitting to delegated power and the insufferable ty-  
 ranny of GANYMEDE. Should his majesty think fit to  
 conclude a peace with CÆSAR, no apprehensions whatever  
 would prevent their acquiescing in his commands.

Their diffi-  
 culty.

Cæsar grants  
 their re-  
 quest, and  
 why.

His speech  
 to Ptolemy  
 at parting.

Ptolemy's  
 dissimula-  
 tion.

He makes  
 war upon  
 Cæsar.

24. Though CÆSAR knew the Egyptians to be a deceit-  
 ful people, who always talked of one thing whilst they  
 meant another; yet he thought it convenient to grant their  
 request. For if they designed to perform their promise, he  
 believed the king would secure their fidelity to the Ro-  
 mans: but if they only wanted a prince to head their ar-  
 my, which seemed more agreeable to their temper, he  
 esteemed it abundantly more glorious and honourable to  
 wage war against a crowned head, than banditti and vaga-  
 bonds. Having therefore exhorted the young prince, "To  
 consult the interest of his hereditary kingdom, and to spare  
 so famous a country, which had already suffered too much  
 by fire and desolation; to bring his subjects first to have  
 right sentiments, and then to adhere to them; to preserve  
 faith with the people of Rome, since CÆSAR had reposed  
 so entire a confidence in him, as to restore him with royal  
 authority over those who were actually in arms against  
 him;" he gave him his hand, and dismissed the youth  
 now almost at age. But he, whose mind had already been  
 imbued with fallacious principles, that he might not dege-  
 nerate from the nature of his country, with tears in  
 his eyes "desired he might not go, protesting empire was  
 not so dear to him as CÆSAR'S presence." Who, being  
 moved to behold the boy's concern, dried up his tears,  
 telling him, If such was his desire, they might quickly  
 meet again; and so sent him away. But PTOLEMY, like  
 a racer just started from the barrier which with-held him,  
 enter'd into warlike measures against CÆSAR so furiously,  
 that the tears he shed seemed to have been those of joy.  
 Several of CÆSAR'S lieutenants, friends, centurions and  
 soldiers, were well enough pleased, that his easy temper  
 had been imposed on by so early an impostor: not consi-  
 dering CÆSAR had been induced to let him go, upon prin-  
 ciples of wisdom and policy, as well as from the dictates of  
 good-nature.

25. The Alexandrians, having now got the general they  
 desired, found not their affairs in a better posture than  
 before: contrary to their expectations, they had the mis-  
 fortune to see nothing done, whilst the soldiers despised the  
 king's age and weakness; and news arrived of considerable  
 supplies,

supplies, that were marching by land from Syria and Cilicia to CÆSAR's assistance, which he himself as yet knew nothing of. In the mean while, they resolved to intercept those provisions which were coming by sea; therefore, having equipped a fleet for this purpose, they disposed their ships in convenient places, near Canopus, to attend the arrival of our convoy. CÆSAR, upon notice of their design, gave orders his fleet should immediately put out to sea; constituting TIBERIUS NERO admiral, who was attended by EUPHRANOR and his Rhodian gallies, without whom there had been no engagement, and none which was not attended with success. But Fortune, who frequently reserves those to harder destiny, on whom she has bestowed many favours, now forsook EUPHRANOR. When our fleet arrived at Canopus, and both navies were drawn up in order of battle, according to his usual custom, he began the engagement, and having split a three-banked galley of the enemy's, sunk her; but pursuing another too far, and the rest of his Squadron following but slowly, he was surrounded by the Alexandrians. No galley came up to his relief, either believing his courage and felicity would protect him, or fearing to venture so far themselves. Thus the only man that behaved himself well in this action, perished with his victorious galley.

ALEX.  
WAR.

The Egyptians design to intercept Cæsar's convoys. Cæsar sends his fleet to disappoint them.

Euphranor dies bravely.

## C H A P. VII.


26. WHILEST these affairs were in agitation, MITHRIDATES of Pergamus, descended from a noble family, equally renowned for his courage, conduct, fidelity, and the place he possessed in CÆSAR's favour, who had been sent, at the beginning of the Alexandrian war, to raise forces in Syria and Cilicia, was arrived by land at Pelusium, where Syria and Egypt join, with a considerable army, which by his own diligence, and the affection of the country he had soon levied. This town ACHILLAS had fortified with a strong garrison, being a place of great importance: for all Egypt is guarded towards the sea by Pharos, and at land by Pelusium. However, MITHRIDATES stormed it, notwithstanding all the resolute defence the besieged could make; his army was so great, he still detached fresh men to relieve the faint and wounded; so that by continuing the assault without intermission, he carried the place the same day he sat down before it, and planted a garrison there of his own. After this success he marched

Per. Jul. 4667. U. C. Var. 707.

Mithr arrived at Pelusium; which he takes by storm.

Marches towards Alexandria.

**ALEX.** towards Alexandria to join CÆSAR, taking in all the countries by the way, and making them declare for CÆSAR, by virtue of that authority which generally attends the conqueror.

**WAR.**  27. The most considerable town in those parts, at no great distance from Alexandria, is Delta, which borrows its name from the similitude of its form to the Grecian letter: For here a branch of the river Nile divides itself into two several streams, which, separating by degrees, run at a considerable distance from each other before they disem-  
bogue themselves into the sea. PTOLEMY having notice of MITHRIDATES's approach to this place, and knowing he must of necessity pass the river there, sent a considerable army to oppose him, hoping to defeat, or at least to put a stop to his journey: the former of these would have compleated his wishes; but he would gain his end if he could prevent MITHRIDATES from joining CÆSAR. Part of the king's forces having passed the river, made what haste they could to engage him, that they might engross the glory of the victory to themselves: but MITHRIDATES wisely sustained their charge by the assistance of a rampier, having fortified his camp after the Roman manner; and perceiving they assaulted his works too rashly, he sallied out, and made a great slaughter amongst them. And had not their knowledge of the country, and the vessels they crossed the river in, protected them, they had been entirely defeated. However, having retreated a little way, they joined the rest of the army, and began a second time to storm the trenches of MITHRIDATES.

but they are put to flight.  
A second attempt to storm his trenches.  
28. Whereupon he dispatched a courier to CÆSAR, with an account of the action: PTOLEMY likewise had notice of it from his forces; so that both he and CÆSAR set out almost the same instant, one to oppose, the other to relieve MITHRIDATES. The king took the shorter cut by the river Nile, on which he had a considerable navy ready fitted out. But CÆSAR, to avoid engaging him in his passage, sailed by the African shore, and joined the victorious MITHRIDATES before the king's army arrived.

PTOLEMY had encamped in a place well fortified by nature; it was a rising ground surrounded by a plain, and secured on three several sides by different fences, the Nile, a mountain, and a morass.

29. Between this place and CÆSAR's rout, about seven miles distant from PTOLEMY's quarters, ran a narrow river with very steep banks, which discharged itself into the Nile;

Nile: the king, upon notice that CÆSAR was marching that way, detached all his cavalry, with the choicest light-armed foot, to oppose his crossing the river, and engage him at a distance to advantage. Here courage had no opportunity to exert itself, nor cowardice to betray its weakness; but our men, enraged to have their passage so long retarded by the Alexandrians, whilst the German horse were finding out fords, a party of them swam cross the river, where the banks were easiest of ascent; and the legionary soldiers having cut down great trees which extended from one side to the other, laying them along strewed fascines upon them, and crossed the river. The enemy were afraid of receiving their charge, and immediately fled; but in vain, for few escaped the slaughter to carry the king news of the action.

30. After so fortunate an event, CÆSAR thinking his sudden arrival might strike a terror into the Alexandrians, pushed his success, and marched directly to PTOLEMY'S camp. But perceiving the place so well defended by art and nature, that the enemy's rampier was guarded by a numerous party, and his own soldiers fatigued with their journey and late engagement, he did not think convenient to attempt their trenches, but encamped at a moderate distance. The day after he assaulted one of the king's castles in a village not far off, from whence there was a line of communication to their camp: this place CÆSAR stormed with all his forces, not because he thought a less number was not sufficient to gain it; but that, whilst the Alexandrians were terrified and in confusion, he might from thence march directly to the king's camp: so that as the enemy retreated within their lines towards the camp, our men followed them by the same direction. We had access to this castle two ways, one by the plain mentioned before, the other by a narrow pass between their camp and the Nile. The side easiest to come at was defended by the flower of the Alexandrian army; but the enemy wounded and repulsed our men with greatest success on the part towards the Nile. Here we were surrounded by showers of darts from every side, and galled both from the rampier and the river; where several vessels lay with slingers and archers on board.

31. CÆSAR perceived his soldiers did their utmost to no purpose, whilst they laboured under so many disadvantages; but observing the highest part of the enemy's camp was left unguarded, because they thought it sufficiently fortified

ALEX.  
WAR.

He sends his  
cavalry to  
oppose Cæ-  
sar, passing  
a branch of  
the Nile;

but Cæsar  
defeats  
them.  
Marches to  
Ptolemy's  
camp.

Storms a  
castle with  
great loss on  
his side,



ALB. X.  
WAR.

Carsulenus  
detached to  
storm the  
highest part  
of the ene-  
my's camp;

which he  
forces.

The Egyp-  
tians entirely  
routed.

Ptolemy  
gets on  
board; but  
the vessel is  
sunk.

Cæsar  
marches to  
Alexandria.

The town-  
men come  
out to meet  
him like  
suppliants.

He performs  
Ptolemy the  
father's will.

Cleopatra  
and her  
younger bro-  
ther consti-  
tuted king  
and queen.

Leaves an  
army to pro-  
tect them.

by nature (for most of their forces were come to the place of action, either to behold or share the engagement) he detached a party under the command of CARSULENUS, an officer of equal conduct and courage, with orders to take a circuit round and ascend the hill. When our men got thither, they found but few of the enemy upon the place, whom they attacked very vigorously: the Alexandrians, surprized to hear the noise of fighting behind them, began to fly; so that almost at the same instant we forced their camp on every side: but CARSULENUS's party entered first, and pouring down from the higher ground, made a dreadful slaughter amongst them; while others, to avoid the like fate, flung themselves headlong in whole troops together over that side of the rampier which was next the river; the foremost of whom, killed with their fall in the ditch, furnished an easy passage for those that came after. The king, during this confusion, got on ship-board; but the vessel, being overladen, was cast away.

32. After this success, CÆSAR, depending on the same of his victory, marched the nearest way by land to Alexandria with his cavalry, and entered that part of the town which was in the enemy's possession. Nor did his opinion deceive him, that on the news of this defeat they would no longer think of war; for on his arrival he received the reward due to his bravery and elevation of soul. The Alexandrians, having quitted their works, and thrown away their arms, came out, arrayed like suppliants, to meet him, and deliver themselves up to his mercy, bringing along with them all those sacred implements with which they used to appease their own angry monarchs. He forgave and comforted them; then entered through their works into his own quarters; where his soldiers congratulated his safe return, and happy decision of the war.

33. CÆSAR, having thus rendered himself master of Alexandria and Egypt, took care to see PTOLEMY's will performed; who had conjured the Romans to be the guardians of it; for, the elder of the king's two sons being dead, he now divided the kingdom between the younger, and CLEOPATRA the elder of the two daughters, who had continued faithful to the people of Rome, and taken refuge during the war in his fortifications. But to prevent new commotions, before these princes should be settled in their thrones, he banished ARSINOË, under whose name GANYMEDE had so long bore tyrannical sway. He took the sixth veteran legion away with him, leaving the rest of his forces to keep the kingdom in obedience to the

the

the new partners of the crown, who had the less of their ALEX. subjects affections, because they were friends to CÆSAR, WAR. and less power, because time had not yet matured their authority. It was for our advantage to protect them so long as they observed their league with the Romans; and the soldiers left behind were able to restrain them from being ungrateful, if they designed it. Thus having settled the kingdom, CÆSAR marched by land to Syria. *Marches to Syria.*

C H A P. VIII.

34. DURING these transactions in Egypt, king DEIOTARUS, to whom CÆSAR had committed the government of Asia, with the neighbouring provinces, came to beg the assistance of DOMITIUS CALVINUS to prevent Armenia the less, which were his own territories, and Cappadocia, the kingdom of ARIOBARZANES, from being possessed and ravaged by PHARNACES; urging that unless they were freed from these misfortunes, they should not be able to pay CÆSAR the tribute they had contracted for. DOMITIUS not only considering how necessary money was for paying the soldiers, but likewise reflecting what a disgrace it would be to the Roman empire, to the victorious CÆSAR, and himself, to suffer the kingdoms of their allies to be invaded by foreign princes, immediately ordered PHARNACES to quit Armenia and Cappadocia; and not incense the majesty of the Roman people, by taking advantage of their being engaged in a civil war. Believing this message would have the greater effect, if he marched that way with an army, he went to his legions, and took the thirty-sixth along with him, for the other two he had sent into Egypt in obedience to CÆSAR's commands, one of which had no share in the Alexandrian war, having march'd by land thro' Syria: besides this legion, DOMITIUS had two others from DEIOTARUS, which had been instructed in the Roman discipline, with one hundred cavalry: ARIOBARZANES likewise furnished him with the same number. He sent P. SEXTUS to C. PRÆTORIUS the quæstor, for the legions which had been levied in haste in Pontus, and QUINTUS PATISIUS for other forces out of Cilicia, which soon met at the general rendezvous at <sup>b</sup> Comana, as DOMITIUS had appointed. *Deiotarus desires assistance from Domitius against Pharnaces. He sends ambassadors to bid Pharnaces quit Cappadocia and Armenia. He gets an army together, appoints them to meet him at Comana.*

35. In the mean time PHARNACES sent ambassadors, in answer to DOMITIUS's demands, who were to acquaint *Pharnaces's answer.*

<sup>b</sup> A town in Cappadocia.

ALEX.  
WAR.



Domitius's  
reply.

He marches  
directly to  
Armenia.

Pharnaces  
sends conti-  
nual embas-  
sies and pre-  
sents; which  
are refused.

He encamps  
within seven  
miles of Ni-  
copolis.

Pharnaces's  
ambuscade  
to no pur-  
pose.

him, their king had quitted Cappadocia, and retired to Armenia the less, which he had a lawful title to by inheritance. However, he would wait CÆSAR's arrival, and submit his cause entirely to his arbitration. But DOMITIUS found he had quitted Cappadocia through necessity only, and because he thought he could more easily defend Armenia, which lay nearer his kingdom, when DOMITIUS was marching against him with all the three legions: whereas, being now advised two were sent to CÆSAR, he had maintained his ground with greater assurance: DOMITIUS resolved therefore to oblige him to quit that kingdom likewise, since he had no better title to Armenia than Cappadocia; nor was it reasonable for him to expect the cause should be entirely referred to CÆSAR; which could not be done till affairs were put in the very same posture he found them, and DEIOTARUS again possessed of his dominions. Having made this reply, he marched with the forces I mentioned before, into Armenia, taking his rout along the hills. For from Pontus to Armenia the Less, by the way of Comana, runs a continued ridge beset with woods, which divides Cappadocia from Armenia. The advantages he proposed by marching this way, were that he should effectually prevent all surprizes, and receive supplies from Cappadocia, which abounded with corn.

36. PHARNACES in the mean time omitted not sending perpetual embassies to treat of peace, and offer DOMITIUS royal presents, which he generously despised; answering, That nothing was of such estimation to him, as the dignity of the Roman empire, and the satisfaction of regaining those kingdoms which belonged to her allies. Having arrived, by long marches, near Nicopolis, a town of Armenia, situate in a plain, but covered by high mountains, at some distance, on two several sides, he encamped about seven miles off the place. Between his quarters and Nicopolis lay a difficult and narrow pass, where PHARNACES disposed an ambuscade of his choicest foot, and almost all his cavalry. He gave orders that plenty of cattle should be dispersed about the entrance of the avenue, and commanded several of the townsmen and peasants to shew themselves there, that in case DOMITIUS came as a friend, he might not suspect an ambush, seeing both men and cattle in the fields; if as an enemy, his soldiers might be attacked, and cut to pieces, whilst they were dispersed up and down in quest of booty. Having formed this contrivance, he still continued his embassies, hoping

hoping the more easily to deceive him: but as fortune would have it, the prospect of a peace detained DOMITIUS in his camp on the other side the mountains; wherefore having slipped the first opportunity, lest DOMITIUS should get notice of his design, PHARNACES recalled his forces into his camp.

The day after, DOMITIUS marched nearer Nicopolis, and encamped over-against it. Whilst our men were working at the trenches, PHARNACES drew his forces out in order of battle. According to the custom of his country, having disposed his front in one line, he supported each of the wings with three reserves, in the same manner as the middle front was supported, the two intervals on the right and left being uniformly filled up. But DOMITIUS, making part of his forces attend in arms before the rampier, compleated his works.

Domitius re-  
moves to Ni-  
copolis.

Pharnaces  
intercepts a  
courier with  
notice of  
Cæsar's  
straights.

Designs to  
prolong the  
time till Do-  
mitius goes.

38. The following night, PHARNACES having intercepted one of our couriers that came from Alexandria, from his packet got intelligence what difficulties CÆSAR laboured under, how earnestly he pressed DOMITIUS to send him supplies, and come nearer Alexandria by the way of Syria. Upon this, thinking himself as good as victor, provided he could prolong the time till DOMITIUS should be obliged to quit the country; where our army had the easiest access to him, he sunk two ditches four foot deep, at some distance from each other, resolving to keep himself within those limits; and between them he constantly drew out his army, placing his cavalry however on the side of each wing beyond them; which were infinitely superior to ours in number, and would otherwise have been useless.

Domitius re-  
solves to  
fight him.

Draws out  
his army.


39. But DOMITIUS, who was more uneasy for CÆSAR's danger than his own, considering he could not safely retreat, if he should now desire the conditions he had rejected, or march away without having effected any thing; drew up his forces in order of battle: the thirty-sixth legion he placed in the right, that of Pontus in the left, those of DEIOTARUS in the middle; leaving them but a very narrow front, and disposing the rest of his cohorts for a reserve.

The fight  
begins with  
various suc-  
cess.

40. Thus both armies being drawn up, and the sign of battle given, the action began with various success; for the thirty-sixth legion, charging the enemy's cavalry which were on the outside of the ditch, made so considerable a progress, that they pursued them over it, and there forced their way to the walls of Nicopolis. That of Pontus,



ALEX.  
WAR.



Domitius  
defeated.

Pontus, in the other wing, being obliged to give ground, the second line of it endeavoured, by taking a circuit, to pass the ditch and flank the enemy, but were cut to pieces in the attempt: as for DEIOTARUS's legions, they scarce were able to endure the first charge. Thus the king's forces being victorious in the right wing and middle, faced about to attack the thirty-sixth legion; who bravely maintained their ground against the conquering enemy; and finding they were overpowered by numbers, with wonderful presence of mind cast themselves into an orb, and retired to the foot of a mountain, whither PHARNACES did not think convenient to follow them, because of the disadvantage of the place. Thus a considerable part of DEIOTARUS's forces being put to the sword, and the Pontick legion almost entirely cut off, the thirty-sixth gained the higher ground, not having lost above two hundred and fifty men. In this action fell several persons of distinction, with some Roman knights; but after the defeat, DOMITIUS rallying the remainder of his broken army, retired a secure way through Cappadocia into Asia.

He retreats  
to Asia.  
Pharnaces  
over-runs  
Pontus; his  
barbarity.

41. Flushed with this success, PHARNACES entered Pontus with all his forces, trusting every thing would befall CÆSAR which he wished for. Here victory made him most inhumanly cruel, for while he was regaining what his father lost, he sacked several towns, plundered the natives and Roman citizens, exercised such barbarity on those, whose age and beauty commanded respect, as was more intolerable than death; and no one opposing his progress, he boasted he had recovered his father's kingdom.

## CHAP. IX.

42. ABOUT the same time, we received another loss in Illyricum, which province for some months before had not only been maintained without disgrace, but with honour. For Q. CORNIFICIUS, CÆSAR's quæstor, being sent thither proprætor in the summer with two legions, though the country was hardly able to maintain an army in its happier days, much less after it had been laid waste by intestine broils; yet by his prudence and diligence, taking particular care to do nothing rashly, he reduced and kept the province in obedience. He demolished several forts erected on eminences; which furnished those that possessed them with opportunities of making excursions, and supporting a war; these he gave the soldiers free leave

leave to plunder, and though the spoil was insignificant, it satisfied them, being the fruits of their labour in so poor a country. On notice that OCTAVIUS, who escaped from the slaughter of Pharsalia, had put into harbour in his province with a considerable fleet, he got together a small number of vessels from the Jadertini, who were always faithful to the commonwealth; and having defeated OCTAVIUS, took the greatest part of his fleet; which, joined to those of his allies, made him powerful at sea.

ALEX.

WAR.

Octavius

comes to Il-

lyricum.

Cornificius

takes seve-

ral of his

ships.

Whilst CÆSAR was pursuing POMPEY to the farthest parts of the world, on advice that several of the enemy had retreated to Illyricum, because it lay so near Macedonia, he sent GABINIUS orders to march with the new raised legion under his command into Illyricum, and join CORNIFICIUS, that he might defend the province from danger: but if he found the country could be secured by a small number of forces, to return with the legions into Macedonia; for so long as POMPEY lived, he expected commotions there.

43. GABINIUS marched to Illyricum in winter-time, when all provisions were scarce: either believing the country to be more plentiful than it really was, or depending on CÆSAR's fortune, or his own conduct and experience, which had often brought him out of the greatest dangers with success: but he could neither be supplied by the province, part of which had revolted, and part was already drained; nor by shipping from the sea, the winds standing contrary: so that he found himself obliged to make war, not as he designed, but as necessity directed. When he was thus forced by want to besiege towns or castles in the depth of winter, he met with many inconveniencies. In fine, he became so contemptible in the opinion of the natives, that retiring to Salona, a sea-port town (faithfully defended by the Roman citizens) they attacked him upon his march. In this action having lost above two thousand soldiers, thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes, he retreated with the rest of his forces to Salona; where suffering the last extremities for want of all kind of provisions, he died within a few months after. Whose ill fate, living and dying, put OCTAVIUS in great hopes of obtaining the province: but fortune, which has a peculiar influence in war, joining with CORNIFICIUS's diligence, and the courage of VATINIUS, soon eclipsed his prosperity.

Gabinus ar-

rives in Illy-

ricum.

He endea-

vours to re-

treut to Sa-

lona, his

rear cut off.

He dies.

44. VATINIUS was at Brindisi when this action happened, and had notice of it from CORNIFICIUS; who frequently

ALEX.

WAR.

Vatinius  
fits out a  
fleet.

Takes several  
towns.


Raises the  
siege of Epi-  
daurus.

Engages  
Octavius's  
fleet, and  
beats him.

quently pressed him to come to the assistance of the province. Being likewise informed that OCTAVIUS, having made a league with the natives, began to invest our garrisons in several places, partly by himself at sea, partly by his allies at land; though he found himself much indisposed, and his body was scarce able to keep pace with his courage, yet resolution overcame the defects of nature, the hardships of the weather, and hurry of speedy preparations. For having but few galleys himself, he had sent to KALENUS for a fleet from Achaia; but finding they came not so soon as our necessity required, who were no longer able to hold out against OCTAVIUS, he fastened beaks to a considerable number of vessels which lay in the port, but were not large enough for an engagement. Joining these to his galleys, and putting veteran soldiers on board, of which he had many, who staid behind at Brindisi for the recovery of their health when the army departed for Greece, he hoisted sail for Illyricum, taking in several sea-port towns by the way, that had revolted, and leaving those that were obstinate to persist in their resolution, thinking nothing of so immediate consequence as pursuing OCTAVIUS. He found him investing Epidaurus, where we had a garrison, by sea and land; but obliged him to quit the siege, and then took the garrison on board his fleet.

45. OCTAVIUS having notice that VATINIUS's squadron consisted mostly of small vessels, and depending on the strength of his own, resolved to wait for him at the island Tauris. Hither VATINIUS followed, not that he imagined OCTAVIUS staid there, but because he designed, if he had quitted the place, to pursue him farther. He approached Tauris with his ships straggling, the sea being rough, and he in no expectation of an enemy, when he discerned a galley, mann'd with soldiers, making up directly towards him. Upon this he immediately gave orders for shortening sail, lowering the yards, arming the soldiers, and hoisting the flag to give the sign of battle, that the ships which came after might prepare for the engagement. OCTAVIUS's fleet came ready drawn up in order out of the port, whereas VATINIUS had hardly time to put themselves in a posture of defence; but if the first had the advantage in their disposition, the latter had it in courage.

46. VATINIUS, finding himself unequally matched with OCTAVIUS, as well in respect to the size as number of his ships, resolved to experience the power of fortune. Wherefore he began the charge, by running against OCTAVIUS's  
four



four-banked ship with his five banked one : this he did with such violence, and so good success, that he broke the beak of his adversary's gally. The engagement was now hotly maintained in all places, though the greatest concourse was about the admirals, for both parties crowded to their assistance, and the battle was fought in a very narrow compass. The nearer they engaged, the greater advantage had VATINIUS's Squadron ; the soldiers of which leaping into the enemy's ships, gave wonderful proofs of their courage : thus when all things else were equal, the superior bravery of our men carried the day. Their admiral's galley was sunk, several more met with the same fate, and others were taken : part of OCTAVIUS's soldiers were cut to pieces, part plunged into the sea ; but he himself got into the boat, which being overladen was cast away ; however he saved his life, though wounded, by swimming to his brigantine. Being taken on board, when night put an end to the battle, he spread all the sail he could, and with a strong wind secured his escape, attended only by a small number of galleys, that had the good fortune to get clear from the danger of the day.

Takes eleven galleys, and other little ships ; but Octavius escapes.

47. VATINIUS, after this success, founded a retreat, and entered victorious into the port from whence OCTAVIUS came out, without the loss of a single vessel, having taken one five-banked, two three-banked, and eight two-banked galleys, with several rowers. Here he staid two days to refit his own ships and those he had taken ; the third he weighed anchor for the island Issa, having notice that OCTAVIUS had retired thither. This place was of the greatest importance of any in those parts, and most firmly attach'd to OCTAVIUS's interest : but on VATINIUS's arrival, the people surrender'd at discretion, informing him that OCTAVIUS, with a few small vessels, had sailed with a fair wind for Greece, from whence he designed to pursue his voyage to Sicily, and then to Africk. VATINIUS having thus in so short a space, happily accomplished his designs, having reduced the province, delivered it into CORNIFICIUS's charge, and defeated the enemy's fleet, returned victorious to Brindisi, with his army and ships entire.

Vatinius takes Issa.

Here desists from the pursuit, and returns to Brindisi.

## CHAP. X.

48. WHILST CÆSAR was employed in besieging POMPEY at Durazzo, in defeating him at Pharsalia, and was afterwards engaged in the dangerous war at Alexandria,



ALEX.  
WAR.

Cassius go-  
vernor of  
Spain.

His libera-  
lity to the  
army.

He goes to  
Corduba;  
his extor-  
tions.

His fines.

A plot to  
assassinate  
him.

He raises a  
new fifth le-  
gion.

dria, though not equal to what fame reported it; CASSIUS LONGINUS was left proprætor in Spain, to reduce the farther province. Who, either prompted by his natural temper, or the hatred he bore the country for the wounds he had treacherously received there when quæstor, shewed still the remains of his resentment; or perhaps conscious of the mutual distaste of the province towards him (which was easy to be discerned, by several tokens, amongst a people who knew not how to dissemble their inclinations) he resolved to balance his aversion to the people by his love to the army. Wherefore having appointed the soldiers a general rendezvous, he promised each of them a hundred sesterces. And not long after, having reduced Medobriga, a town in Lusitania, and mount Herminius, where the people of Medobriga had taken refuge, they gave him the title of Imperator; he in return presented them with a hundred more sesterces each. Besides these, he bestowed considerable gifts upon particular persons, which for the present gained in appearance the army's affections, tho' severe and military discipline vanished by degrees.

49. CASSIUS, having disposed his troops in winter-quarters, went to preside in the law courts at Corduba, where he was deeply in debt, and resolved to pay by laying heavy impositions upon the province. For they, who so prodigally bestow their presents, always do it with a design to gain more than they give away. Money was extorted from the wealthy; which CASSIUS did not only permit, but enjoined should be paid him; those that were rich were amerced for trifling offences. In fine, no kind of profit to be made by great and apparent crimes, or the least and most insignificant, was neglected; by which means the prætor's tribunal was never empty. Those who had any thing to lose, were obliged to find security for their good behaviour, or go to prison; so that their liberties were endangered as well as their fortunes.

50. Thus it happened, that LONGINUS, taking the same measures, when prætor, as he had formerly pursued when quæstor, the natives likewise again consulted how to assassinate him. Some of his nearest attendants promoted this design, who, though they had shared with him in rapine, yet hated the man whose authority had led them into that crime; and looked upon the spoils with which they had enriched themselves, as their own acquisition, and what they had mis'd of they imputed to CASSIUS. He raised a new fifth legion; which added to the people's hatred,

hatred, because they found their charges encreased: he ALEX. WAR. completed his horse to three thousand; imposed heavy taxes, and allowed not the province a moment's respite.

51. In the mean time he received orders from CÆSAR Cassius receives orders to go to Africk with his army. to cross the sea with his army for Africk, and march to Numidia, through the confines of Mauritania; because king JUBA had sent considerable supplies to POMPEY, and designed to send more. Immediately on receipt of this dispatch, prompted by the hopes of gaining new provinces, and so rich a kingdom as Numidia, he marched to Portugal to review his forces, and levy more: he employed commissioners to equip his navy, and prepare provisions; that nothing might retard his voyage at his return, which was abundantly sooner than expected, for whenever profit called, CASSIUS neither wanted industry nor vigilance.

52. Having got all his army together, and encamped near Cordova, he made a speech to the soldiers, wherein he acquainted them with the orders he had received from CÆSAR; and promised, when they should arrive in Mauritania, to give each a hundred sesterces. He told them, he designed to leave the fifth legion behind him in Spain.

And when he had finished his oration, went to Cordova: but the same day, about noon, entering his judgment-hall, He makes a speech to the soldiers. one MINUTIUS SILO, a client to RACILIUS, presented him with a paper, in a soldier's habit, under the pretence of offering him a petition; then retiring behind RACILIUS He is assassinated at Cordova by Minutius Silo.

(who walked close by CASSIUS) as if he expected an answer, the attendants making way for him, he laid hold of the prætor, while his back was towards him, with his left-hand, and struck him twice with the dagger which he held in his right; then setting up a shout, all the rest of the conspirators rushed forwards; MANUTIUS PLANCUS killed the next licitor, then wounded Q. CASSIUS the lieutenant: T. VASIUS and L. MERGILIO seconded their countryman PLANCUS, for they were all Italians. And LICINIUS SQUILLUS gave the governor several small wounds whilst he lay upon the ground. Manutius Plancus kills the licitor. Squillus wounds Cassius whilst he lies upon the ground.

53. By this time CASSIUS's guards came up to his assistance (for he always had several veteran soldiers and select Spaniards about him) who kept out the rest of the assassins. Cassius's guards come up to his relief.

<sup>c</sup> Betones or Vettones, a people of the Provincia Bætica. BLADEN, following the emendation of Hadr. Valeſius. But the MSS read *Beronis* or *Barones*, which anciently signified the king's servants and attendants in the palace; whence in after-ages the word was applied to denote nobility. See Du Fresnoy.

**ALEX.** fines, in which number were **CALPURNIUS SALVIANUS**,  
**WAR.** and **MANILIUS TUSCULUS**. **MINUTIUS**, as he endeavoured to make his escape, stumbling upon some stones which lay in his way, was taken and brought to **CASSIUS**. **RACILIUS** hid himself in a friend's house that lay nearest the place, till he could get information whether **CASSIUS** was dead. But **L. LATERENSIS**, not making the least doubt of it, immediately ran with great satisfaction to the camp, to congratulate the \* Spanish and second legion upon the news, who he was satisfied had a particular hatred for **CASSIUS**. In return for his intelligence, they immediately carried him into the tribunal, and proclaim'd him prætor: for there was not a soldier that had been born in the province, or of the second and Spanish legion, or who, by long continuance in the country, had been naturaliz'd, but join'd with the people in their aversion to **CASSIUS**. But besides these, **CÆSAR** had likewise given him the thirtieth and twenty-first legions, raised some few months before in Italy; as for the fifth legion, he had lately levied that himself.

Minutius taken.  
 Laterensis thinking Cassius dead, carries news of it to the camp.  
 \* Legio Vernacula.

But finding himself mistaken, goes to wait upon Cassius.  
 Every legion but that of the natives, comes to assist Cassius.

54. In the mean time **LATERENSIS** had intelligence that **CASSIUS** was still alive: upon which news, being more troubled at the disappointment, than uneasy for his own safety, he immediately composed himself, and went to wait upon him. The thirtieth legion, by this time having notice of what had pass'd, march'd to Cordova to their general's assistance; the twenty-first and fifth follow'd their example, leaving only the other two behind them in the camp: whereupon the second apprehending they should be left alone, and from thence a judgment should be formed of their inclinations, did the like. But no apprehensions could make the **Legio Vernacula** move from the place, or alter their resolution.

He causes all the assassines to be seized.  
 Racilius, Laterensis, and Scapula, put to death.

55. **CASSIUS** commanded the assassines to be seiz'd, and sent the fifth legion back again to the camp, retaining thirty cohorts for his defence. By **MINUTIUS**'s confession he learn'd that **L. RACILIUS**, **L. LATERENSIS**, and **ANNIUS SCAPULA**, a Spaniard of great quality and interest, as familiar with him as either **RACILIUS** or **LATERENSIS**, was equally concerned with them in the conspiracy: nor did he long defer his revenge, before he caused them to be put to death. He deliver'd up **MINUTIUS** to be racked by his freemen, and **CALPURNIUS SALVIANUS**, whose confession added to the number of plotters, some say not without justice, but others complain what he said was extorted from

Minutius  
 Salvianus  
 and Mergilio  
 racked.

from him by pain. L. MERGILIO likewise underwent the ALEX. question. And SQUILLUS impeach'd several; who were WAR. all condemn'd to die, except those that purchased their pardons; for CASSIUS publickly remitted the sentence of Cassius compounds the death passed upon CALPURNIUS for six millions of sesterces, sentence of that on Q. SEXTIUS for five millions<sup>a</sup>; who, though the death for deepest in the assassination, were only fined. Thus money money with some, made him forget the danger of his life and the pains of his wounds, whilst avarice and cruelty contended for victory.

56. Within a few days after, he received another packet He receives from CÆSAR, with an account of POMPEY's flight, and news of the defeat of his forces. This news equally affected him Pompey's being defeated, with joy and sorrow; for as he could not but rejoice at CÆSAR's success, so on the other hand he was uneasy to reflect that a conclusion of the war would put an end to the licentiousness of the times. Thus he was in dispute with himself whether he should sit down contented, without fear of being called to account for the extortions he had already committed, or pursue the dictates of his covetous temper. At length his wounds being cured, he sent for those to whom He makes the natives he had formerly been liberal, and commanded them to refund the money he gave them, As for the money he imposed new taxes, than usual, he ordered them now to pay larger sums. With the like justice he resolved to levy new forces amongst all the colonies and societies of Roman citizens throughout the country; and such as were afraid of a foreign expedition, he obliged to redeem themselves from the service by a-Makes those mercements; which raised him great sums of money, but that refuse encreased the hatred of the province. After this, having re- to go to viewed the army, he sent to Trajectum the legions he design- Africk fine for it, ed to ship for Africk, and went himself to Sevil to see the fleet he had prepared; where he staid some time, having published a proclamation, for such as had not paid the monies demanded of them, to attend him there; which was looked upon by all people as a very great hardship.

57. About the same time L. TITIUS, who was then a At Sevil he tribune of the Legio Vernacula, informed him there was has news of a report the thirtieth legion, under the command of a mutiny in QUINTUS CASSIUS the lieutenant, being encamped at the thirtieth legion, Ilurgis, had mutinied, and having killed some of the centurions that opposed them, were gone over to the second

<sup>a</sup> Sestertium sexagies cum Calpurnio paciscitur, cum Q. Sextio quinquagies; see Val. Max. l. ix. 4. the former sum about 50,000 l. of our money, the latter about 41666 l. 13 s. 4 d. Typogr.



**ALEX. WAR.** legion, who marched another way towards the sea. On this intelligence, **CASSIUS**, with five cohorts of the <sup>a</sup> nineteenth, began his march, and arrived at Ilurgis the next morning early; where he stay'd a day to consult what was proper to be done, then went to Carmona. Here the <sup>b</sup> thirtieth legion and thirty-first, with four cohorts of the fifth, and all the cavalry attended him, bringing him information that the Legio Vernacula having surprized four of his cohorts near Obucula, had obliged them to march with them to the second legion; where, after their joining, they had unanimously chosen **T. THORIUS**, an Italian, for their general. Whereupon **CASSIUS LONGINUS** immediately summoning a council, sent **MARCELLUS** to Cordova, to secure that town in his interest, and **Q. CASSIUS**, the lieutenant, to Sevil. But within a few days after, he heard Cordova had revolted, and that **MARCELLUS**, either voluntarily, or out of necessity (for the business was variously reported) had joined with them, as well as the two cohorts of the fifth legion, who lay there in garrison. Provoked by this loss, he decamped, and the day after arrived at Segovia, upon the river Silicensis; where he made an oration to sound the soldiers affections, whom he found to be sincerely true to him, not for his own, but **CÆSAR**'s sake; being ready to undertake any dangers, so they might but recover the province for **CÆSAR**.

Thorius arrives at Cordova.

58. **THORIUS** in the mean time led his veteran legions to Cordova; and that this rebellion might not appear the effect of his and the soldiers seditious tempers, as likewise that he might have a name of equal credit to set up against **CASSIUS**, who, upon **CÆSAR**'s account, was likely to gain more assistants than himself, he declared his design was to recover the province for **CN. POMPEY**; which perhaps he was equally induced to by the hatred he bore **CÆSAR**, and the affection he had for **POMPEY**; whose name had a wonderful influence over those legions that formerly served under **VARRO**: but whether this was really his design or not, I shall not pretend to determine. However, it was

<sup>a</sup> Yet there is no notice taken that he had the nineteenth legion, which therefore in my opinion should be the twenty-first.

<sup>b</sup> We are to suppose **TITIUS**'s report was false, but occasion'd by the loss of the four cohorts mentioned; else how came the thirtieth legion to attend **CASSIUS** at Carmona? **BLADEN**. The objection is just; and Dr. Jurin's commendation, if admitted, very happily clears it another way, who at the beginning of this section for *L. Titius tribunus militum in leg. Vernac. nunciat fama legionem xxx---* reads *L. Titius nunciat eam a legione xxx, &c. i. e. L. Titius tribune of the Legio Vernacula informed him that that legion had revolted from the xxx<sup>th</sup>, &c. Typogr.*


his pretence, as the soldiers confessed, who bore POMPEY'S name engraven on their shields. The inhabitants of Cordova, men, women, and children, came out in a body to meet him, begging he would not destroy their town, since they had as strong an aversion for CASSIUS as he, only they desired they might not be obliged to act against CÆSAR.

59. The army were moved by the tears and entreaties of so great a multitude; and finding there was no occasion for the name or memory of POMPEY to persecute CASSIUS, who was equally odious to both parties; but that it was impossible either to persuade the people of Cordova, or MARCELLUS to declare against CÆSAR, erased POMPEY'S name out of their shields, and chusing MARCELLUS, who professed himself CÆSAR'S friend, their general, joined with the colony, and encamped near the town. Within two days after, CASSIUS crossed the Guadalquivir, and encamped on a rising ground within view of the place, about four miles distance from Cordova. From hence he dispatched couriers to king BOGUD in Africk, and M. LEPIDUS, proconsul in the hither Spain, to send him and the Province assistance as soon as possible, for CÆSAR'S sake: not omitting in the mean while to destroy the country and buildings round about Cordova.

60. Fired with this indignity, the legions that had chosen MARCELLUS for their general, unanimously desired he would lead them out in order of battle, and rather engage the enemy, than suffer the most noble and beloved country of Cordova to be consumed with fire and sword before their eyes. MARCELLUS knowing the fatal consequences of a fight to CÆSAR, since a victory on either side would be a loss to him; much against his will cross'd the Guadalquivir, and disposed his legions in order of battle. CASSIUS did the like upon a rising ground; MARCELLUS perceiving he would not descend from the advantage he had got, laid hold of that reason to persuade his soldiers to return again to their camp. He had already begun to retreat, when CASSIUS, knowing himself to be stronger than he, fell upon MARCELLUS'S legions with his cavalry, and made a considerable slaughter amongst their rear, upon the banks of the river. But MARCELLUS, finding the inconvenience he had met with in crossing the water, removed his camp to the other side the Guadalquivir, where both armies frequently drew out, but did not engage, by reason of the difficulty of coming to each other.

ALEX.

WAR.




The soldiers erase Pompey's name out of their shields, choose Marcellus their general.

Cassius arrives at the Guadalquivir; sends Bogud and Lepidus for assistance.

He ravages the country. Marcellus's army provoked at it, desire to fight him. Both armies drawn out; but they do not engage.

ALEX.  
WAR.



Cassius de-  
camps,  
marches to  
Ulla, en-  
camps under  
the walls.  
Marcellus  
pursues him,

and invests  
him and the  
town.

Bogud ar-  
rives with  
his supplies.

Lepidus ar-  
rives, Mar-  
cellus sub-  
mits his  
cause to  
him, Cassius  
will not.

61. MARCELLUS was much superior to CASSIUS in foot; having the veteran legions which had learned experience from the many battles they had fought. But CASSIUS depended more upon the fidelity than the courage of his soldiers; wherefore when both armies were encamped over-against each other, and MARCELLUS had erected a fort on a convenient place, for preventing the enemy from getting water; LONGINUS, apprehending he should be besieged in a country that hated him, silently decamped by night, and marched towards Ulla, which place he believed firm to his interest. Here he encamped so near the town (which was situated on a hill) that the nature of the place and walls of the town might secure him from any attempts of the enemy. Hither MARCELLUS pursued him, and encamped as near Ulla as he could. Having taken a view of the place, he found himself obliged by necessity, and at the same time in conformity to his own wishes, neither to engage CASSIUS, which he could not have restrained his enraged soldiers from without such necessity; nor to permit him to march farther, lest other countries should suffer as much as Cordova. Wherefore having erected castles in proper places, he drew a line of circumvallation, wherein he enclosed both CASSIUS and the town. But before the works were perfected, LONGINUS sent away all his cavalry, who he imagined might do him considerable service by intercepting MARCELLUS's foragers and convoys; but would only be an useless clog upon him, to consume his provisions, if he was once invested.

62. King BOGUD, after the receipt of CASSIUS's letters, arrived in a few days with his forces, having joined to the legion he brought with him several auxiliary cohorts of Spain; for, as it always happens in civil wars, some towns favoured CASSIUS, but more MARCELLUS. BOGUD arriving at MARCELLUS's outward works, there were several sharp disputes between them, wherein fortune sometimes inclined to one, sometimes to the other party, but MARCELLUS still maintained his lines.

63. In the mean time LEPIDUS, from the hither province, with thirty-five legionary cohorts, a great number of horse and auxiliaries, came to Ulla, fully resolving to

a *Adjungitque ei legionem, quam secum adduxerat; compluresque cohortes auxiliares*, i. e. and joined him with the legion he brought with him, and several auxiliary cohorts, &c. But how (as Dr. Jurin observes) could BOGUD join CASSIUS, who was surrounded by MARCELLUS's works? That ingenious critic therefore reads, *adjungit ei legioni quam secum adduxerat, complures, &c.* Typogr.

compose the differences between the two enemies. Upon his arrival MARCELLUS immediately delivered himself into his power; but CASSIUS staid still in his camp; either assuming to himself a greater dignity than MARCELLUS, or fearing LEPIDUS had been prepossessed against him. LEPIDUS encamped near the town, kept a fair correspondence with MARCELLUS, but commanded him not to fight; inviting CASSIUS at the same time to his camp, and offering his parole for his safe return. CASSIUS having long considered on the proposal, still distrusting LEPIDUS, yet not foreseeing any prosperous event from his resolution, if he continued in it, at last desired MARCELLUS's works should be demolished, that he might have free liberty to march out. The truce was not only concluded on, but the works almost levelled, and the centinels drawn off from the fortifications, when BOGUD's soldiers made a furious attack upon one of MARCELLUS's castles, which lay nearest their camp, before any one was acquainted with their design, except CASSIUS; for he was suspected not to be ignorant of it. Here they made a great slaughter amongst our soldiers; and had not LEPIDUS, provoked with the breach of faith, interposed his assistance to put an end to the dispute, more fatal consequences had ensued.

ALEX.  
WAR.

Cassius desires Marcellus's works may be levelled; 'tis granted. Bogud's breach of the truce.

64. CASSIUS having now a free passage, MARCELLUS joined camps with LEPIDUS, and both marched together to Cordova; CASSIUS to Carmona. In the mean time TREBONIUS arrived to take possession of the province, as proconsul: Upon which CASSIUS, having distributed his legions into winter-quarters, immediately packed up his goods and went to Malaga, where he embarked, pretending he durst not trust himself with LEPIDUS, MARCELLUS, and TREBONIUS: his friends reported, it was because he would not make a tour through the province in less splendor than formerly, since part had revolted from him; but others were of opinion, he did it lest that money should be forced from him by violence, which he had scraped together by his innumerable extortions. Having weighed anchor, with as favourable a gale as could be expected from the season of the year, to avoid sailing in the night, he put into the Ebro; and though afterwards the wind blew something stronger than before, yet he thought he might set sail again without danger; but he was cast away in the very mouth of the river, the sailors being neither able to tack about, by reason of the rapidity of the stream, nor to keep the ship steady against the violence of the waves.

Marcellus and Lepidus join camps. Cassius marches to Carmona.

He embarks for Italy;

but is cast away in the mouth of the Ebro.



## C H A P. XI.

**ALEX.** 65. WHEN CÆSAR came to Syria from Egypt, he was informed, as well by letters as several persons who arrived there from Rome to attend him, that the city and commonwealth laboured under great disorders; that dangerous seditions were caused by the disputes between the tribunes of the people; that the ambition of the military tribunes, and those other officers to whom the command of legions had been committed, had suffered the ancient and severe Roman discipline to be corrupted; and that there was no redress to be hoped for, but from his presence. However, before his departure, he thought it absolutely necessary to compose the dissensions in those provinces where he then was, to restore the laws to their ancient current, and free them from all apprehensions of foreign enemies. This he hoped quickly to effect in Asia, Syria, and Cilicia, as those countries were not engaged in war; but expected to find more difficulty in Bithynia and Pontus: for he heard no news of PHARNACES quitting Pontus, nor believed he designed it, being flushed with his late success over DOMITIUS CALVINUS. Having made a short stay almost in every country of note, he distributed rewards both publick and private to those that had deserved them; then heard and adjusted their ancient differences, and having received all the kings and potentates, as well of the provinces as of the neighbouring countries, into his protection, and distributed the necessary orders for defending the country, he dismissed them all full of affection to him and the Roman people.

But stays to settle the affairs of those provinces where he was.

**He makes S. Cæsar governor of Syria. Goes to Cilicia;** 66. Having stayed a few days there, he constituted his friend and relation SEXTUS CÆSAR, governor of Syria; then sailed for Cilicia, with the same fleet in which he came. He gave orders for all the people of that province to attend him at Tarsus, one of the best and strongest towns in their territories. Here he staid no longer than was absolutely necessary to settle the publick affairs with those of the neighbouring states; for, prompted by the desire of opening the campaign<sup>d</sup>, he march'd by long journies through Cappadocia, and arrived at Mazaca; from whence, after two days rest, he pursued his journey to Comana, a town of Cappadocia, renown'd for the most ancient and sacred temple of Bellona; to whom the people pay so pro-

from thence to Cappadocia.

d Against Pharnaces.

found

found an adoration, that her priest possesses the second post of honour and authority in their country, being inferior only to the king. This priesthood CÆSAR conferred upon NICOMEDES, a Bithynian, of a most illustrious house, descended from the royal line of Cappadocia; who laid claim to that office by an undoubted right, though it was obscured by length of time, and the low ebb of fortune to which his family had been reduced. As for ARIARATHES, he delivered him into the protection of his brother king ARIOBARZANES; for since both had well deserved from the commonwealth, he was not willing ambition should tempt one to rebel, or absolute power the other to use his brother too severely \*.

ALEX.  
WAR.  
Makes Nicomedes priest of Bellona.

This affair composed, he pursued his journey with the usual dispatch.

He arrives near Pontus, Deiotarus comes to make his submission.

67. When he arrived near Pontus and the confines of Galatia, DEIOTARUS, undoubted king of Armenia the lesser, though his title to the tetrarchate of almost the whole province of Galatia was disputed by the other potentates of that country; having laid aside not only all regal ornaments, but even the habit of a gentleman, attended CÆSAR in a suppliant's garb; "humbly craving pardon, that being placed by fortune in a country where CÆSAR had no forces, he had lent his assistance to POMPEY; since it did not belong to him to decide the controversies of the Roman people, but obey the present power."

68. To which CÆSAR, "first reminding him of the many friendly offices he had done him, during his consulate; to convince him the defence he made was no excuse for what he had done, reply'd, 'Twas impossible for a person of his prudence and experience to be ignorant who was master of Rome and Italy; where the senate, people, and republick were; or who was elected consul after L. LENTULUS and C. MARCELLUS: however, he forgave him, for the former services he had done, for the acquaintance which had been between them, for the dignity of his character, the respect due to his age, and the numerous intercessions of strangers and friends on his behalf." Having restored him his kingly apparel, he told him he would hereafter decide the dispute about his tetrarchate: but commanded DEIOTARUS to attend him to the war, with all his

Cæsar's answer.

He pardons him.

\* What security then did CÆSAR give ARIARATHES against the absolute power of his brother? He made him king of Armenia the less: and so this place should be supplied. See the foundation for this emendation in Dr. Jurin. Typogr.

ALEX. cavalry and the legion which he had caused to be instructed  
WAR. in the Roman discipline.

69. When CÆSAR was arrived in Pontus, and had drawn all his forces together, he found them but inconsiderable, as well in respect to their number, as their experience; for he had only two legions besides that of DEIOTARUS, and the sixth of veteran soldiers, brought from Alexandria; which was so diminished by the fatigues and dangers they had undergone, part being lost in the difficult marches and voyages they had made, others cut off in the frequent engagements they had been in, that there were not a thousand men of the legion left. Here, however, he received an embassy from PHARNACES: "The deputies, in the first place, desiring he would not enter the country in a hostile manner; for their king was ready to submit to whatever CÆSAR should think fit to command him. But they insisted much upon it, as a meritorious act in their master, that he had never sent any forces to the assistance of POMPEY; which DEIOTARUS had done, and was notwithstanding received into favour."

Pharnaces's  
embassy to  
Cæsar.

Cæsar's an-  
swer.

70. To this CÆSAR made answer, "If PHARNACES performed his promise, he should find CÆSAR his friend: but he mildly advised the ambassadors, not to value themselves so much, because they had not done like DEIOTARUS, in sending supplies to POMPEY; for though he was always ready to pardon private injuries, yet he could never forgive those committed against the republick, even by the persons that had done him the most zealous services. Besides, it was a greater advantage to PHARNACES that he had sent no forces, since he had thereby escaped a defeat, than to CÆSAR, whom the immortal gods had made victorious. However, he was willing to forgive him the grievous injuries he had done the Roman citizens in Pontus, because it was now too late to think of restitution; for neither could those be brought to life again whom he had murdered, nor they regain their virility on whom he had inflicted punishments more intolerable to Romans than death. But let him immediately quit the kingdom of Pontus, restore the general-receivers their servants, and return those goods of private persons which were in his custody. These conditions once performed, then was the time to send those presents, which successful generals usually receive from their friends:" for PHARNACES had presented CÆSAR with a golden crown.

71. He sent the ambassadors back with this answer: but

PHAR-

PHARNACES, who had promised so liberally, hoping CÆ- ALEX-  
SAR was in haste to be gone and had given more credit WAR.  
to his assurances than he really had, that he might the  
sooner dispatch other business of greater importance (for Pharnaces  
every one knew CÆSAR was recalled by many affairs to shuffling.  
Rome) began to perform but slowly, sometimes desiring a  
longer day, sometimes other conditions, and in fine endeavouring to frustrate CÆSAR's design. But he perceiving  
PHARNACES's drift, was now obliged by necessity to that  
which at other times he was led to by inclination, to decide the dispute by a battle sooner than was expected.

72. Zeila is a town of Pontus, well fortify'd considering its situation; for though the town stands upon a plain, Caesar arrives near Zeila.  
yet the walls round about are built upon hills that environ the place, and look as if they had been contriv'd by art. On every side of this town lie many mountains, divided from each other by intervening vallies; the most remarkable of them is that which the victory of MITHRIDATES over TRIARIUS, and the slaughter of our army rendered famous; lying not above three miles distant from Zeila, and having a ridge that extends almost to the town: upon which PHARNACES, in memory of the success his father formerly had, when encamp'd there, lodg'd himself with all his forces.

73. CÆSAR lay about five miles distant from the enemy, and perceiving the same valley which fortified the king's camp might be of the like advantage to him, if he could possess the opposite hill before the enemy, who lay much the nearest to it; he commanded his soldiers to furnish themselves with fascines: these orders performed, the next morning about three o'clock, leaving all his baggage behind him, he set forward with his legions, and by break of day, before the enemy had notice of his motions, possessed himself of the very same place where MITHRIDATES lodged when he routed TRIARIUS. Hither he commanded the servants of the army to bring all the fascines, for he would not suffer one soldier to be absent from the works, since only a vale, He gains a summit opposite to that where Pharnaces was encamped.  
hardly a mile over, divided the two armies.

74. Early in the morning, PHARNACES having notice of this, drew all his forces out before his camp: but as the Pharnaces draws out his forces.  
disadvantage of the place was so very considerable, CÆSAR at first believed he did it only to exercise the soldiers, and to retard the progress of his works, by obliging him to keep more soldiers in arms; or out of ostentation, to convince CÆSAR that he depended not more on the advantage of his post,



**ALEX. WAR.** post, than the strength of his army: wherefore keeping only the first line in order of battle, CÆSAR commanded the rest of his forces to go on with the fortifications. But PHARNACES, prompted either by the omen of the place, by religious predictions which we were afterwards informed he was much governed by, the contempt of our small numbers in arms (for he believed all the servants that daily carried materials for the works were soldiers) or depending on the experience of his army, which his lieutenants boasted had engaged and defeated the twenty-second legion; and despising our forces, which he had worsted when under the command of DOMITIUS, he resolved to give us battle, and therefore descended to the bottom of the valley. CÆSAR at first derided his vain attempt, in drawing his army into so narrow a place, whither no general in his right senses would have ventured. But PHARNACES, in the mean time, having descended into the vale, now began to ascend the steep avenues of our hill in order of battle.

The battle  
begins.

CÆSAR, moved at his wonderful rashness, and finding himself attack'd before he was prepared to receive PHARNACES, in an instant drew his soldiers off from the works, ordering them to repair to their arms; and having sent a party to oppose the enemy's ascent, disposed his army in battle array. However, the surprize occasioned great confusion amongst our men: for before they could be ranged according to method, the king's chariots broke in upon them, and disordered their ranks; but they were so warmly plied with our darts, that we soon put a stop to their career: the battle soon became general, and a shout being set up, the fight immediately began. The advantage of the place was of no small service to us, though not so much as the assistance of the immortal gods, who as they have an influence over all battles, so they most conspicuously exert their power, where human conduct is of no service.

Pharnaces  
routed, his  
camp taken.

76. The conflict had been warmly maintained for some time, when the sixth veteran legion, that was disposed in the right, made the first step towards victory, by forcing the enemy's left to descend from the hill: afterwards with greater difficulty, but by the same providential assistance, the left wing and main body routed likewise the rest of the king's forces, who as they had easily gained the summit, so they now felt the disadvantage of being driven from it with precipitation. Thus part being killed, part trodden under foot, those who were nimble escaped, having first flung away

away their arms; nor was it possible for them to defend themselves even upon the higher ground, whilst they had no weapons. Our soldiers, flushed with success, made no scruple of surmounting difficulties, and stormed the enemy's works: the cohorts which PHARNACES had left to secure his camp made some small resistance, but we quickly forced their trenches. Thus all PHARNACES's army being either killed or taken prisoners, he made his escape, attended only by a few cavalry; but had not our soldiers been amused by assaulting his camp, he had certainly fallen alive into CÆSAR's hands.

77. CÆSAR, though no stranger to victory, yet was more particularly affected with this, which had so soon put an end to an important war; nor did the memory of his unexpected danger a little add to his satisfaction, when he reflected from how difficult a beginning he had gained an easy conquest. Pontus thus reduced, he distributed all the spoil of the king's army among his soldiers, and the day after set forward with a guard of light-armed cavalry, having first ordered the sixth legion to return to Italy, where they should receive the rewards and honours they had merited; he sent back DEIOTARUS his auxiliaries, and left CÆLIUS VINCIANUS with two legions to protect the kingdom.

78. Through Galatia and Bithynia he travelled to Asia, arbitrating all the controversies of the countries he passed through, and distributing equal justice amongst the several kings, states, and tetrarchs. MITHRIDATES of Pergamus he made king of Bosphorus, in return for the service he had done him in Egypt: a general descended from royal blood, and educated in courts even from his youth; for MITHRIDATES, king of all Asia, out of respect to his birth, had taken him whilst a boy from Pergamus, and kept him in his camp for several years. Bosphorus was formerly subject to PHARNACES, and surrounded by barbarous kings, all enemies to the commonwealth; and CÆSAR thought he took an effectual method to secure it in the Roman interest, by committing it to the charge of so faithful a prince. He decreed him likewise, according to right of descent, and propinquity of blood, the tetrarchate of Galatia, which for some years before had been possessed by DEIOTARUS. However he made no longer stay any where than the necessity of his return to compose the disorders at Rome would allow of; but having adjusted all affairs with equal success and dispatch, returned to Italy before he was expected.


# HIRTIUS PANSÆ, or OPPILIUS'S COMMENTARY OF THE AFRICAN WAR.

## The CONTENTS.

*CÆSAR, having composed the troubles at Rome, sails for Africk, gains Leptis. Has several skirmishes with LABIENUS. JUBA, going to join SCIPIO, is forced to return, on news that BOGUD had entered his country. The various success of the war on both sides. Towns lost and taken; ships taken, but fortune inclines to CÆSAR. A set battle, and SCIPIO defeated. The death of CATO, and several other persons of note. JUBA'S kingdom reduced into a province.*

## CHAP. I.

AFRIC.  
WAR.



He arrives at only one legion of new levies, and scarce six hundred cavalry. To prevent his men from having any thoughts of staying, and that they might be ready upon an hour's warn-  
xiv. Cal.  
Jan.  
Per. Jul.  
4667.  
U. C. Var.  
707.

**C**ÆSAR, by common, but continued marches, arrived on the \*thirtieth of September at Lilybæum; designing to go on board immediately, though he had

\* Mr. D'ABLANCOURT, and the gentleman that translated this book into English, render xiv. Kal. Jan. the 17th of December, and are two days earlier than me, at CÆSAR'S embarking: but I have followed Dr. BUSEY'S and Dr. KENNET'S accounts of the Kalends, Nones, and Ides, in making it the 19th of December. BLADEN: Who was not aware that the Julian Calendar was not yet introduced. The former translators therefore, somewhat more rationally than he, computed by NUMA'S. Though that in general is a very  
ing,

ing, he caused his pavilion to be pitched so near the sea, AFRIC. that it was almost washed by the waves. The wind happened WAR. to be contrary; but however, he permitted not the sailors, or rowers, to come on shore, that he might omit no opportunity of weighing anchor: for though he received intelligence from the inhabitants of Africk how considerable the enemy's forces were; that their cavalry was very numerous; that they had six legions belonging to king JUBA, ten to SCIPIO, besides great numbers of light-armed foot, an hundred and twenty elephants, and several squadrons of ships; yet, not in the least daunted at these mighty preparations, he resolved to pursue his enterprize. In the mean time his gallies, transports and new levies, daily encreased; hither likewise came the fifth veteran legion, and two thousand horse to attend him.

2. Having now got six legions, and two thousand cavalry, he caused them to embark in the gallies in the same order they arrived, and the horse in the transports. Then commanded the greatest part of his navy to sail before to the island <sup>b</sup> Paconia, which lies not far distant from Lilybæum; himself staying behind to expose some few persons confiscated goods to public sale. Afterwards having commanded ALIENUS, prætor of Sicily, to send him all necessary provisions, and see the rest of his army go on board as soon as possible, he embarked himself on the eighth of October A. d. vi. and soon came up with the rest of his fleet. Thus with a Cal. Jan. fair wind, and quick passage, he arrived, after four days sail, within sight of Africk, attended by a few gallies; for

imperfect rule, by reason of the arbitrary liberty the Priests took of intercalating more or less, as they had an interest to serve. However, as we know the method JUL. CÆSAR observed in reforming the Calendar just after his return from Africa, we are able to ascertain the precise dates of each transaction the year before. To bring the seasons of the year to answer their respective months, he made a year of 445 days, as Censorinus saies, *De die natal.* c. 20; or 15 months, as Suet. in Jul. c. 40. Now reckoning so many days backward through the year Per. Jul. 4668, they terminate on Oct. 13, Per. Jul. 4667. So far back were the Calends of Jan. got: and consequently XIV Kal. Jan. to Sept. 30. See the learned Dr. Ashon's ingenious dissertation on this subject in *Biblioth. Liter.* 1722. *Typogr.*

<sup>b</sup> The original is Aponiana; but there is no such place to be found in ancient geographers; therefore commentators have thought fit to make it Paconia; which quadrates with the description.

<sup>c</sup> In the orig. a. d. VI. Cal. Jan. which would be Dec. 27. according to the Julian Calends. But Cicero de Divinat. c. 24. saies CÆSAR set sail, *ante brumam*, i. e. before the winter solstice, which was at that time VIII. Cal. Jan. or Dec. 25. Now Dec. 27, cannot be before Dec. 25, or before winter, if we take *bruma* in the extensive sense of the word. By the preceding account this difficulty is removed: Cicero speaks of the winter solstice, denoting the season of the year: Hirtius of VI. Cal. Jan. as it stood in the Calendar of that year, which by the Julian reformation, would be Oct. 8. long enough therefore before the winter solstice Dec. 25. See Dr. Ashon as before. *Typogr.*

most



**AFRIC.** most of his transports, being dispersed by the tempest, put  
**WAR.** into several ports.

Caesar lands  
near Adru-  
metum, with  
3000 foot,  
and 150  
horse.

3. Having sailed by Clupea, Neapolis, with diverse other towns and castles upon the sea-coasts, he at last arrived at Adrumetum, where the enemy had a garrison commanded by C. CONSIDIUS; CN. PISO likewise appeared upon shore towards Clupea, at the head of the cavalry of Adrumetum, and about three thousand Moors.

CÆSAR lay at anchor for some time, to expect the rest of his transports; but at length landed his army, which at present consisted only of three thousand foot, with a hundred and fifty horse, and encamped before the town, without offering injury to any person, having strictly prohibited his soldiers from plundering. In the mean time the inhabitants manned the walls in their own defence, and placed themselves in considerable numbers before the gates, their forces amounting to two legions: CÆSAR having rode round the town to take a view of it, returned again to his camp. Many people reflected on his conduct, that he had not appointed his fleet a certain place of rendezvous; nor, according to his usual custom, delivered them orders sealed up, to be opened at some particular place. But CÆSAR had very good reason for what he did; for he was apprehensive, that no part of Africk was so clear from the enemy's forces, as to afford them a safe landing-place: wherefore he thought it best to rely intirely upon fortune, and land where occasion offered.

Considius's  
cruelty.

4. L. PLANCUS, the lieutenant, desired CÆSAR would give him leave to treat with CONSIDIUS, and try if it was possible to reduce him to reason: his request being granted, he wrote a letter to him, and sent it into the town by one of the prisoners. So soon as the messenger arrived, he went according to orders to deliver the packet, when CONSIDIUS, before he would receive it, demanded whence it came, From CÆSAR the Generalissimo, replied the messenger. I know no Generalissimo of the Roman army but SCIPIO, saies CONSIDIUS; then commanded the messenger to be put to death in his presence, and returned the letter unopened to SCIPIO.

## CH A P. II.

5. CÆSAR had now attended a day and a night before the town, without receiving any answer from CONSIDIUS; and considering his forces were not yet arrived; that his cavalry were but inconsiderable in number; that he had not an army sufficient to invest the town; that it would dis-  
courage

courage his raw soldiers to enter upon warm service so <sup>APRIL</sup> soon; that the place was well fortified; and that the enemy expected numerous supplies of horse, he thought it <sup>WAR.</sup> advisable not to attempt a siege, which would endanger his being surrounded behind by their cavalry.

6. But when he was decamping, the garrison made a vigorous sally, being luckily joined the same instant by JUBA's horse, who came thither to receive their pay. They soon possessed themselves of the camp we had deserted, and began to pursue our rear; whereupon the foot immediately halted, and our cavalry, though few in number, bravely charged so great a multitude. The success was incredible, for less than thirty Gallick horse broke two thousand of the Moors, and pursued them even to the gates of Adrumetum. The enemy thus repulsed, CÆSAR continued his march; but observing they frequently sally'd, and retired again when attacked by our horse, he disposed a few veteran cohorts, which he had along with him, in the rear, with a party of cavalry, and marched forward slowly with the rest: thus the farther he retired, the less eager were the Numidians to pursue him. Several towns and castles sent deputies to meet him upon the road, proffering to furnish him with corn, and execute any commands he should lay upon them; wherefore he encamped that evening, being the thirteenth of October<sup>d</sup>, at Ruspina.

7. From thence he marched to Leptis, a free town. Embassadors came out to meet him, declaring how much their country was at his disposal: wherefore having placed centurions with strong guards at the gates of the town, to prevent any soldiers from entering it, and committing violence; he encamped towards the shore, not far distant from the place. Hither by accident came his transports with some of the gallies: the rest, as they were informed, not knowing where to land, had been seen off of Utica. In the mean time CÆSAR, finding himself obliged to continue near the coasts, and not make any expeditions higher up into the land, for want of the rest of his army, commanded all the cavalry to remain on board; and sent them fresh water from shore; which, I suppose, he did to prevent the country from being ravaged: but the rowers who landed to fetch water, were surprized by the Moors; several of them wounded with their darts, and others killed before

He quits Adrumetum; the enemy sally to attack Cæsar's rear with ill success.

Cæsar encamps at Ruspina, which declares for him; so does Leptis.

Some few of his transports arrive.

<sup>d</sup> Cal. Jan. the first day of the long year consisting of 445 days, which Cal. Jan. answered to Oct. 13. of the Julian year. See before § 1. Typogr.

**AFRIC** our party came up to their assistance: For it is customary with the Moors to lie in ambuscade with their horses in the vallies, from whence they start out and make their attacks in the open plain.

He sends to Sardinia and Sicily for men and corn.

8. Whilst these affairs were transacting, CÆSAR dispatched couriers to Sardinia and the neighbouring provinces for supplies of men and corn, which they were to send him immediately on receipt of his letters; and having unloaded part of his gallies, detached RABIRIUS POSTHUMUS to Sicily for a second supply; not omitting at the same time to order ten other gallies to cruise in quest of his scattered fleet, and to keep the sea open from the enemy. He likewise commanded C. SALLUSTIUS CRISPUS, the prætor, to sail toward Cercina, an island in the enemy's hands, where he understood was plenty of corn. He distributed all these orders so carefully, that he left no room for excuse or delay. In the mean while, having notice from the prisoners and deserters of the posture of SCIPIO's affairs, he pitied the condition of him and his party, who maintained now king JUBA's cavalry, and were so infatuated, as to choose rather to be vassals to a foreign prince, than peaceably enjoy their own fortunes at home with their fellow-citizens.

Sends Sallust to Cercina.

iii Non. Jan. Goes a foraging.

Cæsar de-camps, re-camps, re- turns to Ruspina.

9. On the fifteenth of October CÆSAR decamped; and having left a garrison of six cohorts at Leptis, under the command of SASERNA, returned again to Ruspina with the rest of his forces, from whence he came the day before. Here leaving his baggage, he foraged with a light-armed party about the villages, commanding the boors to attend him with horses and carriages. Thus having got a sufficient quantity of corn, he returned again to Ruspina; which I suppose he did, that he might not leave the sea-ports uncovered behind him, and that he might secure a retreat upon occasion to his ships.

10. Wherefore having left P. SASERNA here with a garrison, brother to him whom he had made governor of Leptis, he commanded store of wood to be carried into the town; then leaving the place, attended by the seven veteran cohorts who had behaved themselves so well under SULPICIUS and VATINIUS, he marched to the haven about two miles distant from Ruspina, where he embarked with them in the evening; which made the whole army very inquisitive and uneasy, since no one was able to guess at the general's design. Thus the new levies, who were but inconsiderable, for all were not yet arrived, finding themselves exposed to a numerous and crafty enemy, had nothing

Embarks with seven cohorts; his army very uneasy.

to support them under their afflictions, but the unusual **A F R I C**  
mirth and gaiety they observed in their general countenance; for such **CÆSAR** put on in this occasion; from his **W A R.**  
conduct therefore and experience they promised themselves success.

11. He continued one night on board; but the next morning early, just as he was about to weigh anchor, most unexpectedly arrived that part of his navy which had lost its way, and had given him so much pain. Whereupon **CÆSAR** immediately commanded all his soldiers to land again, and receive the rest as they came on shore. As soon then as the ships were brought into haven, and the horse and infantry landed, he returned again to **Ruspina**, encamped near the town, and leaving the baggage there, went to forage with thirty cohorts. Now the army perceived **CÆSAR**'s design was privately to have failed to the assistance of the transports which were wanting, and to prevent their falling in with the enemy's fleet. Nor would it have been convenient to have made the soldiers he left behind in garrison acquainted with his design, lest they should have been terrified with the consideration of the inequality of their number to that of the enemy.

Another part of his army arrives. He returns to Ruspina.

C H A P. III.

12. **CÆSAR** had not marched above three miles from his camp, before his scouts gave him notice the enemy was not far off; which intelligence was soon confirmed by the dust that appeared. Whereupon he immediately sent for the horse and archers; having of the first no great number, and an inconsiderable party of the latter along with him: these he commanded to follow after leisurely in good order, whilst he went before with a slender guard. So soon as he arrived within sight of the enemy, he commanded his soldiers to draw up in order, and make ready for battle; the whole number he had amounting only to thirty cohorts, four hundred horse, and an hundred and fifty archers.

Cæsar goes on foraging.


13. In the mean time the enemy, under the command of **LABIENUS** and the two **PACISI**, drew out their forces in a very extended front, not so much of foot, as of cavalry, intermixed with light-armed Numidians and archers, so closely ranged, that at first **CÆSAR**'s army mistook them all for infantry; both their wings were strengthened with several squadrons of horse. **CÆSAR**, as he was obliged by the smallness of his numbers, ranged his army in a single line;

Meets Labienus; who draws up in order of battle.

Cæsar does the like.



AFRIC.  
WAR.



Labiens's  
cavalry sur-  
round Cæ-  
sar's army.

Cæsar's  
army cast  
into an orb.

Labiens's  
discourse to  
Cæsar's sol-  
diers.

A soldier's  
answer.

line; placing the archers in the front, and his cavalry in each wing; giving the latter particular orders, to take care they were not surrounded by the enemy's numerous horse: for he designed only to engage them with his foot.

14. Both armies expected which should begin the charge; which CÆSAR thought not his business; for being so much inferior to them in number, he had more occasion to make use of stratagem than force: when on a sudden the enemy's horse began to extend themselves upon the hills on either side, designing to surround CÆSAR'S cavalry, who could hardly maintain their ground. In the mean time both the main bodies advancing to charge each other, the light-armed Numidian foot, intermixed with horse, sallied from their line of battle, and cast their darts amongst our legionary soldiers; but when our men attempted to return their charge, they immediately retreated, and the foot received our attack, till the horse had time to rally, and come again to their relief.

15. CÆSAR observing this new way of fighting, considered his soldiers broke their ranks by advancing too far; for whenever our foot pursued their cavalry, who retreated a considerable way, and easily evaded our pikes by flight, we were flanked by the Numidians: wherefore he commanded, that not a soldier should move above four foot from his colours. LABIENUS'S cavalry all this while, trusting to the superiority of their numbers, were endeavouring to surround ours; who overpowered at length by the enemy, and having their horses wounded under them, began by degrees to give ground; which made their cavalry pursue with greater ardor. Thus our whole army was in an instant surrounded, and, being intangled like beasts in a toil, was obliged to cast itself into an orb.

16. LABIENUS rode up and down bare-headed before his first line sometimes encouraging his own men, sometimes speaking to CÆSAR'S after this manner; "So ho, you raw soldier there! why so very fierce? What, have CÆSAR'S fair promises inspired you with all this courage? he has brought you into a fine condition! I pity your case." To this, one of the persons he spoke to made answer, "He was no raw soldier, but a veteran of the tenth legion. I don't see your colours, reply'd LABIENUS. No matter for that, added the soldier, you shall quickly know who I am." Then pulling off his helmet to discover his face, and at the same instant darting his pike with the utmost vigour against LABIENUS, he gave his horse a dreadful wound

in the breast: Now, said he, LABIENUS, remember it A F R I C A:  
was a soldier of the tenth legion from whose arm that javelin W A R.  
came. However the whole army was in great conster-  
nation, especially the new levies; who now only turned  
their eyes towards CÆSAR, and attempted nothing farther  
than to defend themselves from the darts of the enemy: Gesar's army in a great consternation.

17. At last CÆSAR, perceiving the enemy's design,  
commanded his men to extend themselves in lines as  
far as they could, facing about at the same to form a  
double front. Thus he broke the enemy's circle with his  
right and left wings, and attacking them from both sides at  
once, after he had received the horse into the middle of his  
forces, his infantry cast their pikes, and soon obliged the  
enemy to fly: but pursued not far, because he was appre-  
hensive of an ambuscade. This action over, the enemy re-  
pulsed and wounded, he began to retreat towards his camp,  
in order of battle. He orders his army to extend themselves in length; they break the enemy's circle. He routs Labienus.

18. And now M. PÉTREIUS and CN. PISO, arrived to  
the assistance of the enemy, with eleven hundred select Nu-  
midian horse, and a considerable number of foot from the  
same country. This supply gave them fresh vigour, and  
having recovered their late disorder, their cavalry again be-  
gan to attack our legions in the rear, endeavouring to stop  
their retreat: Upon which CÆSAR caused his forces to face  
about, and renew the fight in the open plain; but per-  
ceiving the enemy fought as they did before, avoiding a  
close engagement, and considering his own cavalry were  
but few in number, that their horses had not yet recovered  
their voyage, that they were thirsty, fatigued, and so dis-  
abled by the wounds they had received, that they could pursue  
but slowly, and that greatest part of the day was already  
spent; he encouraged his men to decide the business at a  
blow, nor to desist from pursuing the enemy, till they had  
forced them to retreat beyond the farthest hills, and lodged  
themselves there: wherefore he gave the signal. The  
enemy fighting but faintly, he charged them with his squa-  
drons and cohorts; who, without much difficulty, in a mo-  
ment beat them out of the field; and forced them to retreat  
beyond the hills. Having possessed themselves of the place,  
and stayed there a little while, according to their orders  
they retired leisurely to their camp: the enemy, after their  
ill success, did the like. Petreius and Piso arrive with a strong party to Labienus's assistance. They attack Cæsar again, and are again repulsed.

19. After the dispute was ended, CÆSAR was informed  
by deserters of all kinds, who came over to him in great  
numbers, as also from the enemy's cavalry which he had  
taken,

A F R I C.

W A R.



\* For the

Numidians

used none.

Prid. Non.

Jan.

Cæsar for-

tifies his

camp.

Prepares vast

quantities of

arms.

20. AFTER

this, CÆSAR

began to fortify

his camp

with greater

diligence, to

increase the

number of the

guards,

whose busi-

ness was to

defend the

works, and

draw a line

of communi-

cation on one

side from

Ruspina to

the sea, the

like on the

other from

his camp,

to secure the

safer access

for his convoys

backward and

forward. He

likewise gave

orders the

darts and

engines should

be removed

from on

the

batteries.

\* The original

is from Brindisi:

but that's a

palpable error,

for Brindisi

was in CÆSAR'S

custody long

before the

battle of

Pharsalia.

But the

inconsistency

is removed,

if we trans-

late it, "Which,

after POMPEY'S

defeat,

"he had brought

along with him,

taken, that their design was, to have intimidated his new levies, and the few veteran soldiers he had with him, by that new and unusual way of fighting; then to have surrounded and cut them to pieces with their horse, as they had formerly served CURIO. For LABIENUS in his speech to the soldiers declared, he would pour in so many fresh supplies upon us, that, being wearied with the slaughter, we should be defeated even in the midst of victory. He depended much upon his numbers, in the first place, because he heard the veteran legions had mutiny'd at Rome, and refused to go upon the African expedition; and secondly, because three years service in the country having confirmed his own soldiers in his interest, he had reinforced them with great numbers of Numidian horse and light-armed infantry; and besides the German and French cavalry, which after POMPEY'S defeat he had brought along with him from Pharsalia, he had levied other troops after his arrival in Africk, amongst the freed men, slaves, and such as were descended by the father's side from Roman citizens; whom he taught the use of \* bridles; and had a hundred and twenty of JUBA'S elephants, with innumerable other squadrons of horse. Big with these expectations, at the head of sixteen hundred French and German horse, eight thousand Numidians without bridles, eleven hundred other cavalry commanded by PETREIUS, four times as many infantry and light-armed foot, besides considerable numbers of slingers and archers, both horse and foot, did LABIENUS engage CÆSAR in an open and spacious plain, the sixteenth of October, being the third after his arrival in Africk. This dispute continued from eleven o'clock till sun-set; at which time, PETREIUS, being dangerously wounded, was obliged to quit the battle.

## C H A P. IV.

20. AFTER this, CÆSAR began to fortify his camp with greater diligence, to encrease the number of the guards, whose business was to defend the works, and draw a line of communication on one side from Ruspina to the sea, the like on the other from his camp, to secure the safer access for his convoys backward and forward. He likewise gave orders the darts and engines should be removed from on

\* The original is from Brindisi: but that's a palpable error, for Brindisi was in CÆSAR'S custody long before the battle of Pharsalia. BLADIN. But the inconsistency is removed, if we translate it, "Which, after POMPEY'S defeat, "he had brought along with him, having before transported them from Brindisi." However see GLANDORPINS. Type.



ship-board to his camp, with some of the Rhodian and <sup>AFRIC</sup> French rowers and mariners; whom he furnished with arms, <sup>WAR</sup> that upon occasion he might mix them among his cavalry, as the enemy did their light-armed foot: not omitting daily to encrease his forces with strong parties of archers from the Ityrcan and Syrian fleets. For he had information, that <sup>Ityrci or Ithyræi, people of Cælosyria,</sup> ~~SCRIPTO~~ was set out the third day after the late engagement, to join his forces with those of LABIENUS and PENTRETIUS: and that his army consisted of eight legions and four thousand horse. Wherefore CÆSAR took care to erect forges for making arms, to prepare plenty of darts, bullets, and sharp stakes hardened in the fire; sending messengers at the same time into Sicily for hurdles, with timber for battering-rams (because there was but little proper for the purpose in Africk) and lead and iron. He considered likewise the country would not be able to furnish him with corn, for none had been sown the year before, the peasants being obliged to bear arms: besides, what provisions there were in Africk, the enemy had secured in a few well-fortified towns, and demolishing such as were not tenable, had forced the inhabitants to retire within their works, and leave their fields deserted.

21. But CÆSAR, notwithstanding he laboured under these difficulties, by his obliging carriage and the easy access he granted all people, had got a small quantity of corn, which he husbanded to the best advantage. He daily visited the works, and constantly kept a strong party of three cohorts on guard to prevent surprize. LABIENUS about this time sent his sick and wounded, which were very numerous, in waggons to Adrumetum. <sup>Cæsar wants corn.</sup>

In the mean while, CÆSAR's victuallers, being dispersed, failed up and down, not knowing the coast, or where their general was encamped: as they straggled from each other, the enemy's boats attacked, and took or burnt them. <sup>Several of his victuallers burnt.</sup> Wherefore CÆSAR ordered his fleet to cruise about the ports and islands for their security.

## CHAP. V.

22. AT this time MARCUS CATO, who commanded in chief at Utica, was daily spurring young POMPEY forward to undertake some noble enterprize. "Your father, said he, when arrived at your age, seeing the commonwealth harrassed by impious and daring citizens, who had either banished, or put to death, the most worthy of their country-



**A F R I C.** men; prompted by glory, and the greatness of his mind, tho' only a private man and very young, gathered the small remains of his father's army, and restored Rome and Italy to their ancient liberty, which had been sunk almost to the brink of destruction: afterwards with incredible dispatch reduced Sicily, Africk, Numidia, and Mauritania; by which actions he acquired a glorious name throughout the universe, triumphing whilst he was a youth, and only a Roman knight. Nor did he enter into the world with those advantages you enjoy; his father had not laid a foundation for that fame his son acquired, his ancestors were not of that dignity, he had not so many clients, nor was of so considerable quality as you. Will not you therefore, who inherit his honour and glory, who want neither greatness of mind, nor industry, summon all his friends together, and by some vigorous effort assert your own liberty, with that of the commonwealth, and all faithful citizens?"

23. Moved with this advice, which proceeded from so grave and austere a person, young POMPEY, with a fleet of thirty ships of several kinds, amongst which number were only a few gallies, sailed from Utica to Mauritania, where he entered the country of king BOGUD. Leaving his baggage behind him, with an army of two thousand men, composed of freemen and slaves, part with arms, and part without, he marched towards Ascurum, where the king had left a garrison. The inhabitants having notice of POMPEY's arrival, suffered him to approach their walls; then making an unexpected sally, defeated his forces, and obliged them to retire with precipitation to their ships. Upon this ill success young POMPEY weighed anchor, and not thinking it convenient to touch again upon those coasts, directed his course towards Majorca and Minorca.

Young Pompey's successful attempt upon Ascurum.

## C H A P. VI.

24. SCIPIO, in the mean while, having left a strong garrison in Utica, marched with the army we mentioned before to Adrumetum, where he encamped; but after a few days continuance there, pursuing his journey in the night, he join'd PETREIUS and LABIENUS, who lodg'd all their forces in one camp, extending three miles in length. Their cavalry frequently made excursions round our works, and intercepting those that straggled too far for wood or water, obliged us to continue within our fortifications. This reduced CÆSAR's army to great necessities, for

## COMMENTARIES.

375

AFRIC  
WAR.

Forage  
scarce with  
Cæsar.

for the convoys from Sicily and Sardinia were not yet arrived; the season of the year would not permit any ship to put to sea without imminent danger; nor had CÆSAR above the space of six miles every way in Africk, which made forage very scarce. But the veteran soldiers and cavalry, who had been engaged in many wars both by sea and land, and had frequently encounter'd the like hardships and dangers before, gathering weeds on the shore, washed them in fresh water, and with such provender preserved the lives of the horses and cattle.

25. Whilst affairs were in this posture, king JUBA, understanding what difficulties CÆSAR had to struggle with, thought it not convenient to allow him respite till he should receive fresh supplies. Wherefore having gathered a considerable number of horse and infantry, he resolved to leave his country, and go to the assistance of his friends. But whilst he was upon his march, P. SITIUS and king BOGUD joining forces, advanced towards the frontiers of his kingdom, and sat down before Citra, the richest town in his territories, which they reduced in a few days after their arrival. The like success they had over two other towns of the Getulians, which they won by storm, and put all the inhabitants to the sword, having first offered them leave to quit the place with their effects, which they refused.

After this they began to lay the country waste on every side. Upon notice whereof JUBA, when he was already arrived within a small distance of SCIPIO's camp, considering it was more necessary to defend his own country, than assist his neighbours, lest perhaps he might receive a double defeat, desisted from his journey; and solicitous for his affairs at home, recalled his forces from SCIPIO, leaving only thirty elephants behind him, and hastened to preserve his towns from falling into the enemy's hands.

26. CÆSAR perceiving the province still doubted of his arrival, under an imagination that he had only sent one of his lieutenants with the forces to Africk, but was not there himself in person, dispersed his circular letters to remove this error. Upon which several persons of the greatest quality, from all the towns round about, came to his camp, bringing melancholy accounts of the cruel treatment they had met with from the enemy. Moved by their tears, CÆSAR resolved, so soon as he received the rest of his forces, and the season of the year would permit, to quit his fortifications, and take the field. Wherefore he immediately sent orders to ALLIENUS the prætor, and BARBURIUS

Juba  
marches to  
join Scipio;

but on no-  
tice Bogud  
had entered  
his king-  
dom, re-  
turns.

Cæsar dis-  
perses his  
circular let-  
ters, to let  
the province  
know he is  
arrived.

**AFRIC.** POSTHUMUS at Sicily, which he dispatched in a small pinnace, that they should forthwith, without any excuse of the winds or seasons, cause the rest of his army to be transported; otherwise Africk would be over-run by the enemy; and if he did not quickly come to the assistance of his friends, **SCRIPTO**'s cruelty would not leave them a single house to retire to. So impatient was he for the arrival of his forces, that the very day after he had dispatched this packet, he complained they lost time; still keeping his eyes and thoughts intent upon the sea, day and night, without intermission. Nor without reason; for every moment brought him fresh accounts of the burning of villages, laying of countries waste, killing and carrying off cattle, sackings and deserting of towns and castles, imprisoning or massacring the chief inhabitants, and making their children captives, under the pretence of hostages; but whilst his army was so small, he was not able to relieve from their afflictions those who implored his assistance. However, to keep his soldiers employed, he commanded them to go on with the fortifications, and having built forts and castles, cast up a mole into the sea.

**The way of exercising elephants.** In the mean while **SCRIPTO** was industrious in exercising his elephants, which he performed by drawing two parties up in order of battle; one of slingers, which was to act the enemy's part, and cast small stones at the elephants; behind whom he disposed his own army, that when the unwieldy beasts were frightened, and endeavoured to turn upon their friends, they might be driven back again by the slingers, and obliged to face about towards the enemy. But he found it a difficult matter to instruct such uncouth animals: for elephants, after many years teaching, are very inexpert, and are brought into the field at the equal hazard of both parties.

## CHAP. VII.

**28.** WHILEST both generals were thus employed near Ruspina, **C. VIRGILIUS PRÆTORIUS**, who was governor of Thapfus, a sea-port town, on notice that several of **CÆSAR**'s transports straggled up and down the sea, not knowing what haven to put into, laying hold of the opportunity, manned a galley and some pinnaces, with foot and archers, and resolved to pursue **CÆSAR**'s ships wherever he met them single. Several he attacked with ill success, being beaten and forced to fly; but still he did not desist from the

*Virgilius takes some of Caesar's straggling ships.*

the enterprize. At last, by accident, he came up with a AFRIC. vessel, where the two TITI young Spaniards, tribunes of the fifth legion, were on board, whose father CÆSAR had made a senator. In their company likewise was T. SAT. TITI taken. LIENUS, who had besieged lieutenant M. MESSALA at Messina, and making a virulent speech against CÆSAR, had caused the money and ornaments designed for his triumph, to be stopped. Conscious therefore of his guilt, and apprehensive of the punishment his crimes deserved, he persuaded the two brothers to make no resistance, but surrender to VIRGILIUS. They were no sooner in his custody, but he conveyed them to SCIPIO, who immediately sent them to prison, and three days after gave orders for putting them to death. It is said, when the centurion led them to execution, the eldest desired the favour to be first dispatched, which he obtained, and thus they ended their lives.

29. In the mean while the out-guards of the cavalry on both sides had frequent skirmishes; but sometimes LABIENUS's French and German horse, upon parole given, conferred with CÆSAR's. About the same time LABIENUS, with a strong party of cavalry, went to storm Leptis, where SASERNA commanded with three cohorts, which the besieged easily defended; for the place was well fortified, and stored with plenty of engines. However, the enemy made frequent attempts, till by chance the captain of a strong squadron, who had posted themselves before the gates, was killed by a well-directed shot from a scorpion; whereupon the rest being frightened, immediately retired to their camp, without ever daring to approach the walls again.

30. Whilst this affair was in transaction, SCIPIO drew his army out every day, about three hundred paces distance from his camp; where having spent the greatest part of the day, he returned again at night. This he did frequently; and observing none of CÆSAR's forces moved beyond their trenches, or advanced towards his, despising his enemy's patience, he ranged all his troops in battle array, with his thirty elephants that carried castles on their backs; then extending his horse and foot as wide as possible, led them almost up to CÆSAR's trenches.

31. Whereupon CÆSAR recalled all his soldiers that were gone to fetch forage, wood, or other materials for the works, commanding they should retire leisurely without confusion, and ascend the rampier: but he ordered the out-guards of horse to continue in their post, till the enemy should



**AFRIC.** should arrive almost within reach of their javelins; if they came nearer, then to retire within the works in as good order as they could: he likewise instructed the rest of his cavalry where they should repair to their arms, and attend his farther commands. Nor did he trouble himself to mount the rampier, or distribute these orders publicly by word of mouth; but being extremely well skilled in the art military, he directed every thing in his tent, sending his adjutants to perform what he thought convenient; for he remembered how often he had defeated, forgiven, and granted the enemy quarter, when they were infinitely superior to him in number; therefore took it for granted, they never would be so hardy to attempt his trenches, whilst his single name and authority was sufficient to daunt a considerable part of their army. Besides the strength of his fortifications, the depth of the ditch, the height of the rampier, and the sharp spikes disposed in the ground after a wonderful manner, were sufficient, without the soldiers assistance, to have prevented the enemy's access. He was likewise plentifully stored with all kinds of darts, and engines necessary for a vigorous defence. Nor had he made these preparations for fear of the enemy, as they believed, but because his own forces were raw and inconsiderable. Neither did the smallness of his numbers, their want of discipline, or distrust of victory, prevent his engaging them, but a reflection on the conquest he should obtain. \* For he thought it below his dignity, to have it reported he had won a bloody victory over the poor remains of his enemy's defeated troops, after having achieved so many glorious actions, and routed such mighty armies. He resolved therefore to endure their insolence, till some part of his veteran legions should arrive by the second convoy.

Scipio files  
off again to  
his camp.

32. But **SCIPIO** having for some time continued in the posture we mentioned, in contempt of **CAESAR**'s forces, made his own file off by degrees to their camp; where having assembled them, he made an harangue, to inform them what a terror they had struck into their enemy, what a desperate condition they were in, and encouraged them by the hopes of a speedy victory. **CAESAR**, on the other hand, commanded his men to proceed with the works, under which pretence he kept the new levies employed.

\* *Styli cæci*, the same with the *Stimuli* at the siege of *Alife*.

† *Scorpions and Catapultæ*.

‡ Here our author takes abundance of pains to compliment **CAESAR** at the expence of his own discretion.

CHAP. VIII.

THE Numidians and Getulians daily deserted from SCIPIO's camp, some returning home, others coming over to CÆSAR in whole companies, because they and their ancestors had been infinitely obliged to C. MARIUS, whose kinsman they heard CÆSAR was. Having pitched upon some of these that were of the best quality, he sent them back to their own country, with letters to the several states where they lived, encouraging them to take arms in defence of their liberties, and be no longer imposed on by the enemy's speeches.

AFRIC.

WAR.

Deserters come over to Cæsar from the Getulians,

33. Whilst affairs at Ruspina were in this posture, the free city of Achilla, and several other places, sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, promising readily to submit to his commands, provided he would send them garrisons for their security: and they in return would, for the advantage of the common cause, supply him with corn, and such other provisions as their countries afforded. Their demands were readily agreed to, for CÆSAR immediately detached C. MESSIUS, who had lately borne the office of edile, with the forces desired, to Achilla. CONSIDIUS LONGUS, governor of Adrumetum, who had two legions and six hundred horse under his command, having notice of this, left part of the garrison behind to secure the town, and set forward with twelve cohorts for Achilla; but MESSIUS marching with more expedition, arrived there before him. CONSIDIUS therefore, on his approach to the town, perceiving the place was possessed by a garrison of CÆSAR's, thought it not convenient to attempt a storm; so returned again to Adrumetum without effecting any thing, considering the number of forces he had with him. Though some few days after, receiving a reinforcement of horse from LABIENUS, he returned again to Achilla, and began to invest it.

Achilla declares for Cæsar.

Considius's design upon Achilla disappointed.

34. About the same time C. SALLUSTIUS CRISPUS, whom CÆSAR sent (as we have already remarked) some few days before with a fleet to Cercina, arrived there. Whereupon C. DECIMUS the quæstor, who had been left with a strong party, chiefly composed of his own servants, to secure the corn, got a small vessel, embarked and made his escape. SALLUSTIUS was well received by the natives, and finding among them great plenty of corn, loaded the ships which were there in great numbers, and returned to CÆSAR. In the mean time the proconsul ALLIENUS had caused

Some supplies arrive at Cæsar's camp.

AFRIC

WAR

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caused the twelfth and fifteenth legions, with eight hundred French cavalry, a thousand archers and slingers, to embark; whom he sent away to CÆSAR with a second supply of corn; this fleet having a fair wind, arrived safe at Ruspina in four days time, where CÆSAR lay encamped. Thus he enjoyed at the same instant a double satisfaction from a supply of men and corn; and the soldiers apprehensions of want of provisions being now removed, he received the legions and the cavalry on shore, that they might recover from the fatigue and sickness of their voyage, and then distributed them into the castles, and upon the works.

Scipio sends spies into Cæsar's camp; but they betray him.

35. SCIPIO and his party, whilst CÆSAR was thus employed, were strangely surprized, and could not conceive the reason, why he, who always used to be so ready to engage the enemy, and offer battle of his own accord, should now decline it; which they suspected not to be done without some deep design. His patience made them very uneasy; wherefore having chosen two Getulians, whom they thought firm to their interest, they encouraged them by considerable rewards and promises, to go over to the enemy, under pretence of deserting, and to send intelligence. But when they were brought before CÆSAR, they desired leave freely to declare their minds without offence; which being granted, thus they began. "Several of our countrymen, the Getulians, noble generalissimo, who are entirely devoted to the family of the MARII, with almost all the Roman citizens of the fourth and sixth legions, would come over to your camp, were they not prevented by the guard of Numidian horse. But we, who are sent by SCIPIO as spies to learn the posture of your affairs, and to discover what ditches or traps you had disposed before your trenches for his elephants, and how you designed to engage those beasts, gladly accepted of the office, that we might gain an opportunity of deserting in reality." CÆSAR, having praised and rewarded their candid dealing, sent them to the other deserters, and quickly found the truth of their intelligence confirmed; for the day after, several soldiers of the legions they named, came over to his camp.

The deserters speech to Cæsar.

Cato's diligence at Utica.

Tifdra declares for Cæsar.

36. Thus stood affairs at Ruspina, whilst MARCUS CATO, who commanded at Utica, caused new levies daily to be made amongst the natives, freemen, slaves, and all sorts of people that were able to bear arms, whom he had no sooner raised, but he sent them away to SCIPIO. In the mean time deputies arrived from Tifdra, in which town the Italian merchants and farmers of the country had laid



up three thousand bushels of corn, the design of which <sup>AFRICA</sup> embassy was to acquaint CÆSAR how well they were stored with provisions, and to desire he would send a garrison to defend them. He returned them many thanks for their friendship, and promised shortly to send the garrison they desired; then commending their fidelity, sent them back to their countrymen. About the same time P. <sup>SI</sup> Silius takes <sup>WARR</sup> <sup>magazine</sup> <sup>of Juba's</sup> <sup>corn,</sup> <sup>and other provisions for the war.</sup> <sup>of Juba's</sup> <sup>corn,</sup> <sup>and other provisions for the war.</sup>

CHAP. IX.

37. CÆSAR having now augmented his army with two veteran legions, besides the horse and light-armed infantry which arrived by the second convoy; he sent six transports to Lilybæum for the remainder of his forces. On the sixth of November, he commanded his scouts and liectors to be ready to attend him by six that evening, and without acquainting any one of his design, left orders the legions should be drawn out about three the next morning, and follow him to Ruspina, the first town which had declared for him in Africk, where he had a garrison. Thence, having passed an easy descent on the left, he marched towards the sea. Here was a valley wonderfully even, which extended fifteen miles, half encompassed by a ridge of a moderate height, though very long, which resembled the form of a theatre; on the top of this mountain were a few small eminences, on each of which forts and watch-towers had formerly been erected, and at the farthest of these were SCIPIO's out-guards posted.

38. So soon as CÆSAR had rendered himself master of this ridge, he began to build turrets on every one of the little hills; which he effected in less than half an hour. But when he approached the last eminence, where, as I have already observed, lay a Numidian guard, he made a pause, to observe the situation of the place; then having caused his cavalry to mount the guard, he ordered the foot to draw a line of communication along the middle of the ridge to his camp. Which SCIPIO and LABIENUS observing, they drew out all their horse, and disposing them in order of battle, advanced about a mile from their fortifications, then ranged their infantry in a second line, about four hundred paces from the camp.

39. CÆSAR, not in the least dismay'd at the superiority

Gains a famous ridge, fortifies it.

The enemy draw out with a design to interrupt his works.

v. Cal. Feb. Nov. 7.



After the loss of their numbers, commanded his soldiers to proceed with the lines: but being informed the enemy, who were already arrived within a mile and a half, still approached with a design to interrupt and force our soldiers from the works (which would necessarily oblige him to draw off the legions) he detached a squadron of Spanish horse, and some light-armed infantry to support them, with orders to attack the enemy's party on the nearest hill immediately, and lodge themselves there. They made so vigorous a charge, that they quickly took or put to flight the Numidians who guarded the post, and carried the place.

LABIENUS, observing the rout and confusion of his men, advanced with the greatest part of his cavalry in the right wing to their assistance: but CÆSAR laying hold of the occasion, when LABIENUS had marched some distance from his army, detached his left to surround and cut him off.

40. In the valley, where this dispute happened, was a village fortified with four turrets, which prevented LABIENUS from discovering CÆSAR's motions; so that he neither knew he was surrounded, nor saw our horse, till he found himself attacked in the rear. The surprize struck so great a terror into the Numidians, that they immediately fled, and made the best of their way towards the camp: but the Gauls and Germans, who endeavoured to maintain their ground, being charged on all sides, after a vigorous resistance, were every man of them cut to pieces. At which SCIPIO's legions, who were drawn out before their works, were so terrified, that they immediately retired with great precipitation into their camp at every gate. SCIPIO and his forces thus obliged to quit the plain as well as the higher ground, and fly for shelter to their trenches, CÆSAR sounded a retreat. When the field was empty, he beheld the prodigious bodies of the Gauls and Germans, who had followed LABIENUS out of France, part volunteers, part induced by money or promises, and others out of gratitude; who having obtained quarter after CURIO's defeat, were resolved to return the favour by a close adherence to his fortune. The carcases of these men lay dispersed over the plain, remarkable for their bulk and aspect.

41. The day after this action, CÆSAR drew all his forces out of the castles, and disposed them in order of battle in the field; but SCIPIO having had so many men killed and wounded the day before, did not think convenient to move beyond his trenches. CÆSAR, marching slowly by

Cæsar draws  
out, marches  
towards U-  
sita.

the

the foot of the mountain, approached nearer his works. A P. R. I. G. W. A. R. He was already arrived within less than a mile of Uzita, a town in the enemy's possession, when Scipio does the like, but no engagement happens. **SCIPIO**, solicitous for the preservation of so important a place, from whence his army was supplied with water and many other necessities, drew out his forces, and disposed them in four several lines; the first, according to his usual custom, was composed of cavalry, and armed elephants with castles on their backs. In this order he marched to relieve the place; which **CÆSAR** perceiving, imagined **SCIPIO** was now resolved to give him battle. But he found himself mistaken; for the enemy, making a halt, covered their main body with the town, leaving only the two wings exposed, where the elephants were ranged in full view of our army.

42. **CÆSAR** had now attended **SCIPIO**'s motions till almost sun-set, when observing he advanced no nearer him, designing rather to defend himself by the advantage of his post, if occasion should be, than venture a battle in the open field; thought it not proper that day to march nearer the town, which covered the greatest part of the enemy's army, and wherein they had a strong garrison of Numidians. For he judged it almost impracticable at once to assault Uzita, and engage both the enemy's wings in a disadvantageous place; especially since his own soldiers had continued in arms all that day without eating: wherefore retiring to his camp, the day following he began to extend his lines nearer the town.

CHAP. X.

43. IN the mean time **CONSIDIUS**, who had long besieged Achilla with eight cohorts of mercenary Getulians and Numidians, where **C. MESSIUS** commanded in chief; having made many efforts, and raised considerable works, which were always destroyed by the besieged; finding his labour spent in vain, on advice of the engagement between the horse of both armies, was so disturbed, that setting fire to his corn, whereof he had plenty, and destroying his wine, oil, and such other provisions as he had in store, he quitted the siege; then marching through Numidia, divided his forces with **SCIPIO**, and returned to Adrumetum.

44. Whilst **CÆSAR** was thus employed, one of the transports, which **ALLIENUS** had sent with the second supply from Sicily, where **Q. COMINIUS**, and **L. TICIDA**, a Roman knight, were embarked, being separated by foul weather

**A**FRIC. ther from the rest of the convoys, was forced into Thapsus; where **VIRGILIUS**, having fitted out some boats and small vessels, took her, and sent all the persons on board to **SCIPIO**. A three-banked galley likewise straying from the fleet, was driven by the winds to **Ægimurus**; and falling in with **VARUS** and **OCTAVIUS**'s Squadron, was taken. In this vessel were some veteran soldiers, with a centurion, and a few new levies, whom **VARUS**, without suffering any injury to be offered them, sent away to **SCIPIO**. So soon as they came into his presence, and stood before his chair of state, "I am satisfied, said he, it is by the instruction and command of your impious general, you are compelled to pursue the lives of your best countrymen; not of your own accord. But since fortune has put you into our power, if you will perform your duty, and defend the republick; in concert with the rest of her worthy members, you shall not only have your lives pardoned, but receive rewards suitable to your service: speak therefore, the sentiments of your hearts."

Scipio's  
speech to  
the pri-  
soners.

The brave  
centurion's  
answer.

45. **SCIPIO**, having ended his gracious speech, doubted not in the least but they would return him many thanks for his merciful proffer: but received this answer from the centurion. "SCIPIO (for Generalissimo I cannot call you) I thank you for proffering me life and liberty, though I am your prisoner by right of war; and perhaps I might accept your favour, could I do it without being guilty of the basest crime. Shall I draw my sword against **CÆSAR** my Generalissimo, under whom I have had the honour to command a company, and to maintain whose glory I have borne arms above these sixteen years? No! far be it from me; and, as a friend, I would advise you to desist from your enterprizes: for if you are yet ignorant with whom you contend, I will acquaint you. Choose the best cohort in your army, allow me only the liberty to select ten of my fellow-soldiers now in your custody; let us engage, and from our courage you shall form a judgment, what you may expect from your forces."

Scipio puts  
him to  
death.

46. The centurion having thus boldly declared his mind, **SCIPIO**, stung with the affront, and enraged to the last degree, nodded to the officers about him to perform his orders, and caused the centurion to be killed at his feet; the veteran soldiers he commanded to be separated from the new levies. "Take away those hardened wretches, said he, whose hands have been imbrued in the blood of their fellow-citizens." Accordingly they were carried out

of

of the camp, and barbarously murdered. As for the new raised men, he distributed them amongst his own troops, but would not suffer COMINIUS and TICIDA to come into his presence. CÆSAR, extremely concerned at this accident, cashier'd, and published a severe edict against the captains of that squadron, which he ordered to cruise about Thapsus for the security of his transports and galleys.

F & I C  
WAR.

47. About this time something very surprising happened to CÆSAR's army. At the beginning of winter, about November 11<sup>o</sup>, at nine o'clock at night, a violent tempest arose, attended by a dreadful shower of hail. To add to this misfortune, CÆSAR had not, like other generals, disposed his forces into winter-quarters, but decamping every three or four days, lodged himself in a different post, nearer the enemy; and the soldiers were so employed about the works, that they had not an opportunity of taking care of themselves. Besides, he had transported his army out of Sicily with so much expedition, that they were allowed to bring nothing with them but their armour, neither slaves, baggage, nor any thing which might have been serviceable to them: what little provisions they had, were already consumed, nor could the country, where they were, furnish them with more. Reduced to this necessity, a very few were so happy as to lie under tents of skins, others were obliged to erect little huts, which they covered with reeds or their own cloaks. Thus surprized by the storm, beaten

The great storm.

\* Vergiliz or Pleiades, the seven stars, that some place in the tail, others in the neck of the bull; which the poets feign to be the daughters of ATLAS or LYCURGUS. The editor of the Dauphin's edition produces two or three manuscripts to make this Vigiliarum; then the latin will run thus, *Vigiliarum confecto signo, circiter vigilia secunda noctis*: which is a more tautological way of expression than HIRTIUS is usually guilty of. Others again have found out many difficulties in reconciling this text to astronomy. But for my part, I cannot conceive why the word Vergiliz should be changed: nor, in my opinion, does it betray the author's ignorance of the course of the stars, as monsieur D'ABLANCOURT fancies, who from hence infers an error in the ancient Calendar. For the Vergiliz set exactly at the time mentioned by HIRTIUS in Africk, when CÆSAR was alive; viz, about nine or ten at night, at the latter end of January, or beginning of February, when, by computation, this action happened, though now indeed they set some hours later. BLADEN: But we don't yet rid of the tautology by this interpretation, *the Vergiliz being set about nine o'clock at night*, which is only a twofold manner of expressing the same hour. HIRTIUS would not, like an almanac maker, compute the daily astronomical setting of the *Vergiliz*, if he could; but, like an historian, speaks of the annual popular one. The ancients, in fixing the commencement of the four seasons of the year, made the *occafus Vergiliarum* to denote the first day of winter, differently placed by them at November 8, 10, or 11. HIRTIUS having, § 37 to 43, mentioned what CÆSAR did November 6, and the three following days; and § 43—47, the transactions elsewhere; subjoins here this remarkable incident about November 11, viz. at that season of the year when the *Vergiliz* had done setting *cosmice* or with the sun. See Dr. Ashton, as before. Typogr.



**A F R I C.** with hail-stones, and almost drowned with water, their fires  
**W A R.** extinguished, and provisions spoiled, they ran up and down  
 the camp, defending their heads, as they could, with their  
 shields. This night likewise the tops of the fifth legion's  
 piles took fire of themselves.

## C H A P. XI.

48. JUBA by this time had advice of the defeat lately received by SCIPIO's horse, and being much pressed to come to his assistance, left his general SABURA, with part of his army, to act against SITIUS; and thinking his presence might free the armies of his allies from the dread they had of CÆSAR's, marched with three legions, eight hundred horse with bridles, some Numidians without, a great number of light-armed infantry, and thirty elephants, to join them. When he arrived there, he pitched his own camp, with the forces I mentioned, at no great distance from SCIPIO's. CÆSAR's soldiers had long been uneasy at the apprehension of JUBA's army, and the nearer he approached, the more pain they were in. But after he had taken up his quarters close by them, their fears immediately vanished, and they despised him. However, we plainly discovered SCIPIO was not a little encouraged by his reinforcement; for the day after he drew out both armies into the field, with sixty elephants, which he disposed to the best advantage; then advancing several paces before his camp, staid in that posture some time, and retired again within his trenches.

Cæsar extends his lines, after having defeated Labienus's ambuscade.

49. CÆSAR, perceiving SCIPIO had now received all the forces he expected, concluded a battle would soon ensue; therefore began to advance nearer him along the ridge of the mountain, extending his lines, and erecting forts upon every eminence he made himself master of. But the enemy, depending on their numbers, gained the next hill, and prevented our progress any farther: this they did by LABIENUS's advice, who, lying nearest the place, took care to see his own design executed.

50. Before CÆSAR could arrive at the mountain, which he desired to possess, he was obliged to pass a large plain of deep descent, wherein were several hollow places much resembling caves, beyond which was an olive wood. LABIENUS therefore considering CÆSAR must of necessity march this way, and being well acquainted with the place, disposed an ambush of horse and light-armed infantry there; placing

at the same time a strong party of cavalry behind the hills, AFRIC. that so soon as he attacked CÆSAR's foot, the cavalry WAR. might advance from behind the mountain: so that being charged both in front and rear, and surrounded on all sides, the enemy must of necessity be cut to pieces. CÆSAR, ignorant of this ambuscade, commanded his horse to march before, who arrived at the place, when LABIENUS's men, either forgetting or neglecting to perform their orders, or apprehending they should be killed by our soldiers in the ditch, began to appear in small parties, and, quitting their holes, to ascend the hill. But CÆSAR's horse pursuing, slew part, took others prisoners; then making towards the hill, beat the enemy from their post, and lodged themselves there. LABIENUS, attended by a small party of cavalry, with much difficulty made his escape.

51. The horse having so well performed their parts, CÆSAR distributed the work amongst the foot, commanding them to lay out a camp there, and to draw two lines of communication cross the plain to his former camp over-against Uzita, which parted it from SCIPIO's: these lines were so contrived as to meet at the right and left angle of the town. Draws a line of communication from his old camp to Uzita. The reason why he made these works was, that, when his forces should approach the walls, and begin the storm, they might be secure from being surrounded by the enemy's horse, which would otherwise oblige them to quit the assault. Besides, by this means his soldiers had more frequent opportunities of conferring with their forces; and such as had a mind to desert, which they could not before without imminent danger, might now do it with greater security. Nor were these the only reasons which induced him to this resolution; for he knew, being nearer the enemy, he should now discover whether they designed to fight him; and the place he had taken up his quarters in, lying much lower than that he lately came from, he might with greater ease sink wells there, whereas before he was obliged to send a long and troublesome way for water. Whilst the legions were employed about these works, part of the army stood in order of battle before the trenches. Skirmishing with the Numidian horse, and light-armed infantry.

52. In the evening, when CÆSAR drew his forces from the works, designing to retire to his former camp, JUBA, SCIPIO, and LABIENUS, made an unexpected charge upon them with all their cavalry and light-armed foot. Our horse at first, over-powered with numbers, began to give ground; but the affair fell out much contrary to what the

AFRIC. my expected: for CÆSAR immediately halted, and advanced with the legions to sustain his cavalry; who, assuming fresh courage upon his arrival, faced about, and charged the Numidians with so much vigour, whilst they were dispersed with the pursuit, that they killed great numbers, wounded others, and obliged the whole party to retreat in great precipitation to their camp: so that if the night and dust, which prevented our seeing, had not put an end to the dispute, JUBA with LABIENUS had certainly been taken, and all their horse and light-armed infantry entirely cut off. In the mean time SCIPIO's men, of the fourth and sixth legions, daily came over to CÆSAR in great numbers, some to his camp, others to such places as lay most convenient for them. The horse likewise, which had served under CURIO, distrustful SCIPIO's success, followed the others example.

## C H A P. XII.

53. WHILST both generals were thus employed at Uzita, the ninth and tenth legion, who embarked in the transports at Sicily, were already arrived at the harbour of Ruspina; when descrying CÆSAR's ships which lay at anchor about Thapsus, they mistook them for the enemy's; and put out again to sea, for fear of falling into the hands of those, who, they imagined, lay there in order to surprize them. Many days they were tossed up and down by the winds, till almost spent with drought and hunger at last they arrived safe at the camp.

He breaks  
several officers.

54. So soon as they landed, CÆSAR, remembering the disorders in Italy, and rapine committed by some particular persons, was glad of the least occasion to punish them for it; wherefore because C. AVIENUS, a tribune of the tenth legion, had taken up one entire vessel for the use of his family and equipage, without bringing a single soldier along with him from Sicily, he summoned all the officers of the army to attend him the day after, and in their presence from his tribunal said, "I could heartily wish some persons would at last have prescribed bounds to their insolence and ill manners, and that they would have no longer tempted my patience and good-nature. But since they have not had the prudence to correct their irregularities, I shall myself do it for them, that they may serve for an example to the rest of the army. First, CAIUS AVIENUS, because you have instigated the Roman soldiers against the republick, have plundered the municipal towns, and injured both  
me

His speech.

me and your country, taking up whole vessels for your <sup>AFRIC.</sup> horses and retinue, and deprived the commonwealth of the <sup>WAR.</sup> use of those soldiers it has occasion for; I dismiss you with ignominy from my army, commanding you to quit Africk, and be gone as far this day as possible. The like sentence I pronounce upon you, AULUS FONTEIUS, because you have been a seditious officer, and an ill citizen. And as for you, T. SALIENUS, M. TIRO, and C. CLUSINAS, since you gained your commands by favour, not by merit; since you have neither proved yourselves good soldiers in war, nor faithful citizens in peace, studying more how to incite the soldiers to mutiny against their general, than give proofs of your modesty, I hold you unworthy to bear commissions in my army; wherefore I cashier, and command you immediately to leave Africk." Having ended his speech, he delivered them to the centurions, with orders to see they immediately embarked with only one servant each.

55. By this time the Getulian deserters, whom CÆSAR <sup>The Getu-</sup> sent with letters and particular instructions, arrived in their <sup>lians revolt</sup> country, where the people, equally induced by their <sup>from Juba,</sup> authority, and CÆSAR's reputation, were soon prevailed on to take arms and revolt from JUBA: upon which, that monarch, being now engaged in three several wars at once, found himself obliged to detach six cohorts, to defend the borders of his kingdom against the incursions of the Getulians.

## C H A P. XIII.

56. CÆSAR, having finished his lines of communication, and produced them almost within javelin-shot of the town, entrenched himself there; and drawing five legions out of his other camp, caused plenty of war-like engines to be fixed in the front of his works directly over-against Uzita; whereby he perpetually kept the enemy upon the walls in fear and apprehensions. This opportunity gave several persons of quality in both armies, a desire to see their friends and relations, whence frequent conferences proceeded, which CÆSAR was sensible would prove to his advantage. For the chief officers of the Getulian horse, with some others of condition who served under JUBA, whose ancestors had formerly been commanded by MARIUS, and from his generosity obtained considerable estates in their country, but, since SYLLA's victory, had been made tributaries to king HIEMPSAL, taking the favour of the even-



**A F R I C.** ing, when the fires were lighted, with their horses and servants, about a thousand in number, came over to CÆSAR'S camp, in the plain near Uzita.

Aquinius has a conference with NA; upon which SCIPIO sent a messenger to let him know, he ought not to hold correspondence with an enemy: this did not interrupt the conference, till one of JUBA'S attendance was dispatched to acquaint him, it was his master's pleasure he should hold no further discourse: whereupon he immediately desisted, for fear of offending the king. A most unaccountable thing, that a Roman citizen, who had already been promoted to honours in the state, should rather submit to the commands of a foreign prince, than those of SCIPIO, and desire to survive the destruction of his party. But JUBA'S arrogance to M. AQUINIUS, a man of no family, lately admitted to the senatorian order, was still less detestable than his behaviour to SCIPIO, who was nobly born, and equally to be respected for the dignity and honours he possessed. SCIPIO, before the king's arrival, always wore a purple robe; but it is reported, that JUBA told him he ought not to wear the same colour with himself, upon which he changed it for a white one; submitting to the caprice of so haughty and foolish a monarch.

His pride.

Both armies drawn out.

57. Whilst SCIPIO and his party were disturbed at this loss, they perceived M. AQUINIUS talking with C. SÆSERNA; upon which SCIPIO sent a messenger to let him know, he ought not to hold correspondence with an enemy: this did not interrupt the conference, till one of JUBA'S attendance was dispatched to acquaint him, it was his master's pleasure he should hold no further discourse: whereupon he immediately desisted, for fear of offending the king. A most unaccountable thing, that a Roman citizen, who had already been promoted to honours in the state, should rather submit to the commands of a foreign prince, than those of SCIPIO, and desire to survive the destruction of his party. But JUBA'S arrogance to M. AQUINIUS, a man of no family, lately admitted to the senatorian order, was still less detestable than his behaviour to SCIPIO, who was nobly born, and equally to be respected for the dignity and honours he possessed. SCIPIO, before the king's arrival, always wore a purple robe; but it is reported, that JUBA told him he ought not to wear the same colour with himself, upon which he changed it for a white one; submitting to the caprice of so haughty and foolish a monarch.

58. The day after, the enemy drawing out all their forces, posted themselves upon a rising ground, at no great distance from CÆSAR'S camp: who did the like, and immediately disposed his army in order of battle before his lines; taking it for granted, that SCIPIO, who first drew out, and was so considerably reinforced by JUBA'S arrival, would immediately come to attack him. Wherefore having rode through the ranks encouraging his men, and given them the sign of battle, he staid to expect the enemy's charge; for he judged it not convenient to march far from his trenches, because there was a strong garrison in Uzita, which flanked his right, and made him apprehensive, if he advanced farther, their forces might fall out of the town upon him. Besides, there was a very difficult passage to get over, before he could arrive at SCIPIO'S army, which would have disordered his men, in making their onset.

Scipio's disposition.

59. Here I must not omit to give an account of the disposition of both armies: SCIPIO had ranged his legions with those of JUBA in the front, behind which were placed the Numidians for a reserve, in so very thin ranks, and so far extended, that they seemed at some distance to make but

but one line behind the legions; and the wings appeared to be two lines: the elephants were placed in either wing with equal distances between them, and behind them the light-armed infantry and auxiliary Numidians; all the cavalry with bridles were posted on the right, the left being covered by Uzita, so that he had not room enough for his cavalry there. About a thousand paces distant from his right, he had disposed all his <sup>p</sup> Numidian horse and light-armed infantry, at the foot of a mountain, the farthest distant both from the enemy's and his own army; designing they should take a circuit when the battle was begun; and, surrounding CÆSAR's forces, put them into disorder with their darts.

60. Such was SCIPIO's disposition; but CÆSAR's army was ranged in this order. I will begin with his left wing, wherein were placed the ninth and twenty-seventh legions; in his right the tenth and thirtieth; in the middle the twenty-eighth, thirteenth, fourteenth, twenty-ninth and twenty-sixth: <sup>a</sup> but the second line of his right wing consisted, partly of the cohorts of those legions we have already named, partly of new levies; his third line he had disposed entire behind the left, extending it only as far as the middle legion of his front, to make his army triple there, because his right was defended by the works; but it was necessary to make his left stronger, that it might be the better able to sustain the charge of the enemy's numerous horse: for which reason likewise he had placed all his own cavalry, intermixed with light-armed foot there; and since

<sup>p</sup> Those without bridles, I suppose.

<sup>a</sup> The original is, *Ipsum autem dextrum cornu, secundam aciem fere, in earum legionum parte cohortium collocaverat. Præterea ex tironum legionibus paucas adjecerat.* And I wonder the critics have not altered the text, which is so apparently corrupt; since a small variation would make it sense, though at present incomprehensible. RHELLICANUS indeed has taken abundance of pains to convince the world, that *dextrum cornu* and *secunda acies*, are two names for the very same thing; so, says he, no doubt are *sinistrum cornu* and *prima acies*. What he would infer from hence, I cannot conceive; but it is certain his hypothesis is false; else we should never be able to understand the next sentence in HIRTIUS, which tells us, *Tertiam autem aciem in sinistrum cornu contulerat.* Might I take the liberty of altering the text, I would write thus: *Ipsum autem dextrum cornu secundam aciem, fere ex earum legionum parte cohortium, collocaverat; præterea ex Tironum legionibus paucas adjecerat.* And Monsieur D'ABLANCOURT, I perceive, by his version, seems to have been of the same opinion. BLADEN. Dr. CLARKE follows RHELLICANUS, and SALMASIUS contends that in CÆSAR's time each wing was reckoned a distinct *acies* or line, *De militia Rom. c. ix. p. 92.* But Dr. JURIN's emendation is above all the most ingenious: *Ipso autem dextro cornu, secunda in acie, veteranarum legionum partem cohortium collocaverat: Præterea, &c. i. e.* but the second line of his right wing consisted partly of cohorts of the veteran legions, and of some few of the new levies. *Typogr.*

**A F R I C.** he could not rely much upon them, had ordered the fifth legion to sustain them: the archers he dispersed in several places, but especially in the wings.

**W A R.**  
No set battle.

But when Cæsar retreats, the Numidian horse cut off part of his forces.

61. Thus were both armies drawn up, not above three hundred paces distant from each other, and continued in that posture till four in the afternoon without fighting, a circumstance perhaps never known before. But when CÆSAR began to retreat within his lines, on a sudden all the Numidian and Getulian horse without bridles, who, as I have already remarked, had been disposed at some distance off, began to wheel about to the right, and make towards CÆSAR'S camp upon the hill. In the mean while, LABIENUS'S cavalry, with bridles, maintained their post, and endeavoured to stop the march of our legions. Whereupon part of CÆSAR'S horse and light-armed infantry, on a sudden, without orders, rashly ventured too far against the Getulians, and having passed a morass which lay between them, found themselves too weak to sustain the charge of so numerous a multitude; for being forsaken by the foot, they were obliged to retreat in disorder, after the loss of twenty-six infantry, one trooper, and several horses wounded. SCIPIO, proud of this success, drew his forces within his lines again: but his joy was soon interrupted, for the day after, a squadron of horse which CÆSAR sent to Leptis, to convoy some provisions, fell in by the way with a party of Numidian and Getulian raparees, whom they charged so very briskly, that they killed or took near a hundred prisoners. CÆSAR all this while omitted not advancing his lines, and drawing out his forces, to prevent the enemy's incursions; nor was SCIPIO idle, who left nothing unattempted to prevent CÆSAR'S excluding him from the hill. Thus both generals were employed about their works, yet there frequently happened skirmishes between the cavalry.

#### C H A P. XIV.

Some of Cæsar's ships taken.

62. WHILST affairs were in this posture, VARUS, on notice that the seventh and eighth legions had sailed from Sicily, left Utica, where he laid up his squadron all winter, and put out to sea. He manned his fleet with Getulian rowers and marines; then designing to lay wait for our transports, hoisted sail with sixty ships for Adrumetum. CÆSAR, being ignorant of his arrival, sent L. CISPIUS with a squadron of twenty-seven sail to cruise about Thapsus, for the security of his convoy; and Q. AQUILA with  
thirteen

thirteen gallies to Adrumetum, upon the same errand. AFRIC.  
 CISPIUS quickly arrived at the place he was ordered to; WAR.  
 but AQUILA, being tossed by the tempest, could not double  
 the promontory; having found therefore a convenient creek  
 to ride at anchor in, he was glad to shelter his fleet there  
 from the fury of the winds. In the mean while some vessels  
 which lay at anchor in the road of Leptis, were left desti-  
 tute and defenceless by the mariners, who were gone into  
 the town to buy provisions, or were dispersed about the  
 shore. VARUS having notice of this from the deserters, Some vessels  
 about nine that night left Adrumetum, and the next morn- taken.  
 ing early arriving with all his fleet at Leptis, set fire to the  
 transports which rode at anchor without the haven; and  
 meeting no manner of opposition, took two five-banked  
 gallies that were empty.

63. CÆSAR soon received intelligence of this, whilst he Cæsar puts  
 was viewing his works about six miles distant from the to sea, and  
 harbour; whereupon laying aside all other affairs, he im- recovers  
 mediately posted to Leptis, where he made no longer stay, them.  
 than to allow the rest of his fleet sufficient time to follow  
 him; then embarking in a small galley, himself led the  
 way: having joined AQUILA, whom he found under no  
 small terrors at the number of the enemy's fleet, he went in  
 pursuit of the enemy. VARUS, equally amazed at CÆ-  
 SAR's boldness and dispatch, tacked about, and made the  
 best of his way for Adrumetum; but CÆSAR, after a  
 league's sail coming up with him, retook one of his own  
 gallies with all her men, and a hundred and fifty more in  
 her, who were put on board to guard her, and another three-  
 banked galley, with her rowers and mariners; but the rest  
 of the enemy's squadron, having doubled the cape, made  
 the port of Adrumetum, which CÆSAR, by the assistance  
 of the same wind, was not able to do: wherefore lying that  
 night at anchor, next morning early he sailed towards the  
 town, where having set fire to all the transports which  
 rode without the haven, he waited some time to see if the  
 enemy would give him battle; but finding they would not,  
 returned again to his camp.

64. In this ship was taken P. VESTRIUS, a Roman P. Vestrius  
 knight, and P. LIGARIUS AFRANIANUS, whom CÆSAR and P. Liga-  
 had made prisoner in Spain, and dismissed with the rest of rius taken;  
 the captives there; notwithstanding which favour, he had the last put  
 again entered into POMPEY's service, and having made his to death by  
 escape from the battle of Pharsalia, fled to VARUS in Cæsar.  
 Africk: Him therefore CÆSAR put to death for his perjury.



**A F R I C.** But as for P. VESTRIUS, because his brother readily paid his ransom at Rome, and he made it appear, that being taken by NASIDIUS's fleet, and condemned to die, VARUS had procured his pardon; that since he never had an opportunity of making his escape; CÆSAR granted him his life.

**W A R.**

Cæsar gets a  
booty of  
corn.

## C H A P. XV.

65. THE Africans have a custom of hiding their corn in caverns under earth, especially in war-time, to prevent being surprized by the enemy, and every town has private caves for this purpose. CÆSAR having intelligence of one of these hoards from a deserter, about midnight drew out two legions with a party of cavalry, sending them about ten miles off; from whence they returned loaden to the camp with corn. LABIENUS, on notice of this, marched about eight miles from his lines, through the mountains CÆSAR had passed the day before, where he laid out a camp large enough to contain two legions; daily attending with a strong party of horse and light-armed foot in ambuscade, under an expectation we should often pass that way for provisions.

Labiens's  
ambush de-  
feated by  
Cæsar.

66. In the mean while CÆSAR being informed of LABIENUS's design, kept within a few days, that he might render the enemy more negligent and remiss by going through the same duty so often over; then unexpectedly, one morning betimes, commanded eight <sup>9</sup> veteran legions, with part of his cavalry, to follow him out of the Decuman port. Having ordered his horse to advance before, they surprized the enemy, who lay in ambush for them, and killing about five hundred, routed the rest. Whereupon LABIENUS came up with all his horse to sustain his party; but CÆSAR, perceiving his cavalry could not maintain their ground against so unequal a number, advanced with his legions to engage the enemy, who being frightened at his approach, desisted from the pursuit, and secured their own retreat. The day after, JUBA gave orders all the Numidians who had deserted their post, should be hanged, for a terror to the rest of his army.

67. CÆSAR, in the mean while, being streightened for provisions, recalled all his forces to the camp, and having left garrisons at Leptis, Ruspina, and Achilla, ordered AQUILA and CISPIUS to cruise with their several fleets,

<sup>9</sup> The number his wrong: CÆSAR had but seven veteran legions with him. JURIN.


one near Adrumetum, the other about Thapsus, set fire to AFRICA.  
his works, and about three in the morning drew out his WAR.  
army, disposing his baggage in the left, and marched directly  
to Agar, a town which had frequently been invested by the Cæsar  
Getulians, and as often made a vigorous defence. He en- marches to  
camped in the plain near this place, and went out to forage Agar.  
with part of his forces about the country; where he met  
not only with a considerable booty of oil, wine, figs, and  
barley, but also a little wheat: then after refreshing his  
soldiers, he returned again to his quarters. SCIPIO, having  
notice of CÆSAR's motions, followed him along the ridge  
of the hill, with all his forces, and lodged his army in three  
several camps, about seven miles from CÆSAR's.

68. Zetta lay about ten miles distant from SCIPIO, di- Cæsar takes  
rectly over-against the post he possessed, but above eighteen Zetta.  
miles from CÆSAR. Hither the enemy detached two le-  
gions to forage, which CÆSAR being informed of from a  
deserter, removed his camp from the valley, to a safer place  
upon the hill; and having left a guard there, about three  
the next morning passed the enemy's camp, and gained the  
town. When he arrived there, finding SCIPIO's foragers  
were gone up farther into the country, and that the enemy  
advanced with their legions to cover them, he desisted from  
the pursuit, and after having taken C. MUTIUS REGINUS,  
a Roman knight, SCIPIO's familiar friend, and governor of  
Zetta, with P. ATRIUS, another Roman knight of Utica,  
having surprized two and twenty of the king's camels, and  
left lieutenant \* OPPIUS with a garrison in the place, he re-  
turned to his camp.

69. Being now arrived near SCIPIO's quarters, which he  
was obliged to pass, LABIENUS and AFRANIUS, with all  
the enemy's horse and light-armed infantry, rising from an  
ambuscade, appeared upon the hills, and began to attack his  
rear; which CÆSAR observing, first detached his cavalry Cæsar's rear  
to receive their charge, then ordered the foot to dispose of attacked.  
their baggage, and face about; nor did the legions sooner  
begin their attack, than with great ease they forced them from  
the higher ground. But when CÆSAR, thinking the enemy  
had been so warmly received, that they would hardly give  
him any farther trouble, began to pursue his journey, they  
shewed themselves upon a neighbouring hill; and the Nu-  
midians, with their light-armed foot, who are wonderfully  
nimble, always mixed amongst the cavalry (with whom  
they kept an equal pace either in charging or retiring) fell

\* This is the Oppius some suppose author of this book.

**AFRIC.** a second time upon out foot. Thus they frequently renewed the charge, still retiring when we endeavoured to engage, and as we marched forward, pressing upon our rear. **CÆSAR** plainly perceived their design was to oblige him to encamp in a place where no water was to be had, that his soldiers, who had neither eat nor drank from three in the morning till four in the afternoon, might perish with thirst and hunger.

**WAR.**  
  
 But he secures his retreat,

70. The sun was near setting, when **CÆSAR**, finding he had not gained compleat an hundred paces in four hours march; drew his cavalry off from the rear, who had lost several horses, causing the legions by their turns to secure his retreat: thus proceeding slowly, by the assistance of his foot he sustained the enemy's charges with greater ease. In the mean while, part of the Numidian horse galloped to the right and left upon the hills, endeavouring to surround our army with their number, whilst others kept our rear employed: but if only two or three veteran soldiers chanced to face about, and cast their piles with vigour, two thousand of the enemy would fly; then returning, rally again, and following at some distance, throw their darts at the legions. Thus **CÆSAR**, one while marching forward, one while halting, and going on but slowly, arrived safe with all his forces, by seven that evening, at his camp, having only ten soldiers wounded. **LABIENUS** likewise having lost about three hundred, several being wounded, and all much fatigued, retreated to his camp. And **SCIPIO** withdrew his legions and elephants, whom he had ranged for the greater terror within view of **CÆSAR**'s army, before his own lines.

## CH A P. XVI.

71. **CÆSAR**, having so subtle an enemy to deal with, instructed his soldiers, not like a general of a veteran army, who had atchieved so many glorious exploits, but as a fencing master teaches his scholars; how they should retreat from, how encounter the enemy, how far advance, how far retreat, where, and in what manner cast their piles. For the enemy's light-armed infantry gave us great uneasiness, deterring our troopers from meeting them, by killing their horses with their javelins, and wearying our legions by their swiftness: for when our heavy-arm'd foot faced about, and endeavoured to return their charge, they quickly avoided the danger by flight.

72. This


72. This was no small uneasiness to CÆSAR, whose horse, AFRIC.  
WAR. whenever they engaged without the legions, were no equal match for theirs mixed with the light-armed infantry. He was the more concerned at this, because he had never yet tried the courage of their legions, and knew not how far he should be able, even by the assistance of his own, to sustain their charge, with that of their cavalry and light-armed foot united. To add to these grievances, his men were terrified with the number and size of the enemy's elephants: however, to redress this evil, he had caused some of those animals to be transported from Italy, that his soldiers might be better acquainted with the nature and strength of them, what part of their body was most easily pierced, and where their furniture left room for a dart to enter; that being perfectly used to the smell, noise, and species of that beast, they might no longer be afraid of it. The design succeeded to his wish, his men soon became acquainted with the elephants, and discovered their slowness; the cavalry cast blunted pikes at them, and by degrees made their horses familiar to them.

73. For these reasons CÆSAR was more slow and cautious than heretofore, and departed from his usual method of hastening to the issue of a battle. For in Gaul his soldiers used to fight in open plains, and had a generous enemy to engage, who was unacquainted with design, and relied entirely upon force, not on artifice: but here he found himself obliged to prepare his men for deceit, ambuscades, and fraud; that they might know when to engage, when to avoid the combat. That therefore they might the sooner learn this lesson, he thought it not convenient to suffer his legions to continue long in any place, but, under pretence of foraging, made them march up and down the country; being assured the enemy would follow him wherever he went. About three days after, he drew his forces out carefully, and marched by SCIPIO's camp, to offer him battle; but finding he declined it, in the evening retreated again to his own quarters.

## C H A P. XVII.

74. AND now arrived deputies from Vacca, a town Vacca, de-  
signing to  
surrender to  
Cæsar, is  
sacked by  
Juba. not far distant from Zetta, which CÆSAR, as we observed, had lately surprized: their business was to desire he would send them a garrison, and to inform him they had several sorts of warlike provisions at his service. But before their departure



A F R I C. departure arrived a deserter (that wished as well to CÆSAR WAR. ? as they) acquainting them, that before the intended gar-  
 rison could arrive, JUBA had taken the town by assault, and having put the inhabitants to the sword, had ordered his soldiers to sack and plunder the city.

a. d. xii.  
 Cal. Apr.  
 Per Jul.  
 4668.  
 U. C. Var.  
 708.

Cæsar's  
 rear attack-  
 ed, but he  
 secures his  
 retreat.

75. CÆSAR reviewed his army the twenty-first of Jan. and the day after marched out with all his forces about five miles from his camp, where he drew them up in order of battle, about two miles distant from SCIPIO's: but having long invited the enemy to an engagement, finding them averse to it, he retreated. The day following he decamped, and began his march towards Sarsura, where SCIPIO had a Numidian garrison, and a magazine of corn: which LABIENUS perceiving, pursued our rear with all his cavalry and light-armed foot; having surprized some sutlers wag-gons, the success inspired them with such courage, they resolved to attack our legions, who they thought would not be able to fight, whilst incumbered with their baggage. But CÆSAR was prepared to receive them, for he had taken care to make a draught of three hundred men out of every legion, who had nothing to carry but their arms; these he detached to cover his rear against the insults of LABIENUS's cavalry; who, frightened at the approach of our ensigns, turned their horses heads, and began to make a dishonour-able flight, after several of them had been killed and wound-ed. Our men returned to the rest of the army, and pur-sued their journey. LABIENUS kept within sight at the right hand of us at a distance on the top of the hill.

Cæsar takes  
 Sarsura.


76. When CÆSAR arrived at Sarsura, after he had killed P. CORNELIUS, who commanded there for SCIPIO, and taken the town, he put the garrison to the sword, even in the enemy's presence, who durst not come to their assist-ance. Having furnished his army with corn, he marched the day after to Tifdra, where CONSIDIUS lay with a strong garrison, and his cohort of gladiators. CÆSAR, after view-ing the place, being deterred from undertaking a siege for want of provisions, proceeded without delay about four miles farther, and encamped near the river; from thence again, the fourth day following, he returned to his camp at Agar. SCIPIO followed his example, and retreated likewise to his former quarters.

s *De eorum voluntate studioque erga Cæsarem.*—The passage is corrupted. Dr. Jurin's emendation makes the sense thus: "About the same time a de-serter from the town informed SCIPIO of their affection towards CÆSAR; "and we understood that before the intended garrison could arrive," &c. *Typogr.*

77. During these transactions, the Thabenenses, a people AFRIC.  
 subject to JUBA, whose country lies near the sea-coasts, WAR.  
 in the farthest part of his kingdom, having put the king's  
 garrison to the sword, sent messengers to CÆSAR, ac- The Tha-  
 quainting him with what they had done. He, applauding benenses de-  
 the action, sent them M. CRISPUS, the tribune, with a clare for  
 cohort, a party of archers, and store of warlike engines. Cæsar.  
 About this time all the soldiers, who had either been de-  
 tained by sickness, or any other occasion, from coming  
 with the former convoys to Africk, arrived together, a-  
 mounting to four thousand foot, four hundred horse, and a  
 thousand slingers and archers; having therefore drawn out  
 all these forces, and the legions he had before, he marched  
 about eight miles from his camp, and halted in a plain  
 about four miles distant from SCIPIO's.

78. There was a town below SCIPIO's camp, called Te- Both ar-  
 gea, where he generally had a garrison of about four hun- mies drawn  
 dred horse; here, having disposed his cavalry on the right out near  
 and left sides of the town, he drew out his legions, posted Tegea.  
 them upon a hill something lower than his camp, and so Cæsar's ca-  
 stood in order of battle about a mile before his lines. But valry en-  
 when SCIPIO had continued in this posture a considerable gaged with  
 time, and thrown away greatest part of the day to no pur- success.  
 pose, CÆSAR commanded his horse to charge the enemy's  
 that were placed before the town, sending a party of light-  
 armed infantry, archers, and slingers, to assist them. Our  
 cavalry had no sooner clapped spurs to their horses, in order  
 to make a vigorous attack, but PACIDIUS extended his  
 troops, that they might at the same instant surround, and  
 warmly return our onset: which CÆSAR observing, he  
 detached three hundred soldiers out of the next legion to  
 sustain his party; whereupon LABIENUS sent more cavalry  
 to the assistance of his, still ordering fresh men to relieve  
 the wounded and fatigued. Ours, who were only four  
 hundred, finding themselves an unequal match for as many  
 thousands, and being wounded by the light-armed Numi-  
 dians, began by degrees to give ground; which made CÆ-  
 SAR immediately dispatch another wing to their relief:  
 whereupon assuming fresh courage, we charged the enemy  
 again, killed many, wounded others, and put them all en-  
 tirely to the rout. Our men pursued them three miles,  
 till they had driven them to the hills, and then returned  
 again to the main body of our army; which having stood  
 in order of battle till four in the afternoon, CÆSAR retreated  
 to his camp, without the loss of a single man. In this  
 action

AFRIC. action was PACIDIUS dangerously wounded with a pile  
 WAR. which pierced his helmet; many other officers met with  
 the like fate, for none that endeavoured to signalize them-  
 selves escaped without death or wounds.

  
 Pacidius  
 wounded.

## C H A P. XVIII.

Prid. non.  
 Apr.

79. CÆSAR at length perceiving he could not persuade the enemy to quit the higher ground, and engage him with their legions; and that it was impossible for him to encamp nearer them through scarcity of water, concluded they depended more on that want of his, than their own courage. Wherefore, the fourth day of February, about three in the morning, leaving Agar, he marched to Thapsus, sixteen miles distant from the place whence he came. Here VIRGILIUS commanded with a strong garrison; but CÆSAR having encamped, began the same day to invest the town, and dispose parties in several passes, to prevent the enemy from gaining any place within the compass of his lines. SCIPIO, in the mean time, having notice of CÆSAR'S design, found himself obliged to hazard a battle, rather than suffer so signal a disgrace as the loss of Thapsus, and VIRGILIUS, who had been signally faithful to him: wherefore taking his rout along the hills, he immediately followed CÆSAR, and dividing his forces into two parties, sat down about eight miles from Thapsus.

80. There was a salt morass, between which and the sea lay a narrow passage, not above fifteen hundred paces long; and SCIPIO designed to march this way to the assistance of the town. But CÆSAR, foreseeing his attempt, had the day before erected a fort, and left a strong garrison there; then with the rest of his forces drew a line of circumvallation about Thapsus. Thus SCIPIO finding himself disappointed, spent a day and a night a little above the morass; but the morning after, so soon as it was day-light, removing his quarters about a mile further distant from our fort towards the sea, there encamped. CÆSAR, having notice of this, drew off his soldiers from the works, and leaving the proconsul ASPRENAS, with two legions, to secure his camp and baggage, marched immediately with the rest of his forces towards the enemy; he ordered part of his fleet to continue at Thapsus, and the rest to make

<sup>t</sup> The original is, *Prid. Non. Apr. tertiâ vigiliâ egressus, ab Agar xvi millia passuum nocte progressus, &c.* But that's impossible, therefore I have left out the word *noctē*.

as near the shore, towards the enemy's rear, as they could, AFRIC  
observing the signal he should give them; upon which they WAR.  
were immediately to set up a shout behind the enemy, who  
would thereby be obliged to look round in consternation  
and dismay.

81. When CÆSAR arrived at the place, observing the  
enemy had drawn out before their rampier, the elephants  
being disposed in their wing, and that part of their soldiers  
were notwithstanding employ'd in fortifying their camp,  
he likewise ranged his forces in order of battle in three se-  
veral lines; the tenth and second legion he placed in the  
right wing, the eighth and ninth in the left; then forming  
a \* fourth body of the fifth legion, he disposed five cohorts  
on either side before the wings, over-against the elephants:  
to these he likewise added archers, slingers, and light-  
armed foot intermingled with his cavalry. Walking thro'  
all the ranks on foot, he spoke courteously to the veteran  
soldiers, inciting them to behave themselves worthy of their  
former actions, and encouraged the new levies to rival their  
example; that, the victory obtained, they might possess  
the others place, and succeed to their glory.

82. Whilst CÆSAR was speaking to his soldiers, he ob-  
served the enemy were very uneasy, running up and down  
in great confusion, one while retiring within their trenches  
another while coming out again precipitately. Several ob-  
served this as well as himself; wherefore the lieutenants and  
volunteers unanimously desired he would give the signal of  
battle, since the immortal gods had certainly destined him  
the victory. Whilst CÆSAR was doubting with himself,  
striving to moderate their desire, and restrain the soldiers,  
because he thought it not convenient to attack the enemy  
first, on a sudden, without his leave, a trumpeter in the  
right wing, being compelled to it by the soldiers, sounded  
a charge; whereupon all the cohorts marched towards the  
enemy, whilst the centurions in vain interposed their autho-  
rity to make the men attend their general's orders.

83. Which CÆSAR perceiving, found it now too late to  
recall those who were so eager for the engagement; where-

One of Cæ-  
sar's trum-  
peters sounds  
a charge  
without his  
leave.

Cæsar gives  
Good For-  
tune for the  
word.

\* The text is, *Oppositis quinque legionibus in quarta acie, ante ipsa cornua  
quinis cohortibus contra bestias collocatis*; but I believe it should only be *opposita  
quinta legione*. BLADEN. But, 1. CÆSAR had nine legions with him (see §  
60. and JURIN on the place.) Now by this emendation mention is only made  
of five. 2. How in Latin or English can it be said *in quarta acie*, forming a  
fourth body, or rather line, when the author had before said the army was  
*triplici acie constituta*? Read therefore with Dr. JURIN, *in media acie*, for *in  
quarta acie*, i. e. forming his middle front with five legions. - Typogr.



**A F R I C.** fore having given Good Fortune for the word, he clapped  
**W A R.** spurs to his horse, and charged the enemy's front.

The elephants dis-ordered, and they rout their own army.

The archers and slingers on the right were now plying the elephants warmly with their darts; whereupon the unruly beasts, frightened with the noise of the slings and stones, turn'd their backs, and forcing their way through the thickest ranks behind them, endeavoured to enter the camp, where the gates were not above half finished: the officers of the Moorish cavalry, who were in the same wing, finding themselves deserted of their main support, did the like. Thus pursuing the elephants, our legions rendered themselves masters of their camp, after having killed some few that made a vigorous resistance; but the rest, being beaten back, made the best of their way to the place they were encamped in the day before.

A soldier taken up by an elephant in his trunk, wounds the beast so, that he obliges him to let him go again.

84. Here I must not omit recording the bravery of a veteran of the fifth legion; who (observing an elephant, enraged with a wound he had received, attacking a sutler unarmed) and having thrown him under his feet, with his bent knee pressed upon him with all his weight, till he had forced his soul from his body, making a dreadful noise all the while and brandishing his proboscis, could no longer contain himself from engaging the beast. The elephant, seeing him advance, quitted the dead body, and caught his enemy up in his trunk, wheeling him about, armour and all, in the air: the soldier, losing no presence of mind, notwithstanding the danger he was in, continually cut the animal's proboscis with his utmost force, till he obliged him to forego his prey, and retire with a hideous noise to the rest of his companions.

The garrison of Thapsus endeavour to get out of the town, but are beaten back again.

85. Whilst both armies were thus engaged, the garrison of Thapsus, either designing to assist their friends, or desert the town, made a sally through the gate adjoining to the sea, and marching navel deep through the water, endeavoured to gain the land, but were repulsed with stones and darts by the servants in the camp, who obliged them to retire again within their walls. SCIPIO's forces thus routed and dispersed about the field, CÆSAR's legions resolved to pursue them so close that they could have no time to rally. So soon as their broken troops arrived at the camp they designed to fly to, where they would have repaired the works, and again defended themselves, they found no commander whose orders and authority they should submit to. Observing likewise there was not so much as a guard left, immediately casting away their arms they fled into JUBA's quarters. These CÆSAR had already

ready possessed; wherefore now, despairing of safety, they retired to an adjacent hill, where they lowered their <sup>7</sup> swords and according to military custom, made signs of submission. But this could not mollify the veteran troops, who, enraged with grief and anger, granted no quarter, killing or wounding several persons of the most eminent quality, whom they upbraided for having been the authors of the war. Amongst this number was TULLIUS RUFUS, some time quæstor, who was transfixèd with a pile, and POMPEIUS RUFUS, who received a wound in his arm with a sword, and had infallibly been killed, had he not immediately escaped to CÆSAR. Whereupon several Roman knights and senators fled away for fear they should receive the same fate from the licentious soldiers, who thought the services of the day sufficient warrant for all their excesses. Thus SCIPIO's soldiers were put to the sword, even in CÆSAR's presence, notwithstanding they implored his compassion, and he endeavoured to restrain the fury of his men.

86. CÆSAR, having now made himself master of three several camps, killed ten thousand of the enemy, and routed the rest, only with the loss of fifty on his side, and a few wounded, retired to his former quarters. Thence he immediately drew out before Thapsus, causing sixty-four elephants he had taken, with all their armour, castles, and ornaments, to pass by the town, hoping thereby to reduce VIRGILIUS and the besieged to reason, after the defeat of their party: he himself likewise called to VIRGILIUS, inviting him to surrender to that mercy which his enemies had experienced from him; but perceiving the other returned no answer, he retreated from the walls. The day after, having offered sacrifice to the Gods, he summoned the soldiers to attend him; when making a speech to them within sight of the besieged, he applauded their courage, giving rewards to the whole veteran army in general, and not forgetting to recompence each private man's desert. Then quitted the place, having left the proconsul, C. REBILUS, to continue the siege with three legions, and detached CN. DOMITIUS with two others to Tisdra, where CONSIDIUS commanded; and sending M. MESSALLA before towards Utica, he followed himself with the cavalry.

A F R I C.

WAR.

Scipio's forces entirely routed. Juba's camp taken. Cæsar's soldiers grant no quarter.

Cæsar returns to Thapsus. Virgilius still holds out.

<sup>7</sup> The author had before said they flung away their arms, *armis abjectis in regia castra fugere contendunt*. How therefore now *armis demissis salutationem faciunt*, unless at first they only flung away their heavy arms, but retained their swords? Or shall we say, some flung away their arms, others did not? Let the reader chuse. *Typegr.*

AFRIC.  
WAR.

Caesar  
marches to  
Utica.

Scipio's  
horse that  
escaped the  
slaughter,  
sack Parada,  
plunder U-  
tica,

Porta Bel-  
lica,

87. SCIPIO'S horse that had escaped the slaughter, making the best of their way towards Utica, arrived at Parada; but the inhabitants, having before received news of CÆSAR'S victory, shut their gates against them. Upon which they stormed the town; then bringing great piles of wood into the market-place, and binding the inhabitants, they flung them upon it, and set fire to it; and, without respect to age and dignity, compelled them to expire in this miserable manner; which bloody work effected, they marched directly to Utica. CATO heretofore, finding the common people's affections alienated from him by the Julian law, from whence they received signal advantages, had expelled them the town, and taken away their arms, obliging them to encamp before the Warlike gate, where they were enclosed only with a small ditch, and attended with a constant guard; the senate he kept in custody within the walls. SCIPIO'S cavalry therefore, knowing these people were well-wishers to CÆSAR, assaulted the camp, that they might satiate their revenge by putting them to the sword. But the Uticans, assuming courage on the news of CÆSAR'S victory, repulsed the aggressors by the help only of stones and clubs; who not being able to force the trenches, flung themselves into the town, where they killed and plundered several of the inhabitants. CATO finding his persuasions ineffectual to restrain the soldiers, and bring them to join his forces for the common defence of the place; gave each of them a hundred sesterces to make them quiet: FAUSTUS SYLLA did the like out of his own pocket, and marching out of Utica along with them, bent his course towards Numidia.

Cato calls a  
council.

Furnishes  
those that  
are afraid,  
with ships.

88. By this time several had fled to Utica; whom CATO having assembled with the three hundred merchants that furnished SCIPIO with money to carry on the war, advised them to enfranchise their slaves, and maintain the town. But finding whilst part were willing to agree to his opinion, others were so terrified that they could think of nothing but making their escape, he furnished them with vessels, giving them free leave to sail whither they pleased. After this, having settled his own affairs, and recommended his children to the care of L. CÆSAR, his sub-treasurer, without the least suspicion (for his voice and countenance were still the same as formerly) pretending to go to sleep, he privately carried his sword into his bed-chamber with him, and run himself through the body. Before he expired, falling off the

the bed, the noise alarmed his people; immediately his friends AFRIC. and physicians came to his relief, but in vain they endeavour- W. A. R. ed to bind up his wound, for he forced it open again with his Cato kills himself. own hands, and died with the firmest resolution. Though hated by the Uticans, when alive, because of his different party, yet now in respect to his singular integrity, and out of gratitude for the wondrous fortifications he had erected to defend their town, they interred him honourably. CATO thus deceased, L. CÆSAR, to make the best use of this oc- He is ho- casion, assembling the people, made a speech, wherein he nourably bu- advised them to open their gates, and depend upon CÆ- ried by the SAR's mercy. His counsel being submitted to, he marched Uticans. to meet CÆSAR the Generalissimo. And MESSALLA, be- L. Cæsar ing now arrived at Utica, according to his orders, disposed advises them guards at every gate. to open their gates to Ju- lius Cæsar.

89. During these transactions CÆSAR, leaving Thapsus, arrived at Usceta, where SCIPIO had repositied plenty of corn, Cæsar takes arms, darts, and other warlike provisions; having soon Usceta by carried the place, he thence pursued his journey to Adu- surrender. metum, which immediately surrendered at discretion: in consideration of the corn and money he found there, he gave quarter to Q. LIGARIUS, and C. CONSIDIUS the son, who was governor of the place; then leaving LIVINEIUS REGULUS there with a legion, he marched directly for Utica. L. CÆSAR meeting him upon the road, threw him- He pardons self at his feet, desiring nothing more than the grant of his several of life, a request he easily obtained from CÆSAR's nature and the contrary wonted clemency. CÆCINA, C. ATEIUS, P. ATRIUS, the party. two L. CELLA's, father and son, M. EPPIUS, M. AQUINIUS, CATO's son, and DAMASIPPUS's children, enjoyed the like favour. In the evening, by torch-light, he arrived at Utica, but lodged that night without the town, to prevent disorders.

90. Next morning early he entered the town; and having Enters Utica, summoned all the inhabitants to attend him, first returned the Uticans thanks for their affection, then enlarged in a sharp invective against those Roman citizens, and the three hundred merchants that had furnished VARUS and SCIPIO with money to carry on the war. But at last he ordered them to lay aside their apprehensions, and appear before him; for he would pardon their lives, but confiscate their estates, allowing them however a liberty of redeeming them on payment of a fine certain. The merchants, who de- Fines the spairing of life, were already half dead with fear, joyfully 300 mer- embraced so grateful and unexpected a proffer, unanimously chants. desiring CÆSAR would please to impose an amercement in



**A**FRIC. grofs upon them all. He therefore ordered them to pay **WAR.** two hundred thousand <sup>2</sup>sesterces to the republick, at six equal payments, within the space of three years. Nor did any refuse the conditions, but each esteeming it the day of his nativity, returned CÆSAR sincere thanks for his mercy.

## C H A P. XX.

**91.** In the mean time JUBA, having escaped with PETREIUS out of the battle, hid himself always whilst it was day, and travelling only in the night, arrived in Numidia. But when he came to Zama, the usual place of his residence, which at the beginning of the war he had strongly fortified, having lodged his wives, children, riches, and most valuable things there; the inhabitants, upon the welcome news of CÆSAR'S victory, refused him admittance, because, when he first declared war against the people of Rome, he made considerable quantities of wood to be carried into the city, with which he erected a lofty pile in the middle of the market-place, designing, if he met with ill success, to throw the bodies of the citizens with all their effects upon it, and then setting fire to it, would destroy himself, his wives, children, subjects, and all his royal treasure together. He waited a long time before the gates, first making use of threats, afterwards of entreaties; but finding neither had any effect upon the people, he at last desired they would deliver him his wives and children, that they might share his misfortune; but perceiving they returned him no manner of answer, without obtaining any of his requests he left Zama, retiring with PETREIUS and a few cavalry to his lodge in the country.

**92.** Soon after, the inhabitants sent ambassadors to CÆSAR, who was then at Utica, to acquaint him with what they had done, and desire he would send a garrison to defend them, before JUBA could gather forces enough to assault the town, though they were ready to maintain the place for his service, even to the last man, being entirely devoted to his interest. CÆSAR, having given the ambassadors thanks, ordered them to return, and acquaint their fellow-citizens, he himself would quickly come to their relief. Accordingly, the day after, leaving Utica, he began his march. Several of JUBA'S officers met him upon the road, and most humbly supplicated his mercy: which he granted

<sup>2</sup> *Bis mille; H. S.* Supposing these to be sesterces in the neuter gender, they were worth 71. 6s. 3d. a sesterce, at Mr. KENNET'S computation. BLADEN: i. e. two hundred millions of sesterces, which at 2d. each amount to 1,666,666 l. 13s. 4d. of our money. *Typogr.*

them, and soon arrived at Zama. The fame of his cle-  
mency being now divulged, almost all the persons of qua-  
lity in the kingdom attended him there, and received as-  
surances of pardon.

93. Whilst affairs were in this posture, **CONSIDIUS**, who  
commanded at Tifdra, with his own retinue, a company of  
gladiators, and a party of Getulians, having notice of  
**SCIPIO**'s defeat, and being frightened at **DOMITIUS**'s ap-  
proach with the legions, abandoned the town in despair,  
and endeavouring to make his escape into his kingdom of  
Numidia with a few of the barbarians, and a considerable  
treasure, they cut his throat upon the road for the lucre of  
his money, then dispersed themselves up and down the  
country.

And now **C. VIRGILIUS**, finding it was in vain to make  
any further defence after he was invested by sea and land,  
considering all his party were either killed or dispersed;  
that **CATO** had laid violent hands upon himself at Utica;  
that **JUBA** wandered up and down deserted and despised by  
his subjects; that **SABURA**'s forces were routed by **SITIUS**;  
that **CÆSAR** had been received without the least opposition  
at Utica; and that of so numerous an army, not the least  
remainder was left from whence he might expect relief;  
capitulated with **CANINIUS REBILUS**, and surrendered him-  
self, his effects, and the town, to the proconsul.

94. **JUBA**, being refused admittance by all his cities, was  
reduced to despair; wherefore he and **PETREIUS**, that they  
might make an honourable exit, engaged each other with  
their swords; but **JUBA**, being the stronger of the two, soon  
dispatched **PETREIUS**; afterwards attempting to run him-  
self through the body, and finding he was not able to  
effect it, he procured that favour from one of his servants.

95. In the mean time **P. SITIUS** engaging **SABURA**,  
**JUBA**'s lieutenant general, defeated his army, killing him  
upon the spot; afterwards marching through Mauritania to  
**CÆSAR**, by accident he fell in with **FAUSTUS** and **AFRA-**  
**NIUS**, at the head of the party which had plundered Utica;  
who now amounted to about fifteen hundred, and designed  
to transport themselves to Spain. Wherefore having dis-  
posed an ambuscade over night, he fell upon them the next  
morning early with such success, that all were either killed or  
taken, except a few in the rear that made their escape.  
Amongst the number of the prisoners were **AFRANIUS**  
**FAUSTUS SYLLA**, with his wife and children. Not many  
days after, a mutiny arising amongst the soldiers, they cut

*Cæsar leaves  
Utica;*

*marches to  
Zama.*

*Considius  
deserts Tif-  
dra.*

*His throat  
cut by his  
guards for  
the sake of  
his money.*

*Virgilius  
surrenders  
Thapsus.*

*Juba and  
Petreius by  
consent kill  
each other.*

*Sitius de-  
feats and  
kills Sabura.  
Takes Afra-  
nius and  
Sylla.*

*They are  
killed by the  
soldiers.*

**A F R I C.** AFRANIUS and SYLLA to pieces. But CÆSAR took care  
**WAR.** of POMPEIA, SYLLA'S wife, and his children, restoring them  
 to their estates.

Scipio, with  
 several o-  
 thers, forced  
 into the port  
 of Hippos;  
 their ships  
 are sunk  
 there.

96. About the same time SCIBIO, DAMASIPPUS, TOR-  
 QUATUS, and PLÆTORIUS RUSTIANUS, long tossed by  
 adverse winds upon the sea, instead of arriving at Spain, as  
 they designed, were obliged to put into the haven of Hippos,  
 where SITIUS'S fleet rode at anchor; whose larger galleys  
 soon sunk their smaller ships, by which means SCIPIO with  
 his companions perished.

97. CÆSAR, after he had exposed the goods of king  
 JUBA, and those Roman citizens who had borne arms  
 against their country, to public sale, gave great rewards to  
 the inhabitants that had advised shutting the gates of Zama  
 against their king, and having freed the people from the  
 heavy imposts they had lain under, changed the kingdom  
 into a province, leaving CRISPUS SALLUSTIUS governor;  
 and then returned again to Utica.

Cæsar fines  
 the cities  
 that were in  
 the enemy's  
 interest.

Here likewise he confiscated the effects of those officers  
 that had served under JUBA and PETREIUS, fined the peo-  
 ple of Thapsus twenty thousand sesterces, and the company  
 of Roman merchants there thirty thousand; those of Adru-  
 metum thirty thousand more, and their company fifty thou-  
 sand, but preserved them from being plundered. Leptis,  
 which JUBA had some years before ransacked, and upon  
 complaint made to the senate had restitution made by ar-  
 bitrators, was ordered every year to furnish the republick  
 with thirty thousand pounds of oil; because at the begin-  
 ning of the war, by seditious advice, its chief inhabitants  
 had made an alliance with the king of Numidia, whom  
 they assisted with arms, soldiers, and money: but the peo-  
 ple of Tifdra, by reason of their extreme poverty, were  
 only condemned annually to pay a certain quantity of  
 corn.


Idibus Jun.  
 Cæsar ar-  
 rives in Sar-  
 dinia, or  
 Cagliari.

98. The war thus decided, CÆSAR embarked at Utica  
 the fourteenth of April, and arrived at Carales in Sardinia  
 within three days after: Here he amerced the Sulcitani,  
 for receiving and aiding NASIDIUS'S fleet, a hundred thou-  
 sand sesterces: and whereas they formerly used only to pay  
 a tenth, now he imposed an eighth upon them, and ordered  
 some few persons goods to be sold; afterwards on the  
 twenty-ninth of April, weighing anchor at Carales, sailed  
 along the coasts, and arrived within eight and twenty days  
 at Rome; having been obliged to put into several havens  
 by contrary winds,

a. d. iii. Cal.  
 Quint. 1  
 May 26.  
 Per Jul.  
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# HIRTIUS PANSA, or OPPIUS'S COMMENTARY OF THE SPANISH WAR.

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## The CONTENTS.


*CÆSAR's arrival in Spain. The occasion of the war. The battle of Munda. The taking of Cordova and Sevil. The death of POMPEY's eldest son. The taking of Munda. The siege of Ursaon. And CÆSAR's imperfect speech.*

## CHAP. I.

**P**HARNACES defeated and Africa reduced, those who with young CNEIUS POMPEY had escaped the slaughter, got possession of the farther Spain, whilst CÆSAR was employed in distributing rewards in Italy. SPANISH WAR. Per Jul. 4669. U. C. Var. 709. Young Pompey and his party get possession of the farther Spain. POMPEY, the better to strengthen his party, began to insinuate himself into the favour of every state; and partly by entreaty, partly by menaces, having levied a considerable army, he began to lay the province waste. Some cities freely sent him supplies, whilst others shut their gates against him; but if any of the latter happened to fall into his hands by assault, so little regard did he shew, even to his father's best friends, that, if they were accounted rich, he quickly found an occasion to cut them off, and distribute their effects amongst his licentious followers. His soldiers meeting so good encouragement, their number soon increased; wherefore they that were in CÆSAR's interest, dispatched frequent couriers into Italy, to demand his protection.



SPANISH  
WAR.



2. CÆSAR had now compleated his third dictatorship, was chosen a fourth time to the <sup>a</sup> same office ; when making what haste he could to dispatch the war in Spain, after several days journey, he met the deputies from Cordova upon the road, who had deserted from CN. POMPEY : they informed him, he might easily surprise their town by night, for the enemy, as yet, knew nothing of his arrival in the province, notwithstanding they had disposed scouts in every place, to bring them notice of it. Many other things they likewise proposed, which appeared so feasible, that CÆSAR immediately sent his lieutenants Q. PEDIUS and Q. FABIVS MAXIMVS advice of his coming, and commanded them to attend him with all the cavalry in their province. He finished his journey much sooner than he expected, and when he came to the place of rendezvous, found his orders punctually performed.

Ulla besieged  
by young  
Pompey.

Cæsar  
throws sup-  
plies into  
the town.


3. SEXTVS POMPEY now commanded in chief at Cordova, with a strong garrison (for this they accounted the capital of the province) whilst his elder brother invested Ulla, where he had been employed for some months. The besieged having notice of CÆSAR's arrival, contrived to send messengers to him desiring he would immediately come to their assistance. CÆSAR remembering how faithful the people of Ulla had always been to the republick, about nine o'clock that night detached eleven cohorts, with a proportionable number of horse to their relief, under the command of L. JULIVS PACIECVS, an experienced officer, who was well acquainted with the country. He happened to arrive at POMPEY's quarters, when it rained so violently, and the wind blew so hard, that it was difficult to distinguish even the nearest person ; which was a lucky opportunity, and as well improved ; for PACIECVS, ordering the horse to march two by two directly through the enemy's lines to the town, when they were in the midst of them, and the question was asked, Who went there ?" they made answer, " They had taken that occasion to approach the walls, and storm the town, therefore bid them be silent." Thus they got safe to the gates, and upon the signal given, were admitted in ; for part of SCIPIO's guards were prevented from doing their duty by the tempest, and the rest were satisfied with the answer PACIECVS's soldiers made them. Having so luckily succeeded in this attempt, both horse and infantry together, leaving a party within the town, made so vigorous a sally upon the enemy, who knew nothing of their ar-

<sup>a</sup> PLVTARCH says he was consul, not dictator, when he went into Spain.

rival,

arrival, that the greatest part of POMPEY's forces with much difficulty preserved themselves from being taken prisoners.

SPANISH  
WAR.



4. This supply thrown into Ulla, CÆSAR, that he might oblige POMPEY to quit the siege, marched directly for Cordova, sending a squadron of cavalry, and some select heavy-armed foot before. As soon as this party arrived within sight of the town, the infantry got up behind the troopers; which the people of Cordova could not observe; but when the enemy's horse made a sally to engage them, our foot dismounted and returned their charge so warmly, that out of a considerable number, but few returned to the town. This action so alarmed SEXTUS POMPEY that he wrote to his brother to hasten to him with supplies immediately, lest CÆSAR should take the place before he arrived. Thus CN. POMPEY, having almost rendered himself master of Ulla, on receipt of his brother's packet, was obliged to break up, and march with all his forces to Cordova.

Cæsar besieges Cordova, so obliges Pompey to quit Ulla.

CHAP. II.

5. WHEN CÆSAR came to the banks of the \* Guadalquivir, finding the river too deep to be forded, he caused baskets full of stones to be sunk, <sup>b</sup> whereon he erected a bridge over-against the town: which was supported by double beams, as we have already described, and having passed his army over it, divided them into three parties.

\* Bætia.

<sup>b</sup> The text is, *Ita insuper ponte facto, copias ad castra tripartito transduxit. Tenebant adversus oppidum e regione fontis trabes, ut supra scripsimus, bipartito.* To me these sentences do not only seem corrupt, but transposed; for the very next period says, *Huc quum Pompeius cum suis copiis venisset, & ex adverso pari ratione castra posuit*; which appears to have a more immediate connexion with the last sentence but one than the last; therefore I have taken the liberty of translating them in that order. I have likewise converted *Pontis* into *Pontem*, which, in my opinion, is the more natural construction of the two; for *tenebant* and *sustinebant* signify the same thing in some places. That part, *Ut supra scripsimus*, probably may refer to CÆSAR's description of the bridge over the Rhine: but I have already spoken more at large on that subject in my preface. Monsieur D'ABLANCOURT translates, *Copias ad castra tripartito transduxit*, Passa à trois fois toute son armée. And had CÆSAR passed his army over in ferry-boats, that could only have held such a number at a time, I should submit to his opinion: but I cannot conceive the necessity of making three passages when there was a bridge; therefore have rather chose to apply the *tripartito* to *castra* than *transduxit*. BLADEN. STEPHENS's copy reads *tendebant*; whence DAVIES reads better, *Tendebant adversus oppidum e regione pontis* (transfisse ut supra scripsimus) tripartito, i. e. he pass'd his army over the bridge in three divisions, and encamped between the town and the bridge, as I said they passed over, in three divisions likewise. What follows concerning POMPEY shews the A. was speaking of CÆSAR's encamping. Typogr.

POMPEY

SPANISH POMPEY likewise arriving at the same place, encamped  
 WAR. directly opposite to him, disposing his forces after the like  
 manner.

Skirmishes  
 between the  
 two armies.

CÆSAR, that he might cut off POMPEY's communication with the town, and the more easily intercept his convoys, began to draw a line of communication to the bridge, and the enemy did the like; which occasioned frequent skirmishes between the two armies, and various success. At last greatest part of each general's forces being drawn out, whilst either endeavoured to maintain his post, the dispute grew warm and dubious; for when the combatants approached the bridge, they wanted room to bestir themselves, and considerable numbers were thrown over into the river: Thus the loss was equal on both sides, for on both lay mountains of the slain. CÆSAR however frequently essayed all methods to draw POMPEY to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the war to a conclusion as soon as possible.

Cæsar  
 marches to  
 invest Ate-  
 gua.


6. But observing, though he had obliged the enemy to dislodge, yet he could never persuade them to accept of battle, he caused great fires to be made in the night, and crossing the river with all his forces, marched to Ategua, one of their strongest garrisons. POMPEY having notice of his decamping from the deserters, retired the same day, with all his baggage and ensigns, through a narrow road to Cordova: But on advice that CÆSAR had begun to invest Ategua, immediately marched to relieve it. CÆSAR, in the mean while, to compleat his lines, had erected several forts, part of which were possessed by his horse, part were to shelter his infantry, when they watched upon an out-guard. It happened to be a very cloudy morning, when POMPEY arrived, which gave him an opportunity of surrounding some of our cavalry with a party of his horse and cohorts, and of cutting almost all of them to pieces.

Pompey  
 arrives to  
 relieve the  
 place.

Pompey  
 encamps be-  
 tween Ate-  
 gua and U-  
 cubis.

7. The following night, POMPEY having put fire to his camp, crossed the river Salsus, and marching through the valleys, encamped upon a hill, between Ategua and Ucubis, whilst CÆSAR was employed in carrying on his works, raising mounts, vines, and preparing all things necessary for the siege. The country hereabouts is mountainous, and proper to encamp in, for the river Salsus runs through the plain, about two miles distant from Ategua. POMPEY therefore took up his quarters between the two towns; his army consisting of twelve legions, of which number those

he



he most depended on were, the second and the Spanish legion, both which had deserted from TREBONIUS; one levied amongst the Roman colonies; and another that had formerly served under AFRANIUS, which he brought along with him from Africk: as for the rest, they were composed chiefly of deserters and auxiliaries. But we were far superior to him in light-armed foot and cavalry.

8. The nature of the place, the plenty of water and provisions which all the province abounded with, enabled POMPEY to prolong the war; nor were the numerous forts, which had been erected in all places remote from great towns to prevent the excursions of the natives, less assistant to him in this design: for they were not covered with tiles, but terras, as in Africk; and in them were sentinels, which could descry any party at a considerable distance. Besides, most of the cities in the farther Spain being built upon hills, fortified by nature, and difficult of access, prevent an enemy's approaches, and cannot easily be reduced; as plainly appeared in this war.

Whilst the enemy lay between Ategua and Ucubis, within sight of both places, CÆSAR had possessed himself of a certain eminence, called POSTHUMUS's camp, about four miles distant from his own quarters, whereon he had built a fortress.

9. But POMPEY, who lay nearer the place, being covered by the very same ridge, observing it was remote from CÆSAR's camp, who he believed would be prevented from sending relief thither by the river Salsus; about twelve at night began to invest the fort, that he might deliver Ategua from so troublesome a neighbour. <sup>d</sup> When his party approached the place, setting up a sudden shout, they cast their darts with such success, that they quickly wounded several of our men.

Pompey attacks a fort of Cæsar's, without success.

But when we began to defend ourselves, and CÆSAR, on notice of the action, approached with three legions to our relief, many of the enemy were killed or taken, others

<sup>c</sup> Compare § 13. with § 10, 12, 20.

<sup>d</sup> The original indeed is, *Nostri cum appropinquassent, clamore repentino, telorumque multitudine jactus facere cœperunt*, but it is palpably corrupt; for this action, as appears by the following sentence, relates to POMPEY's men; therefore it should either be *Illi cum, &c.* or *Nostri cum appropinquassent*. BLADEN. But it relates as well to CÆSAR's men, if with DAVIES we change the stop, and read—*castrum oppugnare cœpit. Ut laborantibus succurrerent, nostri, &c.* i. e.---began to invest the fort. Upon their approach, CÆSAR's men, to support their friends, setting up a great shout, cast their darts with such success that they wounded several of the enemy. Afterwards, when we had begun to make a good defence at the fort, and CÆSAR, &c. *Typegr.*



SPANISH flung away their arms, that they might the more easily  
WAR. make their escape; so that when the dispute was over, we  
found eighty shields which they had left behind them.

10. The next morning early arrived ARGUETIUS with a party of cavalry, and five colours he had taken from those of Saguntum; but was obliged to quit his post by Asprenas, who came with another body of horse from thence to CÆSAR. This night POMPEY decamped, and marched towards Cordova; but king INDUS, following their rear with too much ardour, was taken and killed by the Spaniards.

Pompey  
decamps;  
marches to  
Cordova.

11. The day following, our cavalry pursued a convoy that brought provisions from Cordova to POMPEY, for a considerable space, and took fifty prisoners besides horses: the same day Q. MARCIUS, a tribune in POMPEY's army, deserted to us; and that very night, about twelve o'clock, the besieged began to storm our lines with great fury, casting plenty of combustible matter within our trenches, either fixed to their darts, or conveyed some other way.

This attempt being ended, C. FUNDANIUS, a Roman knight, came over to us.

12. The day after, two soldiers of the Spanish legion, being taken by our men, pretended themselves to be servants, but were discovered by those that had formerly served under FABIVS and PEDIUS, to be deserters from TREBONIUS, and were therefore put to death. About the same time, the couriers that were dispatched from Cordova to POMPEY, mistaking our camp for his, had their right-hands cut off, and were dismissed. In the mean while the besieged, according to their usual custom, about nine o'clock at night, spent a considerable time in casting darts and fire upon our soldiers; which wounded several of them; and by break of day sallied out upon the sixth legion, whilst our forces were busy about the works, and began a sharp dispute; but were repulsed with many wounds, by the bravery of our men, notwithstanding they had the advantage of the ground.

The be-  
sieged in  
vain attempt  
to force  
Cæsar's  
lines.

13. The day after, POMPEY began to draw a line of communication from his camp to the river Salsus, and surprized a small party of our horse, who were obliged, after the death of three troopers, to give way to his superior numbers. This day A. VALGUS, a senator's son, whose

<sup>e</sup> The text does not exactly agree with this, but can't be understood any other way.

<sup>f</sup> The next sentence is exactly the same, only different in the manner of expression, therefore I have left it out.

brother was in POMPEY's camp, leaving all his baggage SPANISH WAR. behind him, mounted his horse, and went over to the enemy. One of POMPEY's spies, that belonged to the second legion, being taken, was put to the sword: but about the same time POMPEY shot a billet into Ategua with this inscription, "The moment CÆSAR should endeavour to storm the town, he would come to their assistance:" which put the besieged in such hopes, that they ascended their walls with less apprehensions than before, and began to flatter themselves, they might hold out. The day after we overthrew a considerable part of their outward rampier; the enemy took some of our soldiers prisoners, who had formerly deserted from them, but dismissed them to CÆSAR with some of the chief officers of the garrison, that they might obtain for them the liberty of marching out with their baggage. To which CÆSAR replied, "It was not his custom to let the enemy choose their conditions, but to impose them at his pleasure." When the besieged received this answer, setting up a shout, they began to cast showers of darts upon our men, and attack us in our trenches, which made most people believe they would attempt a sally: wherefore surrounding the town on every side, we engaged them very briskly, plying them at the same instant with our engines, which killed five of their men in one turret, and a boy, whose business it was to observe our battery. \*

14. Some time after POMPEY erected a fort on the other side the Salsus, without meeting any opposition, and was not a little proud to think he had been able to effect such a design, so near us. The day after, endeavouring to carry on his lines, some of his cavalry and light-armed foot encountered another party of our horse, who were soon obliged to give ground, being inferior to the enemy in number, and wanting infantry to sustain them. This action happened within view of both camps, and POMPEY, seeing his men pursue, was not a little elated with the success: but our cavalry having retreated some paces, and being reinforced by a party of foot, faced about and renewed the fight with equal vigour.

Pompey builds a fort on the other side the Salsus.

A skirmish, where Pompey has the worst.

15. Whenever a trooper dismounts to engage a foot soldier, he generally finds himself over matched, as appeared in the late action, when a select number of light-armed infantry, on a sudden attacked our horse, who

\* The text is not *tenere*, but *potiri*, which must of necessity be a corruption: but this book is so full of errors, I shall for the future give the reader and myself no further trouble, than to mark such places thus \*

**SPANISH WAR.** alighted to sustain the charge. Thus, in a moment, from a horse it became a foot skirmish; and again, from a foot, a horse rencounter. Not far off from our rampier was a considerable slaughter made; for on the enemy's side fell an hundred and twenty-three, several were disarmed, and the rest obliged to fly to their quarters; on our side three were killed, besides twelve foot and five troopers wounded.

The garri-  
son of Ate-  
gua put the  
townsmen  
to the sword.

The remainder of the day the fight was maintained from the walls as usual. At length, when they had cast many javelins, and much fire upon our men to no purpose, most inhumanly, before our eyes, they began to murder the townsmen, and threw them over the walls, as is customary among the Barbarians; an action which has not been heard of among us since the memory of man.

Make ano-  
ther sally to  
no purpose.

16. In the evening they privately sent an incendiary to set fire to our turrets and rampier, designing that night, about twelve, to make an eruption. Accordingly, having thrown plenty of darts, and consumed a considerable part of our rampier, opening that gate which fronted POMPEY's camp, they sally'd out with all their forces, bringing fascines along with them to fill up the ditches, hooks to destroy the barracks (which our men had covered with straw, to defend them from the cold) and fire to reduce them to ashes: so likewise, to amuse our soldiers, they brought all their effects along with them, that, whilst we should be employed in seizing the plunder, they might fight their way through, and escape to POMPEY, who, expecting their arrival, watched with all his forces, in order of battle, on the other side the Salsus, to favour their retreat. But though they surpris'd us, yet by the bravery of our resolution, we drove them back again with many wounds into the town, making ourselves masters of the spoil, their arms, and some prisoners, who were killed the day after.

The next day a deserter that came from Ategua informed us, JUNIUS was employed in the mine whilst the massacre happened amongst the inhabitants; \* but upon his return, severely reprimanded the soldiers for being guilty of so bloody and ungrateful an action, by which they had violated the laws of hospitality against those who had made them partakers of all their domestic and religious privileges; adding many things more to the like purpose, which put a stop for the future to such inhuman practices.

Deputies  
sent to treat  
of a surren-  
der.  
Their  
speech,

17. The following day TULLIUS, with CATO the Portuguese, were sent as deputies to CÆSAR, who opened their embassy in these words: "We could heartily wish  
the

the immortal gods had ordained us to have been your soldiers rather than POMPEY's; that so we might have given these proofs of our constancy in attending on your victories, not in being companions of his sufferings; since the fruit of our fidelity is only this, that being born with the privileges of Roman citizens we see the desolation of our country, and ourselves given up as the enemies of it. It has been our hard destiny to serve a man, whose prosperity we shared not, nor have been able to assist him in his adversity: in fine, having long sustained the attack of so many legions, watching night and day to oppose your \* designs; deserted by POMPEY, and overcome by your superior bravery, we have nothing left to depend on but your mercy: We conjure you therefore not to shew less compassion to surrendering Romans, than you have done to foreigners." "The compassion, replied CÆSAR, I have shewn to foreigners, I extend to you."

18. CÆSAR having dispatched the embassadors, as C. ANTONIUS entered the town, he perceived TIB. TULLIUS did not follow him; wherefore, returning to the gate, he caught hold of him, upon which TULLIUS cut off ANTONIUS's hand, and so made his escape to CÆSAR. About the same time a standard-bearer of the first legion came over, who informed us, the day the engagement happened between the horse, thirty-five of his company were killed: but they were not permitted to say they had lost a single man in POMPEY's camp. Not long after, a slave in CÆSAR's camp having murdered his master, who had left his wife and children in the town, made his escape to POMPEY; \* and gave CÆSAR an account, by a letter fastened to a bullet, what condition of defence the town was in. Afterwards, when they whose business it was to throw such bullets, were returned into the town, two Portuguese brothers came over to CÆSAR, and gave him an account \* what message POMPEY had sent them, That since he could not relieve them, he advised the besieged privately to withdraw in the night towards the sea: to which one making answer, It were more honourable to venture another engagement, than appear to fly; he was immediately killed. About the same time we intercepted \* one of their couriers that was carrying a packet to the town: CÆSAR delivered the letters to the inhabitants, and the messenger begging his life, had it granted, with promise of further reward, provided he set fire to the enemy's wooden turret; which could not be effected without imminent danger. He unde-

Pompey's  
advice to the  
besieged.



SPANISH dertook the enterprize; but going to execute the design, **W A R.** was killed by the besieged. The same night a deserter informed us, POMPEY and LABIENUS were very angry to hear the townsmen had been murdered.

Another in-  
effectual  
sally.

L. Minu-  
tius's letter  
to Cæsar.

Deputies  
sent again.

Cæsar's an-  
swer.  
The town  
surrenders.

19. About nine o'clock at night, the enemy stormed a wooden turret of ours so vigorously, that the first, second and third story began to fall: whilst others, at the same instant, attacked our trenches, and having a fair wind, set fire to the upper part of the same tower. The next morning a matron cast herself over the wall, and came to our camp, telling us her maid was joined in the same attempt, but, being apprehended, was put to death. And not long after a letter was found, wherein was thus written, "L. MINUCIUS to CÆSAR: If you will pardon my life, since I am deserted by POMPEY, I will serve you with the same sincerity I have done my duty to him." And at the same time the town sent the former ambassadors again to CÆSAR, desiring only their lives, and they would deliver up the place the next day. To which he reply'd, "He was CÆSAR, and they might be secure in his promise." Thus Ategua surrendered the nineteenth of February, and CÆSAR was saluted thereupon with the title of Imperator.

### CH A P. III.

Pompey re-  
moves near-  
er Ucubis.  
Cæsar fol-  
lows him.

20. POMPEY having notice from some deserters, that the town had changed its master, removed nearer Ucubis, where he began to build fortresses, and contain himself within his lines. CÆSAR likewise decamped, and lodged as near him as he could. About this time we were informed by a Spanish legionary soldier, who deserted to us, that POMPEY had assembled the inhabitants of Ucubis, and commanded them to make strict enquiry after all malecontents. Some time before this the slave that had murdered his master, being taken in a mine, was burned alive; and eight more soldiers of the Spanish legion came over to us: but a party of our horse and light-armed infantry encountering another of the enemy, were worsted, and some of them wounded. This evening our scouts surprized three servants and some Spanish soldiers; the former were hanged, and the latter beheaded.

21. The day following, some of the enemy's cavalry and light armed foot deserted to us; at the same time about eleven of their horse falling in with a party of our soldiers that were sent out to fetch water, killed some, and took others prisoners; amongst which number were eight troopers.

The

The next morning POMPEY condemned seventy-four persons to be beheaded for favouring CÆSAR'S cause, and gave orders for \* apprehending others; but a hundred and twenty made their escape to CÆSAR.

SPANISH  
WAR.

Pompey  
condemns

several to  
death, o-  
thers escape  
to Cæsar.

The nego-  
tiation at  
Bursavola.

22. After this some of the inhabitants of Offuna, whom CÆSAR had taken prisoners at Ategua, were sent to acquaint their countrymen what usage they must expect from POMPEY, whose soldiers had massacred the people of Ategua, and committed several other outrages in their presence. When they arrived at the town, attended by some Roman knights and senators of our party, no one durst enter, except those that were natives of the place. In fine, after many messages carried backwards and forwards, as the deputies were retiring to our party, the garrison pursued, and put them all to the sword, except two that made their escape to CÆSAR. \* However, the inhabitants of Bursavola having sent spies to Ategua, to learn the truth of the deputies report, and finding what they had told them confirmed, raised a tumult, and surrounding \* the governor, resolved to stone him, for having caused the ambassadors to be murdered: but \* they spared him upon his earnest suit that he might be indulged the liberty of clearing himself before CÆSAR. Under this pretence being dismissed, he gathered a strong party, and was admitted within the gates by treachery in the night; where he made a dreadful slaughter amongst the townsmen; and having cut off the chief men of the contrary party, again reduced the town into his power. When this was over, as we were informed by some servants that deserted; he confiscated the inhabitants goods, and permitted no one to stir out without leaving their arms; for since Ategua was taken, several being frightened, and despairing of success, had come over to \* us. But when any of ours deserted, \* they met not with equal encouragement, for they were placed among the light-armed infantry, and received only \* their pay, sixteen asses a day.

The depu-  
ties murder-  
ed.

The townsmen surround the governor; he narrowly escapes.

Returns and murders the inhabitants.

23. The day following CÆSAR removed his camp nearer POMPEY'S, and began to draw a line to the river Salsus; but whilst our men were employ'd about the works, a strong party of the enemy's forces came pouring down from the higher ground upon them, and \* wounded several. Whereupon, \* contrary to their usual custom, they began to retreat; which being observed, some centurions of the fifth legion crossed the river to sustain them. The dis-

Cæsar re-  
moves near-  
er to Pom-  
pey.

a Ut ait Ennius, Nostri cessere parumper.

SPANISH  
WAR:



A skirmish:  
Cæsar's party  
get the  
better.

pute was carried on with great vigour; but one of the centurions having received many wounds from the darts that fell from the higher ground, expired: his fellow-officer, after his death, still endeavoured to maintain his ground, till finding himself surrounded on every side, he began to \* retreat; and stumbling, multitudes of the enemy flocked about him. Yet they were soon repulsed by our horse, who obliged them to retreat to their rampier; but persisting with too much ardour, were intercepted by POMPEY's cavalry and light-armed foot. So that if they had not behaved themselves with the utmost bravery, they had all been taken; being driven into so narrow a compass, that they had hardly room enough to move their arms. \* In this action were wounded several horse and foot, amongst the rest CLODIUS AQUITIUS; but our party came off victorious, having only lost the two centurions.

An action:  
Cæsar victorious.

24. The day after both armies withdrawing from Sarracaria, we continued our works: but POMPEY perceiving his communication with the fort of Aspavia cut off, found himself obliged to fight: However, he did not proffer us battle upon equal terms, but drew up upon a hill, that he might have the advantage of the upper ground. Both armies therefore having contended for a certain eminence, our men forced them to retire into the plain; which gained us the day: we made a dreadful slaughter amongst them on every side, whilst they fled before us, and were obliged to the next rising ground, not to their courage, for preservation. But had not the night befriended them, though inferior in number, \* we had certainly cut them all to pieces; for three hundred twenty-four of their light-armed infantry, and a hundred thirty-eight of their legionary soldiers, fell upon the place, not computing those that were disarmed. Thus the loss of the two centurions, but the day before, was richly vindicated.

The combat  
between  
Turpio and  
Niger.

25. The next day POMPEY's \* horse, according to their usual custom, came towards our lines, for none but his cavalry durst venture to draw up upon even ground. Hither they flocked in considerable numbers, whilst our men were employed about the works, frequently calling upon our legionary soldiers, and provoking them to an engagement, \* designing, if we pursued, when they should have drawn us some distance from the camp, to face about and give us battle. Our men having advanced some paces beyond the valley they were posted on, halted on a more \* equal place; whereupon the enemy did not think fitting to engage them.

But

But ANTISTHIUS TURPIO, one of their party, depending on his strength, and thinking no person able to encounter him, \* professed himself the champion of the cause: QUINTUS POMPEIUS NIGER, a Roman knight, born in Italy, soon accepted the challenge, and their meeting was not unlike that of <sup>a</sup> ACHILLES and MEMNON.

\* Both armies being drawn out, their minds were wholly intent on the success of the combatants, each impatiently expecting the fate of their champion. <sup>b</sup> The \* knights descended into the field with equal sprightliness, armed with resplendent shields; and they had certainly been parted, but for our soldiers, who had disposed themselves not far off, to prevent the designs of the enemy's horse and light-armed infantry. When our men were retreating towards the lines, the enemy fell upon their rear with great fury: but, facing about, we returned their charge with such vigour, that they were obliged to retire to their camp, after having lost several of their party.

26. CASSIUS's horse behaved themselves so well on this occasion, that CÆSAR rewarded them with a present of thirteen thousand <sup>c</sup> sesterces; amongst the light-armed foot he distributed ten thousand more, and gave the captain of the party two golden chains. This day likewise A. BÆBIUS, C. FLAVIUS, and A. TREBELLIVS, all Roman knights of Aſta, came over to CÆSAR loaden with treasure, reporting, all the Roman knights in POMPEY's army had agreed to do the like; but their design being discovered by a slave, they were apprehended.

Not long after, we took a courier with a packet, from POMPEY to the people of Oſſuna\*: "Wishing you the same health we at present enjoy, this is to acquaint you, we have hitherto had all the success we could desire over the enemy, and should put an end to the war sooner than you could expect, provided they would but offer us battle upon equal terms. But they dare not bring their raw army into the


<sup>a</sup> This citation, though trifling for an historian, is abundantly more pardonable than the former, where, in the midst of an important description, he quotes Ennius's authority for a common phrase, which I have remarked in the foregoing leaf, *ut ait Ennius, Noſtri ceſſere parumper*; a way of writing by no means agreeable to the state and gravity required in an historic style.

<sup>b</sup> But whether got the victory, this careless author, or his more negligent transcribers, have left undetermined. Yet one would believe Nigèr had the better of it, because Cæſar's men prevented their being parted.

<sup>c</sup> According to Mr. KENNET's computation, 1s. 3d. each, for I cannot suppose them to be in the neuter gender. BLADEN. *Tredecim ſeſtertia* or *tredecim millia ſeſtertium*, 13,000 ſeſterces, at 2d. each, amounting to 108l. 6s. 3d. English money.



SPANISH  
WAR.



plain, and only prolong the war by the assistance of those forts they have surprized. For removing from one country to another, they supply themselves with corn. But we shall take care to cover those states which are under our protection, and decide the war as soon as possible. We design to send you some cohorts for your defence, and doubt not, but when we shall have intercepted the enemy's supplies, they will find themselves obliged to fight."

Pompey de-  
camps;  
marches to-  
an olive wood near Seville.  
Caesar burns  
Ucubis, and  
follows him.

27. Some time after, our men being carelessly dispersed about the works, a party of our cavalry, that went to fetch wood, were killed by the enemy in a thicket of olives. This day came over several slaves, who informed us, that ever since the action on the fifth of March at Soritia, all POMPEY's army had been in continual apprehensions, and ATEIUS VARUS had been appointed to survey their lines. Immediately after, POMPEY removed, and encamped in an olive wood near Seville. But CÆSAR did not follow him till \* midnight, giving orders to the garrison he had put into Ucubis when it surrendered, to set fire to the town, and afterwards to join the rest of his army. Ventiponte surrendered to him by the way; from thence he marched to Carruca, and took up his quarters over-against POMPEY's: who, \* before his arrival, had reduced the town to ashes, the inhabitants having refused him entrance. Here, apprehending a \* deserter from our army, who had murdered his brother, we put him to death. Then we pursued POMPEY to the plains of Munda, and sat down directly opposite to him.

Pursues  
Pompey to  
the plains of  
Munda.

## CHAP. IV.

28. THE day following, as CÆSAR designed to march further, he had notice that POMPEY's army had been drawn out in order of battle \* a considerable time. He intended to have marched towards Ossuna, to convince the inhabitants, as raw as his army was, that he durst venture to descend into the plains, notwithstanding POMPEY's letter, which had given them so great hopes, and persuaded them he had so much the advantage. However, so soon as he received this intelligence, he immediately gave the sign of battle, though the enemy had the advantage of the ground, and were defended by the fortifications of Munda, near which they lay encamped; for, as we have already taken notice, \* the best towns are built upon hills.

29. Here I must not omit to give an account what happened at this juncture. Between both armies lay a plain about five miles over; but POMPEY was defended, as well by the nature of the place he possessed, as the town, at the foot whereof began this valley, through which ran a river, that served as well as the rising ground to prevent our approach to the enemy; for on the right, overflowing its banks, it made a morass. CÆSAR doubted not in the least but the enemy would meet him half way, because the plain was within view of \* Munda. Besides, having \* disposed their cavalry on the lower ground, the day being serene, and the sun shining bright, our soldiers began to rejoice, that the immortal gods had blessed them with so happy an opportunity; though some were uneasy to think, how soon the fate of both parties should be placed in the balance of fortune. Thus we proceeded to give them battle, expecting they would do the like: But when we arrived within a thousand paces of the town, the enemy did not think fit to advance towards us, still continuing close by the walls. Wherefore we marched so near, that the equality of the ground might invite them to the engagement: nor was this sufficient to entice them from the mountains; where they continued till our men, arriving at the river, made a halt.

SPANISH  
WAR.

A description  
of the  
place of  
action.

30. Their army consisted of thirteen legions; their wings were lined with cavalry and six thousand light-armed foot, besides as many auxiliaries. But we had only eighty cohorts, and eight thousand horse. Thus when we arrived at the extreme part of the valley, the enemy stood ready on the higher ground, to prevent our further progress. Which CÆSAR observing, that his rashness might not draw his soldiers into an inconvenience, he caused a mark to be made, beyond which they were not permitted to pass; which restraint rendered them more eager. This pause likewise made the enemy more inclinable to engage, whilst they fancied our men were afraid of them: wherefore \* descending a few paces from the higher ground, they gave us an opportunity of coming at them, though not without danger: however, our men, setting up a shout, began the charge.

The disposition  
of both  
armies.

The tenth legion, according to CÆSAR's usual custom, was placed in the right; the third and fifth, with the auxiliaries and horse, in the left.

The battle  
begins.

31. The dispute was maintained with great obstinacy on both sides; for though they had the advantage of the ground,

SPANISH ground, yet that was compensated by our bravery. However, so great was the noise, so dreadful the concourse, so thick flew the darts, that our soldiers began to despair of victory; for the enemy returned our first charge, which is usually of greatest consequence in a battle, with equal vigour. \* The fight had continued dubious for some time, when a shower of javelins, from our side, made a dreadful slaughter amongst POMPEY's forces. Whereupon the tenth legion, which we have already observed to have been posted in the right, put the \* enemy's left wing into a great disorder, and obliged them to give ground, till another legion detached from the \* right of their army, came to sustain them, and prevent their being surrounded. In the mean time our cavalry in the left, laying hold of this opportunity, pressed the enemy's right, who in return maintained the charge so vigorously that there was no room for aid to interpose. The shouting of the soldiers, intermix'd with groans, and the clashing of arms, did not a little terrify our new levies; for here, as <sup>d</sup> ENNIUS says, Foot to foot was set, and arm to arm. But at length, after a vigorous resistance, the enemy gave ground, and \* retired to the town; some few of them embracing the only means left for saving themselves, that of escaping to the place they came from. <sup>e</sup> In this action, which happened on the feast of Bacchus, POMPEY lost near thirty thousand men, amongst which number were LABIENUS and ATTIVUS VARUS, whose funerals were celebrated after the battle: besides three thousand Roman knights, part of Rome, part of the Province. We took all their eagles, several other ensigns, and POMPEY's fasces, with seventeen general officers. Whereas on our side were only a thousand, part horse, part infantry, killed, and five hundred wounded.

Pompey  
defeated.

Mar. 17.  
xvi Kal.  
Apr.

## CHAP. V.

Munda in-  
vested.

32. SUCH was the event of this battle; they who escaped retired into Munda; which obliged us to draw a line of circumvallation about the town. We made use of the enemies dead bodies instead of turfs; their shields and javelins heaped supplied the place of a rampier; round about were fixed the heads of the deceased on swords and daggers,

<sup>d</sup> The second time he has cited ENNIUS.

<sup>e</sup> PLUTARCH and APPIAN give a different account of this battle, and tell us, CÆSAR was never before engaged in so dangerous an action; here, he used to say, he fought for life, in other places for victory.

to strike the greater terror into the besieged, \* and let them SPANISH WAR. see the rewards they were to expect for their obstinacy.

\* The management of this siege was committed to the Gauls, who having thus compleated their lines, began to assault the town with darts and javelins.

Young VALERIUS, having made his escape with a few cavalry, retired to Cordova; where he acquainted Valerius escapes to Cordova, acquaints the younger Pompey with the defeat, who thereupon quits the town. SEXTUS POMPEY with the melancholy news: who thereupon immediately divided what ready money he had \* amongst the horse, and pretending he was going to treat with CÆSAR concerning a peace, about nine o'clock the same night left Cordova. In the mean time his elder brother, with a small party of cavalry and foot, made the best of his way towards his navy, which lay at Carteia, a town about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Cordova. When he was arrived within eight miles of the place, he sent The elder Pompey flies to Carteia. P. CALVITIUS, the marshal of his camp, before, to fetch a litter to carry him to the town, finding himself indisposed. His orders were obeyed, and when he entered Carteia, several of his friends attended him, privately to enquire about the state of affairs. But the whole town soon flocking about him, \* he found himself obliged to acquaint them with the truth, and trust to their fidelity.

33. The battle being over, and the lines about Munda compleated, CÆSAR marched towards Cordova, where Cæsar marches to Cordova. part of the enemy's forces that escaped the slaughter, had possessed themselves of a bridge. Upon our arrival there, they laughed at us, when they saw how inconsiderable our number was, demanding, whither we designed to fly? as if we had been the army defeated. Thus they began to oppose our passage; but CÆSAR having crossed the river, encamped on the other side. SCAPULA, who had levied the freedmen and seditious, Scapula's death. escaping to Cordova, called his followers about him; and causing a funeral pile to be erected, adorned it with his richest garments; he then ordered a sumptuous supper to be prepared: which being ended in good time, he distributed what money he had amongst his attendants: and having plenty of frankincense and spike-nard with him, \* ascended the pile, commanding a freedman, his catamite, to dispatch him, and another to put fire to the stack.

35. In the mean time arose so loud a contention amongst the besieged, whilst some were for POMPEY, others for CÆSAR, that the noise was heard even in our camp. A dissention in the town. Some of the forces in garrison consisted of vagabonds, and the townsmen's



SPANISH townsmen's slaves, whom POMPEY had enfranchised; who immediately on CÆSAR's arrival, \* were for surrendering; but the thirteenth legion made a vigorous defence; \* and

W A R.

The inhabitants demand a guard of Cæsar.

Cæsar gains the town.

part of their turrets being beaten down, they still ascended the walls. At length the inhabitants sent to desire CÆSAR would grant them a party for the defence of the town; whereupon the garrison began to set fire to their houses, but were beaten by our men, and twelve thousand of them killed upon the spot, not computing those that fell without the walls. Thus CÆSAR rendered himself master of Cordova; and whilst he was employed here, the besieged at Munda made a vigorous sally, but were repulsed into the town again with considerable loss.

Cæsar marches to Seville; which surrenders.

35. CÆSAR marched next towards Seville; but deputies met him upon the road, and humbly besought he would spare the town; which he condescended to, and sent lieutenant CANINIUS thither with a garrison. POMPEY's forces within the town, taking it ill that CÆSAR's should be admitted, privately dispatched one PHILO, a staunch assertor of his party's interest, to Portugal, where he was well known, \* to obtain assistance from CÆCILIUS NIGER, surnamed the Barbarous, who lay encamped there, near Lenium, with a considerable number of the natives. Being privately received into the town at his return, he put the centinels and garrison to the sword, and shutting the gates began to defend the place.

The town recovered by a plot.

Carteia sends deputies to acquaint Cæsar they had seized Cn. Pompey.

36. In the mean time arrived deputies from Carteia, who, to atone for having denied entrance to CÆSAR, now brought him word they had secured POMPEY. The Portuguese, all that while, obstinately \* held out; which CÆSAR observing, lest despair might make them set fire to the city, and demolish the walls, if besieged too closely, held a council that night, wherein it was resolved, the garrison should have an opportunity of making an eruption: accordingly the Portuguese, not thinking it was a liberty design'd them, having forced their way to the river Bætis, put fire to our ships that rode at anchor there, and whilst we were employed in extinguishing the flame, made their escape; but were afterwards pursued by our cavalry and cut to pieces. Thus CÆSAR having recovered Seville, marched towards Asta; which sent ambassadors to meet him, and deliver the keys of their town. Whilst these affairs were transacting, Munda having long been closely besieged, several who had escaped thither out of the battle, deserted to us, and were distributed amongst our troops;

Cæsar regains Seville.

Asta surrenders.

but

but before they came over, the besieged and they had agreed upon a certain signal to be given in the night, when they within the walls were to make a vigorous sally, whilst the deserters did what execution they could in the camp. The plot being discovered, the next night about twelve o'clock, the \* soldiers were ordered to cast lots for their lives, and all the officers were put to death without the rampier.

SPANISH WAR.  
The conspiracy of Pompey's party at Munda detected.

## C H A P. VI.

37. CÆSAR took in all the towns as he march'd along, which now deserted POMPEY, who was \* employed at this time in quieting an insurrection at Carteia; for only part of the town consented to the sending of deputies to CÆSAR, one half still remained in POMPEY's interest. After a warm dispute he made \* himself master of the gate, and having received some wounds, secured his retreat to his thirty gallies, so escaped. But DIDIUS, who commanded a squadron of CÆSAR's ships at Cadiz, on notice of POMPEY's flight, immediately put out to sea after him; having first ordered several horse and foot to embark, in case there should be occasion to pursue by land. He chased him four days before he came up with him, when the enemy, who hoisted sail without necessary provisions, found themselves obliged to put into land for fresh water: in the mean time DIDIUS arriving, burnt several of their ships, and took the rest.

A sedition at Carteia: Pompey is wounded, and narrowly escapes: Is pursued by Didius, and killed.

Pompey lands; his ships taken and burned.

38. POMPEY thus reduced, fled for shelter to a place fortified by nature; but our horse and infantry, who were put on board for that particular service, having sent their scouts before, pursued day and night without intermission. POMPEY had been dangerously wounded at \* Carteia in his shoulder and left leg; besides, he had put his ankle out of joint, which prevented his making speedy journies; being forced to be carried in a litter. However, \* the better to disguise himself, he had put on the habit of a Portuguese soldier; but being found out by CÆSAR's party, they quickly surrounded the \* place where he was, with their foot and cavalry. The post was difficult of access, for the moment he perceived himself discovered, he gained an eminence, which a few soldiers were able to defend against a more considerable number. Thus our men were repulsed by their darts, and eagerly pursued by the enemy when they endeavoured to retreat. \* DIDIUS perceiving

He is pursued.

his

**SPANISH** his party had frequently attempted the hill to no purpose, **WAR.** resolved to draw a line about the place, that he might encounter them upon equal terms: \* he had already begun his works, when they, perceiving his design, betook themselves to flight.

**Cn. Pompey**  
killed in a  
cave, his  
head sent to  
Cæsar.

39. **POMPEY**, as we have already observed, being lame and wounded, was not able to keep pace with the rest, the descent being so steep, that he could not be safely carried down by horse or litter. Our forces having driven the enemy from the upper ground, dealt destruction on every side: **CN. POMPEY**, descending into the valley, hid himself in a cave, where he could not easily be discovered; but being betrayed by the prisoners, our soldiers put him to the sword. His head was presented to **CÆSAR** on the twelfth of April, as he marched to Seville, and there<sup>f</sup> exposed to the view of the people.


**Didius's**  
encounter  
with the  
Portuguese;  
his death.

40. **DIDIUS** being proud of this success, retreated to a neighbouring castle, causing some of his vessels to be hauled on shore to be refitted. In the mean time the Portuguese, who had escaped from the battle of Munda, rallying in a considerable body, marched against him. \* Omitting nothing for the preservation of his fleet, he sometimes found himself obliged to sally from his castle, to put a stop to the enemy's excursions. This occasioned daily skirmishes between them; but at last the Portuguese, dividing their forces into three parts, ordered one to put fire to the ships, \* another to receive our charge, and disposed the third in ambuscade. When **DIDIUS** marched out with his forces to engage them, immediately on a signal given, the galleys were set on fire, and whilst our men pursued the enemy, they were attacked from behind. Here **DIDIUS** behaved himself with signal bravery, and was attended by the greatest part of his followers to the other world. Some few that had the good fortune to escape the slaughter, leaped into the boats that lay nearest the shore, whilst others made to the galleys by swimming, and weighing anchor, immediately put out to sea; which preserved their lives, but the Portuguese got all their baggage.

**The ambu-**  
**cade.**

<sup>f</sup> Which does not well agree with **APPIAN**'s account, who says **CÆSAR** caused his head to be buried.

## C H A P. VII.

SPANISH  
WAR.Fabius  
Maximus  
takes Mun-  
da :  
Thence  
marches to  
Ossuna.Cæsar at  
Seville.

His speech.

Fabius at  
Ossuna.

41. DURING these transactions, CÆSAR returned from Cadiz to Seville. In the mean while FABIVS MAXIMVS, whom he had left to carry on the siege of Munda, having closely blocked up the town, had frequent skirmishes with the garrison; \* who at last attempting to force their way through our fortifications, many of them lost their lives, and the rest were taken prisoners. Our men laid hold of this occasion, to render themselves masters of the town; from whence they marched directly to Ossuna. This place was equally fortified by art and nature, and besides the advantage of its situation, no water except that within the wall, was to be had at less than eight miles distance: nor were materials to be met with for building turrets nearer than six miles off; for SPOMPEY, to render the place more secure, had taken care to fell all the timber round the country; which obliged our men to supply themselves with necessaries of that kind from Munda.

42. Such was the situation of affairs at Munda and Ossuna, when CÆSAR, the day after his arrival at Seville, assembling the inhabitants, made an oration to this effect:

“ When first I entered on the office of quæstor, yours was the province that determined my choice; which I obliged with all the friendly services in my power. When I was chosen prætor, I prevailed with the senate to remit the tribute MARCELLVS had imposed upon you, undertook your protection, promoted several laws for your advantage, and publicly asserted as well the interest of your country in general, as all its natives in particular; which created me many enemies: nor did I forget to continue the same favours, after my election to the consulate. But you, ungratefully forgetting all these benefits, have twice carried on a war against me and the commonwealth: nay, though you were well acquainted with the Roman customs, have, like Barbarians, violated the law of nations, by twice assassinating the sacred person of a magistrate, and attempting to murder CASSIVS in the publick market-place, even at noon-day. So rebellious have you always been, that the republick is continually forced to be at the expence of keeping an army on foot in your country, to keep you in obedience; whilst you misconstrue good turns for bad,

\* The younger brother, who, as I suppose, was in the town.



SPANISH ill offices for good : thus you have neither given proofs of a  
 WAR. quiet temper in peace, nor constancy in war. CNEIUS  
 POMPEY though a youth, a private gentleman, found reception amongst you, and here usurped imperial dignity. After the defeat of \* his party in Africk, here he raised recruits against the commonwealth, and at your own desire laid your province waste. But suppose you had defeated me, what could that have availed you, whilst the Roman people had still ten legions left, who are not only able to subdue farther Spain, but all the earth beside ? *Quorum laudibus & virtute."*

*Desunt reliqua.*



# INDEX of the Names of Places.

N. B. The Numerals refer to Book, the Figures to Sections.  
G. stands for War in Gaul; C. for Civil Wars; Al. for  
Alexandrian; Af. for African; Sp. for Spanish War.

## A

- A** *BRUZZO*, Marufini.  
Acarmania, a country of  
Epirus, *Carnia*, C. iii.  
55, 58, 78.  
*Achaia*, in Peloponnesus, *Duchy*  
of *Clarence*.  
*Acilla* or *Acholla*, a city of *Africa*.  
Afr. 33.  
*Adduasdubis*, see *Dubis*.  
*Addrumetum*, a town in *Africa*,  
*Toulba* or *Mahometta*, C. ii. 23.  
Afr. 3, 33, 63.  
*Aduatici*, see *Atuatici*.  
*Ædui*, people of *Gaul*, the *Au-*  
*tunois*, G. i. 9 viii. 46.  
*Ægimurus*, an Isle in the *African*  
sea, *Galetta*. Afr. 44.  
*Eginium*, a town of *Theffaly*,  
C. iii. 79.  
*Egyptus*, *Egypt*.  
*Ætolia*, a country of *Greece*, *Ar-*  
*tinia*; al. *il Despotato*, C. iii.  
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